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ABSTRACT 
 
Military Achievement and Late-Republican Aristocratic Values. 81-49 BCE. 
 
by 
 
Noah A.S. Segal 
 
 
Our modern attempts to understand the aristocratic values of the Roman Republic 
have long held that military achievement was the most important sources of political prestige. 
Based largely upon middle-republican evidence, surveys of the aristocratic ethos often focus 
upon military activity at every stage of the senatorial career: aristocrats were expected to serve 
for long periods in the army as youths and then, upon obtaining political office, distinguish 
themselves as commanders. In discussions of aristocratic values, therefore, non-martial 
pursuits are frequently relegated to secondary importance. This model, however, reconciles 
poorly with the evidence we have from the Republic’s best-attested period, the Late Republic. 
In the Republic’s final generation we see clearly a number of sure signs that the aristocracy 
was increasingly spurning military activity in favor of non-martial political action. To name a 
few prominent examples: youthful military service was in decline, praetors and consul rejected 
traditionally-coveted command positions, and the frequency of triumphs fell precipitously.  
 
These changes are part of a larger cultural renegotiation of the importance of military 
achievement that was taking place during the last decades of the Republic, and this 
dissertation aims to provide a more nuanced understanding of the extent of this shift in 
aristocratic values and the implications it had for the period. The middle-republican evidence 
does seem to suggest an elite preoccupation with military service, but the influence of this 
evidence has clouded our view of the ideological changes of the first century BCE. Rather 
than a monolithic system of aristocratic values, what we see in the Late Republic is 
competition between different views on what kind of actions should form the basis of 
aristocratic legitimacy, and disagreement often centered upon the role of military 
achievement. This project approaches the topic in three different ways: Chapter 1 examines 
how common youthful military service was among the Roman elite. Chapter 2 takes a closer 
look at a problem we have some evidence for in the first century: inexperience among military 
commanders. And the final chapter provides a new, values-focused reading of the epistolary 
exchange between Cicero and Cato about Cicero’s pursuit of triumph. A better 
understanding of this cultural shift will also have some major implications for many of the 
main historical narratives regarding the Late Republic.  
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1. Introduction:  
A Farewell to Arms? 
 
Prima igitur est adulescenti commendatio ad gloriam, si qua ex bellicis rebus comparari potest, in qua multi apud 
maiores nostros existiterunt; semper enim fere bella gerebantur. Tua autem aetas incidit in id bellum, cuius altera pars 
sceleris nimium habuit, altera felicitates parum. Quo tamen in bello cum te Pompeius alae [alteri] praefecisset, magnum 
laudem et a summo viro et ab exercitu consequebare equitando, iaculando, omni militari labore tolerando. Atque ea 
quidem tua laus partier cum re publica cecidit.  
 
Now, the first recommendation for a young man seeking glory is to obtain it, if he is able to, by military 
means. Many among out ancestors distinguished themselves in this way; indeed, they were always waging 
war. Your youth, however, has come during a war in which one side had too much wickedness and the other 
too little luck. Yet, when Pompey gave you a cavalry command in this war you gained great praise from that 
best man and from the army for your riding, javelin-throwing, and ability in all the labors of the soldier. But 
when the Republic died the praise you gained from these things did as well. (Cic. Off. 2.45) 
 
 This advice from Cicero to his son in 44 BCE reads like a roller coaster. It is, of course, 
surprising that the first recommendation from a man who mostly avoided military activity 
throughout his own career was for his son to gain gloria via military activity. Cicero, however, 
swiftly qualifies his statement: this route to gloria was more common among the maiores than it 
was contemporarily. Further undermining his own prima commendatio, Cicero pours more cold 
water on the prospect of military activity: Marcus’ youth has coincided with the Civil War, a 
type of conflict which did not yield prestige as foreign wars did. But he then switches direction 
again; even in this war Marcus acquitted himself well and managed to win laus from the army 
and from Pompey himself. Yet, in a final volte-face, Cicero laments that the good reputation 
Marcus earned under Pompey was rendered void by the result of the conflict: the death of the 
Republic. It must have been a difficult portion of the de Officiis for young Marcus to make 
sense of, and the modern reader is in no different a position. It is no surprise that the elder 
Cicero hastily moved on to a discussion of opera animi, a field of activity with which he had 
more experience. 
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 Despite this ambivalence, this passage, along with two others from the Ciceronian 
corpus, is cited by William Harris as an instance in which Cicero, despite the efforts he made 
throughout his career to the contrary, “admits that military achievements are the pre-eminent 
source of fame at Rome, the most glorious of the three standard aristocratic occupations (the 
others being jurisprudence and oratory).”1 Even a cursory glance at the passage, however, shows 
that what Cicero is suggesting is rather more complicated than a momentary acknowledgement 
of a political reality he had gone to great lengths to avoid. In fact, the reader comes away from 
de Officiis 2.45 rather unclear regarding Cicero’s valuation of military activity, an uncertainty 
which is better understood as a reflection of the author’s own uncertainty on the subject than 
as dissimulation. Harris sees Cicero admitting that military activity trumped others in terms of 
political prestige, but in reality what we have is simultaneously simpler and more difficult to 
account for: contradiction. The other “admissions” cited by Harris can be similarly 
problematized. We can travel back nearly 20 years from the de Officiis to 63 BCE, the year of 
Cicero’s greatest triumph. In defending Murena Cicero clearly argued for the superiority of 
military achievement relative to legal and oratorical activity in yielding political prestige, but 
later he would memorialize his own actions in 63 with the equally transparent epitaph: arma 
cedant togae.2 Likewise, most of the figures of Roman greatness cited by Cicero in Tusc. 1.110 
are primarily remembered as men of military achievement (with the notable exception of Cato 
Uticensis), but in the same work Cicero calls military command the “shadowy phantom of 
                                               
1 Harris 1979: 22. He also cites de Or. 1.7; Tusc. 1.109-10; Mur. 19-30.  
 
2 Cic. Mur. 19-30. Off. 1.77.  
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gloria.”3 In fact, earlier in the de Officiis (1.74) Cicero did not attempt to conceal the 
importance of military activity at all, confessing that many thought that achievements in war 
were more important than domestic triumphs (sed cum plerique arbitrentur res bellicas maiores esse 
quam urbanas). This was an idea, however, he felt needed to be corrected (minuenda est haec 
opinio).  
As we have seen, Harris reconciles Cicero’s contradictory statements by labeling one 
group artiface and the other reality, but this oversimplifies. Instead, I shall argue that the 
confusion displayed by Cicero on the value of military achievement is indicative of a more 
complicated cultural phenomenon in the Late Republic. Aristocratic values in this period are 
rarely discussed by scholars in their own right (Harris’s work is on imperialism, and he only 
discusses aristocratic values passim) and when they are we are often presented with a monolithic 
model which focuses upon the importance and value of military achievement.4 These attempts 
to understand republican aristocratic values have most often taken a longue durée approach that 
has privileged the evidence pertaining the the Middle Republic, a time when the Roman 
aristocracy has been most frequently characterized as a kind of warrior elite. In this model, it 
was of paramount importance for the young aristocrat to prove his virtus in order to launch his 
political career, and for continued success on the cursus honorum it was crucial to prove himself 
a capable commander of Rome’s legions. The pinnacle of his career would be his consulship, 
                                               
3 Cic. Tusc. 3.2.3 
 
4 E.g. Most notably Harris 1979: 22ff and throughout; Develin 1985: 90ff; Richardson 
1986: 41, 177; Rich 1993: 54; McDonnell 2006: 181-195; Rosenstein 2006 & 2007; 
Mouritsen 2015: 158; Tatum 2015: 258-9; and recently Van der Blom 2016: 54-9 
(commenting on shifts to other forms of political capital in the first century). 
  4   
 
when he would more than likely be expected to command Rome’s armies in the most-pressing 
theaters of war, and his crowning achievement – if he were lucky – would be to ride in the 
triumphal chariot to dedicate the spoils from his victory. These were the primary functions and 
ambitions of the governing class.  
Most who present this militaristic understanding of the republican aristocracy have 
trouble, however, reconciling their model with aristocratic behavior in the Republic’s last 
generation, a period in which participation in domestic political activities – most recognizably 
oratory – was on the rise and more figures without claims to martial virtus appear among the 
powerful in the Curia. Throughout this project I will discuss in detail several unmistakable 
signs that the attitude of the aristocracy towards the traditional military ethos was changing 
dramatically. To tease a few prominent examples: Youthful military service seems to have been 
on the decline among the elite, praetors and consuls were rejecting opportunities to command 
armies in the field, the rate of triumphs fell sharply.5 Trends such as these point somewhat 
straightforwardly to an obvious conclusion: The Roman aristocracy was less interested in 
achieving and displaying excellence in war. Yet, this conclusion pairs rather awkwardly with the 
hyper-militaristic conceptions of republican aristocratic values we are presented with, and as we 
have already seen from Harris’s use of de Officiis 2.45 this model can influence how we read the 
late-republican evidence.  
This project seeks to provide a more-nuanced account of the status of military 
achievement as a political value in the period between the dictatorship of Sulla and the Civil 
                                               
5 Chapter 2 of this work gives a detailed examination of this trend, but at the moment 
see Rich 2014: 235-7 
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War between Caesar and Pompey. Without a doubt, military achievement was of vital 
importance to the aristocracy’s claims to power and could yield immense political capital to the 
successful general; I will not be arguing against this. Yet, despite the fact that the primacy of 
military achievement is often taken for granted in modern scholarship, in the period between 
81-49 BCE we find an aristocracy which cannot agree on precisely this issue, one much more 
complex than simply “who should be in charge?” It may be that the middle-republican evidence 
shows a strong community consensus on the foundational importance of military achievement 
to both the individual aristocratic career and the legitimacy of the elite as a group, although 
even this is perhaps somewhat overstated at times.6 Yet, I will show in this project that our 
evidence from the Late Republic shows clearly that there were different, competing ideas 
within the aristocracy about how military achievement should be valued in the community and 
on what foundation aristocratic authority should rest. Recognition and analysis of this cultural 
renegotiation is crucial for our understanding of the period.   
This project, although it deals with military activity, is not primarily concerned with 
battle tactics, equipment, or even the narrative of military events in the Late Republic per se. 
Instead, I will deal with the political value of military activity and how such activity was 
evaluated by different members of the political community. Centering this study upon values 
addresses an important gap in the scholarly discussion on political culture of the Late 
Republic, but at the opening of this project I want to stress that I am not claiming that the 
changes and events I am discussing were a result only of shifting values; pragmatic concerns 
                                               
6 Rosenstein’s (2006) piece on aristocratic values will be discussed in detail but does a 
much better job of addressing non-military sources of prestige in the Middle Republic. 
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(such as the expansion of the Senate, wealth, administrational changes in the army, and the 
changing nature of provincial commands, etc.) were certainly influential and could themselves 
provide an impetus for changes in values. But scholarship, as we shall see below, has focused 
almost exclusively on pragmatic concerns in explaining the different ways in which we see the 
aristocracy shifting away from military activity. Thus, while I do not believe we should discount 
the effect such pragmatic concerns may have had on how aristocrats determined the relative 
value of military and domestic activities, it is time for ideology to have its day in this 
discussion.  
Of course, if we wish to understand the changes of the late second and early first 
centuries BCE we must begin by casting our eye further in the past. After all, it is the values of 
the Middle Republic that the men of the first century inherited as “traditional.” This presents 
something of an interpretive problem since the sources for the period of change – the Late 
Republic – are much more plentiful and substantial than the time preceding the shift. 
Nevertheless, there exists a network of texts which have come to define our understanding of 
aristocratic values in the Middle Republic, and I will take this opportunity to discuss a few 
prominent examples. The inscription on the tomb of L. Cornelius Scipio Barbatus (cos. 298 
BCE) gives us a brief but valuable piece of evidence from the early third century BCE:  
Cornelius Lucius Scipio Barbatus Gnaivod patre | prognatus, fortis vir sapiensque, quoius forma virtutei parisuma | fuit, 
consol censor aidilis quei fuit apud vos Taurasia Cisauna | Samnio cepit, subigit omne Loucanam opsidesque abdoucit. 
(CIL VI.1285)7 
 
Lucius Cornelius Scipio Barbatus, son of Gnaeus. He was a strong and wise man whose good looks matched 
his virtus. He was consul, censor, and aedile among you. He seized Taurasia and Cisauna in Samnium and 
conquered all of Lucania and led back hostages.  
                                               
7 Admittedly the text of the elogium on the front of the tomb, quoted here, is after 200 
BCE – later than the epitaph on the front.  
 
  7   
 
 
Looking at the inscription on this tomb, what should we imagine a young Roman was supposed 
to aspire to? It seems wisdom, attractiveness, and military achievement. Good looks are hard to 
come by outside of genetic luck, but all young aristocrats were able to aspire to deeds of virtus on 
the battlefield. Barbatus’ son apparently did not share his father’s handsomeness, so his elogium 
focuses on the capture of Corsica and Aleria. In the case of L. Cornelius Scipio (quaestor 167 
BCE), his tomb championed most prominently his father’s splendid victory over Antiochus III at 
Magnesia. One other Scipio is remembered as having become flamen dialis, but sadly a premature 
death kept him from honos, fama, virtusque – martial prowess and its rewards.8  
The tombs of the Scipiones, it would seem, place a premium on military achievement, 
even if such a conclusion requires some small measure of reading in between the lines. 
Polybius was much more straightforward. In a world where war was an almost constant reality, 
Polybius conceded that courage was important in all states, but he argued it was most valued in 
Rome.9 By this Polybius did not mean that Rome went to war more often than other 
Mediterranean states;10 the distinction he was making is ideological: Rome prioritized martial 
prowess to a greater extent than other political communities. This fact, as Polybius saw it, was 
at the heart of his explanation of how the Romans “in less than 53 years conquered almost the 
entire world and brought it under their sole governance.”11 In a later passage he provided an 
                                               
8 CIL VI.1286, 1288 and 1296. 
 
9 Polyb. 31.29.1 Λοιποῦ δ᾿ ὄντος τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν <µέρους> καὶ κυριωτάτου 
σχεδὸν ἐν πάσῃ µὲν πολιτείᾳ µάλιστα δ᾿ ἐν τῇ Ῥώµῃ, 
 
10 See notably Eckstein 2006. 
 
11 Polyb. 1.1.5 τίς γὰρ οὕτως ὑπάρχει φαῦλος ἢ ῥᾴθυµος ἀνθρώπων ὃς οὐκ ἂν βούλοιτο 
γνῶναι πῶς καὶ τίνι γένει πολιτείας ἐπικρατηθέντα σχεδὸν ἅπαντα τὰ κατὰ τὴν οἰκουµένην ἐν 
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example of his theory in action. The Romans were able to come back from continuous defeats 
at the hands of Hannibal thanks to their customs (ἐθισµῶν), which worked to motivate young 
Roman men to accomplish great deeds.12  
 In the passage from Polybius book 31 I just mentioned the author used the term 
ἀνδρεία for courage, but the Romans probably would have used the Latin word virtus as the 
epitaphs of the Scipiones did. Virtus was perhaps the most important value for republican 
aristocrats, and the best study on the subject recognizes clearly that in the Middle Republic 
virtus denoted prowess on the battlefield.13 The two major temples to Virtus in the city were 
both dedicated as a result of and in celebration of military achievements.14 On a coin from 70 
BCE Honos et Virtus are depicted as military virtues, Honos wearing a laurel crown and Virtus 
wearing a helmet.15 Myles McDonnell highlights fragment of Ennius, a friend to the Scipiones, 
which illustrates the meaning of virtus nicely:16  
                                               
οὐχ ὅλοις πεντήκοντα καὶ τρισὶν ἔτεσιν ὑπὸ µίαν ἀρχὴν ἔπεσε τὴν Ῥωµαίων, ὃ πρότερον 
οὐχ	εὑρίσκεται γεγονός,  
 
12 Polyb. 6.52.10-1 διαφέρουσι µὲν οὖν καὶ φύσει πάντες Ἰταλιῶται Φοινίκων καὶ 
Λιβύων τῇ τε σωµατικῇ ῥώµῃ καὶ ταῖς ψυχικαῖς τόλµαις· µεγάλην δὲ καὶ διὰ τῶν ἐθισµῶν 
πρὸς τοῦτο τὸ µέρος ποιοῦνται τῶν	νέων παρόρµησιν. 
 
13 McDonnell 2006. Balmaceda 2017 is more recent and also excellent, but more 
limited in its scope than McDonnell.  
 
14 M. Claudius Marcellus built an addition to an already existing temple of Honos to 
celebrate his capture of Syracuse in 211 BCE. His son dedicated it in 205 BCE Marius built 
another temple to Honos et Virtus after his victory over the Cimbri and Teutoni. See Scullard 
1981: 165-6. 
 
15 RRC 403. Also see RRC 401 (71 BCE). See also Scullard 1981: 165-6; for the coin see 
Plate 41.30.  
 
16 McDonnell 2006: 6ff. 
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Melius est virtute ius: nam saepe virtutem mali 
Nanciscuntur: ius atque aecum se a malis spernit procul. (Enn. The Ransom of Hector Fr. 200-1) 
 
Justice is preferable to virtus: for evil men often stumble upon virtus. 
Justice and equality, however, despise the evil from a distance. 
 
The meaning of virtus in the Late Republic possessed a much broader ethical range, but here – 
given that “evil men” are able to obtain it – it would be hard to argue that virtus entailed much 
more than skill on the battlefield. Again, our sources are not so plentiful as we should like, but 
from the limited amount of evidence we have it is evident that even in earlier Roman history, 
when it signified little else than martial ability, virtus was the value around which the 
aristocratic identity was organized. The potency of virtus is attested by late-republican authors as 
well. Sallust, looking longingly backwards (as was his custom), wrote of the aristocracy during 
the earlier Republic as a time when the “only competition” among the elite was to distinguish 
themselves in respect to their virtus.17 In the preface to his Jugurtha he says that gazing upon the 
masks of his ancestors lit the spirit of the young man ablaze to live up to their example of 
virtus.18 In his de Republica Cicero has Scipio Aemilianus say that eagerness for gloria, a concept 
closely related to virtus, motivated Roman aristocrats to do great deeds and that Rome’s 
principes were nourished by it.19  
The goal for young Roman aristocrats was to climb the cursus honorum by repeatedly 
securing election to political office. Karl Hölkeskamp refers to the necessity of a political career 
                                               
 
17 Sall. Cat. 7. 
 
18 Sall. BJ 4.5-6. 
 
19 Cic. Rep. 5.7. 
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as the “fundamental fact of Roman aristocratic life.”20 Naturally, the curriculum of the 
aristocratic education can tell us much about what the community envisioned service to the 
state entailed. This is not unique to Rome; from an Althusserian perspective education is one 
of society’s foundational institutions for producing and reinforcing ideology.21 Studies which 
focus upon the militaristic nature of the Roman elite therefore naturally highlight the rigorous 
martial education young Romans were accustomed to receive.22 Certainly many also received 
some literary training, but by all indications such pursuits were limited in scope and secondary 
in emphasis. Cato the Elder’s sons likely received a more robust literary education than others 
given their father’s efforts as an author but they were also busy with the rest of their studies: to 
throw the javelin, to fight while wearing armor, to ride horses, to box, endure the elements, 
and swim.23 Even Cicero, who more often than not eschewed the camp, comments upon the 
same activities in the education of his son. 24   
                                               
20 Hölkeskamp 2010: 91.  
 
21 See most notably Althusser 1970. 
 
22 Bonner 1977: 9ff; Harris 1979: 14ff; Meier 1982: 56ff; McDonnell 2006: 181ff; 
Goldsworthy 2006: 37ff. 
 
23 Plut. Cat. Mai. 20.4. 
 
24 Cic. Off. 2.45. We might also connect to this the account of the education of 
Jugurtha in Sallust (BJ 6.1). Morstein-Marx 2001 has commented on the perception that 
Jugurtha’s upbringing reminds the reader of the Persian youth education from Herodotus and 
Xenophon, his argument is compelling. I would also suggest that the Numidian past times as 
presented by Sallust (equitare, iaculari, cursu cum aequalibus certare) could just as easily (perhaps 
even more easily) remind one of the traditional Roman education. Meier 1982: 56-72 is a good 
source for those interested in how the curriculum of the aristocratic education broadened in 
the Late Republic.  
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The military education of young aristocrats also swiftly transitioned from theoretical to 
practical. At age 17 young Roman elites were expected to begin their service in the cavalry. 
According to Polybius, those who wished to have a political career (again, we should imagine 
this included nearly all the aristocratic youth) were obligated to serve 10 campaigns with the 
army before seeking public office.25 This meant that every future senator would have spent 
nearly his entire young life in camp. Further, it was not enough to be present, future politicians 
needed to prove their virtus through exemplary achievements in battle. Sallust, for example, 
singles out being the first to strike an enemy or the first to mount a wall.26 It was, of course, 
always most dangerous to be the first, and even more daunting when one considers that 
cavalrymen did not even wear protective armor until the Second Punic War. 27  
Since Roman society placed such importance on martial activity, the community also 
naturally developed symbols and decorations to distinguish and honor them. Battlefield 
citations were material recognitions of virtus. There were at least seven different classifications 
of coronae that were distributed for various acts of valor, with recipients ranging from common 
                                               
25 Polyb. 6.19.4. πολιτικὴν δὲ λαβεῖν ἀρχὴν οὐκ ἔξεστιν οὐδενὶ πρότερον, ἐὰν µὴ δέκα 
στρατείας ἐνιαυσίους	ᾖ τετελεκώς. 
 
26 Sall. Cat. 7. See also Polyb. 6.39.4 where he mentions that cavalrymen were 
encouraged to seek dangerous actions even when the battle did not necessarily require 
them:  τυγχάνει δὲ τούτων οὐκ ἐὰν ἐν παρατάξει τις ἢ πόλεως καταλήψει τρώσῃ τινὰς ἢ 
σκυλεύσῃ τῶν πολεµίων, ἀλλ᾿ ἐὰν ἐν ἀκροβολισµοῖς ἤ τισιν ἄλλοις τοιούτοις καιροῖς, ἐν οἷς 
µηδεµιᾶς ἀνάγκης οὔσης κατ᾿ ἄνδρα κινδυνεύειν αὐτοί τινες ἑκουσίως καὶ κατὰ προαίρεσιν 
αὑτοὺς εἰς τοῦτο	διδόασι. 
 
27 Rosenstein 2006: 367. This not only allowed the cavalryman a wider range of 
movement while on horseback, but also often resulted in scars which could later be used as 
proof of virtus. 
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soldier to consular commander.28 The feats recognized by these coronae were, naturally, quite 
dangerous. The corona obsidionalis (also called the “grass crown,” or “siege crown”) was given to 
one who raised a siege and thereby saved lives.29 The corona civica (or “civic crown”) was given 
to one who saved the life of a fellow citizen on the battlefield without yielding any ground. 
Being the first to mount an enemy wall (an achievement which, as we saw above, Sallust praised 
specifically) was rewarded with the corona muralis. Nor did the expectation that an aristocrat 
would put his life in extraordinary danger on battle end once he left the cavalry for a command 
position. Up to the middle of the second century BCE there was still an active tradition of 
monomachy – dueling with an enemy leader or champion: M. Servilius Pulex Geminus (cos. 
202 BCE) claimed to have fought at least twenty-three duels. Scipio Aemilianus’ duel with a 
Celtiberian chieftain in the middle of the second century is the last known example.30 Thus, 
young Romans were encouraged not only to serve in the army, but to do so in a manner that 
exposed them to the harshest realities of war and the most intense types of combat.  
                                               
28 See Gell. NA 6.5; as well as Maxfield 1981 and Le Bohec, Yann (Lyon) “Decorations, 
military,” in BNP. 
 
29 See Pliny NH 22.4-6. The grass crown was bestowed rarely, usually to officers or 
soldiers who managed to rescue a seemingly-doomed group of troops. Pliny wrote that the 
crown was always awarded in desperation. Maxfield (1981: 68) mistakenly claims that Pliny listed 
six recipients, he actually listed eight: L. Siccius Dentatus, P. Decius Mus (cos. 340 BCE), Q. 
Fabius Maximus Verrucosus Cunctator (dic. 221, 217 BCE), M. Calpurnius Flamma (a 
military tribune during the First Punic War), Cn. Petreius Atinas (a centurian in the Cimbrian 
War), Sulla (in recognition of the siege at Nola during the Social War), Q. Sertorius (as a 
military tribune in Spain in 97 BCE), and Augustus.  
 
30 For Geminus see Livy 45.39.16-9; Plu. Aem. 31.2. For Scipio see Polyb. 35.5.1. Harris 
1979: 38-39 gives a summary of known examples of Roman monomachy in the notes. 
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When he returned from the field the tokens of virtus earned by an aspiring politician 
could be put to effective use. Pliny the Elder tells us that when a recipient of the corona civica 
entered the games it was custom for everyone, including the senatorial members of the 
audience, to stand up.31 Julius Caesar, for example, was awarded the corona civica in 80/79 BCE 
for his valor during the storming of Mytilene; he was only twenty years old at the time.32 This 
recognition of his virtus must have greatly aided his early career. Like the warriors themselves, 
aristocratic homes could also accumulate signs of military prowess of their inhabitants. The 
most famous example of this was the display of wax ancestor masks (imagines) in the atrium of 
the home.33 Young aristocrats would pass these masks daily, and to some extent we are given 
the impression that these masks seemed to stare back at their living counterparts. In 
exceptional cases the exterior of home would be decorated with the spoils won by its 
inhabitant, and these spoils often remained even after the home came into another’s 
possession.34  
                                               
31 Plin. NH 16.5; See also Gell. 5.6.11; Luc. 1.358. 
 
32 Suet. DJ 1.2; App. 2.106 tells us that some of Caesar’s later statues featured him 
wearing the corona civica, although recently Brigit Bergman 2010 (following Weinstock 1971) 
argues convincingly that this was in reference to his clementia shown to citizens during the Civil 
War and not to his award from Mytilene. For the date of the storming of Mytilene see Butler 
& Cary 1982: 45. 
 
33 Flower 1996 is still the best study of imagines.  
 
34 Ascon. 43.13-4; Polyb. 6.39.9-10; Suet. Nero 38.2 is often cited for the decoration of 
homes with the spoils from foreign wars (in this case ones that had burned down). See also 
Ovid Met. 1.168-76; Pliny NH 35.6ff. Useful in secondary literature: Wiseman 1987; Flower 
1996: 41ff; McDonnell 2006: 182-3 
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No military honor was as coveted or prestigious as the triumph. That there has been a 
long and lively debate over whether or not the triumphator took on a divine status during his 
chariot ride up the Capitoline Hill betrays the importance and grandeur of a successful 
general’s welcome home.35  During the aristocratic funeral, Polybius tells us, those who had 
reached the consulship were represented in togas with purple borders, those who had been 
censor with an entirely purple toga, and those who had triumphed wore a toga embroidered 
with gold. This interesting sartorial distinction not only shows the importance of the triumph, 
but also its kinship with high public office.36 Put simply and literally, the triumph was the 
crowning achievement of the aristocratic career. It was the moment, T.P. Wiseman once wrote, 
“that a Roman knew he was first, best, and greatest.”37  
Military decorations and triumphs were not only valuable to the individual senator; the 
political class gained their legitimacy from broadcasting their success on the battlefield. There 
has been much debate on how much political power the Roman People wielded in the 
republican system of government, and it is not within the purview of this project to review the 
bibliography exhaustively.38 What is important for our purposes is that it is generally agreed 
                                               
35 See Harris 1979: 25-7; Rosenstein 2006: 370ff; Rüpke 2006. 
 
36 Polyb. 6.53.7 οὗτοι δὲ προσαναλαµβάνουσιν ἐσθῆτας, ἐὰν µὲν ὕπατος ἢ στρατηγὸς ᾖ 
γεγονώς, περιπορφύρους, ἐὰν δὲ τιµητής, πορφυρᾶς, ἐὰν δὲ καὶ τεθριαµβευκὼς ἤ τι	τοιοῦτον 
κατειργασµένος, διαχρύσους. See also Rosenstein 2006.  
 
37 Wiseman 1985: 4 
 
38 The so-called “traditional” understanding of Roman political life emphasized the 
oligarchic nature of political culture and the web of patronage relationships through which the 
inner elite controlled the affairs of the state. The authors most commonly associated with this 
view are Gelzer 1969, Münzer [1920]1963, and Syme 1939. More recent scholarship has 
questioned this view, beginning with Fergus Millar through a series of articles largely 
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that there was an understanding within the Roman political community, at least at an 
ideological level, that the People entrusted the management of state affairs to the political class 
in view of the common good. It was crucial, therefore, that the elite be perceived to be 
administering the state effectively in order to retain this trust. Senatorial legitimacy within the 
community rested on the body’s ability to communicate the effectiveness of its administration, 
and military achievement played an indispensable role in this effort.  
To this end, Polybius wrote that the triumph was an opportunity to “bring the actual 
spectacle of their achievements before the eyes of their fellow-citizens.”39 Although the triumph 
was technically a thanksgiving to Jupiter and in practice a celebration of an individual 
triumphator, we should also understand that the procession did much to bolster senatorial 
claims to successful administration of state affairs.40 That is to say, the individual triumphator 
certainly gained immense personal prestige from the triumph, but regardless of who celebrated 
the honor, it also served as a powerful reminder of senatorial capability and success. Further, 
we have already seen some examples of how the private spaces inhabited by Roman aristocrats 
communicated the importance of military achievements, but in public spaces in Rome were 
                                               
represented in Millar 2002, but also importantly in his monograph The Crowd in Rome in the 
Late Republic 1998. North 1990 is a very insightful discussion on the debate (at least as of 
1990). More recent work has built upon Millar’s findings and rolled back some of his more 
radical claims. See also Morstein-Marx 2004; 2013 & the more critical Hölkeskamp 2010. The 
most compelling recent contribution is Morstein-Marx 2015. Finally, most recently Mouritsen 
2017 has attempted (unsuccessfully in my opinion) to undermine any sense of a democratic 
element within the Roman constitution. 
 
39 Polb. 6.15.8 τοὺς γὰρ προσαγορευοµένους παρ᾿ αὐτοῖς θριάµβους, δι᾿ ὧν ὑπὸ τὴν 
ὄψιν ἄγεται τοῖς πολίταις ὑπὸ τῶν στρατηγῶν ἡ τῶν κατειργασµένων πραγµάτων ἐνάργεια... 
 
40 Hölkeskamp 1987: 219; Rüpke 2006: 252. 
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also filled with reminders of military success. The Rostra, of course, was so-called because it 
displayed the beaks of ships captured during the defeat of Antium in 338 BCE. Also erected in 
the Comitium in the fourth century BCE in celebration of victory over Antium was the 
Columna Maenia. The temple of the Dioscuri in the Forum was originally a fifth century 
monument commemorating the victory of the Battle of Lake Regillus, but the Dioscuri were 
also invoked in several other Republican military conflicts and frequently received spoils from 
new victories.41 The Forum itself would have been filled with statues of individuals, but 
unfortunately little is known about them aside from the anecdotal evidence. Not all statues 
commemorated military achievement. We know, for instance, that a statue of Attus Navius, an 
augur from the regal period, stood in the Comitium.42 There was also a statue (albeit not in the 
Forum) of Cornelia, the daughter of Scipio Africanus and mother of the Gracchi.43 Yet, Cicero 
gives us the impression that the majority of commemorative statues made use of military 
                                               
41 For the foundation of the temple and its connection to the Battle of Lake Regillus 
see Dion. Hal. 6.13.1-2. Some examples of later appropriations of the Dioscuri for military 
purpose: Marcius Tremulus dedicated an equestrian statue in from of the temple to 
commemorate his victory over the Samnites in 305 BCE (Plin. HN 34.23.2). T. Quinctius 
Flamininus alleged that the Dioscuri had contributed to his victory at Cynoscephalae in 197 
BCE (Plut. Flam. 12)  The gods themselves were rumored to have appeared in the Forum to 
announce L. Aemilius Paullus’s victory at Pydna in 167 BCE (Plin. HN 7.86; Cic. Nat. D. 2.6; 
Plut. Aem. 24.4-6). A similar story is linked to Marius’ victory at Vercellae in 101 BCE (Plin. 
HN 7.86.3) Sulla had also claimed the aid of the Dioscuri in his capture of Jugurtha (LIMC 
III.1.622-23, no. 109). See Rebeggiani 2003: 55-6. 
 
42 Livy 1.36.5. 
 
43 Plin. HN 34.14. The statue was in the colonnade of Metellus; the pedestal inscription 
still survives (ILS 68). See also Flory 1993 for a useful history of statues dedicated to women in 
the Roman Republic. 
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imagery.44 These are just some of the visual reminders of past military success that the Senate 
wished to bring before the eyes of the People. What is clear is that in the most important 
discursive spaces in the city, the Senate chose to emphasize military achievements.45  
This has been a necessarily brief catalogue of some of the most prominent pieces of 
evidence we have about the role of military achievement in republican political culture, but the 
strength of this and similar evidence has produced a somewhat monolithic understanding of 
aristocratic values in the Republic. The most prominent work on aristocratic preoccupation 
with military achievement is William V. Harris’s (1979) War and Imperialism in Republican Rome. 
Harris’s work responded to the theory, orthodox up to that point, that Rome’s empire had 
expanded not because of bellicosity of desire for territorial expansion, but through a series or 
military actions in defense of her friends and allies. In place of this “defensive imperialism,” 
Harris argued that Roman foreign policy was aggressive rather than reactionary, and that it was 
the political community’s insatiable desire for military achievement which drove the expansion 
of Roman imperium. As we have already seen (and as anyone familiar with republican political 
culture will doubtlessly be already aware), each generation of aristocrats was under pressure not 
only to live up to the achievements of their ancestors, but also to surpass them. This pressure, 
Harris argues, motivated aristocrats to seek out conflicts in which they might distinguish 
themselves. Further, as I have already discussed above, the senatorial class rested their 
                                               
44 Cic. Off. 1.61. maximeque ipse populus Romanus animi magnitudine excellit. Declaratur 
autem studium bellicae gloriae, quod statuas quoque videmus ornatu fere militari. 
 
45 Harris 1979: 20ff, 261-2 for a helpful catalogue of “The Fame of Victorious 
Commanders as it was Reflected in the Monuments.” See also Morstein-Marx 2004: 92ff; 
Hölkeskamp 2012. 
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legitimacy on claims to service to the Republic, particularly military service. Thus, Harris’s 
understanding is that these intra-societal political pressures drove the state to nearly constant 
war in order to feed the ambitions of the aristocracy and the political narratives within the 
community that supported their hegemony.  
There have been effective challenges to Harris in recent years, but mostly ones which 
deal with his understanding of foreign policy – not aristocratic values.46 For the time period 
Harris examined (327-70 BCE) the supremacy of military achievement within the political 
sphere is still widely accepted. More recently (2006) Harris’ student Myles McDonnell advances 
a similar understand of traditional aristocratic values in his study: Roman Manliness: Virtus and 
the Roman Republic, in which he asserts that the term denoted courage in battle until the 
meaning expanded in the Late Republic. Even more important for scholarship in the last 
decade is Nathan Rosenstein’s piece (2006) on aristocratic values which provides a more 
nuanced view by discussing other important sources of glory. Oratory, for instance, had always 
played a significant role in Roman politics, and it is clear that by at least the time of Scipio 
Aemilianus aristocrats were expected to plead in the courts. Yet, while excellence in public 
speaking could help to distinguish an aristocrat from his peers, Rosenstein maintains that 
without some evidence of military valor it was difficult to launch a political career. The 
                                               
46 Gruen 1984 argues for Rome’s reluctance to become directly involved in the Greek 
east; Kallet(=Morstein)-Marx 1995 takes Gruen’s findings further into the late Republic and 
finds a similar Roman reluctance to become directly involved in eastern conflicts; Eckstein 
2006 uses International Relations Theory to show that Rome’s militarism was not exceptional 
within the network of Mediterranean communities; Richardson 2008 uses a philological 
approach to argue that the Republic lacked an idea of a territorial empire until the reign of 
Augustus; Burton 2011 furthers Eckstein’s IR model to include IR Constructivism, and 
examines how Roman ideas of fides and amicitia constrained its foreign policy. 
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preoccupation with military activity even bleeds into Rosenstein’s conception of non-military 
activity; pleading in the courts could, he argues, be seen as a form of ritualized combat.47  
The military-focused understanding of republican aristocratic values fits well with the middle-
republican evidence upon which it is based, and we might therefore think of it as our best 
picture of “traditional” aristocratic values. But scholarship has increasingly recognized that the 
middle-republican aristocratic militaristic ethos and the evidence from the Late Republic 
reconcile poorly. In response scholars have most often attributed change in this period to 
pragmatic concerns. Starting again with the aristocratic youth and education, the values and 
skills emphasized in the first century differ from those outlined above. By the second century 
BCE oratory had already gained a strong foothold in the aristocratic education. Harris makes 
much of Cicero’s comment that there was not a practioner of “legitimate and proper” oratory 
until the middle of the second century BCE.48 But Scipio’s lament to Polybius, that he was 
thought “un-Roman” because he refused to plead in the courts illustrates how important 
forensic activity had become for the aristocratic identity.49 Certainly by the Republic’s last 
generation the aristocratic education now centered upon oratorical learning.50  
                                               
47 Rosenstein 2006: 368ff.  
 
48 Cic. Brut. 82. Servius Galba (cos. 144 BCE). Further, Cicero doesn’t allow for a 
Roman orator who deployed Greek rhetorical theory until M. Aemilius Lepidus Porcina (cos. 
137 BCE). See also Harris 1979: 14. 
 
49 Polyb. 31.23.10-2 
 
50 We will see example of this throughout the project, but for the moment see especially 
Tac. Dial. 28-35, which gives us a much less militaristic picture of the aristocratic education.  
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On the battlefield too, aristocratic experience was changing dramatically. Cavalry 
service, formerly the defining sine qua non of aristocratic life, was outsourced to provincial 
units. The latest evidence we have for a Roman citizen serving in the cavalry is around 96 BCE, 
and even this is tenuous. The Battle of Athesis in 102 BCE is our last solid evidence for the 
citizen cavalry in combat outside of Civil War. We know certainly that Caesar did not make 
use of a citizen cavalry in Gaul or in the Civil war.51 This does not mean that aristocrats 
stopped serving in the army entirely, only that the nature of their service changed. Aristocrats 
gradually migrated from service in the cavalry to the commander’s general staff – positions in 
which they usually experienced combat from a distance, rather than on the front lines. As early 
as Marius’ first consulship (if we trust Sallust) we can see that the aristocracy’s retreat from 
cavalry service was becoming a political liability for the group.52  
Even while aristocratic service in the cavalry was decreasing, command of Rome’s 
armies was still the province of the elite. Previously, commands (barring crisis) had been spread 
throughout the aristocracy, ensuring that a wider portion of this group could expect access to 
                                               
51 Rosenstein 2007: 143; McCall 2002: 101. Val. Max. 5.4 records that the son of M. 
Aemilius Scaurus (cos. 115 BCE) killed himself after fleeing with the rest of the Romani equites. 
For L. Orbilius Pupilius, who would have served in the cavalry in the 90’s BCE if Suetonius is 
to be trusted, see Suet. Gramm. 9. Caes. BG 1.42 details the terms for parley with Ariovistus: 
Caesar was only allowed to be accompanied by cavalry, but volebat neque salutem suam Gallorum 
equitatui committere audebat. Therefore, Caesar took horses from his Gallic cavalry and mounted 
milites of the Tenth Legion. Caes. BC 1.102 does not mention a citizen cavalry in the list of 
groups that received donatives. We have already seen that Cicero’s son served under Pompey 
during the Civil war, and Plut. Pomp. 64 says that Pompey’s cavalry was the “flower of Italy.” 
But the presence of citizens in the cavalry may have been a result of the unique nature of civil 
war and out of step with the contemporary practice. See also Plut. Caes. 45.3. 
 
52 Sall. Jug. 85.10-4; Plut. Mar. 9.2-4; Cic. Balb. 47. 
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command and the honors that usually followed it.53 Since military achievement was the core of 
political clout the aristocracy policed itself to ensure that there were opportunities for earning 
achievement and to prevent any one senator from accruing too much gloria. Restricting the 
number of times one could hold the consulship, for example, was a way of making sure that 
more senators had access to command of consular armies (those usually allocated to the most 
significant theaters of war).54 In the Late Republic, however, access to significant commands 
seems to have become more restricted; experience became a significant factor for selecting 
commanders. Military action, so scholars have argued, became simultaneously less threatening 
on an existential level and more complex logistically.55 The result was that significant military 
campaigns were fewer, and military achievement became the concern of a smaller group within 
the aristocracy.56 Thus, starting in the late second century BCE we see commanders being given 
                                               
53 Rosenstein 2007: 138-43. 
 
54 Kunkel & Whitmann 1995: 564ff; Elster 2003: 408ff; Rosenstein 2007: 139-40, who 
points out that starting in 342 BCE a ten-year gap was imposed between consulships, and a 
second consulship was prohibited starting in 151 BCE. We should, of course, note that this 
rule (like many other Roman rules) could be and was disregarded in certain circumstances. See 
Livy 10.13ff for the election of Q. Fabius Macimus Rullianus to the consulship of 297 BCE 
even though he had just held the office in 310 BCE. Livy writes: Acuebat hac moderatione tam 
iusta studia; quae verecundia legum restinguenda ratus, legem recitari iussit qua intra decem annos eundem 
consulem refici non liceret. Vix prae strepitu audita lex est tribunique plebis nihil id impedimenti futurum 
aiebant: se ad populum laturos uti legibus solveretur. Et ille quidem in recusando perstabat: quid ergo 
attineret leges ferri, quibus per eosdem qui tulissent fraus fieret. Iam regi leges, non regere. Populus nihilo 
minus suffragia inibat, et ut quaeque intro vocata erat centuria, consulem haud dubie Fabium dicebat. 
Also the obvious case of C. Marius (cos. 107, 104-100, 86 BCE). 
 
55 Harris 1979: 9-53; Gruen 1974: 113ff; Cornell 1993; Blösel 2016: 80-1. 
 
56 Harris 1979: 5 cites this trend towards specialization as the impetus for change in the 
first century BCE. For an excellent synthesis of the theories surrounding this phenomenon see 
Cornell 1993. 
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multiple consulships or special commands in order to deal with particularly stubborn problems 
abroad.57 The result was that fewer and fewer senators were able to claim significant military 
victories, the traditional foundation of the group’s political legitimacy. 
This model suggests that although military command still afforded an imperator 
significant political gain, access to command positions was more limited in the Late Republic 
than previously. In such a situation, we would imagine that commands were highly coveted by 
(if not available to) senators. Yet, if this is true it is difficult to explain the noticeable trend of 
rejection of command in this period.58 Wolfgang Blösel found that from 80-50 BCE 15% of 
known praetors turned down provincial commands they were offered. Likewise, at least a 
quarter, but possibly as much as half of the consuls in this period refused provincial commands 
in favor of remaining in the city.59 J.P.V.D. Balsdon found a similar trend among consuls in the 
Republic’s last generation.60 Blösel’s article cites diminishing financial gain for the disinterest 
                                               
57 Scipio Aemilianus was given the consulship in 134 BCE in order to command 
Rome’s forces in Numantia, despite the fact that he had already been consul in 146 BCE (and 
held command during the Third Punic War). Marius famously held the consulship five times 
consecutively (104-100 BCE) in order to combat the Cimbri and Teutoni, even though he had 
already been consul just three years earlier in 107 BCE. See also an interesting gloss in Sallust 
(Cat. 59.6): Homo militaris, quod amplius annos triginta tribunus aut praefectus aut legatus aut praetor 
cum magna gloria in exercitu fuerat, plerosque ipsos factaque eorum fortia noverat. 
 
58 Brennan 2000: 400-3; Steel 2012; Blösel 2016. 
 
59 Blösel 2016: 68-9. See also Rosenstein 2016 (in the same volume) who questions the 
profitability of middle Republican imperialism, and Blösel 2011 which provides an analysis of 
the growing trend of rejections of provinces in the late Republic and concludes that absence 
from the city was politically costly. 
 
60 The rejection of command by magistrates will be discussed in depth in Chapter 2, 
but for now see Balsdon 1939: 63. 
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in military commands, but this should also signal to us that there has been a change in the 
political value of military achievement as well. Even if an aristocrat could not hope to enrich 
himself financially by means of a command, as scholarly orthodoxy has long held was common, 
we would still expect the political capital of conquest to be alluring. That senators of the Late 
Republic were turning down commands at such significant rates points to something other 
than only financial concern – a shift in values.  
The triumph, Rome’s highest military honor, was also not immune to change in this 
period. Triumphs had been celebrated after military victory, if the Fasti Triumphales are to be 
believed, since the origins of the city. In light of its revered status within the Roman economy 
of honor, aristocrats coveted the procession, and often went to great lengths to obtain it. Yet, 
the late Republic saw a decline in triumphal frequency, despite considerable opportunities for 
victory over foreign enemies. The period between 81 - 69 BCE had averaged one triumphal 
celebration per year, but the period between 68 - 50 BCE averaged only about one every three 
years.61  
The political terminology itself reflects this movement away from the camp. Already in 
the late second century virtus was undergoing a cultural redefinition. Caesar’s use of the word 
cleaves to its traditional martial meaning,62 but Cicero used virtus as the rough equivalent of 
the Greek ἀρετή, an ethical term that may include some martial aspects, but which certainly 
                                               
61 Rich 2014. L. Licinius Lucullus in 63, Q. Caecilius Metellus Creticus in 62, Pompey 
in 61, C. Pomptinus in 54, Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius Scipio in 54, and P. Cornelius Lentulus 
Spinther in 51. 
 
62 Eg. Caes. BC 3.59-60. 
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exceeded them. For example, in de Amicitia, when using virtus Cicero was clearly referring to an 
ethical sense of the word, and not a military one.63 Outside of Cicero, one of the most 
surprising examples of this shift is in Sallust.  If we imagine that virtus still carried a primarily 
military connotation in the late Republic, we should be surprised that one of the two men of 
virtus Sallust singled out in the Catiline was Cato Uticensis.64 Cato had some military service, 
but no significant military achievement to speak of. That Pompey, who up to his defeat in the 
Civil War was Rome’s most successful general, was not considered by Sallust as one of the men 
with the most virtus signals clearly to us that the meaning of the word must have stretched 
beyond military considerations.65 
One popular way of understanding these trends holistically has been to apply the lens 
of specialization. Traditionally, the best route to political prestige had been as a soldier and 
commander, but other factors such as skill in public speaking or wealth could also help 
considerably. In the Late Republic, however, we see more and more aristocrats focusing their 
efforts on domestic activities like oratory or legal pleading. Cicero once claimed (albeit in a 
forensic setting where one must consider how accurately he was representing reality) that there 
were two main paths to power in Rome in the first century: the general and the orator.66 Some 
                                               
63 Cic. Amic. 21. Iam virtutem ex consuetudine vitae nostrae sermonisque nostri interpretemur nec 
eam, ut quidam docti, verborum magnificentia metiamur, virosque bonos eos qui habentur numeremus—
Paulos Catones Gallos Scipiones Philos—his communis vita contenta est; eos autem omittamus, qui omnino 
nusquam reperiuntur. 
 
64 Sall. Cat. 53.6. 
 
65 See McDonnell 2006: 241ff. 
 
66 Cic. Mur. 30. 
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modern scholars have accepted his suggestion.67 Of those studies which have turned to 
specialization in order to understand aristocratic activity the most influential articulation of 
this idea came from Keith Hopkins’s Conquerors and Slaves (1978) in which he argues for seeing 
aristocratic behavior in this period through the lens of “structural differentiation.” This model 
argues that as a society becomes more complex its institutions become more independent of 
each other and end up competing for the community’s power and resources.68 Hopkins’s 
argument is satisfying in many ways, especially in its discussion of the education and legal 
systems. As I hope to show, however, when thinking about the developments in the militaristic 
ethos in the Late Republic, specialization has some challenges as a model. As my first and 
second chapters will show, military activity was in a much more precipitous decline than we 
might have imagined, and even many of those whom we might think of a “military specialists” 
were serving less time in the legions and taking up fewer command positions than previous, 
“non-specialists” had.  
 It is, I believe, clear that the political value of military activity was undergoing a 
significant cultural renegotiation in the Late Republic, and this project aims to examine this 
phenomenon in three new ways. My first chapter. “Youthful Military Service and Aristocratic 
Values in the Late Republic,” examines the diminishing amount of pre-cursus service performed 
by aristocrats in this period. Scholars have been willing enough to acknowledge that aristocrats 
of the first century served in the camps less than their ancestors, yet there has been no clear 
                                               
67 Afzelius 1946; Rawson 1985: 3-18; De Blois 2000; Rosenstein 2007: 144; and 
Balmaceda 2017: passim but esp. 14-47 who sees a divide in the meaning of virtus as a result. 
 
68 Hopkins 1978: 74-98. 
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consensus about how much military service was normal in the period. Since there is quite a wide 
spectrum between zero and, say, nine campaigns to be undertaken between the ages of about 
17 and 27 (military tribune) or 30 (quaestor), it is correspondingly uncertain just how much less 
“military” the Roman aristocracy of the Late Republic had become. My first chapter provides a 
more nuanced account of norms for military service in this period.  
The fundamental challenge in creating such an account is the scarcity of evidence on 
aristocratic youth. Our sources usually focus upon historical narratives, and therefore mention 
figures only when they enter into the series of events – rarely in their youth. I have found, 
however, a way to compensate for this evidentiary obstacle. Plutarch’s Lives, being biographies, 
are more interested than our other sources in their subjects’ early careers, and while these 
subjects are virtually by definition exceptional as the most prominent senators of their time 
they can be expected to have fulfilled all essential expectations of Roman voters. Accordingly, I 
used Plutarch’s late-republican Lives to curate a list of examples from which we might draw 
some conclusions. If the extent of military service was an important qualification for a public 
career, then one would expect them to have had significantly more of it than the norm. As we 
shall see, my findings suggest that the amount of military service among the aristocrats of the 
Late Republic was much less than we have previously imagined, and I will discuss the 
implications this evidence has for our understanding of the period.  
My second chapter, “‘We Will Have to Raise Marius from the Underworld!’: Cicero's 
Pro Fonteio and the Shortage of Commanders in the Late Republic,” moves forward in the 
aristocratic career and focuses upon command experience among the late-republican senatorial 
class. In the pro Fonteio, Cicero rests a large portion of his argument for acquittal on the idea 
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that the Republic could ill afford to lose a military man like Fonteius since the state did not 
have at its disposal as many capable commanders as it had enjoyed previously. This is a radical 
claim given our understanding of traditional aristocratic values in the Republic. The evidence 
in the pro Fonteio alone may be enough to accept that there was a perception that there were 
fewer military leaders circa 70 BCE, but my chapter goes one step further and offers some ways 
we might test the truth of Cicero’s claim. I first collect the data on pre-consular command 
experience among the consuls of 81-49 BCE. Of course, this sample does not give us definitive 
proof of military experience among the entire aristocracy, but I do believe there are some 
compelling reasons to think that the sample does reflect larger aristocratic trends. In order to 
investigate Cicero’s claim that the amount of military experience among the elite was in 
decline, I also compare my findings from 81-49 BCE with an earlier period of republican 
history and find that the orator’s rhetoric does seem to represent truthfully (albeit 
hyperbolically) contemporary reality.  
My final chapter, “Procession Recession: Triumphs, Letters, and Ideology in the Late 
Roman Republic,” puts my previous findings in dialogue with the sharp drop in triumphal 
frequency during the Late Republic via one of the most intriguing pieces of source material on 
the subject: the epistolary exchange between Cato and Cicero on the topic (Fam. 15.4-6 = SB 
110-112). Cicero’s initial request for Cato’s support for a supplicatio en route to a triumph, 
Cato’s refusal, and Cicero’s reply give the modern scholar an excellent resource for 
understanding the politics that went into such a request. Given the conservative reputation of 
both Cato and his family, and perhaps skepticism of Cicero’s qualification for triumphal 
consideration, some have chosen to see Cato’s withholding of support as a defense of 
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traditional militaristic Roman values. I instead argue that such an understanding of Cato’s 
letter (15.5 = SB 111) overlooks the ways in which Cato rewrites Roman aristocratic values in 
respect to the triumph. In his response to Cicero, Cato describes an honorific economy that 
greatly devalues military achievement and the glory assigned to successful imperatores. Such a 
conception of the triumph stands in stark contrast to other contemporary understandings of 
the triumph and its role within Roman political life. 
Of special importance in this chapter are philosophical responses to the traditional 
Roman militaristic ethos. I first analyze the ways in which Cato’s Stoicism influenced his 
position vis a vis military honors in his letter, but on a broader level philosophical engagement 
had a larger impact on aristocratic rejection of traditional military values than has been 
previously imagined. Cicero himself within his letters to Cato and elsewhere provides us with 
his own Stoic-flavored critique of military achievement. In the Somnium Scipionis he encourages 
the reader to disregard homnium gloria and instead focus on the more philosophical eternal 
form of virtue. Likewise, in his de Officiis he twice warns against the overzealous pursuit of war 
and the destruction that can accompany too much bravery.69  “Divine virtus,” he wrote in book 
six of the de Republica, “desires not lead statues, nor triumphs with ephemeral laurels, but for 
those rewards which are more stable and lasting.”70 On the other side of the philosophical 
spectrum, Epicureanism also adopted a hostile position against the traditional Roman military 
ethos as well. Five years before the epistolary exchange between Cicero and Cato, Cicero 
                                               
69 Cic. Off. 1.38, 1.81. 
 
70 Cic. Rep. 6.8.8. tamen illa divina virtus non statuas plumbo inhaerentes nec triumphos 
arescentibus laureis, sed stabiliora quaedam et viridiora praemiorum genera desiderat. 
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delivered his blistering in Pisonem against his enemy L. Calpurnius Piso (cos. 58 B.C.). Piso had 
failed to even request a triumph upon his return from Macedonia, despite having some ability 
to do so. From Cicero’s speech it seems that Piso, informed by his Epicureanism, defended his 
triumphal apathy by claiming that he did not care to have one. We can notice a similar critique 
of Rome’s obsession with warfare in the Epicurean poem of Lucretius.71 It is fascinating that 
both Stoicism and Epicureanism, so often pitted against one another, seem to agree on this 
point. 
What I hope the reader will emerge from this project with is an appreciation of how 
fluid the valuation of military achievement was during this period. It will be clear, I hope, that 
the militarism of the aristocracy – a foundational part of elite identity according to our 
understanding of republican aristocrat values – underwent a dramatic cultural renegotiation in 
the Late Republic. Further, that this has been at times difficult to detect is a reflection of 
contemporary cognitive dissonance among the elite on the topic. Romans of the first century 
existed in a political space which still acknowledged traditional views on military achievement 
and simultaneously radically reinterpreted them. This is to say, we will see that Romans of the 
Late Republic were simultaneously venerating the traditional values they had inherited while 
also behaving in ways that contradicted them.  
                                               
71 E.g. Lucret. 1.29-49. 
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2. Youthful Military Service and Aristocratic Values.1 
 
I. Introduction: multae imagines et nullus stipendi. 
 
“Bellum me gerere cum Iugurtha iussistis, quam rem nobilitas aegerrume tulit. Quaeso, reputate cum animis vostris num id 
mutare melius sit, si quem ex illo globo nobilitatis ad hoc aut aliud tale negotium mittatis, hominem veteris prosapiae ac 
multarum imaginum et nullius stipendi...” (Sall. Iug. 85.10) 
 
You have commanded me to wage war against Jugurtha, and the nobility is most troubled by this. I ask you, 
reconsider whether or not it would be better to change your minds, to send someone from that cabal of 
nobility or someone similar to this conflict – a man from an old family who had a plethora of imagines and zero 
military experience.” 
 
 In the prologue to the Jugurtha Sallust wrote that he decided to write a monograph 
about the war with Numidia – hardly an obvious choice given the options available to him – 
because it was difficult and great, and because it was the first time the superbia of the aristocracy 
had been challenged.2 It comes as no surprise then that the work casts the Roman political 
class in an unflattering light. In Sallust, as in his role model Thucydides, speeches are 
privileged moments in the text, and the two major speeches in the Jugurtha build upon the 
author’s stated theme. The first such speech is appropriately given by a firey tribune, 
Memmius, and centers on aristocratic corruption and violence against popular leaders. The 
second speech is given by Marius, then the consul-elect for 107 BCE. In this speech Marius 
attacks the aristocracy for their laziness and luxury, two classic Sallustian watchwords, and in 
doing so returns repeatedly to one issue: aristocratic disinterest in military achievement.  
                                               
1 A condensed version of this chapter was presented at the 2019 annual meeting of the 
Society for Classical Studies in San Diego, CA under the title “Youthful Military Service and 
Aristocratic Values in the Late Roman Republic.” I am indebted to the panel’s chair, Matthew 
Roller, and to those in attendance for their thoughtful feedback. I am also grateful to Cary 
Barber, who gave very helpful comments on a draft of the conference presentation.  
 
2 Sall. Iug. 5.  
  31   
 
 The passage above is how Marius (or perhaps I should say Sallust) frames the speech, a 
comparison of his merit-based auctoritas as a new man and the inactivity of the hereditary elite. 
The consul-elect goes on to allege that many aristocrats were so lacking in actual military 
experience when they were appointed to command positions that they were frequently forced 
to seek the opinions of a more-seasoned subordinate, or to undergo a crash course on the topic 
via Greek military handbooks.3 To Marius this is unacceptably hypocritical; the nobility, he 
argues, are entitled to a prominent place in society not on the basis of their own actions but 
due to the military valor displayed by their (sometimes quite distant) ancestors. If we want to 
imagine the kind of virtus-obsessed aristocratic culture of the ancestors which Sallust had in 
mind we could look to his other surviving monograph, the Catiline, in which he wrote that the 
Roman elite of the past competed with each other most of all over gloria.4 Conversely in the 
Jugurtha Marius complains that the aristocrats of 108 were no longer interested in the 
traditional concerns of their class: spears, standards, and military decorations. Instead, young 
aristocratic Romans spent their time eating, drinking, falling in love, and learning Greek.5  
 In the Introduction to this work I outlined how important military achievement was to 
the political class in the Roman Republic, both individually and collectively. Interestingly, 
Marius’ speech seems to confirm both this importance while also attesting to declining interest 
in military affairs among the Roman elite. As always with direct speeches, howevever, we ought 
                                               
3 Sall. Iug. 85.11-12. 
 
4 Sall. Cat. 7.6 Sed gloriae maximum certamen inter ipsos erat; se quisque hostem ferire, murum 
ascendere, conspici dum tale facinus faceret, properabat;  
 
5 Sall. Iug. 85.32 and 41. 
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to approach the evidence with caution. The speech of Marius in the Jugurtha is foremost a 
literary construction and therefore has rarely been taken seriously in its claims.6 Further, 
Sallust’s penchant for prioritizing literary effect over historical accuracy undermines the 
writer’s reliability in instances such as these, when his text suggests something surprising or 
controversial.7 Therefore, from a historical perspective the speech of Marius asks rather than 
answers the question this chapter seeks to address: how much military service was normal for 
an aristocrat in the Late Republic? 
 Polybius, who may have met Marius while the two were with Scipio Aemilianus at the 
siege of Numantia, is the most important text for our understanding of youthful military 
service among the Roman aristocracy. He maintained that any Roman seeking public office 
could only do so after having served in ten military campaigns, a regulation commonly referred 
to in scholarship as the decem stipendia.8 This meant that young aristocrats who aspired to 
                                               
6 See also Plut. Mar. 9.2-4. Skard 1943; Von Fritz 1943: 166-8; Carney 1959 (who 
thought that the speeches are close to actual Marian rhetoric); Syme 1964: 168-70; Paul 1984: 
207-15; and Evans 1994: 71-2 who argues that some parts of the speech (thanks for support, 
preparations for the new campaign, the changes to the conscription process) are contextually 
expected and therefore likely reminiscent of what Marius would have said, but in reference to 
Marius’ attack upon aristocratic military service he goes on to write, “Orations such as these do 
not deserve to be analyzed too precisely for hidden meanings or pertinent historical messages 
since more often than not they are inserted into a text purely as entertainment or as an 
illustration of the writer’s creative ability.” Rosenstein 2007: 139 mentions that the idea that 
commanders were learning from Greek rhetorical handbooks “may reflect contemporary 
political polemic rather than reality.” 
 
7 Syme (1964: 1) wrote that Sallust’s works, “betray all manner of disquieting features.” 
See also in the same work pp. 123, 136ff, 186, 248ff. 
 
8 Polyb. 6.19.4. πολιτικὴν δὲ λαβεῖν ἀρχὴν οὐκ ἔξεστιν οὐδενὶ πρότερον, ἐὰν µὴ δέκα 
στρατείας ἐνιαυσίους	ᾖ τετελεκώς. Other evidence we possess confirms a ten-year term of 
cavalry service but does not mention any connection with eligibility for public office: Plut. C. 
Gracc. 2.4-5 wherein C. Gracchus claims to have served more than was customary (12 years); 
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political office – and we should assume that almost all did – were expected to spend almost the 
entirety of their young lives in camp. Military service traditionally began at 17, which meant 
that a young man would have to serve until the age of 27 in order to initiate his canvass. Given 
that this meant a young man’s pre-cursus life was mostly spent at war, it is hardly surprising that 
the Roman aristocracy has so often been styled as a kind of warrior-elite. This understanding 
aligns well with Marius’ conception of nobility in his speech. 
 Yet, it is certain that youthful military service among aspiring politicians was declining 
in the Republic’s last generation. A popular example for the shirking of the decem stipendia in 
the first century BCE is Cicero, who seems to have had at best two years of military service 
before he stood for the quaestorship in 76. This is not shocking from a man Erich Gruen once 
called “very unmilitary.”9 More surprising is the case of Julius Caesar, a more than capable 
military man; as we shall see, he too certainly fell short of ten campaigns. Perhaps he was only 
slightly exaggerating in the early 60’s BCE when Cicero said that military service had been 
“forgotten” by the youth.10 The decem stipendia requirement was clearly not strictly enforced in 
the first century BCE, but the problem is that modern scholarship lacks a more detailed sense 
of this trend. Agreement that the decem stipendia was defunct is as close to universally accepted 
                                               
Plut. Pomp. 22.4-6 about an equestrian ritual following the end of military service, and Livy 
27.11.14 wherein the censors wiped out the previous service of cavalrymen at the Battle of 
Cannae and imposed a new ten-year term of service. Illis omnibus et multi erant adempti equi qui 
Cannensium legionum equites in Sicilia erant. Addiderunt acerbitati etiam tempus, ne praeterita 
stipendia procederent iis quae equo publico meruerant, sed dena stipendia equis privatis facerent. 
 
9 Gruen 1974: 495. 
 
10 Cic. Font. 42-3 
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as possible in our field, but there is no correspondingly clear consensus on how much military 
service was normal in this period. William Harris provided the current opinio communis on this 
subject: “The rule [requiring ten campaigns before running for office] had lapsed a generation 
or so earlier [than Cicero], but among Cicero’s contemporaries most candidates for office had 
probably still done some military service.”11 He is technically correct, but rather vague. How 
many senators were seeking office without ten campaigns of military experience? How much 
military experience was normal for aristocrats of this period? Since there is quite a wide 
spectrum between zero and, say, nine campaigns to be undertaken between the ages of about 
17 and 30 (quaestor), it is correspondingly uncertain just how much less “military” the Roman 
aristocracy of the Late Republic had become. At stake is nothing less than the place of military 
valor in the value-system governing public service in the last generations of the Roman 
Republic. Therefore, my first task in this chapter is to give a sense of scale to this 
phenomenon. I do so by examining a group of late-republican senators for whom we have 
some account of their youth. Finally, after establishing a more precisie sense of the norm, I will 
consider the implications that the neglect of the decem stipendia had for Roman aristocratic 
ideology in the Late Republic.  
 
II. The decem stipendia. 
 
The phrase decem stipendia never occurs in our primary sources; it is a modern 
designation for the regulation mentioned by Polybius. The Greek historian is our main and – 
as I will argue here – only evidence for the existence of the decem stipendia, but before turning 
                                               
11 Harris 1979: 12. 
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our attention to the Polybian evidence we must first examine two passages from Plutarch which 
are also relevant. The first comes from his Life of Gaius Gracchus. In 125 BCE Gracchus had 
been quaestor in Sardinia and the winter that year was especially harsh. The Romans were ill-
equipped to withstand the cold, but the surrounding communities had already successfully 
petitioned the Senate in order that they not be compelled to provide the Romans with 
provisions. Nevertheless, Gracchus was out of options on how to properly equip his men and 
therefore went to directly to the communities himself to appeal for aid. Gracchus’ enemies in 
Rome viewed this episode with suspicion, they thought the younger brother of Tiberius 
Gracchus was trying to gain popular support. Gaius felt that the campaign against him in 
Rome was serious enough that he left Sardinia in order to return to the city and defend 
himself, but this decision in turn opened him up to accusations that he had prematurely 
abandoned his duties in Sardinia. Ultimately the matter came before the censors (presumably 
in connection with their lectio), who questioned Gracchus about his actions in Sardinia and his 
departure from his post. Gaius spoke in his own defense: 
οὐ µὴν ἀλλὰ κατηγορίας αὐτῷ γενοµένης ἐπὶ τῶν τιµητῶν, αἰτησάµενος λόγον οὕτω µετέστησε τὰς γνώµας 
τῶν ἀκουσάντων ὡς ἀπελθεῖν ἠδικῆσθαι	τὰ µέγιστα δόξας. ἐστρατεῦσθαι µὲν γὰρ ἔφη δώδεκα ἔτη, τῶν 
ἄλλων δέκα στρατευοµένων ἐν ἀνάγκαις, ταµιεύων δὲ τῷ στρατηγῷ παραµεµενηκέναι τριετίαν, τοῦ νόµου 
µετ᾿ ἐνιαυτὸν ἐπανελθεῖν διδόντος· µόνος δὲ τῶν στρατευσαµένων πλῆρες τὸ βαλάντιον εἰσενηνοχὼς κενὸν 
ἐξενηνοχέναι, τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους ἐκπιόντας ὃν εἰσήνεγκαν οἶνον, ἀργυρίου καὶ χρυσίου µεστοὺς δεῦρο τοὺς 
ἀµφορεῖς ἥκειν κοµίζοντας. 
(Plut. C. Gracc. 2.4-5) 
 
But when [C. Gracchus] was accused before the censors, having asked to speak he changed the minds of 
those listening so that he seemed to have been done a great injustice. He said that he had done twelve 
campaigns of service in the army, others had only done ten ἐν ἀνάγκαις. Further, he had served over two 
years in addition as a quaestor under the general, even though legally he was able to return after one year. 
He alone in the army set out with a full purse and returned with an empty one, since the others had drunk 
the wine which they had seized and returned with the jugs full of gold and silver.  
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What is certainly clear is that Gracchus used his lengthy and exemplary military service record 
in order to justify his actions; it is less clear, however, whether he was referencing a regulation 
which required ten campaigns of service prior to seeking public office.  
 The first point of interest is the phrase ἄλλων δέκα στρατευοµένων ἐν ἀνάγκαις. It is 
unclear exactly what Plutarch has Gracchus suggest here. The TLG gives two meanings of ἐν 
ἀνάγκαις relevant to this passage (although the entry does not cite this passage specifically). The 
first, which in this instance would indicate a requirement à la Polybius, supports the idea that 
Gracchus was referring to a regulation; we might even go so far as to render it “according to law.” 
The second meaning, however, is closer to “in emergencies,” which would imply that ten 
campaigns were only expected during pressing times. The only other time Plutarch uses this 
phrase it is clearly to indicate the second meaning, one implying an emergency, although in using 
the term he was quoting Simonides.12 It is unclear, therefore, exactly what Gracchus was saying 
in his speech in 125 BCE, and without the influence of Polybius there is no reason to prefer one 
reading over the other.  
 The second point of consideration with this passage is that the way in which Gracchus 
recounts his service record aligns poorly with the Polybian conception of the decem stipendia. If we 
were to use this passage as evidence for the decem stipendia, then the thrust of Gracchus’ 
argument would be that while others had served only the required ten campaigns, he had served 
12. Yet, if we examine the passage more closely, the two additional years of service Gracchus 
boasts about came as a quaestor. This is important because the Polybian decem stipendia was 
                                               
12 Plut. Arat. 45.5 (quoting Simonides) ἀλλ᾿ ἐν ἀνάγκαις γλυκὺ γίνεται καὶ 
σκληρόν,	κατὰ Σιµωνίδην.   
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supposed to be fulfilled before an aristocrat sought public office. Thus, if the decem stipendia as 
Polybius understands is in the background of this passage, Gracchus’ boast becomes somewhat 
awkward. He is not saying that he exceeded the service requirement, but rather that he did the 
same amount of service as everyone else was required to do and then did some additional 
service after he began his political career. This is a much different suggestion, and a much less 
impressive one. We should not, therefore, count this passage as firm evidence for the existence 
of the Polybian decem stipendia.  
 The second Plutarchian passage of interest comes from the Life of Pompey, and tells of 
the tranvectio equitum, a public ritual which equestrians underwent after they completed their 
military service: 
Ἔθος γάρ ἐστι Ῥωµαίων τοῖς ἱππεῦσιν, ὅταν στρατεύσωνται τὸν νόµιµον χρόνον, ἄγειν εἰς ἀγορὰν τὸν ἵππον 
ἐπὶ τοὺς δύο ἄνδρας οὓς τιµητὰς καλοῦσι, καὶ καταριθµησαµένους τῶν στρατηγῶν καὶ αὐτοκρατόρων ἕκαστον 
ὑφ᾿ οἷς ἐστρατεύσαντο, καὶ δόντας εὐθύνας τῆς στρατείας ἀφίεσθαι. νέµεται δὲ καὶ τιµὴ καὶ ἀτιµία 
προσήκουσα τοῖς βίοις ἑκάστων.	(Plut. Pomp. 22.4) 
 
It was a custom for Roman knights, whenever one had been on campaign for the amount of time required by 
law, to lead his horse into the Forum before the two men called “censors,” and having accounted for his 
campaigns, each general under whom he served, and the nature of his service then to be discharged. According 
to their conduct each was either rewarded or punished.  
 
Again, one might see this as a confirmation of the decem stipendia outside of Polybius, but this 
passage is also mired with uncertainty. The strongest argument for not associating this ritual 
with the Polybian decem stipendia is that the transvectio was restricted to equites equo publico, and 
thus – unlike Polybius’ regulation – would not have been required of all aristocrats.13 More 
importantly, the transvectio was not at all connected with running for public office. Even if we 
were to overlook this major difference, what will become clear by the end of this chapter is that 
                                               
13 For other references to the ritual see Livy 9.46.16; Val. Max. 2.2.9; Dion. Hal. Ant. 
Rom. 6.13.4; Vir. Ill. 32.3; Plin. HN 15.19; Tac. Ann. 2.83.5; Suet. Aug. 38.3; Plut. Cor. 3. See 
also Hill 1952: 19, 37-9; McCall 2002: 7-8, 82; McDonnell 2006: 186ff.  
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while Pompey was able to claim ten campaigns, it would have been impossible for many others 
to do so. Cicero, for example, would have had a particularly awkward ceremony if the amount 
of service required by law was ten campaigns. Thus, at best this ritual is a remnant of the 
Polybian decem stipendia which no longer signified what it previously had.  
These two Plutarchian passages may in fact suggest a formal – perhaps even legal – ten-
year period of military-service obiligation, but they stop short of confirming the decem stipendia 
as most scholars have understood it. I would argue, therefore, that Polybius 6.19.4 is our only 
direct evidence for a regulation that requires this service before running for public office. This 
difference is important. Further, even if there had been a legal requirement along the lines 
Polybius suggests, we will see that there can be no doubt that such a regulation was being 
ignored by the time Pompey performed the transvectio. Let us turn, therefore, to Polybius. The 
historian mentions it at the opening of his section on the Roman military system: 
Ἐπειδὰν ἀποδείξωσι τοὺς ὑπάτους, µετὰ ταῦτα χιλιάρχους καθιστᾶσι, τετταρασκαίδεκα µὲν ἐκ τῶν πέντ᾿ 
ἐνιαυσίους ἐχόντων ἤδη στρατείας, δέκα δ᾿ ἄλλους σὺν τούτοις ἐκ τῶν δέκα. τῶν λοιπῶν τοὺς µὲν ἱππεῖς 
δέκα, τοὺς δὲ πεζοὺς ἓξ καὶ <δέκα> δεῖ στρατείας τελεῖν κατ᾿ ἀνάγκην ἐν τοῖς τετταράκοντα καὶ ἓξ ἔτεσιν 
ἀπὸ γενεᾶς πλὴν τῶν ὑπὸ τὰς τετρακοσίας	δραχµὰς τετιµηµένων· τούτους δὲ παριᾶσι πάντας εἰς τὴν 
ναυτικὴν χρείαν. ἐὰν δέ ποτε κατεπείγῃ τὰ τῆς περιστάσεως, ὀφείλουσιν οἱ πεζοὶ στρατεύειν 
εἴκοσι	στρατείας ἐνιαυσίους. πολιτικὴν δὲ λαβεῖν ἀρχὴν οὐκ ἔξεστιν οὐδενὶ πρότερον, ἐὰν µὴ δέκα 
στρατείας ἐνιαυσίους	ᾖ τετελεκώς. (Polyb. 6.19.4) 
 
After they elect the consuls, they next choose the military tribunes: 14 from those who had served five 
campaigns, and ten from those who had served ten campaigns. Of the rest, cavalrymen must serve ten 
campaigns, and infantrymen must serve 16 campaigns before they are 46, not including those who have less 
than 400 drachmae – these are put into the navy. Should there be an urgent danger, the infantrymen are 
required 20 campaigns of service. No one is able to obtain any public office if he has not completed ten 
campaigns.  
 
This passage comes from Polybius’ description of the dilectus – the process by which Rome 
enlisted men for the legions. The most important sentence (for our purposes) is the last one, 
which articulates the decem stipendia in a helpfully clear and succinct manner.  
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 In addition to being our lone citation for the decem stipendia, Polybius is also not 
without problems as a source for the dilectus. Some other parts of the section in which Polybius 
mentioned the decem stipendia show that the author’s understanding of Roman military 
procedure was imperfect. The number of troops in a legion at this time provided by Polybius 
clashes with Livy’s testimony, and the evidence suggests that Livy is probably the more reliable 
account in this instance.14 Further, the procedure for the levy described by Polybius is clearly 
incorrect, or at the very least incomplete. Before the first century BCE the dilectus took place 
on the Capitol which would have made it difficult to assemble the massive number of people 
Polybius suggests. It would have been unrealistic in terms of both travel and space available to 
expect every Roman citizen eligible to meet in Rome for the dilectus annually. More likely is 
that non-urban citizens were conscripted remotely and then reported to Rome having already 
been selected.15 In light of these problems and the dearth of ancient testimony about the decem 
stipendia, some have argued that Polybius misunderstood the nature of the practice and that 
service in ten campaigns was more of an expectation than a legal requirement.16 It is difficult to 
                                               
14 Polybius records 4,500 men per legion, Livy (40.1) suggests 5,200 men starting from 
184 BCE on. De Ligt: 2007: 115-6 suggests that Livy is to be favored here given his general 
reliability on second century army figures. De Ligt argues that Polybius’ number probably 
reflects earlier military handbooks he consulted. 
 
15 These are just the major issues. See Walbank 1957: 698-9 and De Ligt 2007: 115-7 
for a thorough catalogue of the problems with Polybius’ account. 
 
16 Harris 1979: 11ff seems to accept that the decem stipendia were supported by lex but 
does open the possibility of a less formal arrangement. Most recently Beck 2005: 336-7. See 
also Astin 1958: 42-46; Kunkel & Whitmann 1995: 60-3; Develin 1979: 58ff.  
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say one way or the other based on this meager evidence, and as I believe that my findings have 
some impact on this issue I will reserve my judgement until later in the chapter.  
For those who have accepted the existence of the decem stipendia the first challenge has 
been to date it. As we have already seen, it is widely accepted that the rule (if it existed) was no 
longer being observed rigorously in the Republic’s last generation, and more will be said about 
that below. When was this rule actually being enforced? The first major debate around the 
dating of the decem stipendia has to do with Scipio Africanus’ candidacy for the curule 
aedileship in 214 BCE. The young Scipio already had a reputation for virtus when he presented 
himself as a candidate. He had served alongside his father, allegedly saving his life at the Battle 
of the Ticinus in 218 BCE, and survived the disaster at Cannae in 216 BCE .17 In 214 BCE, 
when he was only 22 years old, Scipio stood for the curule aedileship. Livy is our source for the 
event: 
Huic petenti aedilitatem cum obsisterent tribuni plebis, negantes rationem eius habendam esse, quod nondum ad 
petendum legitima aetas esset, “Si me” inquit “omnes Quirites aedilem facere volunt, satis annorum habeo.” Tanto inde 
favore ad suffragium ferendum in tribus discursum est ut tribuni repente incepto destiterint. (Livy 25.2.6-8) 
 
The tribunes of plebs opposed him as he was seeking the aedileship, denying that Scipio had the right to run 
since he had not yet reached the required age. “If all the citizens want to make me aedile,” he said,” then I 
am old enough.” Then there was such fervor in the sorting into tribes for the vote that the tribunes suddenly 
relented.  
 
Scipio was made aedile, and he would certainly go on to justify the exception made on his 
behalf. The question facing us, however, is where the decem stipendia fit into the controversy 
surrounding Scipio’s candidacy. Mommsen used this event to claim that the decem stipendia was 
                                               
17 There are diverging accounts about Scipio’s actions at the Battle of the Ticinus. In 
one version (Plin. HN 16.14) Scipio saved the life of his father, but then rejected the corona 
civilis because it would have confusingly obligated the elder Scipio to treat his own son as his 
father. The Livian account (21.46.7-10 apparently following Cloelius Antipater) credits a slave 
with saving the elder Scipio’s life. See Maxfield 1981: 71 
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not yet in effect in 214 BCE. The hostile tribunes, he argued, would have included the decem 
stipendia in their objection to Scipio’s candidacy if the rule was being enforced.18 Complicating 
Mommsen’s view, however, Polybius does not mention any tribunician opposition to Scipio’s 
candidacy at all.19  
 Again relying on Livy, Mommsen suggested that the decem stipendia only came into 
existence in 180 BCE with the lex Annalis, but Livy recorded only that the law specified at what 
age one might seek and obtain magistracies.20 Mommsen speculated that the lex Annalis did this 
by formally requiring three things: the decem stipendia, the order in which one could hold each 
magistracy, and the biennium (the period of two years in between offices).21 If Mommsen was 
right this would mean that the decem stipendia would have actually been established as a 
regulation rather recently at the time Polybius was writing. There are not, however, any sources 
supporting Mommsen’s theory on the details of the lex Annalis, and Livy’s brevity hardly invites 
this level of speculation.22 In light of this, others have argued Livy recorded the objections of 
the tribunes as related to Scipio’s age anachronistically, since the lex Annalis had not yet been 
passed. The objection of the tribunes in 214 BCE, they argue, was more likely related instead to 
                                               
18 Mommsen StR I3.505ff. Gelzer 1969: 7. Others followed Mommsen’s lead for a post 
214 BCE date: B. Kübler, RE s.v. “magistratus” (1928); Astin 1958: 45 n.1. 
 
19 Polyb. 10.4-5. 
 
20 Livy 40.44.1 Eo anno rogatio primum lata est ab L. Villio tribuno plebis, quot annos nati 
quemque magistratum peterent caperentque. 
 
21 Mommsen StR 1.523-577.  
 
22 See Astin 1958.  
 
  42   
 
the decem stipendia.23 Each argument is speculative. This is further problematized by the nature 
of the event in question. Scipio’s candidacy in 214 BCE should not be taken to represent 
normal practice and can be explained in light of the irregularities in magistracies brought on by 
the crisis of the Second Punic War and his own extraordinary popularity, rather than the 
absence of the rule in question.24 We cannot, I believe, use the events of 214 BCE to prove the 
existence of the law.  
Given Polybius’ laconic mention of the decem stipendia, there has also been much ink 
spilled over what such a regulation would have actually entailed. Since the translations of 
Polybius often discuss the requirement in terms of “years,” the impression is that one needed 
to spend a calendar year in the field. This interpretation is no doubt aided by modern 
vernacular regarding military service. If we use a more accurate translation, however, it is less 
clear how much time a young Roman was expected to spend, “on campaign.” On one extreme 
end of interpretation, Mommsen doubted that “service in a campaign” necessarily required 
actually being selected for service at all. Instead he suggested that ten years of simply standing 
for the equestrian levy was sufficient.25 The first reason for this was (as I have already 
mentioned) that Mommsen thought that the decem stipendia came about as part of the lex 
Annalis (180 BCE). Thus, since the important mechanism of the decem stipendia (according to 
Mommsen) was to regulate the age at which one could seek office, actual military service in the 
                                               
23 Harris 1979: 11n3, suggesting that Livy was wrong about Scipio in 214 BCE but 
correct about the lex Annalis in 180.  
 
24 Rögler 1962: 78; Harris 1979: 11. 
 
25 Mommsen StR I3. 506; Gelzer 1969: 7; De Sanctis 1953: 4.1.510; Afzelius 1946: 276.  
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field was a secondary concern. Mommsen’s second reasoning was that requiring active service 
on campaign would have given consuls the opportunity to avoid enlisting the children from 
rival families and thereby delay their advancement on the cursus honorum, a practice he believed 
would have been untenable. This is an imaginative (and, I suppose, possible) concern, but it 
appears nowhere in our sources. Plinio Fraccaro disagreed with Mommsen and argued 
convincingly that active service was more likely the requirement.26 Fraccaro rightly divorced the 
decem stipendia from the lex Annalis, and instead emphasized the importance of military service 
for those seeking to hold a magistracy.  
Fraccaro is, however, silent concerning the nature of military service that the young 
aristocrat was likely to encounter. Harris provided the most useful argument for this question 
when he helpfully pointed out that the Tabula Heracleensis (a set of bronze inscriptions that 
preserve local statues for the Italian city of Heraclea, as well as a portion of the lex Iulia 
Municipalis) stipulated that service was only counted for candidates if they spent at least half of 
the year on what we might think of as “active duty.”27 This meant that if one spent half the year 
in the camp, this qualified as service in a campaign, and this makes sense when we consider 
that aristocrats often appear in Rome during years in which they also rendered some service. It 
should be noted, of course, that the Tabula Heracleensis gives details on what was required of 
local candidates, not candidates at Rome, but it is still reasonable to imagine that the periphery 
                                               
26 Fraccaro 1934. 
 
27 Crawford RS 1.375ff.  
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was taking cues from the center in this instance and that the municipal regulation reflected a 
familiar expectation. 
The last puzzle involving the decem stipendia is when exactly it fell into disuse (again, 
assuming that it was ever “in use”). Those who mention it often use a somewhat broad 
periodization when identifying the lapse, usually the late second - early first century BCE. This 
is understandable given the paucity of evidence. Some have attempted to narrow the dating by 
connecting the lapse of the decem stipendia to the disappearance of the citizen cavalry, the 
customary locus of elite military service.28 Broadly speaking, this must have happened at some 
point between 102 and 63 BCE29 We know from a conveniently detailed anecdote that Caesar 
did not use citizen cavalry units while in Gaul.30 Caesar, however, never mentions the practice 
of using provincial cavalry units as being particularly unique or novel. We should imagine that 
he was not the first to neglect the services of a citizen cavalry unit. There is one instance of 
citizens serving the cavalry after 63 BCE: Pompey’s army at Pharsalus. Plutarch called Pompey’s 
cavalry the “flower of Rome and Italy.”31 This, however, is likely an anomaly brought on by civil 
                                               
28 McCall 2002: 100-36; Rosenstein 2007: 143-4. 
 
29 McCall 2002: 100-13. Val. Max. 5.4 records that the son of M. Aemilius Scaurus 
(cos. 115 BCE) killed himself after fleeing the Battle of the Athesis (102 BCE) with the rest of 
the Romani equites. For L. Orbilius Pupilius, who would have served in the cavalry in the 90’s 
BCE if Suetonius is to be trusted, see Suet. Gramm. 9. 
 
30 Caes. BG 1.42. Caesar and Ariovistus agreed to meet for a parley, but only if both 
parties were accompanied by cavalry, not infantry. Caesar feared that his Gallic cavalry would 
betray him if left alone, so he mounted infantrymen on their horses. Likewise, Caesar also does 
not seem to have used a citizen cavalry during the Civil War as the unit is absent from the list 
of his donatives (Caes. BCiv. 1.102). 
 
31 Plut. Pomp. 64 ἱππεῖς δέ, Ῥωµαίων καὶ Ἰταλῶν τὸ ἀνθοῦν, ἑπτακισχίλιοι… See also 
Front. Strat. 4.32. 
  45   
 
war, rather than an indication that Pompey and his contemporaries had previously used citizen 
cavalry in non-civil engagements.32  
Nathan Rosenstein has speculated in passing that the decline in military service among 
the aristocracy may have been connected to challenges faced by the Romans during the Social 
War.33 The allies had been a large source of legionary manpower for Rome, and during their 
rebellion Rome was challenged to find a way to replenish their ranks. The solution, so it has 
been argued, was that Rome effectively “outsourced” their cavalry needs by hiring provincial 
cavalry units; Romans who would have served in the cavalry now shifted to other roles in the 
legion. After the Social War the Roman cavalrymen never returned to the cavalry, and 
provincial cavalry units became the norm thereafter.34 The theory, then, is that aristocrats gave 
up cavalry service during the Social War and did not come back after the reconciliation with 
the allies. Without cavalry service, aristocrats stopped serving the decem stipendia, and the 
regulation was thereafter ignored. The Social War theory is a neat one. Its first, and most 
straightforward, strength is that it fits the range of dates most often cited for the shift away 
from the decem stipendia. Second, this theory (albeit indirectly) attaches the lapse of the decem 
stipendia to a significant event – one to which the aristocracy was responding. As we shall see, 
however, the evidence available to us does not fully support such a tidy explanation, but rather 
I believe that it suggests a more active move away from military by the Roman aristocracy. But I 
                                               
 
32 McCall 2002: 101-2. 
 
33 Rosenstein 2007: 143.  
 
34 Rosenstein 2007 following McCall 2002: 100-36.  
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will turn to this line of thought following my examination of the youthful military service 
rendered by some late-republican examples. 
 
III. A Sample of Late-Republican Pre-Cursus Service Records. 
 
We know frightfully little about the youth of any given Republican statesman. Our 
sources for many Roman senators do not extend past their involvement in the period’s borader 
historical narrative; in the case of most this does not exceed a passing mention. The nature of 
the evidence relevant to this study is significantly bleaker considering that even in the case of 
notable senators we often know very little about their lives before they held public office. For 
example, we know more about Cicero than any historical figure before him (and any figure 
after until Saint Augustine in the 4th - 5th century CE). Yet, we still are left uncertain about 
much of Cicero’s early life. Cicero does not even mention his mother in any of his extant 
writings.35 The landscape of the evidence for youthful military service would seem to be 
something of wasteland, and this has doubtlessly contributed to the hesitancy of scholars to 
comment on how widespread the neglect of military service was in the Late Republic. Yet, 
while there is hardly as much evidence as we should like, we do have some useful sources for 
approaching this problem.  
All, however, is not lost. We do possess one significant set of source material for 
reconstructing the early lives of important Romans: the biographies of Plutarch. Writing at the 
turn of the second century CE, Plutarch wrote (among other things) biographies of Greek and 
Roman subjects. In the existing Plutarchian corpus we have 23 Parallel Lives, as well as four 
                                               
35 Quintus does briefly mention matrem nostram in Fam. 16.26.2. 
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unpaired Lives. Of these, 11 Roman Lives fall in the time period relevant to this study: three are 
from just before the chronological period that is the focus of this work, what we might call the 
“second-to-last generation of the Roman Republic” (Marius, Sulla, and Sertorius).  Eight more 
Lives are from the Republic’s last generation (Lucullus, Cicero, Pompey, Caesar, Crassus, Cato 
Minor, Brutus, and Antony).36  
The Plutarchian evidence offers the historian some significant advantages. First, these 
biographies preserve the lives of some of the most important and influential senators of the 
period. One, of course, could always wish for more biographies; Plutarch’s Lives in no way 
represent an extensive list of important senators in the Late Republic. Still, in the 36 years this 
chapter covers, Plutarch’s biographies cover ten consulships and a dictatorship (not counting 
Caesar’s future dictatorship since it is technically outside of the chronological limits I am 
interested in). The Lives also include all three generals who led a major campaign against 
Mithridates VI of Pontus, a command which was repeatedly the object of fierce competition 
amongst the most elite senators. Not included in these groups, but still immensely important 
figures in the post-Sullan period, are Caesar’s staunchest political adversary M. Porcius Cato 
Uticensis and his future assassin M. Iunius Brutus. Neither reached the consulship, but both 
were influential, perhaps even defining figures in the crisis of the Late Republic. We may not 
get an image of the normal senatorial career from these biographies, but it is fair to consider 
most if not all of the Plutarchean subjects “successful,” if we equate success with influence and 
renown. 
                                               
36 Except for the Lucullus, scholars have argued that the remaining six were written at 
the same time. See Pelling 1988: 3-4. 
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Second, Plutarch had access to some sources from the Late Republic which are now lost 
to us. Quellenforschung was a subject taken up with enthusiastic interest by scholars of Plutarch 
in the 20th century, and as a result we have some useful insights into Plutarch’s likely sources.37 
I will draw attention to particularly relevant examples in the list itself, but a few major 
examples bear mention at the outset. On the early side of our period, it is clear that Plutarch 
had consulted Sulla’s now lost autobiography. It is unclear where exactly Sulla began the 
narrative of his own life, but some studies have argued that he started from his birth.38 On the 
other end of our chronological range, Plutarch also had access to Asinius Pollio’s lost Historia. 
It is uncertain where exactly Pollio’s history began and ended, but it certainly was an invaluable 
(and in some instances firsthand) source for the events of the Republic’s last generation.39 
There were also other biographical sources available to Plutarch. He seems, for instance, to 
have had access to Tiro’s biography of Cicero, and we should expect also that some now-lost 
biographies by Cornelius Nepos, a contemporary witness, provided Plutarch with some 
material for his Lives. In addition to these notable works, there also must have been a wealth of 
speeches and letters from Late Republican sources available to the biographer.40 
Finally, Plutarch’s evidence is particularly useful for our purposes precisely because he 
wrote biographies and not histories. He tells us this explicitly in his Alexander: 
οὔτε γὰρ ἱστορίας γράφοµεν, ἀλλὰ βίους, οὔτε ταῖς ἐπιφανεστάταις πράξεσι πάντως ἔνεστι δήλωσις 
ἀρετῆς ἢ κακίας, ἀλλὰ πρᾶγµα βραχὺ πολλάκις καὶ ῥῆµα καὶ παιδιά τις ἔµφασιν ἤθους ἐποίησε µᾶλλον ἢ 
                                               
37 Pelling 1979 and 1988: 26ff; Van Hoof 2014: 136ff.; Van der Stockt 2014: 322ff.  
 
38 For an excellent discussion see FRH 1.284-6 
 
39 FRH 1.430ff. 
 
40 Pelling 1979: 89. Plutarch also probably knew of Tiro’s de Iocis. 
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µάχαι µυριόνεκροι καὶ παρατάξεις αἱ µέγισται	καὶ πολιορκίαι πόλεων. ὥσπερ οὖν οἱ ζωγράφοι τὰς 
ὁµοιότητας ἀπὸ τοῦ προσώπου καὶ τῶν περὶ τὴν ὄψιν εἰδῶν, οἷς ἐµφαίνεται τὸ ἦθος, ἀναλαµβάνουσιν, 
ἐλάχιστα τῶν λοιπῶν µερῶν φροντίζοντες, οὕτως ἡµῖν δοτέον εἰς τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς σηµεῖα µᾶλλον ἐνδύεσθαι 
καὶ διὰ τούτων εἰδοποιεῖν τὸν ἑκάστου βίον, ἐάσαντας ἑτέροις τὰ µεγέθη καὶ τοὺς ἀγῶνας. (Plut. Alex. 1.2) 
 
I am not writing histories, but rather Lives. For the image of virtue or vice is not always clear in the most 
famous events; but a small thing, such as a saying or a joke, often reveals the character more than battles in 
which thousands perish, or the greatest sieges od cities. Just like painters take up the likeness of a person 
after seeing it from the face and the eyes through which the character is revealed, and then ignore the other 
parts, in this way I must be allowed to focus on the signs of the soul, and through these to craft the Life of 
each, allowing others to handle the description of their great feats. 
 
Thus, whereas a history might detail only a significant event, Plutarch’s Lives are concerned 
with uncovering the character of his subjects using details from over the course of their entire 
lives. Although at least one scholar has objected to the use of Plutarch for evidence about the 
youthful campaigns of his subjects, the evidence, I believe, suggests quite the opposite.41 Now, 
for the historian the passage above presents an obvious challenge when using Plutarch as a 
source; the moralizing project that is the foundation of the Parallel Lives is less desirable than 
other sources which at least claim to approach a topic without particular bias. Such hesitancy is 
entirely appropriate when dealing with Plutarch as evidence. Yet, whereas histories might seek 
to narrate events, and thus largely ignore a subject’s life up to that point wherein he assumes a 
significant role within the narrative being presented, Plutarch’s mission to reveal the character 
of his subjects often leads to a discussion (albeit brief) of their birth and upbringing. Outside 
of Plutarch’s Lives the chances of discovering significant biographical detail on any given 
subject before his political career are bleak. There is, however, one figure from the Late 
Republic about whose youth we can speak with some certainty. M. Caelius’ close association 
                                               
41 Ridley 2010: 105 claims that Plutarch was rarely interested in youthful campaigns but 
compare this with the catalogue of early campaigns provided by Pelling 2011: 137, who says 
that Plutarch, “likes such first campaigns” when commenting on the biographer’s unusual 
silence on Caesar’s service in Bithynia and Cilicia.  
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with Cicero has given us some epistolary evidence and, more importantly, a surviving defense 
speech that accounts for much of his youth. Therefore, I have decided to include Caelius in 
addition to our other Plutarchean subjects. Finally, this is not to say that I have consulted 
Plutarch exclusively. In every instance I have brought in as many relevant sources as I was able to 
collect. Rather, Plutarch’s list of late-republican lives has served to curate this sample since the 
existence of a biography on a subject assures we will have at least some information on his 
youth. 
 In analyzing these early careers I am seeking to establish how much service each man 
had prior to his first public office (for most the quaestorship). Throughout what follows I will 
also be keeping in mind the decem stipendia in order to see how many of these men fulfilled it 
(or even had the ability to). Many of the details of any given senator’s early life are uncertain, 
especially in respect to dating. A source like Plutarch may mention one anecdote from a 
subject’s military service without commenting on the duration of a posting. As a result, in 
many cases scholars have engaged in debates over these details and have in certain instances 
disagreed as to the amount of military service undertaken by a subject. In such cases I have 
provided an account of the differing arguments. In order, however, that my findings not appear 
skewed by opportunistic readings and decisions I am applying what seem to me to be the most 
reasonable conservative criteria in both the dating of campaigns and in determining what 
qualifies as “service” and what does not. Our sources are not explicit about how this might 
have been determined, and in their absence I have chosen to err on the side of caution. Thus, 
for example, some aristocrats may have undertaken military action while holding no official 
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position, but rather having raised a force as a privatus.42 I have counted such action as service, 
even though it is conceivable that the formal satisfaction of the decem stipendia may have 
required the holding of an official position within the army. Likewise, I have chosen to count 
service as a contubernalis (time spent on a commander’s staff) in reckoning the amount of 
service rendered. Finally, I have also counted official military positions served in peaceful 
provinces, even though there could be some debate as to whether this would have been an 
adequate form of service for fulfilling the campaigns. Where relevant, I have provided 
important texts and my translations of them. I have found relevant those texts which mention 
youthful service or suggest military inexperience when discussing a senator’s later campaign.  
 
III.1 C. Marius (b. 157 BCE Consul 86 BCE) 
 
[C(aius) Marius C(ai) f(ilius)] / [co(n)s(ul) VII pr(aetor) tr(ibunus) pl(ebis) q(uaestor) a]ugur tr(ibunus) 
mil(itum)  (CIL 6.41024) 
 
πρώτην δὲ στρατείαν στρατευσάµενος ἐπὶ Κελτίβηρας, ὅτε Σκηπίων Ἀφρικανὸς Νοµαντίαν ἐπολιόρκει, τὸν 
στρατηγὸν οὐκ ἐλάνθανεν ἀνδρείᾳ τῶν ἄλλων νέων διαφέρων καὶ τὴν µεταβολὴν τῆς διαίτης, ἣν ὑπὸ τρυφῆς 
καὶ πολυτελείας διεφθαρµένοις ἐπῆγε τοῖς στρατεύµασιν ὁ Σκηπίων, εὐκολώτατα προσδεχόµενος. (Plut. Mar. 
3.2) 
 
Sed is natus et omnem pueritiam Arpini altus, ubi primum aetas militiae patiens fuit, stipendiis faciundis, non Graeca 
facundia neque urbanis munditiis sese exercuit; ita inter artis bonas integrum ingenium brevi adolevit. Ergo ubi primum 
tribunatum militarem a populo petit, plerisque faciem eius ignorantibus, factis notus per omnis tribus declaratur. (Sall. Iug. 
63.3-4) 
 
 I began this chapter with a quote from a speech attributed to Marius by Sallust in the 
Jugurtha, and he is also the first figure in our sample. He was also one of the most 
accomplished military men in Roman history. In praising Marius’ achievements on the 
                                               
42 See III.5 Crassus, III.9 Caesar. It is unclear exactly what is meant by privatus in this 
instance. It is possible that instead of meaning “private citizen” in the usual sense (we might 
think of the anachronistic designation “civilian”) it means that one did not hold a command 
position. On these grounds I have elected to count such terms as service. 
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battlefield, the Roman People were forced to turn to the city’s semi-mythical past to find suitable 
company for the new man from Arpinum.43 In the speech in the Jugurtha, as we have seen, 
Marius was critical of aristocrats who shirked military service, and it makes for an appropriate foil 
– perhaps suspiciously appropriate – that Sallust says Marius began military service “as soon as 
age allowed.” Much like the content of Marius’ speech, the confluence of the opacity of Sallust’s 
comment, its role in Sallust’s literary project, and hyperbole undermines the value of this 
evidence. When does age allow one to enter the army? 
 There are only a few other hints about Marius’ life before the Jugurthine War. Plutarch 
was much more specific than Sallust on this topic while also strongly contradicting him. 
Regarding military service, Plutarch only mentions that Marius served under Scipio Aemilianus 
at Numantia (134-33 BCE) before moving on to his term as tribune of plebs in 119 BCE.44 In 
accounting for Marius’ time in Numantia, Plutarch’s Greek is helpfully clearer than what we 
encounter in other subjects on this list; he says that the campaign was Marius’ first (πρώτην δὲ 
στρατείαν στρατευσάµενος). Marius was 23 years old at the time, much older than the earliest 
age which would first allow service in the army; Romans were traditionally eligible for service at 
17. Outside of Plutarch, we are also told that Marius held a military tribunate, mentioned by 
Sallust and the existing Augustan elogia of Marius from the Forum of Augustus (see above for 
                                               
43 Plut. Mar. 28.5 After the victory at Vercellae Marius was hailed as Rome’s “third 
founder” after Romulus and Camillus.  
 
44 Plut. Mar. 3.2-3. Marius seems to have made a strong impression upon Scipio 
Aemilianus while at Numantia. Fascinatingly, if we trust the Sallustian testimony, Marius 
would have shared his commander’s approbation with his future adversary Jugurtha. 
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both).45 The dating and location of this posting is also unclear, since some have thought it came 
as early as 129 BCE while others have placed it as late as 119 BCE.46 There is no other record in 
our sources of a campaign undertaken by Marius before his quaestorship – another Marian office 
about which the details are uncertain. Thomas Carney places Marius’ quaestorship in 121 BCE, 
others have argued for 123 or 122 BCE47 In fact, another modern biographer of Marius doubted 
that the novus homo held the quaestorship at all, although his argument is one from silence and 
in contradiction of other sources.48  
Thus, the sources provide some useful information while leaving much to the 
imagination. It should come as no surprise that there have been many different reconstructions 
of Marius’ early life. Two of Marius’ (relatively) recent biographers agree that he must have 
fulfilled the decem stipendia before his first office but provide very different accounts of how he 
                                               
45 Suet. Aug. 31.5. In 2 BCE Augustus dedicated a series of statues and inscriptions 
commemorating great Romans. The elogia we have for Marius is from this project.  See Sage 
1979.  
 
46 Badian 1961: 496 favors 129 BCE in Asia under M. Aquillius (cos. 129 BCE) due to 
Marius’ later familiarity with the cult of the Magna Mater and his close association with 
Aquillius’ son of the same name, who would serve as Marius’ consular colleague in 101 BCE 
Evans 1994: 28-9 also suggests 130/129 BCE because he felt that Marius would not have 
waited long after his success in Numantia to capitalize at the polls. Carney [1962]1970: 17 
favors 124 BCE because it would allow Marius to serve his tribunate under the command of 
Q. Caecilius Metellus Balearicus (cos. 123 BCE). Gabba 1972: 770 puts the military tribunate 
in 123 BCE Suolahti 1955: 312, 405 dates the office to “around 119 BCE” but gives no 
justification for doing so.  
 
47 MRR 3.139-40. Carney [1962]1970: 17-8 suggests 122 BCE for Marius’ quaestorship, 
assuming that he stood for the office immediately following his military tribunate. 
 
48 Evans 1962: 32-5, on the basis that Sallust and Plutarch do not mention a 
quaestorship by Marius (although neither mentions him “skipping” the office either). Marius’ 
quaestorship is attested in the epigraphic evidence provided above as well as Val. Max. 6.16. 
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must have done so. Carney accepts Plutarch and agrees that Marius’ first campaign was in 134 
BCE in Numantia and therefore he places the military tribunate in 124 BCE (believing that 
Marius would have needed to fulfill the decem stipendia before seeking this office). This, however, 
is an interpretive mistake by Carney. He assumes that the decem stipendia mentioned in Polybius 
(6.19.1-2) applied to the military tribunate, but this cannot be the case since Polybius, in the very 
same passage, mentions a different standard for military tribunes. There were 24 military 
tribunes in a given year, and while it is true that some (10) military tribunates required 10 years of 
prior service, others (14) only required five – we have no indication from the sources that Marius 
held the former position rather than the latter.49 Thus, we cannot assume that Marius had 
fulfilled the decem stipendia by the time of his military tribunate on these grounds.  
Richard Evans takes a different approach in assigning more years of service to Marius’ 
record. He doubts that Numantia in 134 BCE was Marius’ first campaign (as Plutarch tells us it 
was) on the grounds that it was unlikely that Marius began his military service so late in life. 
Evans looks elsewhere in Plutarch to support his thesis: 
τὸν στρατηγὸν οὐκ ἐλάνθανεν ἀνδρείᾳ τῶν ἄλλων νέων διαφέρων καὶ τὴν µεταβολὴν τῆς διαίτης, ἣν ὑπὸ 
τρυφῆς καὶ πολυτελείας διεφθαρµένοις ἐπῆγε τοῖς στρατεύµασιν ὁ Σκηπίων, εὐκολώτατα προσδεχόµενος. 
(Plut. Mar. 3.2) 
 
He attracted the attention of his (new?) general by excelling the other young men in bravery, and by his 
cheerful acceptance of the changed régime which Scipio introduced into the army when it had been spoiled by 
luxury and extravagance.50 (Evans’ translation) 
 
This gives the impression (according to Evans) that Marius had been a member of the army before 
Scipio’s arrival and that the young Marius had ingratiated himself to the new commander by 
                                               
49 See Polyb. 6.19.1. Also Suolahti 1955: 51-7. This is noted by Evans 1962: 26-7 when 
discussing this problem. 
 
50 Evans’s translation ad loc.  
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zealously embracing Scipio’s reforms. This is possible, but not supported at all by the text. 
Without the hesitant interpolation that Scipio was Marius’ “(new?) general” there is nothing to 
suggest that Marius’ service in Spain predated Scipio’s tenure, and certainly not enough to 
overturn Plutarch’s own clear assertion that Numantia was Marius’ first campaign.  
How do we account for Marius’ youthful military service in the face of so much 
uncertainty? First, I accept Plutarch’s testimony that Marius’ first campaign was in 134 BCE 
because I fail to see a compelling reason not to, and I have chosen to adopt the most conservative 
(and reasonable) dating (i.e. the dating which allows for the most time for Marius to serve) of 
Marius’ quaestorship: 121 BCE. This leaves a 13-year window in which Marius may have fulfilled 
the decem stipendia – and it is entirely possible that he did. It is, however, important to remember 
that we only have evidence for three campaigns (two with Scipio at Numantia and at least one as 
military tribune in an unknown theater). If we follow Badian and Evans in dating Marius’ 
military tribunate to 129 BCE, this would have given him just enough time to fulfill the 
minimum five years of service required to seek that office if he served continuously from 
Numantia until his election. Including these purely hypothetical years, Marius’ total rises to six 
campaigns. The question, naturally, is what Marius did between 128 and 121 BCE – again, a 
question we are unable to answer.51 There, of course, would have been plenty of opportunity for 
Marius to have added more campaigns to his résumé in this period; the Fasti Triumphales show 
                                               
51 Evans 1994: 30-2 suggests that Marius spent this time away from military service 
tending to business in Arpinum and amassing wealth in anticipation of his political 
aspirations. While this argument aids the idea that Marius did not serve ten campaigns before 
seeking the quaestorship, it is too speculative to be taken as evidence.  
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military action in Illyria and Liguria during the 120’s.52 Yet, we have no explicit mention of 
Marius having undertaken any service during this time.  
What makes the case of Marius so challenging is his extraordinary reputation as a soldier. 
Our sources suggest that his military record (even before his victories in Africa and Gaul as 
consul) was the backbone of his electoral success and self-presentation. Yet, we should not 
overlook the possibility that our sources were influenced by Marius’ post-quaestorship success. 
We may detect, perhaps, the kind of rhetorical exaggeration Marius’ later career inspired in the 
interesting disagreement between two of the brief passages I have provided above, in which 
Plutarch claimed Marius’ first campaign came when he was already 23, while Sallust suggested 
Marius began his service at the earliest possible age. The Sallustian passage fits nicely with the 
author’s portrayal of Marius as a man of action, but this could be an example of the great 
general’s future achievements infecting and account of his youth. Uncertainty abounds.  
For the purposes of this paper and in the spirit of providing a conservative account I add 
four years of service to the six I have already counted, bringing Marius’ total to ten years. Seven 
of these years are unaccounted for, but I believe that Marius’ reputation and the sources 
insistence that he traded on his military deeds early in his career should hold sway.  
 
III.2 L. Cornelius Sulla Felix (b. 138 BCE Consul 81 BCE) 
Igitur Sulla, uti supra dictum est, postquam in Africam atque in castra Mari cum equitatu venit, rudis antea et ignarus 
belli, sollertissumus omnium in paucis tempestatibus factus est. (Sall. Iug. 96.1) 
 
L. vero Sulla usque ad quaesturae suae comitia vitam libidine, vino, ludicrae artis amore inquinatam perduxit. qua 
propter C. Marius consul moleste tulisse traditur quod sibi asperrimum in Africa bellum gerenti tam delicatus quaestor 
sorte obvenisset. (Val. Max. 6.9.6) 
 
                                               
52 See Rich 2014: 250. 
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Our view of Marius’ early life is considerably obscured by uncertainty, but the account 
of his rival Sulla’s youth is effectively redacted by comparison. The combination of Sulla’s 
massive impact on the political community and the complete uncertainty about his youth have 
inspired so much speculation that no other figure on this list has been the focus of more 
discussions on the decem stipendia than Sulla. Like Marius, he was a man of considerable 
military ability and also heavily emphasized his military achievement in order to enhance his 
political prestige.53 Further, that he was able to keep pace somewhat with Marius, Rome’s 
“third founder,” in terms of military achievement places him in the rarified air of Rome’s most 
famous generals. Yet, it has often troubled modern scholars that, despite Sulla’s subsequent 
and extensive military success, we have no indication whatsoever that he served in the army 
prior to his quaestorship in 106 BCE.54  
 It is important at the beginning of our assessment of Sulla to recognize that while we 
have no evidence attesting to any campaigns served by Sulla before his quaestorship, the 
sources for his youth are also not ideal. Appian’s Mithridatic War and Civil War give us a great 
deal of our evidence about Sulla but do not deal with his early life at all. Plutarch only 
dedicated the first two chapters of his Sulla to the dictator’s youth prior to his quaestorship 
under Marius in Africa. The biographer does spend some time on Sulla’s humble beginnings 
and moral turpitude as a youth but he does not mention any military service prior to 106 BCE. 
Sallust painted with broad strokes as well. Like Plutarch, he attested both to Sulla’s incredible 
                                               
53 For his political exploitation of his role in the capture of Jugurtha see Plut. Sulla 6.1, 
Marius 11.5; See Keaveney [1982]2005: 24ff; Behr 1993: 114-121. 
 
54 Esp. Keaveney 1980 & Ridley 2010. 
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natural talent and the moral shortcomings. The Sallustian evidence, as with his testimony on 
Marius, is tainted by the historian’s reputation for inaccuracy, especially when such inaccuracy 
lends rhetorical value.55 Above I have provided the most relevant quote from the Jugurtha which 
states that before going to Africa to join Marius Sulla was rudis antea ignarus belli (“before this 
he was inexperienced and ignorant of warfare”). Sallust’s meaning is fairly clear; he only used 
the word rudis twice in his extant corpus, both in the Jugurtha: this passage about Sulla, and 
another (49.2) where Jugurtha is reassuring his men by pointing out the Roman’s ignorance of 
the landscape. We have 17 uses of ignarus scattered throughout all three existing Sallustian 
works, but all would suggest unfamiliarity, rather than simply disinterest or limited 
experience.56 Yet, although Sallust’s meaning is clear we must weigh this statement against his 
penchant for inaccuracy. In this instance, Sallust’s reputation should give us pause indeed since 
the author’s portrayal of Sulla as rudis and ignarus in respect to war provides a nice foil to his 
commander in Africa and future rival, Marius.57 Marius’ rhetoric in the Jugurtha emphasized 
his military experience as legitimizing his aspirations and position; Sallust’s Sulla spent his 
youth in frivolous vice but excelled in Africa thanks to innate talent. While discussing this 
issue Ronald Ridley calls the problem one of “contrived history.”58 I have also included above a 
                                               
55 Sallustian character sketches are often broad-brushed; his portraits of major figures 
such as Catiline, Caesar, Cato, Cicero, Jugurtha, and Marius often betray literary (rather than 
historical) concerns. 
 
56 Sall. Cat. 17.7, 51.27; Iug. 12.5, 18.7, 19.7, 28.5, 36.3, 49.4, 52.4, 67.1, 80.1, 85.10, 
91.1, 96.1 (the Sullan passage), 104.2; Hist. 1.103, 3.102. 
 
57 Harris 1979: 257; Paul 1984: 236. 
 
58 Ridley 2010: 103 
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brief piece of evidence from Valerius Maximus which likely follows the Sallustian evidence and 
tells us that Marius was concerned over his new, delicatus quaestor.  
Then there are the sources we do not have. Somewhat tantalizingly, Sulla’s 
autobiography looms behind all our extant ancient accounts of Sulla’s life. Plutarch clearly had 
read Sulla’s autobiography, and Sallust certainly had access to it as well.59 Sulla had not 
finished his memoirs when he died in 78 BCE (they were completed by Sulla’s freedman 
Epicadus), but he had made significant progress – the work spanned 22 volumes.60 
Unfortunately we do not know precisely how much attention Sulla paid to his youth in his 
work. Some have argued that Sulla ignored his ancestry and youth in an effort to pass over 
embarrassing material. Instead, it is argued, Sulla began in earnest with his quaestorship in 
Africa.61 This idea is undermined, however, by the fact that other authors who are almost 
certainly using material from Sulla’s autobiography display a familiarity with Sulla’s ancestry, 
which in turn suggests that Sulla did devote some space to a review of his family history – and 
perhaps even a robust section at that.62 Further, Sulla also undoubtedly had a familiarity with a 
previous autobiography written by a Roman aristocrat, M. Aemilius Scaurus, since Sulla 
married Scaurus’ widow.63 This is significant for us because we know that Scaurus did include 
                                               
59 Sallust: Mellor 1999: 39. 
 
60 FRH 1.284-6; Keaveney [1982]2005: 168. 
 
61 E.g. Valgiglio 1975, Keaveney [1982]2005: 168-9 (list borrowed from the helpful 
review in Lewis 1991: 512n13). 
 
62 Badian 1970: 4ff; Lewis 1991: 512-3. 
 
63 FRH 1.268-70. 
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information on his youth and pre-cursus honorum life in his de Vita Sua.64 Finally, some have 
suggested that Sulla would have omitted information about his early life because he would have 
found it embarrassing,65 but such an assumption takes (in my opinion) too many interpretive 
liberties. We simply have no evidence for such a decision on his part and we should be loath to 
psychoanalyze. Finally, the theme of Sulla’s autobiography was clearly his felicitas, and few 
narrative arcs would match this leitmotif as well as a rags-to-riches story. Scaurus seems to have 
deployed a similar tactic in his own memoir.66 This is all to say that it is possible that Sallust 
and Plutarch both had access to detailed source material on Sulla’s early life, and if this is true 
it is worth noting that neither mentioned any military service by Sulla until his quaestorship. 
We ought not, however, place too much weight on this argument ex silentio.  
Our sources, therefore, cannot speak conclusively as to how much (if any) military 
service Sulla had rendered prior to 106 BCE. In the face of such uncertainty scholarship has 
predictably split. On one side, many have accepted the existence of the decem stipendia in this 
period and have fallen back on the Sallustian evidence’s unreliability and lacunose nature to 
suggest that Sulla must have had some military experience before his quaestorship which we 
simply do not hear about.67 Propping up this interpretation is the assumption that Sulla’s 
candidacy for quaestorship would have been disqualified if he lacked ten campaigns. Ridley 
                                               
64 Lewis 1991: 512. 
 
65 Keaveney [1982]2005. 
 
66 Lewis 1991: 215; FRH 1.268-70. 
 
67 Afzelius 1946: 263-78; Ridley 2010: 102-6. 
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uses the Plutarchian evidence to show that no policy change vis a vis the decem stipendia had 
taken place by Sulla’s youth, citing examples (many of which we will see in this catalogue) of 
pre-cursus service by Plutarch’s subjects.68 Yet, there is a serious problem with Ridley’s 
methodology: he takes any military service prior to one’s quaestorship as indication that the 
subject had fulfilled the full term of the decem stipendia. For some, as we will see, well under ten 
campaigns of service can be accounted for. Further, if we are to glean Ridley’s definition of 
service from his list of instances then his definition is very broad indeed.69 Based on these 
findings, the argument that Sulla had fulfilled the decem stipendia prior to 106 BCE fails to 
convince. Further, it is clearly a circular one.  
Others who are less certain about the nature and level of observance of the decem 
stipendia during Sulla’s lifetime point to a more logical basis for supposing some military 
experience for Sulla prior to his quaestorship: he was simply too talented for a beginner.70 
While Sallust did mention that Sulla was inexperienced when he arrived in Africa, he finished 
the sentence by writing: sollertissimus omnium in paucis tempestatibus factus est. Sulla was a 
“natural” according to Sallust, but how likely could this be? Ridley is also skeptical on these 
                                               
68 Ridley 2010: 105ff.  
 
69 E.g. Ridley 2010: 105. It is fair enough to assume that M. Crassus (cos. 70 BCE) 
served under his father during the Social War, but it is important to remember that we have 
no evidence stating that. M. Brutus accompanied his uncle Cato Uticensis to Cyprus in 58 
BCE, but there is no indication that he did so in an official capacity. Antony is said to have 
gone on “military exercises” in Greece in 58 BCE, but there is no suggestion in our sources 
that he held a military position, and Plutarch focuses more on his rhetorical training 
undertaken there than his military training. 
 
70 Long 1864: 1.467, 2.215; Paul 1984: 237; Hinard 1985: 21, 26, 31; Ridley 2010: 
102-3. 
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grounds.71 He has trouble imagining that Sulla was placed in charge of the cavalry without 
having had any previous cavalry service. From a practical standpoint, so it is argued, Sulla was 
simply too capable. The foundation of Ridley’s objection is that the horsemanship required of 
cavalrymen was too difficult to be learned in so brief a period of time. Ridley writes: “The 
cavalry had to be able to ride a variety of mounts. ‘Normal riding is difficult enough to master. 
Good riders spend years perfecting techniques.’”72 This objection is fair, but the author fails to 
note the difference between training and experience. Even if we were to accept that 106 BCE 
was Sulla’s first campaign in the cavalry (admittedly, in my opinion, an overly-literal 
interpretation of the evidence), it would be ridiculous to imagine that it was his first time on a 
horse. Mastery of horsemanship was a major focus of the education of young Roman 
aristocrats.73 The young Caesar, to cite a famous example, was already an expert rider before he 
was old enough to go out on campaign.74 The reality was that young aristocrats were trained for 
war even before they took up their first military service. Thus, Ridley’s interpretive mistake is 
to assume that military training began in the army. Sulla may have been inexperienced in 
actual service but still possessing of the skill set necessary to serve as a cavalry commander.  
On the other side of the scholarly discussion of Sulla’s youth are those who are 
friendlier to the Sallustian evidence. Mommsen (albeit in passing) agreed with Sallust and 
                                               
71 Ridley 2010. 
 
72 Ridley 2010: 108 citing Hyland 1990: 110-6.   
 
73 See the discussion of aristocratic education in the Introduction. 
 
74 Plut. Caes. 17.6. 
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Valerius Maximus and accepted the narrative that Sulla came to Africa “untried” but quickly 
proved himself a brilliant military officer.75 Many others have echoed the Sallustian/Valerian 
narrative without considering that Sulla’s biography as we have it may omit youthful service.76 
Ernst Badian claimed, based on Sallust, that Sulla did no military service, but he takes this to 
mean that Sulla had initially not intended upon a political career since, in his view, the decem 
stipendia were still being enforced.77 More recently, Arthur Keaveney believed that we should 
not dismiss the Sallustian evidence.78 Instead, Keaveney offered some suggestions of how Sulla 
may have avoided military service and still stood for office. His first suggestion resurrects the 
opinion of Mommsen and posits that merely standing for the levy was sufficient for counting 
service in a campaign. A I discussed above, I believe this interpretation highly unlikely. Second, 
Keaveney believed that the lex Annalis may have – perhaps even gradually – replaced military 
expectations with age requirements. Such an argument is interesting, but there is little evidence 
to support it. Finally, Keaveney pointed to the lex Iulia municipalis, which stated that anyone 
running for magistracy in a municipium or colony must be 30 years old unless he had served 
three campaigns in the cavalry or six in the infantry.79 Keaveney believes that it is possible that 
                                               
75 Mommsen RG 4.142ff 
 
76 Ridley 2010 provides a very thorough and useful bibliography, although much of the 
scholarship he cites is by now quite antiquated. See Hooke 1818: 7.1201; Lau 1885: 28, 47, 
52, 69 (Sulla’s first modern biographer); Neumann 1881: 1.334-5; Liddell 1855[1901]: 514; 
Shuckburgh 1894: 576; Drumman 1902: 2.365; Greenidge 1904: 444-6. 
 
77 Badian 1970: 6. Gabba 1972: 704 follows Badian. 
 
78 Keaveney 1980: 165ff. 
 
79 See Crawford RS 366ff. quei minor annos (trigenta) natus est erit, nei quis eorum post 
k(alendas) Ianuar(ias) secundas in municipio colonia praefectura IIuir(atum) IIIIuir(atum) neue quem 
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this law, technically for the municipia, may have been based on an older Roman precedent, 
perhaps one that Sulla was in adherence with when he ran for the quaestorship. Again, an 
entirely possible solution that also lacks any support from our sources.  
On level it excessive to argue that Sulla had no military experience before his 
quaestorship; our sources are simply not strong enough to warrant such an extreme 
interpretation, and one would imagine this would have seemed worthy of more comment by 
those who wrote on Sulla’s early career in antiquity. It would also be difficult, however, to 
claim that Sulla had fulfilled the decem stipendia without any record of service before 106 BCE. 
Therefore, for the moment I am reserving judgment on Sulla. At the end of this chapter, when 
a normal range of years of service is clearer from our examples, it may in fact be appropriate to 
consider whether or not we should consider Sulla to have done some amount of service in line 
with our findings. The disproportionate relationship between Sulla’s success and his 
experience in youth may have been dramatic, but we shall see that it was less extraordinary for 
a senator of this period to serve less than ten campaigns. 
 
III.3 Q. Sertorius (b. circa 123 BCE Praetor circa 85 BCE) 
 
ἤσκητο µὲν οὖν καὶ περὶ δίκας ἱκανῶς, καί τινα καὶ δύναµιν ἐν τῇ πόλει µειράκιον ὢν ἀπὸ τοῦ λέγειν ἔσχεν· αἱ 
δὲ	περὶ τὰ στρατιωτικὰ λαµπρότητες αὐτοῦ καὶ κατορθώσεις ἐνταῦθα τὴν φιλοτιµίαν µετέστησαν. (Plut. Sert. 
2.1) 
 
Πρῶτον µὲν οὖν Κίµβρων καὶ Τευτόνων ἐµβεβληκότων εἰς Γαλατίαν στρατευόµενος ὑπὸ Καιπίωνι, (Plut. 
Sert. 3.1) 
                                               
alium mag(istratum) petito neue capito neue gerito, nisei quei eorum stipendia equo in legione (tria) aut 
pedestria in legione (sex) fecerit... Scholarship now generally agrees that we cannot conclusively 
identify the regulations on the Tabula Heracleensis as the lex Iulia municipialis of 45 BCE. There 
is, however, a good likelihood – following Crawford – that the regulations are Caesarian in 
date. 
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δεύτερον δὲ τῶν αὐτῶν ἐπερχοµένων µυριάσι πολλαῖς καὶ δειναῖς ἀπειλαῖς, ὥστε καὶ τὸ µένειν ἄνδρα 
Ῥωµαῖον ἐν τάξει τότε καὶ τὸ πείθεσθαι τῷ στρατηγῷ µέγα ἔργον εἶναι, Μάριος µὲν ἡγεῖτο, Σερτώριος δὲ 
κατασκοπὴν ὑπέστη τῶν πολεµίων. (Plut. Sert. 3.2) 
 
τότε µὲν οὖν ἀριστείων ἔτυχεν· ἐν δὲ τῇ λοιπῇ στρατείᾳ πολλὰ καὶ συνέσεως ἔργα καὶ τόλµης ἀποδειξάµενος 
εἰς ὄνοµα καὶ πίστιν ὑπὸ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ προήχθη. µετὰ δὲ τὸν Κίµβρων καὶ Τευτόνων πόλεµον ἐκπεµφθεὶς 
ὑπὸ Δειδίῳ στρατηγῷ χιλίαρχος ἐπὶ Ἰβηρίας ἐν τῇ πόλει Καστλῶνι παρεχείµαζε τῆς Κελτιβήρων. (Plut. 
Sert. 3.3) 
 
Ἐκ τούτου Σερτώριος ἐν τῇ Ἰβηρίᾳ διεβοήθη· καὶ ὅτε πρῶτον ἐπανῆκεν εἰς Ῥώµην, ταµίας ἀποδείκνυται τῆς 
περὶ Πάδον Γαλατίας, ἐν δέοντι. τοῦ γὰρ Μαρσικοῦ πολέµου συνισταµένου, στρατιώτας τε προσταχθὲν αὐτῷ 
καταλέγειν καὶ ὅπλα ποιεῖσθαι, σπουδὴν καὶ τάχος προσθεὶς τῷ ἔργῳ παρὰ τὴν τῶν ἄλλων νέων βραδυτῆτα 
καὶ µαλακίαν ἀνδρὸς ἐµπράκτως βιωσοµένου	δόξαν ἔσχεν. (Plut. Sert. 4.1) 
 
 Quintus Sertorius was born into a Sabine equestrian family in Nursia (modern Norica).80 
We do not have a solid date for Sertorius’ birth, and scholarly theories as to the date rest most 
often on Sertorius’ entry into the army. Sertorius’ first recorded campaign is in 106 or 105 BCE 
(for reasons I will explain below, I favor 106), if one assumes that Sertorius joined the army at 17 
then 123 BCE would have been his birth year. This has been the traditional view.81 This of 
course works from the assumption that he would have joined the army at 17, but we shall see 
throughout this work that it was not uncommon for young men to join up earlier or later.82 
Little is known about his family other than that he lost his father and was raised by his mother, 
                                               
80 Cicero (Brut. 180) referred to Sertorius as someone “of our order.” 
 
81 Schulten 1926: 38 was the first to suggest 123 BCE; others have followed: Sumner 
1973: 108; Katz 1984: 44-9; DNP Elvers, “Q. Sertorius” takes 123 BCE for granted. 
 
82 Spann 1987: 158-9 argues that Sertorius joined later than 17, believing that Plutarch 
suggests that Sertorius gained some notability as an orator before joining the army and thinking 
that it would have been difficult to do so at 17. Konrad 1994: 37-8, however, convincingly 
argues that Plutarch’s separation of rhetorical achievements and military ones is a product of 
theme rather than chronology. 
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Rhea.83 We also have some evidence of his early non-military career; Cicero mentioned having 
seen Sertorius speak and classified Sertorius among the rabulae (“ranters”) who were 
characterized by their ignorance, rudeness, and rusticity.84 Whether or not Sertorius was a good 
public speaker, we have no reason to doubt Plutarch when he tells us that Sertorius’ military 
ability steered his career primarily towards the camp rather than the forum.  
 While it is generally accepted that Plutarch suggests the fight against the Cimbri and 
Teutoni as Sertorius’ entrance into the army, it is not actually as clear as we might like that this 
was what Plutarch meant. Elsewhere (as we have already seen in Marius’ case, and as we shall see 
in other entries) Plutarch is rather intentional about identifying his subject’s first campaign, 
usually doing so with some form of πρώτη στρατεία. Here, however, the πρῶτον is connected to 
the later δεύτερον, and thus not referring explicitly to the campaign (στρατευόµενος).85 While 
this does leave the possibility that Sertorius served before this time, we have no source material 
to base such a thesis on. Further, if Sertorius first served against the Cimbri and Teutoni, in what 
year did his service begin? The details provided by Plutarch are from the disaster at Arausio in 
105 BCE, but Caepio took command in 106. In order to accept the most conservative date in 
                                               
83 Konrad 1994: 35. Two other Roman subjects of Plutarchean biographies were raised 
by their mothers (see Cor. 1.2 and Ti Grac. 1.5-7). Although Plutarch’s words on Sertorius’ 
upbringing are laconic, we may also compare with Tacitus’ account of Agricola’s upbringing 
(Agric. 4.2ff). There is an intriguing connection throughout Plutarch’s Lives between the early 
loss of a father and future rebellion/betrayal of one’s country (Coriolanus, Alcibiades, the 
Gracchi, and Sertorius).  
 
84 Cic. Brut. 180 Sed omnium oratorum sive rabularum, qui plane indocti et inurbani aut 
rustici etiam fuerunt, quos quidem ego cognoverim, solutissimum in dicendi et acutissimum iudico nostri 
ordini Q. Sertorium.  
 
85 An excellent point advanced by Konrad 1994: 40.  
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respect to my argument I am assuming Sertorius joined Caepio at the start of his command in 
106 BCE.86 Whenever he arrived at the front, it is from this campaign that we get a harrowing 
(albeit almost certainly apocryphal) episode wherein an injured Sertorius swam across the Rhone 
in full armor without even yielding his shield.87 
The next we hear of Sertorius is his posting under Marius, who assumed command in 
Gaul in 104 BCE. At least one scholar has argued that Sertorius spent some time between 
Arausio and his service under Marius in Rome and not with the army, but his argument lacks 
any support in the evidence.88 Again we cannot have the level of certainty we would like, but 
without solid evidence that Sertorius spent time away from the army there is no reason to 
interpose a gap in between his postings under Caepio and Marius.89 Here also Plutarch includes 
an anecdote that reveals Sertorius’ prowess and bravery: this time Sertorius went undercover 
among the enemy and obtained valuable information for Marius.90 Helpfully for our purposes, 
                                               
86 Spann 1987: 159; Konrad 1994: 41ff who points out an obscure passage from the 
Scolia Berensia (Mommsen 1861: 451) on the Georgics that suggests Sertorius was a signifer at 
Arausio: Sertorius effodit signa, pugnavit et victus est, vix ipse ut evaderet, Rhodanum transnatavit. If 
indeed Sertorius was a signifer, it was likely not his first year in the army.  
 
87 Sertorius’ swim is also mentioned by Ammianus (24.6.7). Konrad 1994: 43 points 
out that the similarities between this episode and the famous swim of Horatius Cocles (also 
one-eyed) “invite skepticism.” Katz 1984: 290 argued that Sallust must have given considerable 
attention to this event in a now-lost portion of the Histories, suggesting that Sallust would have 
modeled it on Caesar’s famous swim in the Nile (Caes. BAfr. 21.2-3; Plut. Caes. 49.7-8; Suet. DJ 
64). This is intriguing, but entirely speculative.  
 
88 Rijkhoek 1992: 74-5 suggests that Sertorius spent 104-103 BCE at Rome, but there is 
no evidence for this in the sources.  
 
89 Following Konrad 1994: 45.  
 
90 When exactly this took place is uncertain. Some (Schulten 1926: 29; Spann 1987: 14-
7) place Sertorius’ mission just before the Battle of Aquae Sextiae. Konrad 1994: 46 gives some 
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Plutarch is fairly clear that Sertorius served through until the end of the conflict with the Cimbri 
and Teutoni.91 Thus, in order to adopt the most conservative position possible, it is fair to 
assume that Sertorius served continuously from his first posting in 106 BCE until 101 BCE.  
After this, Sertorius went to Spain under the command of Titus Didius (cos. 98 BCE); 
nothing is known about his life in between 101 BCE and this point.92 It is also unclear exactly 
when Sertorius began this campaign. The note in the current Loeb edition of Plutarch’s Sertorius 
suggests 97 BCE when Didius became a proconsul after his term in office, but others are less 
certain. Broughton accepts Didius’ term in Spain as 97-93 BCE, but Konrad believes that Didius 
began his campaign while consul in 98 BCE.93 Konrad suggests this on the basis of a brief aside 
in Obsequens (47) “Hispani pluribus proeliis devicti,” but this passage is too weak to hold up the 
argument – there was, of course, military activity in Spain before Didius’ tenure. In fact, L. 
Cornelius Dolabella held a Spanish triumph in 98.94 Thus, I see no good reason to adopt 98 
                                               
other options: the fall of 104 BCE (when the Romans apparently expected an invasion – see 
Plut. Mar. 14.9-10) or fall of 102 BCE (when Marius seems to have had good intelligence about 
the subsequent invasion – see Plut. Mar. 15.1-5, 23.2). Ultimately, I agree with Konrad when 
he conceeds that Sertorius’ mission could conceivably have happened at any time between 104 
and 102. 
 
91 Especially considering some of Plutarch’s phrasing: ἐν δὲ τῇ λοιπῇ στρατείᾳ and µετὰ 
δὲ τὸν Κίµβρων καὶ Τευτόνων πόλεµον. 
 
92 Spann 1987: 18 believes he remained in the army, which is possible, but there are no 
sources to support this.  
 
93 MRR 2.4-7, volume 3 records no dispute about Didius’ term in Spain. Konrad 1994: 
48ff argues (briefly) for 98-93 BCE. 
 
94 MRR 2.5. C. Cloelius Caldus was also a proconsul in the region during Didius 
consulship in 98 BCE. 
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BCE in lieu of the start of Didius’ proconsular term in 97 BCE. This is significant for us 
because, as with Sertorius’ posting under Caepio, it is reasonable enough to expect that Sertorius 
joined his commander at the beginning of his tenure rather than later.  
As with his arrival, we are also in the dark about when exactly Sertorius returned. Didius 
came back to Rome in 93 BCE and held a triumph. It would seem natural for Sertorius to have 
returned with his commander, but whenever he returned he did not stay long. Plutarch tells us 
that Sertorius was made quaestor for Cisalpine Gaul “as soon as he returned.” Further, Plutarch 
added that Sertorius’ posting came at an opportune time for the newly-minted quaestor to make 
an impact during the outbreak of Social War. This creates something of a chronological 
problem. If Sertorius was elected “as soon as he returned,” 92 BCE would be an attractive dating 
for his year in office, but we also know that Sertorius’ tenure came τοῦ γὰρ Μαρσικοῦ πολέµου 
συνισταµένου – the Social War did not break out until 91 BCE. One scholar has argued that 
Sertorius must have stayed on in Spain for a year following Didius’ departure. The Celtiberians 
did rebel in 92 BCE while Didius’ replacement C. Valerius Flaccus (cos. 93) was in command, 
and it is possible that Sertorius stayed on to aid the new commander. In this way, Sertorius would 
have returned in 92 in time to be elected for 91. We do not, however, have any indication of this 
in our sources.95 Broughton originally dated Sertorius’ quaestorship to 90 based on the reference 
to the Social War, but emended this in his third volume in favor of 91 BCE based on Plutarch’s 
mention that Sertorius was elected quickly upon his return.96 Konrad provides, in my opinion, 
                                               
95 Spann 1987: 161-2 see also Sumner 1973: 108ff.  
 
96 MRR 2.27; 3.193. 
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the most reasonable suggestion. He argues that Plutarch was likely compressing events at this 
point to form a convenient narrative: Sertorius did well in Spain, he was elected quaestor soon 
after, his quaestorship saw participation in the early period of the Social War. If Sertorius 
returned with Didius in 93 BCE, he would have had to begin to organize his campaign for the 
elections in 92 quickly. Thus, it is reasonable given the laconic nature of our lone source to think 
that Plutarch considered a return in 93 and a successful election in 92 (for 91) to be rather swift, 
and that a term of office in 91 BCE would have included the outbreak of the Social War.97 
Therefore, for our purposes, 97-93 BCE is the most prudent dating of Sertorius’ service in Spain. 
Judging from this analysis, Sertorius had nine years of military service when he stood for 
the quaestorship in 92 BCE (106-101 and 97-93 BCE). This would leave him one year shy of 
fulfilling the decem stipendia. If we accept Spann’s rather tenuous suggestion that Sertorius stayed 
on an extra year in Spain then our tally would rise to 10. On the other hand, however, if we were 
to also accept Rijkhoeck’s equally speculative argument that Sertorius spent two years in Rome 
between his postings under Caepio and Marius, then the tally would drop again to eight (seven, 
if we do not include Spann’s argument regarding 92 BCE). Given our sources, I believe that nine 
is our most reasonable option.  
 
III.4 L. Licinius Lucullus (b. 118 BCE Consul 74 BCE) 
Νέος δ᾿ ὢν ἐν τῷ Μαρσικῷ πολέµῳ πολλὰ µὲν τόλµης δείγµατα παρέσχε καὶ συνέσεως, µᾶλλόν γε µὴν 
αὐτὸν δι᾿ εὐστάθειαν καὶ πρᾳότητα Σύλλας προσηγάγετο, καὶ χρώµενος ἀπ᾿ ἀρχῆς ἐπὶ τὰ πλείστης ἄξια 
σπουδῆς διετέλεσεν· ὧν ἦν καὶ ἡ περὶ τὸ νόµισµα πραγµατεία. (Plut. Luc. 2.1) 
 
Post ad Mithridaticum bellum missus a senatu non modo opinionem vicit omnium quae de virtute eius erat sed etiam 
gloriam superiorum; idque eo fuit mirabilius quod ab eo laus imperatoria non admodum exspectabatur qui adulescentiam 
in forensi opera, quaesturae diuturnum tempus Murena bellum in Ponto gerente in Asia pace consumpserat. (Cic. Aca. 
1.1-2) 
 
                                               
97 Konrad 1994: 52-3. 
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With Plutarch’s Lucullus we creep onto more stable footing in our sources. The dawn of 
the Republic’s last generation brings with it more source material useful for prosopographical 
research. In Lucullus’ case we are fortunate to have some Ciceronian information in addition 
to Plutarch’s extant biography. As with Sulla, however, now-lost works lurk in the background 
of the existing accounts. Plutarch cited both Sallust and Livy in his Life of Lucullus, but most of 
the works referenced by Plutarch are lost. Despite its fragmentary state we are able to tell that 
Sallust’s Histories seem to have been the primary source for Plutarch’s account.98 In addition, 
the poet Archias was a companion of Lucullus on his campaigns in the east and apparently 
wrote a poem in praise of his patron. As with the vast majority of Sallust’s Histories this is now 
lost, but was consulted by Plutarch for his Life.99 Antonius of Ascalon (another member of 
Lucullus’ traveling literary circle) was also consulted by Plutarch, and the biographer also had 
access to the account of Strabo in his now-lost Historical Sketches.100 Last among our missing 
sources, Plutarch’s Life was likely not the first biography of Lucullus – the author claims to have 
consulted the work of Cornelius Nepos, who possibly had written his own account of Lucullus’ 
life.101 Finally, Cicero was a colleague and occasional collaborator of Lucullus, who appears 
passim in the Ciceronian corpus. Most significantly, Cicero dedicated the second book of his 
                                               
98 Plut. Luc. 11.6; 33.3. Tröster 2008: 23 gives a useful review of the scholarship: 
Gleitsmann 1883: 12-24, 27ff; Otto 1889: 315-7; Maurenbrecher 1891: 48-54; Reinach 1895: 
441ff; Bauhofer 1935: 24ff, 100-9; McGushin 1994: 202. Plutarch also cites Livy in the 
Lucullus (28.8, 31.9) 
 
99 Schettino 2014: 423ff 
 
100 Plut. Luc. 28.8. 
 
101 Plut. Luc. 43.2 
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Academia to Lucullus, which (usefully for the purpose of this study) includes a brief summary 
of Lucullus’ career at its opening.  
Only just over a chapter of Plutarch’s account is dedicated to the period before 
Lucullus’ quaestorship in 87. Yet, he does mention that Lucullus did have some (distinguished) 
military experience during the Social War (91-88 BCE).102 Cicero, on the other hand, mentions 
no military service by Lucullus until his quaestorship.103 Certainly, Lucullus would go on to 
capitalize on significant military achievement, but Cicero tells us that Lucullus’ later military 
success came as a surprise to his peers since he had spent his youth in forensi opera.104 Plutarch 
also noted that, although Lucullus served honorably in the Social War, it was his non-martial 
virtues that attached him to Sulla.105  
Keaveney’s biography of Lucullus assumes that he had military experience previous to 
his military tribunate in 89 BCE based on two assumptions: 1) The pre-requisite of at least five 
years of service before holding a military tribunate, and 2) his brother Marcus Terentius Varro 
Lucullus’ (cos. 73 BCE) military record.106 His first point is in line with a somewhat tenuous 
interpretation accepted previously by Broughton, namely that Lucullus held the military 
                                               
102 Plut. Luc. 2.1 Νέος δ᾿ ὢν ἐν τῷ Μαρσικῷ πολέµῳ πολλὰ µὲν τόλµης δείγµατα 
παρέσχε καὶ συνέσεως, µᾶλλόν γε µὴν αὐτὸν δι᾿ εὐστάθειαν καὶ πρᾳότητα Σύλλας 
προσηγάγετο, καὶ χρώµενος ἀπ᾿ ἀρχῆς ἐπὶ τὰ πλείστης ἄξια σπουδῆς διετέλεσεν· ὧν ἦν καὶ 
ἡ περὶ τὸ νόµισµα πραγµατεία. 
 
103 Cic. Aca. 2.1 
 
104 Cic. Aca. 2.2 
 
105 See Plut. 2.1 (above). 
 
106 Varro Lucullus was a legate of Sulla’s in 82 BCE See Keaveney 1992: 15ff.  
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tribunate. The only evidence cited by Keaveney and Broughton is Plutarch’s Lucullus 2.1 
(provided above) which does not mention in what capacity Lucullus served under Sulla during 
the Social War.107 Perhaps Lucullus was a military tribune, perhaps not. Further, even if we 
were to say that Lucullus was, in fact, a military tribune in this period, this does not necessarily 
mean he would have served the traditional five years beforehand. Michael Sage has argued 
convincingly that by the first century BCE the pre-requisite of five years of service had 
lapsed.108 A late-republican example is instructive. Caesar, describing the panic that went 
through his army at the prospect of facing the Germans in battle, says the fear began with his 
tribuni militares who, ex urbe amicitiae causa Caesarem secuti non magnum in re militari usum 
habebant (had followed Caesar out of the city out of friendship and did not have much 
experience in military affairs).109 This hardly suggests that Caesar’s military tribunes were 
seasoned veterans. We cannot, therefore, assume that simply holding a military tribunate in 
the first century meant that the officer had served for five years prior to his office. Keaveney’s 
second reason for assuming some military service by Lucullus before 89 BCE (his brother’s 
military record) is easier to deal with, if only because we have no record of any military service 
by M. Terentius Varro Lucullus until 82 BCE when he was a legate under Sulla.110 Perhaps he 
too did not fulfil the decem stipendia. 
                                               
107 MRR 2.35 puts a question mark before Lucullus’ name (no mention of this office in 
volume 3); Keaveney 1992: 15ff.  
 
108 Sage 2008: 104. 
 
109 Caes. BG 39. See also Keppie [1984]1998: 98. 
 
110 Plut. Sull. 27.7; App. B Civ. 1.424; Vell. Pat. 2.28; MRR 2.65. 
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Despite its absence from Cicero’s dedication in the Academia, I believe it is prudent to 
accept that Lucullus served during the Social War. Keaveney’s arguments for assuming service 
past that point are, however, highly problematic. Finally, the dating of Lucullus quaestorship, 
the terminus ante quem for youthful military service, is either 88 or 87 BCE. Broughton initially 
dated the office to 87 but changed to 88 in his third volume based largely on the popular – but 
tenuous – assumption that Lucullus was the lone officer to follow Sulla to Rome in 88.111 For 
our purposes, however, it matters little as I see no reason to ascribe more than two years of pre-
cursus service to Lucullus.  
 
III.5 M. Licinius Crassus (b. 115. Consul 70 BCE) 
Ἐµπειρίας τε γὰρ ἐνδεὴς ἦν καὶ τῶν πράξεων αὐτοῦ τὴν χάριν ἀφῄρουν αἱ συγγενεῖς κῆρες ἐπιφερόµεναι, 
φιλοκέρδεια καὶ µικρολογία. (Plut. Crass. 6.5) 
 
 Crassus was born in 115 BCE or early 114 BCE.112 He grew up in close proximity to a 
sterling example of military achievement and political success. His father, P. Licinius Crassus 
(cos. 97 BCE), spent 96-93 BCE in Spain and returned to celebrate a triumph over the 
Lusitanians and obtain the censorship in 89 BCE.113 It is possible, perhaps even probable, that 
M. Crassus served under his father during his Spanish campaign, potentially as a 
                                               
111 MRR 2.52n5, 3.121  
 
112 This is based on the passage in Plutarch (Crass. 17.1) which says that Crassus had 
just turned 60 when he joked that King Degotarus of Galatia was too old to found a new city. 
Crassus would have passed through Galatia on his way to Syria in either late 55 or early 54 
BCE. See Ward 1977: 46 citing Sumner 1973: 123-4.  
 
113 For P. Crassus’ Spanish campaign see CIL I1. 661; Plut. Crass. 4.1. Cicero twice 
commented on P’s reputation for bravery (de Or. 3.10; Sest. 48).  
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contubernalis.114 Likewise, Crassus was already 24 when the Social War began; he was not a 
teenager during the conflict as Cicero and Pompey were. This may make it more likely that he 
served in the war with the allies. Although Plutarch does not mention Crassus’ service in the 
Social War we know that his father was a legate under the consul L. Iulius Caesar, and thus 
scholars have fairly enough assumed that the younger Crassus served under his father.115 Other 
biographical accounts of Crassus’ life skip over the Social War to the more firm footing of the 
Civil War between Marius and Sulla.116 During the dominatio Cinnae Crassus’ father and one of 
his brothers died while Crassus fled to Spain.117 While there Crassus raised a private army and 
went to Africa, originally to join forces with Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius (cos. 80 BCE).  Their 
association, however, did not last long and Crassus joined Sulla in Italy in 83 BCE. Crassus 
was a useful officer for Sulla and played an integral role at the Battle of the Colline Gate in 82 
when he commanded the decisively successful right wing of Sulla’s forces.118 The date of 
                                               
114 Adcock 1966: 1 says it is possible that Crassus accompanied his father as a 
contubernalis. Marshall 1976: 10 cites Adcock in favor of Crassus’ service as a contubernalis. 
Ward 1977: 49 does not speculate as to Crassus’ position while serving under his father in 
Spain.  
 
115 App. B Civ. 1.40-41. P. Crassus was driven out of Grumentum in 90 BCE. Will, DNP 
“Licinius: I.11.”; Adcock 1966: 1; Marshall 1976: 10; Ward 1977: 49. Adcock is the first to raise 
the possibility that Crassus served as a military tribune under his father, but it is unclear on 
what basis he suggests this role for Crassus. Marshall (again following Adcock) also suggests 
that Crassus served as a military tribune, but only cites Adcock’s testimony. Ward opts instead 
for legate but is silent on why he does so. 
 
116 Cadoux 1956: 154. 
 
117 Livy Per. 80 says that Crassus’ father committed suicide, but Plut. Crass. four says 
both he and Crassus’ brother were executed. For Crassus’ father’s suicide see also Appendix II. 
 
118 Plut. Crass. 6; Sull. 29.4-30.1. 
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Crassus’ quaestorship is uncertain, but Der Neue Pauly places it in 77 BCE at the earliest. 
Regardless of the exact year of Crassus’ quaestorship, we do not hear of any military action on 
his part until his takeover of the command against Spartacus as proconsul in 72 BCE.119  
 One interpretive challenge in considering Crassus in terms of military achievement is 
the obvious baggage that accompanies his death: the disaster at Carrhae 53 BCE. In light of 
this dramatic defeat Crassus has somewhat unfairly had the reputation of being a poor 
soldier.120 It does not mention Carrhae, but a Plutarchean example illustrates this nicely: 
Ἠνία δὲ Ποµπήϊος αὐτὸν εὐηµερῶν ἐν ἡγεµονίαις καὶ πρὶν ἢ βουλῆς µεταλαβεῖν θριαµβεύων καὶ Μάγνος, 
ὅπερ ἐστὶ µέγας, ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν ἀναγορευθείς. καί ποτε καὶ φήσαντός τινος ὡς Ποµπήϊος Μάγνος 
πρόσεισι, γελάσας ἠρώτησεν ὁπηλίκος. ἀπογνοὺς δὲ τοῖς πολεµικοῖς ἐξισώσασθαι πρὸς ἐκεῖνον, ὑπεδύετο 
τὴν πολιτείαν, σπουδαῖς καὶ συνηγορίαις καὶ δανεισµοῖς καὶ τῷ συµπαραγγέλλειν καὶ συνεξετάζεσθαι τοῖς 
δεοµένοις τι τοῦ δήµου κτώµενος δύναµιν ἀντίπαλον καὶ δόξαν ᾗ Ποµπήϊος εἶχεν ἀπὸ πολλῶν 
καὶ	µεγάλων στρατειῶν. καὶ πρᾶγµα συνέβαινεν αὐτοῖς ἴδιον. (Plut. Crass. 7.1-3) 
 
Now it bothered [Crassus] that Pompey was successful in his campaigns, that he had celebrated a triumph 
before becoming a member of the Senate, and that he was called Magnus (that is, Great) by the People. And 
once when someone said: “Pompey the Great is coming,” Crassus laughed and asked: “How great is he?” 
Therefore, he put off all efforts to equal Pompey in military achievements, and focused on politics; and 
through his eagerness, his legal work, his money-lending, and his collaboration in the canvassing and 
examinations which candidates for office had to undergo, the influence and fame he obtained was equal to 
that which Pompey had acquired from his many great campaigns. 
 
Thus, early in his biography Plutarch prepares us for the familiar comparison between the two 
rivals: Pompey the super-soldier and Crassus the oligarch. If, however, we consider the actual 
details of Crassus’ career it is clear that he did not put off pursuing military achievement. The 
reckoning of his pre-cursus service just given shows an amount which, we shall see, is actually 
                                               
119 See DNP Will, “Licinius [I 11]”; MRR 2.118. 
 
120 For rehabilitations of Crassus’ military ability see Cadoux 1956: 154-5; Ward 1977: 
64.  
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somewhat high relative to his peers.121 Add to this his command against Spartacus (after which 
he zealously pursued military laurels) and his (albeit disastrous) Parthian campaign and we can 
see plainly an enthusiastic interest in military affairs. If we total Crassus’ youthful campaigns, 
this amounts to at best seven years of service before his quaestorship: three years under his 
father in Spain, two years during the Social War (again under his father) and two years during 
the Civil War; it is important to remember, however, that five of these seven years are 
unattested in the sources. 
 
III.7 M. Tullius Cicero (b. 106 BCE Consul 63 BCE) 
Memini colloquia et cum acerrimis hostibus et cum gravissime dissidentibus civibus. Cn. Pompeius Sex. f. consul me 
praesente, cum essem tiro in eius exercitu, cum P. Vettio Scatone, duce Marsorum, inter bina castra collocutus est. (Cic. 
Phil. 12.27) 
 
Nam de angue illo qui Sullae apparuit immolanti, utrumque memini122 et Sullam, cum in expeditionem educturus esset, 
immolavisse, et anguem ab ara extitisse, eoque die rem praeclare esse gestam non haruspicis consilio, sed imperatoris. 
(Cic. Div. 2.65) 
 
Haec ego novi propter omnis necessitudines, quae mihi sunt cum L. Tuberone: domi una eruditi, militiae contubernales, post 
adfines, in omni denique vita familiares; magnum etiam vinculum, quod isdem studiis semper usi sumus. (Cic. Lig. 21) 
 
ἅµα δὲ τοῖς περὶ Μούκιον ἀνδράσι συνὼν πολιτικοῖς	καὶ πρωτεύουσι τῆς βουλῆς εἰς ἐµπειρίαν τῶν νόµων 
ὠφελεῖτο· καί τινα χρόνον καὶ στρατείας µετέσχεν ὑπὸ Σύλλᾳ περὶ τὸν Μαρσικὸν	πόλεµον. (Plut. Cic. 3.2) 
 
Unlike the other subjects on this list, we have an immense amount of biographical 
detail for Cicero’s life, and with the added value that much of it is autobiographical. he is, as I 
have already noted, often mentioned by scholars when discussing the lapse of the decem 
                                               
121 DNP give 85 BCE as the year Crassus fled to Spain. Plutarch says that Crassus raised 
his force there ἅµα τῷ πυθέσθαι τὴν Κίννα τελευτὴν which would be 84 BCE I am 
conservatively including the entire period between the death of Cinna and the decisive Sullan 
victory at the Battle of the Colline Gate in 82 BCE 
 
122 The specific meaning of memini is important to my argument and will be discussed 
below.  
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stipendia.123 This should come as no surprise; Cicero’s distaste for soldiering features 
prominently in many discussions of his life. Perhaps most famously, the praise Cicero lavished 
on himself for his domestic suppression of the Catilinarian conspiracy as consul was widely 
mocked, especially his famous line: Cedant arma togae, concedat laurea laudi.124  
Unsurprisingly then, Plutarch also emphasized Cicero’s antipathy towards violence and 
military service.125 In comparing him with his counterpart in the Parallel Lives, Demosthenes, 
Plutarch assessed that both orators were κινδύνους καὶ πολέµους ἄτολµον.126 Among the 
Pompeians during the Civil War Plutarch suggested that Cicero’s largest contribution to the 
campaign was his ability to provide a well-timed bon mot, and later recounts that he was thought 
cowardly by some when he abandoned the cause after Pharsalus.127 Again, after the Civil War, 
the conspirators against Caesar decided to leave Cicero out of their plans because he lacked the 
bravery necessary for the undertaking.128 It is important to note, however, that Plutarch’s 
portrait of Cicero in this respect is somewhat overwrought. For example, the biographer also 
makes much of Cicero’s discomfort with presence of soldiers during his account of Milo’s trial 
                                               
123 Harris 1979: 12; McCall 2002: 113n72; Rawson 1983: 15-6. Rosenstein 2007: 143 
says that Julius Caesar is the first known example, but he perhaps means Caesar is the first 
example of this phenomenon from a patrician. 
 
124 Cic. Off. 177. Plut. Comp. Dem. Cic. 2.1. 
 
125 Moles 1988: 150. 
 
126 Plut. Dem. 3.2. 
 
127 Plut. Cic. 38.1, 39.1-2 
 
128 Plut. Cic. 42. 
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in 52 BCE, but he almost certainly misunderstood the purpose for the presence of the soldiers 
at the trial.129 This characterization of Cicero has (perhaps not entirely unjustly) followed him 
to the present: Erich Gruen gave the opinio communis most succinctly when referred to Cicero as 
“very unmilitary.”130 
Most discussions of Cicero’s youth focus on his savant-like experience as a young 
student and his rhetorical training, first at Rome and then later abroad. Yet we do know that 
Cicero did have some military experience when he approached his quaestorship in 76 BCE: he 
had served in the army during the Social War. We can be certain that this activity was the only 
military experience he had before the start of his public career, but less clear is exactly what 
form this service took. All agree that Cicero served under Cn. Pompeius Strabo, the consul of 
89 BCE and father of Pompey Magnus. This can hardly be questioned given Cicero’s very clear 
language in Twelfth Philippic provided above, where he claims to have been with Strabo as a tiro 
(recruit) in his army. In addition, Cicero is listed among Strabo’s officers on an inscription 
from 89 BCE. This would have been a fascinating camp indeed, since we know from the same 
inscription that Cicero was joined in camp by Pompey (naturally serving under his father) and 
his future nemesis L. Sergius Catilina.131  
                                               
129 Plut. Cic. 35.1-5. The orator makes this clear in the version of the speech extant 
today: Cic. Milo 1. 
 
130 Gruen 1974: 459. See also e.g. Shackleton Bailey 1971: 8; Harris 1979: 12; Rawson 
1983:15-16. Tempest 2011: 155. 
 
131 CIL I2 709.  
 
  80   
 
The details of Cicero’s service in the Social War, however, are quite opaque. It is 
certain that Cicero spent at least some time under the command of Pompeius, but less clear is 
whether or not he also spent time under the command of Sulla. Plutarch flatly stated that 
Cicero’s activity during the Social War was ὑπὸ Σύλλᾳ; but Bernadette Perrin’s Loeb edition 
(1919), however, issues a note to this passage suggesting that the biographer had made a 
mistake and that Cicero’s service was under Pompeius alone. This does not account, however, 
for an interesting series of passages focusing on an event from the Social War in Cicero’s de 
Divinatione. In this dialogue (2.65) Cicero described an apparently well-known scene from the 
Social War at which he claimed to have been present. While besieging a town, Sulla made a 
sacrifice during which a snake came out from under the altar. Sulla’s haruspex, a Gaius 
Postumius, then urged Sulla to lead the army out immediately. Sulla did so and captured a 
Samnite camp.132 It is true that Cicero’s analysis (Div. 2.65) of the irregularities of Sulla’s 
sacrifice does not mention that he himself was under Sulla’s command. Yet, this can be 
reasonably inferred from an earlier passage in de Divinatione (1.72) where Cicero makes his 
brother Quintus allude to the event and mention that the sacrifice was held te [Marcus Cicero] 
inspectante (the language of Cicero’s description in Div. 2.65 nam de angue illo also makes 
reasonably clear that Cicero is responding to Quintus’ having brought up the topic previously). 
Further, Cicero uses the same verb to describe both Sulla’s sacrifice, and the meeting between 
                                               
132 Aside from the Ciceronian evidence provided, the event is attested by several 
sources. Plut. Sull. 9.6 (without mentioning the snake); Val. Max. 1.6.4; FRH Sulla F17. The 
haruspex Postimius is also mentioned in a fragment of Livy preserved by St. Augustine (Civ. 
2.24). 
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Pompeius Strabo and P. Vettius Scato (memini), which may indicate that the memory is a 
personal one rather than just a familiarity with the story. What can we make of this? 
Unlike Perrin’s Loeb, J.L Moles’ commentary accepts Plutarch’s account without 
further discussion, presumably unaware of the evidence from de Divinatione.133 Thomas 
Mitchell, Cicero’s excellent biographer, claimed that the evidence makes it “certain” that 
Cicero served first with Sulla, and then with Strabo – both in 89 BCE. He bases this certainty 
on the dating of the surrender of Nola, which he placed firmly to the first half of 89.134 Andrew 
Lintott acknowledges that Cicero seems to have served in two armies, but stops short of 
offering a solution and only admits that we do not know how Cicero came to serve in two 
different armies in the same year.135 Mitchell, then, believes that Cicero served in the army for 
only one year during the Social War. He supports this view with Cicero’s assertion that he 
attended multiple contiones held by the tribune of the plebs in the early part of 88 BCE136  
The landscape, however, has been complicated since Mitchell’s account. The key issue 
for our purposes is when exactly Sulla’s memorable sacrifice took place. The Ciceronian 
evidence is not clear on the issue. Traditionally scholars have agreed with Mitchell and 
                                               
133 Plut. Cic. 3.3. Moles 1988: 150 accepts Cicero’s service under Sulla without 
comment. 
 
134 Mitchell 1979: 8-9. He suggests that Cicero’s reference to a parley with Vettius Scato 
(mentioned in Phil. 12.27) probably occurred in the latter half of 89 BCE under Pompeius.  
 
135 Lintott 2013: 134. 
 
136 See Cic. Brut. 306ff. Although we should remember (as previously discussed) that 
men were able to return to Rome for periods of time while still “serving” in the army. 
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associated this episode with Sulla’s campaign in Campania in 89 BCE137 There is some reason, 
however, to doubt this dating. Valerius Maximus records that Sulla oversaw this sacrifice as 
consul, which would mean that it occurred in 88 BCE and not 89.138 Shackelton Bailey’s Loeb 
edition of Valerius provides a note claiming that the author was mistaken, and that Sulla was 
not consul at the time, but was filling for the consul L. Porcius Cato.139 Yet, not all have agreed. 
Keaveney (in at least one publication) and Smith, however, have both accepted 88 for this 
event.140 The implications are important for this study; if we assume that Cicero served under 
two commanders in the same year, then he would have had only one year of military service on 
record before standing for office. If, on the other hand, Cicero served under Pompeius in 89 
BCE and then under Sulla in 88 (when Sulla was consul) then he would have had at least two 
campaigns to his credit.  
The evidence clearly shows that Cicero served under both commanders, so Perrin’s 
dismissal can be ignored. The evidence we have for his presence in Strabo’s camp (his 
attestation in the Twelfth Philippic and the consilium of Strabo) would put him with Strabo 
during the fall of Ausculum in 89 BCE, for which Strabo triumphed later that year.141 The 
                                               
137 MRR 2.36 citing. 
 
138 Val. Max. 1.6.4 L. Sulla consul sociali bello, cum in agro Nolano ante praetorium immolaret, 
subito ab ima parte arae prolapsam anguem prospexit. qua visa Postumii haruspicis hortatu continuo 
exercitum in expeditionem eduxit ac fortissima Samnitium castra cepit. 
 
139 Keaveney 2005B: 211. 
 
140 FRH 3.295; Keaveney [1982]2005: 48. Although Keaveney 2005B: 211 seems to 
contradict this. 
 
141 Liv. Per. 74; App. B Civ. 1.207-16. 
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remaining question is what to do with his time under Sulla; and the evidence for whether or 
not Cicero served under Sulla in 89 or 88 BCE is, I confess, too murky for me to take a 
position firmly. Fortunately, the aims of this project incline me to choose 88, since I have 
decided to accept the most conservative (and yet, still reasonable) positions in such debates 
with respect to my study. Therefore, I will consider Cicero as having served in two different 
campaigns.  
After his time in the Social War (however long it was) Cicero avoided military service 
until he reluctantly went to Cilicia as a proconsul in 51 BCE.142 The choice to avoid the camp 
was obviously an intentional one. During his suppression of the Catilinarian Conspiracy as 
consul in 63 BCE he left the military operations to the praetor Q. Caecilius Metellus Celer 
(cos. 60 BCE), his colleague C. Antonius Hybrida, and the collection of imperatores waiting 
outside the pomerium while pursuing a triumph.143 After his consulship Cicero bartered away 
his chance at a proconsular command in Macedonia, a highly coveted province, to Antonius 
and stayed in Rome. He was forced by the lex Pompeia de provinciis of 52 BCE to take up 
proconsular command. He reluctantly did so, a decision about which he became more anxious 
given that at the time it seemed as though Cilicia might become a particularly active military 
theater. Relations with the empire’s eastern neighbor Parthia were still tense following the 
disastrous Battle of Carrhae in 53 BCE. In fact, In 51 BCE, after Cicero had arrived in his 
                                               
142 On Cicero’s reluctance see Att. 5.15.1. 
 
143 Plut. 16.1; Cic. Sall. Cat. 56.4. Others were involved as well - Metellus Creticus and 
Marcius Rex were both awaiting triumph outside the pomerium (and thus still retained their 
imperium) and were sent against Manlius. Pompeius Rufus, a praetor in 63 BCE, was also sent 
to Capua. 
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province, a force of Parthians under the command of the crown prince Pacorus invaded 
Roman-controlled Syria. Pacorus (much to Cicero’s relief) never made it past Antioch, and 
Cicero’s time in Cilicia will be dealt with in detail in chapter two of this work. For the 
moment, it is enough to note that Cicero sailed east to Cilicia with a military résumé that only 
included two years as a tiro over 30 years before, when he was a teenager. 
 
III.8 Cn. Pompeius Magnus (b. 106 BCE Consul I 70 BCE)144 
Ἔτι δὲ µειράκιον ὢν παντάπασι καὶ τῷ πατρὶ συστρατευόµενος ἀντιτεταγµένῳ πρὸς Κίνναν, (Plut. Pomp. 
3.1) 
 
Ἐκ τούτου Ποµπήϊος ἔτη µὲν τρία καὶ εἴκοσι γεγονώς, ὑπ᾿ οὐδενὸς δὲ ἀνθρώπων ἀποδεδειγµένος στρατηγός, 
αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ δοὺς τὸ ἄρχειν, (Plut. Pomp. 6.3) 
 
Ἐκ τούτου Σικελίαν ἠγγέλλετο Περπέννας αὑτῷ κρατύνεσθαι καὶ τοῖς περιοῦσιν ἔτι τῆς ἐναντίας στάσεως 
ὁρµητήριον παρέχειν τὴν νῆσον, αἰωρουµένου καὶ Κάρβωνος αὐτόθι ναυτικῷ καὶ Δοµετίου Λιβύῃ 
προσπεπτωκότος, ἄλλων τε πολλῶν ἐπέκεινα µεγάλων ὠθουµένων φυγάδων, ὅσοι τὰς προγραφὰς ἔφθησαν 
ἀποδράντες. ἐπὶ τούτους Ποµπήϊος ἀπεστάλη µετὰ πολλῆς δυνάµεως. (Plut. Pomp. 10.1) 
 
τῶν πραγµάτων αὐτῶν ποθούντων τὸν Ποµπήϊον οὐ διεµέλλησεν ὅπη τράπηται, προσθεὶς δὲ τοῖς ἀρίστοις 
ἑαυτὸν ἀπεδείχθη στρατεύµατος ἡγεµὼν ἐπὶ τὸν Λέπιδον ἤδη πολλὰ τῆς Ἰταλίας κεκινηκότα καὶ τὴν ἐντὸς 
Ἄλπεων Γαλατίαν κατέχοντα διὰ Βρούτου στρατεύµατι. (Plut. Pomp. 16.2) 
 
Ἐπεὶ δὲ τῆς Ἰβηρίας ἁψάµενος ὁ Ποµπήϊος, οἷα φιλεῖ πρὸς νέου δόξαν ἡγεµόνος, ἑτέρους ταῖς ἐλπίσιν 
ἐποίησε τοὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ τὰ µὴ πάνυ βεβαίως τῷ Σερτωρίῳ συνεστῶτα τῶν ἐθνῶν ἐκινεῖτο καὶ 
µετεβάλλετο, (Plut. Pomp. 18.1) 
 
οὐ µὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ τούτῳ τὸν Ποµπήϊον εἰσποιούσης ἁµῶς γέ πως τῷ κατορθώµατι τῆς τύχης, πεντακισχίλιοι 
φεύγοντες ἐκ τῆς µάχης ἐνέπεσον εἰς αὐτόν, οὓς ἅπαντας διαφθείρας, ἔγραψε πρὸς τὴν σύγκλητον ὑποφθάσας 
ὡς Κράσσος µὲν ἐκ παρατάξεως νενίκηκε τοὺς µονοµάχους, αὐτὸς δὲ τὸν πόλεµον ἐκ ῥιζῶν παντάπασιν 
ἀνῄρηκε (Plut. Pomp. 21.2) 
 
 Due to his prodigious military talent and remarkable achievements we know more 
about Pompey’s youthful service than about any other subject in this study. Pompey was born 
                                               
144 The source tradition for Pompey’s youthful service is significantly more robust than 
most other figures on this list, since he did most of his service as his own commander. Thus, I 
am only quoting the Plutarchean evidence at the outset of this entry. I will, of course, refer to 
other sources throughout.  
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on September 28, 106 BCE.145 He received a military education from his father, and later (at 
age 15) served under him when he was a legate in the northern theater of the Social War and 
was later made consul for 89 BCE.146 The Social War concluded in 89 and the next we hear of 
Pompey is that he was with his father in 87 BCE when he returned (somewhat sluggishly) to 
the city in an attempt to stave off Cinna and Marius.147 Pompey’s father died suddenly in 87, 
while wildly unpopular in Rome. The newly ascendant Cinna was hostile to the young Pompey 
and so it makes sense that while the former had control in Rome Pompey seems to have stayed 
in Picenum, an area still friendly to his late father and family.148  
In 83 BCE Pompey raised a private army from Picenum and the surrounding region 
and pledged his support to Sulla, who gained control of Rome in 82. After Sulla’s victory in 
Italy, Pompey was given propraetorian imperium and tasked with crushing Sulla’s enemies 
abroad in Sicily and Africa. There has been some debate over the precise dates for this period 
in Pompey’s biography. Pompey went out against Sulla’s enemies in 82 BCE, but the duration 
of this period of service is unclear. The problem is that we have a significant divergence in our 
sources concerning Pompey’s age at the time of his first triumph; there are sources for every 
                                               
145 Vell. 2.53.4; Plin. NH 37.13. 
 
146 On Pompey’s training see Sall. Hist. 2.19; Diod. 38.9; Vell. 2.29.3. Pompey is 
mentioned on a list of his father staff at the fall of Ausculum in 89 BCE (CIL I2 709). See also 
3.7 Cicero 
 
147 For Pompey’s presence in his father’s army see Plut. Pomp. 3; Dio 36.25.2. 
 
148 Pompey was prosecuted either in 86 or 85, probably for peculatus from his father’s 
appropriation of the booty after the fall of Ausculum. See Alexander 1990: no. 120. 
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age between 23 and 26.149  Some of these possibilities can be reasonably dismissed: Civil war 
was ongoing in 82 BCE and further would have left Pompey very little time to complete his 
campaigning and arrange for a triumph, thus we should dismiss this possibility.150 On the 
other end of this range, Ernst Badian has argued convincingly against 79 BCE – this leaves 81 
and 80 BCE.151 Badian suggests that Sulla’s seemingly decisive influence over whether or not 
Pompey obtained a triumph may indicate that Sulla was still dictator at the time, and thus 
would date Pompey’s procession to 81 BCE.152 For this study, however, because I am adopting 
the most reasonable, conservative dating in such instances, I will assume Pompey celebrated his 
triumph in 80. 
Starting in 77 BCE Pompey was sent to Spain to combat another subject of this study, 
Q. Sertorius, who had been operating a kind of second government there since 83 BCE. 
Sertorius was initially successful against his younger adversary but was murdered by his own 
officer in 72 BCE – allowing Pompey to subsequently defeat Sertorius’ less-competent usurper. 
While returning to Rome Pompey stumbled into more luck when he encountered the last 
remnants of Spartacus’ army, which had previously been routed by M. Crassus. Pompey 
returned to Rome with a second triumph and was elected to his first public office, the 
consulship for 70 BCE. 
                                               
149 Eutrop 5.9.1 (23); Liv. Per. 89 (24); Gran. Licin. 31 (25); vir. ill. 77.2 (26). 
 
150 Badian 1955: 107 suggests Eutropius likely confused “years completed” with “years 
of life.” 
 
151 Badian 1955. Mommsen was the original proponent of 79 BCE (RG 4.94ff).  
 
152 Badian 1955: 115ff. Seager [1979]2002: 29 prefers 81 to 80 BCE. 
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To sum up: Pompey served from 91-89 BCE in the Social War (two years), 83-82 BCE 
as a partisan of Sulla and a privatus (one year), 82-80 BCE as a propraetor in Sicily and Africa 
(two years), and 77-71 BCE under a special commission against Sertorius in Spain (six years). 
This amounts to 11 years of service, one above the decem stipendia and the most of any figure 
examined in this chapter. Of course, we must also take into account that Pompey’s career was 
exceptional and that he did not stand for office (the consulship!) until he was 35, which gave 
him more time to serve relative to his peers.  
 
III.9 C. Julius Caesar (b. c.100 BCE153 Consul I 59 BCE) 
Stipendia prima154 in Asia fecit Marci Thermi praetoris contubernio… (Suet. DJ 2.1) 
 
Meruit et sub Servilio Isaurico in Cilicia, sed brevi tempore. Nam Sullae morte comperta, simul spe novae dissensionis, 
quae per Marcum Lepidum movebatur, Romam propere redit. (Suet. DJ 3.1) 
 
Vastante regiones proximas Mithridate, ne desidere in discrimine sociorum videretur, ab Rhodo, quo pertenderat, transiit 
in Asiam auxiliisque contractis et praefecto regis provincia expulso nutantis ac dubias civitates retinuit in fide. Tribunatu 
militum, qui primus Romam reverso per suffragia populi honor optigit, actores restituendae tribuniciae potestatis, cuius 
vim Sulla deminuerat, enixissime iuvit. (Suet. DJ 4.2-5.1) 
 
Τοῦ δὲ δήµου πρώτην µὲν ἀπόδειξιν τῆς πρὸς αὐτὸν εὐνοίας ἔλαβεν ὅτε πρὸς Γάϊον Ποπίλιον ἐρίσας ὑπὲρ 
χιλιαρχίας πρότερος ἀνηγορεύθη· (Plut. Caes. 5.1)  
 
                                               
153 There was previously some debate about whether he was actually born in 102, 101, 
or 100, based on how old he would have been when assuming magistracies. 100 BCE is now 
widely accepted. See Badian 2009: 16. 
 
154 It is hard to understand prima stipendia (whether it should be rendered in the plural 
or singular); Suetonius is the only author to use the term in this form and does so only twice 
(see also Tib. 9.1). Caesar joined Thermus in 80 BCE, but he left in 78 BCE This could 
represent two campaigns. Yet, in the case of Tiberius Suetonius was referring to the future 
emperor’s service as a military tribune against the Cantabri in 25 BCE, one campaign. Nor 
does there seem to be a popular alternative in the singular; Cornelius Nepos is the only author 
to use the phrase stipendium primum (Cat. 1.2). 
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 In Julius Caesar we have another well-attested figure. Current scholarship has coalesced 
around July 12th, 100 BCE as the birthdate for Caesar.155 He was elected quaestor for 69 BCE 
when he was 31 years old. At 16 or 17 (84 or 83 BCE, the precise date is unclear) Caesar was 
nominated as Flamen Dialis at the recommendation of the consul Cinna, whose daughter he 
later married (perhaps in keeping with the rule that the Flamen Dialis was required to marry a 
patrician woman). It is now widely accepted that Caesar was never inaugurated as a flamen 
officially. Some have argued that he was appointed but that his appointment was undone by 
Sulla when he retook the city in 88 BCE and undid all of Cinna’s acta.156 This, however, 
clashes with the testimony of Tacitus (Ann. 3.58.2) who wrote that there was no Flamen Dialis 
appointed for over 70 years after the priesthood of Caesar’s predecessor L. Cornelius Merula. 
In any case, it is unlikely that Caesar was ever officially installed as Flamen Dialis.157 His 
nomination is still, notable; the flaminate was a prestigious position, especially for a young 
man from a family which (at the time) was not especially powerful politically.158 Yet, the 
                                               
155 There was previously some debate about whether he was actually born in 102, 101, 
or 100, based on how old he would have been when assuming magistracies. 100 BCE is now 
widely accepted. See Badian 2009: 16.  
 
156 See Taylor 1941: 121. 
 
157 I agree with Pelling 2011: 134-5 who thinks it unlikely that Caesar was ever officially 
installed in the priesthood. See also MRR 3.105. Interestingly, had Caesar been inaugurated, 
this meant that Caesar could have potentially joined the Senate at 17, considerably earlier in 
life than his peers. 
 
158 Pelling 2011: 134. See also Tatum 2010: 29-31 who fields the fascinating, but highly 
speculative suggestion that Caesar may found the flamenate attractive given his epilepsy 
(although it should be noted that we do not know whether or not his condition had 
manifested itself at this point). 
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posting also would have prevented Caesar from a military and political career. It is hard to 
imagine a hypothetical history in which Caesar took up the flamenate with its the strict 
guidelines for behavior. He certainly would not have been able to become an effective force on 
the battlefield since he would have been barred from riding a horse, touching a corpse, 
spending more than two nights away from Rome, or even seeing a Roman army in the field.159  
In 82 BCE Sulla marched upon Rome and set about re-establishing his authority; there 
is some disagreement in our sources about how this affected Caesar, but in every version of the 
event he was released from his priesthood and thus unburdened of its strict code of conduct.160 
After being relieved of his priesthood, Caesar seems to have set out on almost immediately on 
the career path that had been previously closed to him: the life of a soldier. In 80 BCE he 
joined the staff of M. Minucius Thermus (the governor of Asia at the time), and Suetonius tells 
us Caesar did so as a contubernalis. It was during this period that he spent time with the king of 
Bithynia Nicomedes IV Philopator, whence came the scandalous rumor that Caesar had been 
the passive sexual partner in a relationship with the king.161 To shift from the scandalous to the 
                                               
159 The Flamen was subject to a rather extreme code of conduct so that he could avoid 
any ritual pollution. For the much longer list of regulations that came with the Flamen Dialis 
see Gell. NA 10.15. It is unclear just how strictly these rules were being observed in the first 
century BCE; Merula had managed to become consul in 87 BCE, which one would think was 
challenging in light of the stringent lifestyle to which he was obligated. Still, regarding military 
involvement we have no indication that Merula held any kind of military command as a 
proconsul after his term in office. See Pelling 2011: 134. 
160 Plut. Caes 1.3; Suet. 1.1; Vell. 2.43.1. 
 
161 Suet. 49, 2.1. Plutarch avoided mention of the scandal; see Gelzer 1968: 22, 30n1, 
88n1, 285; Goldsworthy 2006: 65-70; Pelling 2011: 137. A recent and convincing article by 
Josiah Osgood (2008) argues that there is evidence for believing that the whole scandal was 
likely manufactured by Cn. Cornelius Dolabella when Caesar prosecuted him for 
maladministration in 77 or 76 BCE. 
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heroic, while serving under Thermus he won the corona civica for his actions during the 
storming of Miletus in 80 BCE.162 From Bithynia he next went to Cilicia under the command 
of P. Servilius Vatia Isauricus (cos. 87, 79 BCE).163 
 Thereafter it is possible, but not certain, that Caesar was a legatus under M. Antonius 
(pr. 74 BCE, father of Caesar’s future collaborator), probably in 73 BCE. A “C. Iulius” is 
mentioned by and inscription from Gytheum in Laconia as a legate on Antonius’ staff. This is, 
however, probably unlikely to be the future dictator.164 Caesar was involved in the fight against 
Mithridates in the winter of 74/3 BCE when he helped to prevent Bithynia from taking up the 
Pontic king’s cause after the death of Nicomedes, but his position while doing so is unclear. 165 
Velleius wrote that Caesar was a privatus during this period, but we also know that Caesar was 
                                               
162 Suet. Iul. 1.2; App. B Civ. 2.106 tells us that some of Caesar’s later statues featured 
him wearing the corona civica, although the crown was perhaps more a symbol of Caesar’s 
clementia after the Civil War rather than as a remembrance of the storming of Mytilene. 
Bergmann 2010: 109-31 makes a compelling argument that the crown featured in Caesar’s 
later iconography is the corona graminea, an honor given to him by the Senate, not by the army. 
For the date of the storming of Mytilene see Butler & Cary 1982: 45. See also Gelzer 1968: 22; 
Meier 1982: 64; Goldsworthy 2006: 65-6; Pelling 2011: 137-8. 
 
163 Suet. Iul. 3.1. This position was less eventful than his time spent in Bithynia. Pelling 
2011: 137 says that the year was “given mainly to preparations.” See MRR 2.88. 
 
164 MRR 2.113-5, 3.105; SIG3 748. Gelzer 1968: 24-5 argues that this was indeed the 
future dictator. This would have been unusual, since legates were usually senators and Caesar 
was not yet a member of the body. It is possible that Caesar’s corona civica may account for the 
irregularity of the post; note also that Q. Cicero wished to make his brother-in-law Atticus his 
legate in 61 BCE (Nep. Att. 6.4). Yet, Sumner 1973: 137-8 makes an argument for the other C. 
Iulius attested at this time, the otherwise obscure Catilinarian conspirator (Sall. Cat. 21.1). 
Will DNP “Caesar” still accepts that the inscription refers to C. Iulius Caesar.  
 
165 Kallet-Marx 1995: 300 n34 dates this to the winter of 74/3 BCE, immediately 
following the Caesar’s famous capture by pirates. 
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elected as military tribune for either 72 or 71 BCE.166 Caesar may have been serving against 
Mithridates as a military tribune. We hear nothing of Caesar’s actions while military tribune 
except that he was a vehement supporter of a bill to reinstate the rights of the tribunate 
previously curtailed by Sulla, and another to recall some exiles from the Marian Civil War and 
the uprising of Lepidus.167  
 The next we hear of Caesar is his election to the quaestorship for 69 BCE.168 To put his 
record together: Caesar began his military activities in 80 BCE; this left him 11 years in which 
to accrue ten years of service if he was to fulfill the decem stipendia but it is clear that he did not. 
Judging only from the sources, he seems to have served 5 years: 80-78 BCE in the east, first 
under Thermus and then briefly under Isauricus; 73 BCE in Asia, either as a legate or (more 
likely given his age) a privatus; and one year (in 72 or 71 BCE) as a military tribune.169 It is 
                                               
166 Suet. Iul. 4.2. Plut. makes no mention of this event. Vell. 2.42.2 calls Caesar a 
privatus. See Gelzer 1968: 24n4 (who accepts that Caesar did this without any formal 
authority); Meier 1982: 109-10. The debate over the dating is due to the lack of clarity in the 
sources and is largely based on how much time would be left for his colleague in the military 
tribunate, C. Popilius, to attain his tribunate of the plebs in 68 BCE Gelzer 1968: 25-6 and 
Sumner 1973: 136 accept 72 BCE, Taylor 1941: 121n32 and Syme 1963: 57 prefer 71 BCE 
See also Ryan 1995: 295-7 and MRR 3.105. Yet, it is possible that this is a different C. Popilius, 
see Pelling 2011: 149. 
 
167 Suet. Iul. 5.1. The rights were restored in 70 BCE during the first consulship of 
Pompey and Crassus, a year after Caesar’s military tribunate. Regarding the recall of the exiles, 
Suetonius says that Caesar, habuitque ipse super ea re contionem.  
 
168 Suet. Iul. 6.1; Plut. Caes. 5. The dating in 69 BCE is now widely accepted. See MRR 
3.105-6; Pelling 2011: 150. 
 
169 Military tribunates could be extended at the discretion of the commander, but this 
was not the norm. Without any attestation to the contrary I do not think we should assume 
Caesar had his tribunate extended.  
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possible that there are other campaigns that we do not hear of from our sources, but since the 
life of Caesar is so well-documented this would be a hard claim to make. We know Caesar was 
in Rome in 77 and 76 BCE, thanks to legal action, and presumably he spent 70 BCE 
canvassing.170 The other years are uncertain, so in an attempt to offer the most conservative 
position possible I am suggesting Caesar had 7 years of service before his quaestorship. Of 
course, serving less than ten years did not disqualify Caesar from being considered a military 
man. As attested by his corona civica, Caesar had served with distinction while making a name 
for himself in his youth. Pliny the Elder tells us that when a recipient of the corona civica 
entered the games it was custom for everyone, including the Senate, to stand up.171 This must 
have provided the young Caesar with a significant amount of political capital as he set out on 
the cursus honorum.172  
 
III.10 M. Porcius Cato Uticensis (b. c. 95 BCE Praetor 54 BCE) 
Τοῦ δὲ δουλικοῦ πολέµου συνεστῶτος, ὃν Σπαρτάκειον ἐκάλουν, Γέλλιος µὲν ἐστρατήγει, Κάτων δὲ τῆς 
στρατείας µετεῖχεν ἐθελοντής, διὰ τὸν ἀδελφόν· ἐχιλιάρχει γὰρ ὁ ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ Καιπίων.	(Plut. Cat. Min. 
8.2) 
 
Verum ut huius viri [Scipio Africanus] abstinentiae testis Hispania ita M. Catonis Epiros, Achaia, Cyclades insulae, 
maritima pars Asiae, provincia Cypros. (Val. Max. 4.3.2) 
 
Ἀποδειχθεὶς δὲ χιλίαρχος εἰς Μακεδονίαν ἐπέµπετο πρὸς Ῥούβριον τὸν στρατηγόν. (Plut. Cat. Min. 9.1) 
 
ille [Cato the Elder] semper alioquin universos ex Italia pellendos censuit Graecos, at pronepos eius Uticensis Cato 
unum ex tribunatu militum philosophum, alterum ex Cypria legatione deportavit; (Plin. NH 7.113) 
 
                                               
170 TRR no. 140 & 141. 
 
171 Plin. NH 16.5; See also Gell. 5.6.11; Luc. 1.358. 
 
172 See Goldworthy 2006: 65-6. 
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 Despite how he is usually portrayed on stage and screen, M. Cato was significantly 
younger than Cicero, Pompey, and Caesar. Born in 95 BCE, he was far too young to 
participate in the Social War, although a Plutarchian anecdote alleges that even as a boy Cato 
made his opposition to Italian citizenship known to Pompaedius Silo.173 In 72 BCE Cato 
volunteered to serve in the army of consul L. Gellius Publicola against Spartacus; his half-
brother Caepio was a military tribune under Publicola at the time. It is unclear exactly what 
happened during Gellius’ command. Our main sources (Plutarch and Appian) give differing 
accounts. There is agreement that Gellius won a victory over the portion of Spartacus’ forces 
commanded by the latter’s lieutenant Crixus. Appian then records two victories by Spartacus, 
first over Gellius’ co-consul Cn. Cornelius Lentulus Clodianus, and then over Gellius. 
Plutarch mentions the first victory over Lentulus, but no subsequent battle with Gellius. What 
we do know for certain is that the Senate was unimpressed with the performance of both 
consuls and replaced them with M. Crassus.174 Whether or not Gellius suffered a major defeat 
at the hands of Spartacus, Plutarch tells us that Cato served with distinction while under 
Gellius’ command. Due to the poor manner in which the war was conducted, according to the 
biographer, Cato did not display his valor as much as he would have liked, but he still did 
enough to earn ἀριστεῖα καὶ	τιµὰς from Gellius himself. Cato, however, declined these awards 
because he did not think he had earned them, which caused others to think him “strange.”175 
                                               
173 Plut. Cat. Min. 2.1-4. 
 
174 App. BCiv. 1.117; Plut. Crass. 9.7-10.1. 
 
175 Plut. Cat. Min. 8.2  
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We get no indication that Cato continued with the army against Spartacus after 72 
BCE. Because Plutarch suggests that he had only volunteered to be close to his half-brother 
Caepio, it is reasonable to assume that he did not continue on after Caepio’s year in office was 
up. We do not hear about military service by Cato again until c.67 BCE, when he was military 
tribune under a Rubrius in Macedonia.176 The details surrounding this post are also quite 
opaque: Rubrius is not attested outside Plutarch, and it is difficult to identify him with any of 
the known proconsular governors of Macedonia. Likewise, the dating of this posting is also 
somewhat uncertain, although I find Broughton’s argument for 67/66 BCE compelling, given 
that Cato was a candidate for the quaestorship in 65 BCE177 If this is true, this means that for 
Cato we have only two recorded years of military service before he stood for the quaestorship.  
 
 
III.11 M. Iunius Brutus (b. c.85 BCE) 
Ἔτι δὲ µειράκιον ὢν Κάτωνι τῷ θείῳ συναπεδήµησεν εἰς Κύπρον ἐπὶ Πτολεµαῖον ἀποσταλέντι. (Plut. 
Brut. 3.1) 
 
M. Iunius Brutus was probably born c. 85 BCE, the son of the people’s tribune in 83 
BCE of the same name and Servilia, Cato the Younger’s half-sister. 178 Brutus’ father was 
                                               
176 Plut. Cat. Min. 9-11; Val. Max. 4.3.2; Plin. NH 7.113 says that he brought back unum 
ex tribunatu militum philosophum, it is not clear who this was. c.f. DNP “Rubrius” I.2. 
 
177 For both the identity of Rubrius and the dating of Cato’s military tribunate see MRR 
2.150 at n.12. Others have attempted to identify Rubrius as L. Culeolus, the addressee of Cic. 
Fam. 13.41,42; but this would necessitate an incredibly early date for these letters.  
 
178 MRR 3.112; Dettenhofer 1992: 100-1. This dating hangs on his eligibility for the 
praetorship of 54 BCE (See also Plut. Brut. 24; App. B Civ. 2.134; Val. Max 1.5.7). 
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executed by Pompey in 78 BCE, although it is unclear on exactly what grounds.179 It is not 
surprising then that we hear of Brutus’ suspected involvement in the “Vettius Affair” in 59 
BCE, a failed attempt to assassinate Pompey.180 From 58-56 BCE Brutus went with his uncle 
Cato who was overseeing the annexation of Cyprus; there is no suggestion in the sources that 
Brutus did so in any official capacity, although perhaps we can assume he accompanied his 
uncle as a contubernalis.181 In 54 BCE Brutus stood for and won a quaestorship, which took 
him back to Cyprus.182 If we consider that Brutus went abroad from 58-56 with Cato simply as 
his uncle’s companion, this would mean that we have no record of military service from Brutus 
until his involvement in the Civil War. For the purposes of the project, I am counting his two 
years with his uncle as service, even though they seem to have required nothing of Brutus 
militarily. 
 
III.12 M. Antonius (b. 83 BCE, Consul 44 BCE, Triumvir) 
[Antony] φοβηθεὶς τοὺς συνισταµένους ἐπὶ τὸν Κλώδιον, ἀπῆρεν ἐκ τῆς Ἰταλίας εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα, καὶ 
διέτριβε τό τε σῶµα γυµνάζων πρὸς τοὺς στρατιωτικοὺς ἀγῶνας καὶ λέγειν µελετῶν. (Plut. Ant. 2.4) 
 
Ἐπεὶ δὲ Γαβίνιος ἀνὴρ ὑπατικὸς εἰς Συρίαν πλέων ἀνέπειθεν αὐτὸν ὁρµῆσαι πρὸς τὴν στρατείαν, ἰδιώτης 
µὲν οὐκ ἂν ἔφη συνεξελθεῖν, ἀποδειχθεὶς δὲ τῶν ἱππέων ἄρχων συνεστράτευε. καὶ πρῶτον µὲν ἐπ᾿ 
Ἀριστόβουλον Ἰουδαίους ἀφιστάντα πεµφθεὶς αὐτὸς µὲν ἐπέβη τοῦ µεγίστου τῶν ἐρυµάτων πρῶτος, 
ἐκεῖνον δὲ πάντων ἐξήλασεν· εἶτα µάχην συνάψας καὶ τρεψάµενος ὀλίγοις τοῖς σὺν αὑτῷ τοὺς ἐκείνου 
πολλαπλασίους ὄντας ἀπέκτεινε πλὴν ὀλίγων ἅπαντας· αὐτὸς δὲ µετὰ τοῦ παιδὸς Ἀριστόβουλος ἥλω. 
(Plut. Ant. 3.1) 
 
                                               
179 Plut. Pomp. 16. 
 
180 See Gruen 1974: 95-7 who points out how little we actually know about the details 
of this event, and how much of the narrative preserved is tenuous at best. 
 
181 Plut. Brut. 3.1; Cat. Min. 34, 36. 
 
182 MRR 2.229. Auct. vir. ill. 82.3-4 
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In reconstructing Antony’s early life, we are aided (as we have been with others on this 
list) by both a surviving Life by Plutarch and a relative wealth of Ciceronian testimony. Again, 
Plutarch would have had access to some intriguing source material lost to us today (e.g. 
Augustus’ autobiography might have given us more information, albeit hostile; Asinius Pollio’s 
history of the Civil War would have given us a less polemic sketch of Antony) but these would 
not likely have said much about Antony’s early life before he entered the broader historical 
narrative. This dearth of source material for Antony’s youth can be sensed in Plutarch’s Life. As 
we have seen Plutarch enjoys including evidence about a subject’s formative years, but the 
Antony is among the most laconic on its subject’s youth.183 The Ciceronian evidence is more 
intriguing, although one must always be cautious when dealing with Ciceronian rhetoric 
(especially invective) as evidence. Nevertheless, the orator rarely missed an opportunity to 
criticize and – helpfully for us – enjoyed starting from the very beginning when undertaking 
character assassination.  
Antony was born in 83 BCE.184 We do not hear of any military service for him until 58 
BCE, when he was 24 years old, when he went to Greece for what Plutarch called τό τε σῶµα 
γυµνάζων πρὸς τοὺς στρατιωτικοὺς ἀγῶνας καὶ λέγειν µελετῶν (“training his body for 
combat and giving attention to oratory”). We could reasonably categorize this trip as a personal 
one, rather than a military one. It had become common place in the years prior to Antony’s 
time in Greece for young aristocrats to spend brief “study abroad” periods in Greece, and while 
                                               
183 Pelling 1988: 26-31 
184 Dettenhofer 1992: 64; MRR 3.19. 
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the passage does mention training for combat it does not indicate any official service.185 
Additionally, Cicero does not mention this year in his catalogue of Antony’s youth in the 
Second Philippic. After Greece, from 57 until 55 BCE he was a cavalry prefect under Aulus 
Gabinius, a posting confirmed by Plutarch, Cicero, and Josephus.186 Antony was sent to Judaea 
to combat Aristobulus II, and while there acquitted himself well on the battlefield. Plutarch 
tells us he was the first to mount the highest wall, a feat traditionally aspired to by aristocratic 
warriors and awarded with the corona muralis.187 In 54 BCE Antony next joined Caesar’s staff in 
Gaul, and seems to have done so as a legatus, since Caesar referred to him as such during his 
narrative of the siege of Alesia in 52 BCE.188 One complication with Antony’s Gallic service is 
that he also appears in Rome somewhat frequently during this period. In one famous instance 
he returned to Rome in August or September of 53 to seek the quaestorship but became 
entangled in the political chaos of that year.189 Cicero tells us that during a riot in 53 Antony 
                                               
185 See Daly 1950; Rawson 1985: 3-18. 
 
186 Plut. Ant. 3; Joseph. AJ 14.84, 86, 92; BJ 1.162, 165, 171-2. MRR 2.205. 
 
187 Plut. Ant. 3. Josephus’ account (AJ 14.86) says: Μᾶρκος Ἀντώνιος ἐπιφανῶς 
ἀγωνισάµενος καὶ πολλοὺς ἀποκτείνας ἔδοξεν ἠριστευκέναι. Elsewhere in Josephus (BJ 1.165) 
the author says that Antony, “always fought bravely). See also Sall. Cat. 7.6 Sed gloriae maxumum 
certamen inter ipsos (aristocrats) erat; se quisque hostem ferire, murum ascendere, conspici dum tale facinus 
faceret, properabat; bonam famam magnamque nobilitatem putabant. 
 
188 Caes. BG 7.83.3 and 90.6. 
 
189 Cic. Phil. 2.49. venis e Gallia ad quaesturam petendam. Ramsay 2003 ad loc. notes that 
we can date Antony’s return due to his involvement in the violence surrounding Clodius’ 
canvass for the praetorship.  
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almost killed Clodius while acting in Caesar’s interests.190 Antony did not kill Clodius, but 
Milo did so in the following year. Surprisingly, Antony then appears opposite Cicero as a 
prosecutor of Milo.191 It is difficult to account for Antony’s volte-face in respect to Clodius; 
Maria Dettenhofer speculates that Antony staged the attempt on Clodius’ life in 53 BCE for 
the benefit of Cicero.192 
Given Antony’s repeated appearances in Rome during the political chaos surrounding 
the rivalry between Clodius and Milo: should we count these years as “service?” It is clear that 
Antony was spending some time in Rome during his tenure under Caesar. Yet, as mentioned 
above, it is possible that service in a campaign meant spending an entire calendar year in the 
field. We cannot know exactly how Antony split his time between the camp and the city, but in 
the interests of providing the most conservative reckoning possible, I am counting Antony’s 
career from 54 up to his quaestorship in 51 BCE as continuous service. Antony was clearly a 
capable soldier. Yet, this amounts to only seven years of service prior to his quaestorship: one 
year of “military exercises” three years with Gabinius in Syria as a cavalry prefect, and three 
years as a legate in Gaul with Caesar. In this instance, we have further reason to doubt that 
Antony had any other service to his credit: Cicero’s exhaustive (albeit polemic) catalogue of 
                                               
190 Cic. Phil. 2.49 Acceperam iam ante Caesaris litteras ut mihi satis fieri paterer a te: itaque ne 
loqui quidem sum te passus de gratia. Caesar had sent a letter to Cicero asking the orator to 
reconcile with Antony. 
 
191 Ascon. 41C. 
 
192 Dettenhofer 1992: 66-7.  
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Antony’s life provided in the Philippics. Cicero, always thorough when on the attack, started 
from boyhood (a puero) and mentioned only Antony’s positions under Gabinius and Caesar.193 
 
III.13 M. Caelius Rufus (b. 82 BCE) 
Cum autem paulum iam roboris accessisset aetati, in Africam profectus est Q. Pompeio pro consule contubernalis, 
castissimo homini atque omnis officii diligentissimo, (Cic. Cael. 73) 
 
Caelius is the only subject on the list who does not have a Plutarchian Life, but thanks 
to his closeness with Cicero we have more information about the youth of M. Caelius than we 
do about some others. For the purposes of this catalogue, one concerned with the youthful 
activity of senators, we are especially blessed by Cicero’s pro Caelio. Cicero gave a thorough 
account of Caelius’ youth, some of which was overseen by Cicero personally.  There has been 
some debate about the birthdate of M. Caelius. Pliny gives us an exact date: May 28th, 82 BCE, 
but he is probably mistaken.194 Others have pointed out that this too late to account for 
Caelius’ praetorship in 48 BCE, since the lex Villia (180 BCE) stipulates that a praetor should 
be at least 39, meaning Caelius would have had to have been born in 88 BCE.195  
                                               
193 Cic. Phil. 2.44-48. 
 
194 Plin. NH 7.165. 
 
195 MRR 3.44; Dettenhofer 1992: 80-1; Ramsay 2013: 4n17. Pliny’s point is more 
concerned with astrology, and thus perhaps he had the day correct, but the year wrong. Dyck 
2013: 4ff suggests that Pliny possibly confused Caelius with Gaius Scribonius Curio, who is 
paired with the poet C. Licinius Calvus – the person Pliny said shared a birthday with Caelius 
– elsewhere (Cic. Brut. 208, 283). Lintott 2008: 431 suggests that Pliny may be right, and that 
Caelius may have obtained special permission to run for office early; but we have no evidence 
of such a dispensation, and one imagines Cicero would have mentioned it in his defense 
speech on Caelius’ behalf.  
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Some have questioned whether or not Caelius attempted to hold the quaestorship at 
all. We do not hear of him holding an office in our sources until he was people’s tribune in 52 
BCE, but it is possible that he mounted a run for the quaestorship in 56 BCE. This is based 
on an apparent ambitus charge from that time period mentioned by Cicero in the pro Caelio, 
but the Ciceronian testimony is too vague to be certain.196 Thus, both based on the nature of 
the evidence and in order to utilize the more conservative date as it is relevant to the present 
study, it is best to proceed as if 53 BCE (when Caelius was 35) was Caelius’ first candidacy for 
public office. Cicero mentions only one period of military activity by Caelius in his youth, his 
service as a contubernalis of Q. Pompeius Rufus (pr. 63 BCE) from 62 - 60 BCE.197 Caelius had 
been placed in Cicero’s charge at age 16 (in 66 BCE) and remained there until he departed for 
Africa in 62 BCE. After his return in 60 BCE, we do not hear of another military posting for 
Caelius until the Civil War. This leaves Caelius with only two campaigns, and it is difficult 
indeed to imagine that Caelius has eight years of military service in between 60 - 52 BCE that 
we hear nothing about. 
 
IV. Conclusion. 
 
Prima igitur est adulescenti commendatio ad gloriam, si qua ex bellicis rebus comparari potest, in qua multi apud maiores 
nostros exstiterunt; semper enim fere bella gerebantur. (Cic. Off. 2.45) 
 
                                               
196 Cic. Cael. 16. Numquam enim tam Caelius amens fuisset, ut, si se isto infinito ambitu 
commaculasset, ambitus alterum accusaret, neque eius facti in altero suspicionem quaereret, cuius ipse 
sibi perpetuam licentiam optaret, nec, si sibi semel periculum ambitus subeundum putaret, ipse alterum 
iterum ambitus crimine arcesseret. Sumner 1971: 248; Wiseman 1985: 66 believe that the charge 
did stem from an otherwise unattested quaestorship. Jackson 1979: 55 doubts this. Dyck 2013: 
5, 82 provides a brief review of the various possibilities and a helpful bibliography but does not 
indicate a personal opinion on the topic. 
 
197 We know Caelius was back in the city in 60 BCE because of his ambitious 
prosecution of C. Antonius Hybrida (cos. 63 BCE). See Cassius Dio 38.10.4. 
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Therefore, my first recommendation for a young man concerned with glory is that if he is able he should 
obtain it through military activity. Many of our ancestors came to prominence in this way, because they were 
always at war.  
 
 This is Cicero’s advice to his son in 44 BCE. It is traditional in its military emphasis, but 
– in light of what we now know about youthful aristocratic service from the figures in our sample 
– was it contemporary? Even in just this brief passage Cicero, by invoking the maiores, leaves us 
with the impression that prominence via military achievement was more common in the past 
then in was in the middle of the 40’s. With the final portion of this chapter I will explore 
consider what implications the mass of prosopographical information above has for our 
understanding of youthful military service among elites in the Late Republic. This will include, 
most importantly, a reexamination of decem stipendia and a suggestion of another piece of 
evidence from which it may be more appropriate to generalize.  
 
Figure 1.1: Years of Pre-Cursus Service Among the Sample. 
Figure 1.1 shows my findings. Each bar shows the amount of service I have estimated 
for each subject in the sample based on the prosopographical evidence I presented above. In 
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addition to my estimate, I have also included two markers on each bar. The lower marker 
shows what I believe to be a minimum reasonable number, the higher marker a maximum 
reasonable number. Note that in the case of Antony and Pompey there is only one marker, 
because we can be fairly certain about the amount of service for these two figures, and 
therefore the presentation of only on amount is necessary. In most cases, the lower marker 
reflects the amount of service mentioned in our sources and the higher marker the amount of 
service possible in light of the various points of biographical uncertainty for each subject. As I 
expressed ad locum above, in the case of the earlier figures such as Marius and Sertorius our 
dearth of evidence means that these estimates are somewhat vague. I assumed that mention of 
service in one event of a longer conflict meant that service throughout the duration was likely. 
Similarly, I assumed that years about which we are totally clueless could have been spent in 
camp. In the later, better-attested lives from Lucullus onward the upper limit was brought 
down more easily thanks to evidence of presence in Rome or other non-military activity in any 
given year.  
Before discussing the implications of the evidence in figure 1, there are two points of 
interest that beg for mention. For the most part the graph proceeds in chronological order, but 
I have moved Pompey to the edge rather than keeping him adjacent to Cicero (both were born 
in 106). Pompey is an obvious outlier in the sample, and this is not surprising since his pre-
cursus service was unique in two major ways. First, Pompey spent the majority of his youthful 
service as a commander rather than a soldier, and thus the nature of his service was quite 
extraordinary. Secondly, Pompey did not stand for public office until he sought the consulship 
for 70 BCE at the age of 35. If we assume that his peers sought the praetorship at 30, as was 
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customary in the Late Republic, then Pompey’s unconventional political career gave him five 
additional years in which to serve. Therefore, I have kept Pompey on the graph, but moved 
him to an edge so that we may get a better sense of the data from more normal careers.  I have 
also left Sulla’s entry as uncertain, rather than zero. As I mentioned above, scholarship on how 
much military service Sulla is likely to have had before 106 is split between two poles: those 
who believe he had absolutely none, as Sallust seems to suggest in the Jugurtha, and those who 
assume he must have had ten campaigns of experience. We simply lack, I believe, the necessary 
evidence to make an argument for either extreme, or to support any number in between 
(which I suspect is most likely). Thus, I have left Sulla out of the calculations that follow.  
In terms of averages, if we begin with my estimates of the likely amounts of service, the 
subjects averaged only 5.5 years of military service before seeking their first public office. If we 
remove Pompey, the amount drops to five. Even if we accept the maximum figures the amount 
of pre-cursus service rises only to 6.9, and without Pompey 6.5. On the other end, the 
minimum amounts average to 4.4 years, and without Pompey this drops to 3.7. In every 
instance this is well below the 10-campaign figure that scholars have lean upon when 
discussing youthful aristocratic service in the Republic. I would caution, however, against 
overreacting to this data alone, because discussing these findings in terms of averages is 
misleading. Instead, the clearest trend shown by figure 1 is a split between low amounts – two 
is the most common entry – and relatively higher ones such as Crassus, Caesar and Antony, all 
of whom had seven years of service by my estimate.  
 These numbers, at least in this admittedly small sample, leave little doubt: if aspiring 
politicians were ever required to serve in ten campaigns before their first canvass, we can say with 
  104   
 
even more certainty that this does not seem to have been the case in the Late Republic. 
Obviously we do not have as much evidence as we should like in order to make a definitive 
claim, but our sampling suggests that it was actually common for men to seek their first office 
with well under ten campaigns to their name. In fact, in this period I suggest we flip the 
articulation of such an interpretation: it seems rare for someone to have stood for their first 
office having fulfilled the decem stipendia. Of all of these subjects, only Marius and Pompey (two 
of Roman history’s most-celebrated soldiers) seem to have accomplished the feat. Further, in 
Marius’ case I have assumed rather a great deal (four years) of service for which we have no 
mention in our sources, and the circumstances of Pompey’s service were (as I mentioned 
above) extraordinary. 
 This data show how harmful an influence the decem stipendia has had on our 
interpretation of the evidence. We have seen frequently in the prosopographical analysis above 
that scholars are accustomed to turn to the decem stipendia in making chronological arguments, 
but given how rare it seems to have been for someone to fulfill the decem stipendia in the Late 
Republic such arguments rest on rather precarious foundations. Further, this knowledge 
should effectively break the circular arguments that claim that some of these senators must have 
had some military service we have not heard of on the grounds that their candidacy would not 
have been admitted without the decem stipendia. In some cases, as we have seen, this argument 
(e.g. the decem stipendia was still in effect, therefore Sulla must have served ten years prior to his 
quaestorship) has been used to undermine sources that explicitly say otherwise. Again, based 
on these findings I suggest that such arguments are founded upon rather tenuous assumptions. 
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At least in the period between Marius and Caesar (if not even before Marius) I do not think we 
can assume that anyone fulfilled the decem stipendia before the age of 30.   
 Then what happened to the regulation? As I discussed above, one prevailing theory 
about the decem stipendia is that it fell into disuse following the Social War after military 
practice shifted away from employing a citizen cavalry. If we return to the beginning of this 
chapter and Marius’ speech in the Jugurtha, however, we should notice that Marius was 
describing an aristocracy that avoided military service in 107 BCE – 16 years before the Social 
War. Of course, the speech of Marius in the Jugurtha was a Sallustian creation and thus one 
may argue that Sallust was anachronistically describing his own times. Yet, Marius’ career was 
not so far removed from Sallust’s lifetime that there would not have been some memory within 
the community of Marius and his rise to prominence. Further, this evidence undermines the 
idea that the Social War marked a sharp decrease in aristocratic military service. I have counted 
Marius as having fulfilled the decem stipendia based upon his reputation and out of a desire to 
interpret the evidence as conservatively as possible, but we only have evidence for six 
campaigns. Further, it is unlikely that Sulla had no military experience when he stood for the 
quaestorship (even though Sallust suggests as much), but as I have argued above and as the 
other evidence present in this chapter has corroborated it would be highly speculative to 
assume he had at least ten campaigns. Therefore, his election to the quaestorship would have 
come too early for the Social War to explain how he avoided the decem stipendia. Likewise, 
Lucullus was twenty-eight when he first served in the military during the Social War; unless he 
had been planning to start his political career when he was nearly forty, it is likely that he 
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planned to run for office with less than ten campaigns under his belt.198 The argument that the 
Social War caused the disappearance of the decem stipendia already lacked sources strongly 
supporting it; now I believe that it is quite possible that this tenuous solution actually lacks a 
problem as well. Aristocratic cavalry service appears to have been declining before the allies 
rebelled in 91.  
 Instead of searching out a new date for the lapse of the decem stipendia I believe the 
evidence here supports those who have questioned whether or not the regulation ever 
existed.199 Polybius is our only explicit evidence for this rule, and he himself seems to 
undermine its existence elsewhere. His friend Scipio Aemilianus was an excellent soldier but 
was famously criticized as “un-Roman” for refusing to plead in the courts – a fair enough 
criticism given the importance of legal pleading among the Roman elite.200 Later, however, 
Polybius reveals how Scipio won his reputation for bravery: 
διὸ καὶ παραγενόµενος εἰς τὴν Ῥώµην καὶ προσλαβὼν τὸν τοῦ Πολυβίου πρὸς τοῦτο τὸ µέρος ἐνθουσιασµόν, 
ἐφ᾿ ὅσον οἱ λοιποὶ τῶν νέων περὶ τὰς κρίσεις καὶ τοὺς χαιρετισµοὺς ἐσπούδαζον, κατὰ τὴν ἀγορὰν ποιούµενοι 
τὴν διατριβήν, καὶ διὰ τούτων	συνιστάνειν ἑαυτοὺς ἐπειρῶντο τοῖς πολλοῖς, ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ὁ Σκιπίων ἐν ταῖς 
κυνηγεσίαις ἀναστρεφόµενος καὶ λαµπρὸν ἀεί τι ποιῶν καὶ µνήµης ἄξιον καλλίω δόξαν ἐξεφέρετο τῶν 
ἄλλων. (Polyb. 31.29.8-10) 
 
Therefore, returning to Rome and taking as a companion Polybius who was also interested in this (hunting), 
as much as the rest of the young men busied themselves in legal cases and greetings and passing time in the 
forum and through these activities attempted to win over the People, Scipio instead turned to hunting and 
                                               
198 Although we have very little information about him at all, the same could 
presumably be said of Lucullus’ consular colleague M. Aurelius Cotta. Harris 1979: 257 
includes Cotta in his catalogue of early magistrates who may have shirked the decem stipendia. 
Appian Mith. 71 may suggest that Cotta suffered from a lack of military experience while 
proconsul in Bithynia (73 BCE).  
 
199 Again, Kunkel & Whitman 1995: 60-3 call it ein traditionelles Prinzip; Develin 1979: 
58ff; Beck 2000: 336 calls the decem stipendia a guideline (Richtlinie) rather than a regulation.  
 
200 Polyb. 31.23.10-2. Rosenstein 2006: 368ff suggests that legal pleading itself was a 
kind of “ritualized combat.” 
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through the brilliance of his deeds and the memory of them obtained a reputation more splendid than that 
of others.  
 
Hunting, it seems, was the source of Scipio’s reputation, not his considerable efforts in war. If 
Polybius is correct here – a big “if,” admittedly – then this hardly seems like an aristocratic 
culture that places a premium on battlefield prowess. In this light, the speech of Marius in the 
Jugurtha seems less like a rhetorical exercise from Sallust and more plausibly like a reflection of 
contemporary issues in 108 BCE.  
 Additionally, we should consider the logistics of enforcing the decem stipendia. Until 
218 BCE, shortly after the date of this figure, the normal cavalry complement for a legion was 
200-300 men. The Republic fielded four legions at this period, so we should assume a total 
cavalry enlistment to be between 800 and 1200 men total.201 Thanks once again to Polybius, 
we have a fairly reliable figure for the number of citizens eligible for cavalry service in 225 
BCE: 23,000 men.202 Now, not all of the men counted in Polybius’ figure would be under the 
age of 27 nor would all be aristocrats, but even if only a small minority of this number was 
comprised by aristocrats it would be hard to imagine that they were all able to serve ten 
campaigns before their first office given the size of the pool of potential cavalrymen and the 
number of spaces available in each legion. McCall’s study on the Roman cavalry estimates that 
                                               
201 Polyb. 3.107.9-15. Walbank 1984: 439; 677-83; Afzelius 1944: 62, 72; McCall 2002: 
36ff, 100, 151. 
 
202 Polyb. 2.23.9ff. See Walbank 1984 ad loc. Polybius’ figures are thought to be 
relatively reliable, given their sourcing (Fabius Pictor). There is some question as to whether 
the figures provided by Polybius include men already serving under arms or just those available 
but not conscripted. I follow Walbank, who favors reading the figures as a full muster. See also 
Mommsen StR 3.575; Beloch 1886: 355-70; De Sanctis: 1953: 2.385, 462, 3.330; Rosenstein 
2004: 89-91. 
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out of the 23,000 men mentioned by Polybius, 9,000 would be between the ages of 17-30 and 
therefore prime targets for conscription. McCall concludes that if each man between 17-30 
years old served in the cavalry, then the average amount of service would only come to three 
years.203 Of course, not all members of the cavalry class would expect to serve ten years, but the 
numbers make it challenging to imagine that even all aristocrats would be able to. It is not 
within the purview of this study to pursue this line of inquiry too far, but it is hard to imagine 
that these numbers – firmly within the Middle Republic – would support a system that 
required a decade of cavalry service prior to beginning a political career.  
The inability to rely upon Polybius for the amount of youthful military service expected 
of aristocrats should force us to look elsewhere, and we are not without other options. I offer 
one here which we have already seen: the Tabula Heracleensis. The inscription probably does 
not (as has been previously supposed) give us the text of the lex Iulia municipalis of 45 BCE but 
is more likely a digest of several different texts. Yet, the entirety of the Tabula Heracleensis is 
thought to be Caesarian in date.204 The most relevant passage for the current study is from a 
section of the Tabula which deals with qualifications for magistrates and senators in the 
municipia:205 
quei minor annos (triginta) natus est erit, nei quis eorum post K(alendas) Ianuar(ias)  
secundas in municipio colonia praefectura IIvir(atum) IIIvir(atum neve quem alium mag(istratum) petito neve capito 
neve gerito, nisei quei eorum stipendia equo in legione (tria) aut pedestria in legione (sex) fecerit... 
 
                                               
203 McCall 2002: 150-1. He uses the life table in Parkin (1992: 147) to conclude that 
24.058% of the sample would be between 17-30 years old. Although note that his number 
works from what he estimates to be the total population of the cavalry class in 225 BCE (i.e. 
Polybius’ 23,000 plus those under the age of 17), 37,700.    
204 Crawford RS 1.358-60. 
 
205 Crawford RS 1.366. 
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After the Kalends of next January, no one who is less than 30 years old is to seek, to obtain, or to hold the 
office of IIvir, IIIvir, or any other magistracy in a municipium, colony, or prefecture unless he has served three 
campaigns in the cavalry or six campaigns in the infantry. 
 
This regulation is directed at communities outside of Rome, but in light of the service records 
of the subjects examined here it is hard not to notice some similarity. The most frequent 
amount of campaigns in our sample is two – well under the decem stipendia but just one 
campaign shy of the three-campaign minimum recorded in the Tabula. If we consider the 
possibility that the regulations on the Tabula Heracleensis were applying Roman standards to 
municipal communities – and others have206 – then I suggest that this is a more attractive 
option for discussions of military service minimums than the decem stipendia.  
 Finally, the last major implication I wish to discuss is one of acculturation. If we were 
to imagine that the Roman Senate was populated by men who had all spent the majority of 
their developing years in the army then it would follow that the sharing of a universal 
formative experience would have greatly influenced the group’s identity. Senators may have 
gone on to pursue more or less bellicose political careers after their youthful military service, 
but service in the cavalry would still have been a major (perhaps the only) shared experience to 
which all members of the body could relate. Additionally, it has been shown that military 
service in during this period (and others) had a powerful socializing effect on those who 
participated.207 Thus it is natural for a group’s identity to coalesce around such shared 
experiences, and we have already seen in the Introduction and throughout this chapter that 
military service foundational to aristocratic legitimacy and therefore emphasized in the group’s 
                                               
206 See Harris 1979: 12ff; Crawford RS 1.358ff. 
 
207 See most notably Rosenstein 2012. 
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efforts to communicate its identity to the broader political community. What happens when a 
group like the Roman Senate decides to shift away from an important shared experience? 
 Within the Senate itself, one would naturally expect that the loss of a shared formative 
experience would lead to fragmenting and disagreement within the body concerning what the 
basis of the aristocratic identity should be. This is exactly what we see in our sources. I will 
discuss this in much greater depth in my third chapter, which focuses upon aristocratic 
attitudes towards military honors, but at the moment we might think briefly about the famous 
Sallustian synkrisis in the Catiline.208 Sallust compares the virtues of Caesar and Cato – the 
men he singles out having great virtus – in a way that contrasts their beliefs and methods. In 
the comparison Caesar and Cato are presented as holding opposite views on what kind of 
activity was important in aristocratic life. For our purposes, it is important to recognize that 
military activity is a major difference between the two men: Cato’s efforts in the competition 
over virtus focused on moral, internal achievements such as modestia, innocentia, and abstinentia, 
while Caesar wished most for a “great command, an army, and a new war.” Much ink has been 
spilled attempting to identify a “winner” in Sallust’s comparison,209 but such pursuits are – in 
my opinion – not particularly useful. Sallust tells us from the beginning of his synkrisis that 
both men “won” the distinction of having great virtus. Rather than the triumph of the 
                                               
208 Sall. Cat. 53-54. 
 
209 Bibliographies can be found a Vretska 1976: 2.618-22; McGushin 1976: 309-11; 
Batstone 1988: 1-2. Syme 1964 is still the standard-bearer for a pro-Catonian interpretation of 
the Synkrisis. Shwartz 1897 and Schur 1934 represent some pro-Caesar readings. Batstone’s 
reading, which emphasizes the differences between the men rather than attempting to identify 
a “winner,” is still in my opinion the best and most useful work on the subject 
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Caesarian or Catonian conception of what makes a good Roman Senator (Cato wins the 
debate in the Catiline, Caesar wins the Civil War) what we see is the coexistence of competing 
value systems and that military activity was an important point of difference between them. We 
would, to put it simply, expect that a Senate deprived of a shared formative experience would 
become more divided, and that factions within the body would have increased difficulty 
communicating with each other. Moments like the Sallustian synkrisis (and many others we 
have already seen and will see later in this project) show us that this was the case in the Late 
Republic.   
 I began this chapter with a quote from the speech of Marius in the Jugurtha, a portion 
of the text that has often been discredited as “pure entertainment” or merely “an illustration of 
the writer’s creative ability.”210 I would not go so far as to suggest that we consider the speech a 
preservation of words spoken in 108, but after this examination I do believe we should take its 
claims more seriously. We should also remember that changes in aristocratic career pattern do 
no only signify shifting elite values but also indicate voters’ priorities as well. Whereas 
previously military achievement seems to have been by far the most significant variable in 
Roman voters’ decision making, this evidence suggests that candidates no longer felt compelled 
to advertise themselves as soldiers. In fact, with this evidence, the importance of youthful 
service to the voters of the Late Republic may be somewhat analogous to American political 
landscape during the years of the draft, wherein most candidates had only to prove a minimum 
amount of military service while few who could claim more distinguished and lengthy terms of 
service were able to trade more heavily upon their military record. Certainly there was a deeply-
                                               
210 See above n.4.  
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ingrained sense of the importance of military service among the political class. But while 
republican oratory, historiography, and culture often paid service to this idea, their assertions 
do not match the reality. Cicero, whose quote above began this section, illustrates this nicely. 
On the whole the de Officiis clearly privileges non-military political action, and yet Cicero still 
felt compelled to offer service in the army as his “first recommendation” on the path to gloria.
113  
 
 
3. "We Will Have to Raise Marius from the Underworld!": Cicero's Pro Fonteio and the 
Shortage of Commanders in the Late Republic. 
 
I. “Excitandus nobis erit ab inferis C. Marius.” 
 
Magna mehercules causa, iudices, absolutionis cum ceteris causis haec est, ne quae insignis huic imperio macula atque 
ignominia suscipiatur, si hoc ita perlatum erit in Galliam, senatores equitesque populi Romani non testimoniis 
Gallorum, sed minis commotos rem ad illorum lubidinem iudicasse. Ita vero, si illi bellum facere conabuntur, excitandus 
nobis erit ab inferis C. Marius, qui Indutiomaro isti minaci atque adroganti par in bello gerendo esse possit, excitandus 
Cn. Domitius et Q. Maximus, qui nationem Allobrogum et reliquas suis iterum armis conficiat atque opprimat, (Cic. 
Font. 36) 
 
By Hercules, judges, among all the reasons for acquittal, a great one is to prevent a conspicuous and 
shameful stain upon our imperium if this will be spread throughout Gaul, that the senators and knights of 
the Roman People have ruled not in consideration of testimony of Gauls but rather in light of threats and 
according to their desire. Truly then, if they attempt to wage war, we will be forced to raise from the 
underworld C. Marius, who would be able to equal this threatening and arrogant Indutiomarus1 in waging 
war. We will be forced to raise Cn. Domitius and Q. Maximus, that they might again press and subdue the 
Allobroges and the rest. 
 
 This passage comes from one of Cicero’s less-studied forensic speeches, the pro Fonteio. 
Sometime in either late 70 or early 69 BCE Cicero defended a provincial governor, M. 
Fonteius, against charges of extortion stemming from the latter’s time administering 
Transalpine Gaul.2 The trial marked Cicero’s return to his preferred role of defense counsel 
                                               
1 The Indutiomarus in this speech is not to be confused with the rebellious leader of 
the Treveri who opposed Caesar in 54. See Caes. BG 5.55-8.  
 
2 For a discussion of the dating see Dyck 2012: 13-4. Coçkun 2006: 358-61 pushes for 
70 BCE, but this leaves little time for the promulgation of the new law, the enrollment of new 
jurors, and - most fundamentally - time for the plaintiff Gauls to travel to Rome. See Alexander 
2002: 60-1. The precise term of his governorship in Transalpine Gaul (probably a 
propraetorship) is disputed but was almost certainly either from 75-73 or from 74-72 BCE 
(although Brennan 2000: 509-11 suggests 77-75) See MRR 2.104; 3.93; Badian 1966: 911-2; 
Alexander 2002: 60ff, 274n.3; Lintott 2008: 101. Cicero tells us (§44) that Fonteius was in 
Macedonia in 77, and we know (§16) that he was in Gaul at a time that allowed him to help 
Pompey’s forces winter there. Pompey wintered in Transalpine Gaul twice: 77-76 BCE, which 
we can rule out because Fonteius was in Macedonia, leaving 74-73 BCE. Badian argues for 74-
72, since Cicero fails to mention that Pompey’s colleague in Spain, Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius, 
  114   
 
after he had just won a terrific victory in the prosecution of C. Verres, who had also been 
charged de repetundis. The charges should be familiar to anyone who has knowledge of Roman 
provincial administration in the Late Republic. The prosecution claimed that Fonteius took 
kickbacks in the construction of infrastructure in the province (§17-18), that he profited 
personally from a new tax on wine (§19), that he waged warfare unjustly against the Vocontii 
(§20), and that he distributed troops into winter quarters oppressively (§20).3 Much of Cicero’s 
defense follows the xenophobic path one would expect: the plaintiffs were Gauls and therefore 
not to be trusted.4 There is, however, a line of Cicero’s argument that connects it to the 
questions of this project and that opens an avenue into an intriguing issue in the Republic’s 
last generation: he claims the court should acquit M. Fonteius because of his military 
experience. 
                                               
wintered in Transalpine Gaul in 75-74 (see Plut. Sert. 21). Critics of 75-73 argue that a 
prosecution in 69 BCE is too late but see note on the dating of the trial below. 
 
3 I am using Dyck’s organization of the text, which is preferable to the traditional 
organization of the fragments. See also Alexander 2002: 59-77. The manuscript tradition is 
somewhat complicated, and Dyck points out that the fragmentary state of the text probably 
contributes to this dearth of scholarly treatment about the speech. §1-6 were discovered as a 
palimpsest and §11-end are on Quire V of Vativan Arch S. Pietro H.25. Riggsby 1999: 120 says 
it is “apparently in an intermediate degree of preservation,” while contrasting it with the pro 
Flacco (more fragmentary) and the pro Rabirio (essentially complete). 
 
4 The reverence Cicero had shown for Sicilian testimony during his prosecution of 
Verres no longer applied. Such arguments are certainly flawed and distasteful to the modern 
reader, but Riggsby (1999: 134ff) was right to caution against underestimating their rhetorical 
effectiveness in de repetundis trials. In doings so he was pushing back against Kurke 1989: 175 
who characterizes these racial characters as “empty rhetoric.” For similar arguments in other 
Ciceronian forensic speeches see See Flacc. 10-1; 65; Rab. 35; Scaur. 42. See also Vasaly 1993: 
193ff.  
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 Cicero argued that military men were in short supply in 70 BCE. We have already seen 
in Chapter 1 that youthful military experience among aristocrats of the first century was in 
precipitous decline during the middle of the first century BCE. The evidence presented there 
showed clearly that aspiring statesmen – quite contrary to the values they inherited – felt their 
prospects were better served by domestic activity rather than extended service in the camps and 
proving their prowess on the battlefield. In the pro Fonteio Cicero tells us that the elite 
eschewing of the camps continued as men climbed the cursus honorum. The advocate states 
clearly that Rome did not have as many experienced commanders as it had enjoyed in the past. 
In this chapter I will first examine the perception Cicero seems to be exploiting in his speech. 
Once we have a better idea of what exactly Cicero was suggesting in the pro Fonteio, I will then 
attempt to test Cicero’s claim against our evidence. Of course, our source material is not 
plentiful enough to approach the question head on as it would be impossible to determine 
exactly how many men of military experience there were among aristocrats of the Late Republic 
– or for that matter in any other period. Instead, I will work with a smaller sample, the consuls 
from 81-49 BCE, in order to see what their service records can tell us about command 
experience among the holders of Rome’s highest annual magistracy.  The principle question 
here is not unlike that of my first Chapter: how much command experience did consuls have 
in this period? Once we have seen how the evidence in the pro Fonteio aligns with contemporary 
reality, I will close by examining some other loci in which we might detect this anxiety and 
close by discussing the implications of my findings.  
Let us return to the trial. Above I have given a portion of §36 of Cicero’s speech. Up to 
this point in his defense, Cicero had gone to some lengths to suggest that the situation in Gaul 
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was unstable and a conviction of Fonteius would embolden those eager to move against Rome.5 
This was, so far as we can tell, a fiction created by the speaker to serve his interests and those of 
his client, but his focus on potential military threat reveals an intriguing part of Cicero’s 
strategy. If the Gauls do rebel, he argues, Rome will be forced to raise up from the underworld 
(excitandus nobis erit ab inferis) its former heroes from the perpetual struggle with Gaul. He gives 
us some suggestions. The first entry on the list is the most obvious, Marius, the man who 
repelled the Cimbri and Teutones. Next came Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus (cos. 122 BCE) 
who fought as consul against the Salluvi, Alloborges, and Averni. And finally Q. Fabius 
Maximus, the consul of 121 BCE who joined Domitius.6  
This rhetorical necromancy did a large amount of argumentative work for Cicero’s 
defense. By bringing these illustrious exempla into his speech Cicero was associating his client 
with them, even though Fonteius’ achievements paled in comparison.7 The invocation of large-
                                               
5 Cic. Font. 17, 36. 
 
6 Following the order of Cicero’s mention, not chronological order: Marius’ command 
against the Cimbri and Teutones concluded with battles at Aqua Sextiae in 102 BCE and at 
Vercellae in 101 ( For Aqua Sextiae see: Cic. Cat. 4.21; Leg. Man. 60; Plut. Mar. 15-22; Dio 
Cass. 27; Livy Per. 68; Vell. 2.12.4; Val. Max. 1.2.4; Oros. 5.26.9-14. For Vercellae see: Cic. 
Cat. 4.21; Prov. Cons. 32; Caes. BG 1.40.5; Livy Per. 68; Vell. 2.12.5; Val. Max. 5.2.8, 6.1; Plin. 
NH 22.11; Plut. Mar. 24-7). For Domitius see: Caes. BG 1.45.2; Livy Per. 61; Vell. 2.10.2-3, 
39.1; Strabo 4.1.11, 4.2.3; Val. Max. 9.6.3; Suet. Nero 1.2, 2.1; Flor. 1.37.4-6; App. Celt. 12. For 
Fabius in addition to the sources for Domitius see also Plin. NH 7.166, 33.141. He took the 
cognomen “Allobrogicus” (Val. Max. 3.5.2, 6.9.4; Senec. Ben. 4.30.2; Amm. Marc. 15.12.5; Ps. 
Ascon. 211). His mention of Maximus is potentially a cheeky one, one of Fonteius’ prosecutors 
was a M. Fabius. Whether or not he was actually descended from the consul of 122 is 
unknown, that Cicero fails to mention this explicitly may suggest he was not. Nevertheless, the 
similarity of the names would be apparent to the audience.  
 
7 Van der Blom has argued persuasively (2010: 3ff) that by using exempla in his speeches 
Cicero was able to compensate for his lack of family prestige. Presumably this also worked for 
his client. In de Partitione Oratoria, (§96) for example, Cicero writes that exempla are useful for 
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scale conflicts with Gaul also helped bolster a sense of urgency which Cicero has been carefully 
cultivating in his listeners. He has already suggested that the Gauls may be so emboldened by 
the prosecution of Fonteius that revolt could follow. In invoking his fellow-Arpinate Marius, 
Cicero was bringing to mind the crisis of the previous generation. Some in the audience would 
have remembered how surprising and dire the situation had been.8 More importantly for our 
purposes, in addition to bringing the crisis of the end of the second century to the minds of 
the listeners Cicero has also made a somewhat radical claim given what we know about military 
response to crisis in the Roman Republic. In saying that it will be necessary to raise the dead to 
meet the enemy he was indirectly (but undeniably) suggesting that there are not living senators 
fit for the task. 
As we saw in the Introduction to this work, leading Rome’s armies had traditionally 
been the foremost responsibility of the senatorial class. Their time was consumed with it, their 
political legitimacy rested upon it, and thus their self-presentation focused upon it. Further, 
nearly universal desire among the elite for command positions had produced an ideology 
which valued amateurism in order to diffuse opportunities more widely among aristocrats. 
This in turn produced, as Nathan Rosenstein put it, the expectation in the Middle Republic 
(generally speaking) that any member of the aristocracy should be prepared to lead the legions 
                                               
“amplification.” He further recommends the speaker have old and recent exempla on hand 
because the former carry more auctoritas and the latter will be more recognizable. See also Cic. 
Or. 120 where he says that exempla (Roman and non-Roman) give auctoritas and fides to an 
argument. He gives a definition at Inv. 1.49: Exemplum est quod rem auctoritate aut casu alicuius 
hominis aut negoti confirmat aut infirmat, and Rhet. Herenn. 4.62. See also Roller 2018: 11-22.  
 
8 It is important to remember that the jury in 69 was only 35 years removed from the 
panic of 105 BCE.  
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successfully.9 Again, as we saw in the Introduction, the political culture of the Republic has 
often been interpreted as a national predisposition towards militarism. While we ought not 
overemphasize this idea, it would also be foolish to suggest that the community was not – in 
the modern parlance – obsessed with military achievement. Nor should we be surprised by the 
centrality of military activity in the Roman political sphere; this was, at its most basic level, a 
necessity. The gates of the Temple of Janus, which closed during times of peace, were opened 
(so the story goes) by Rome’s third king and stayed so until a brief opening after the First Punic 
War in 235 BCE. Augustus closed them next after the Battle of Actium in 29 BCE. Peace 
during the Late Republic was exceedingly rare.10 To put this chapter in dialogue with the first, 
the Republic forced its leaders to train as soldiers because it needed commanders.  
Contrast this traditional expectation with Cicero’s words in the pro Fonteio (§43): 
Age vero, nunc inserite oculos in curiam, introspicite penitus in omnis rei publicae partes; utrum videtis nihil posse 
accidere, ut tales viri desiderandi sint, an, si acciderit, eorum hominum copia populum Romanum abundare? Quae si 
diligenter attendetis, profecto, iudices, virum ad labores belli impigrum, ad pericula fortem, ad usum ac disciplinam 
peritum, ad consilia prudentem, ad casum fortunamque felicem domi vobis ac liberis vestris retinere quam inimicissimis 
populo Romano nationibus et crudelissimis tradere et condonare maletis. 
 
Truly now, turn your attention to the Curia, scrutinize the deepest corners of the Republic. Do you think 
there is no possible situation which calls for such men? Or, if something should happen, do you think the 
state has an abundance of these men? Think on this carefully, judges, and without doubt you will prefer to 
retain this man for the sake of your homes and children instead of convicting him and handing him over to 
the most wicked nations which are most hostile to the Roman People, a man energetic in the face of war’s 
labors, one brave against dangers, one experienced in the practice and discipline of war, one wise in counsel, 
one who is proven lucky in war.  
 
                                               
9 Rosenstein 2006: 381; 1990: 172ff calls this the “myth of universal aristocratic 
competence.” 
 
10 For the practice of closing the Temple of Janus see Livy 1.19; Plut. Num. 73. and 
Augustus’ Res Gestae §13. For the closure in 29 see Dio Cass. 51.20 (and again in 25 BCE – 
53.27). 
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Cicero’s description of Fonteius should be familiar; he casts his defendant in the mold of the 
traditional aristocratic leader. Fonteius is energetic, brave, experienced, wise, and lucky. He is, 
simply put, someone equal to the task of leading the army. What stands in sharp contrast, 
however, to the values inherited by the men of the Late Republic is Cicero’s assertion that men 
like Fonteius are a rarity. Whether one is searching inside the Curia or outside of it (inserite 
oculos in curiam, introspicite penitus in omnis rei publicae partes), Cicero claims that there is no 
abundance of capable military leaders. Rather, Fonteius must be preserved because there is a 
dearth of such men.  
Elsewhere in the pro Fonteio Cicero had put this even more bluntly (§42): 
Quare si etiam monendi estis a me, iudices, quod non estis, videor hoc leviter pro mea auctoritate vobis praecipere posse, 
ut ex eo genere homines, quorum cognita virtus, industria, felicitas in re militari sit, diligenter vobis retinendos existimetis. 
Fuit enim maior talium virorum in hac re publica copia; quae cum esset, tamen eorum non modo saluti, sed etiam 
honori consulebatur. Quid nunc vobis faciendum est studiis militaribus apud iuventutem obsoletis, fortissimis autem 
hominibus ac summis ducibus partim aetate, partim civitatis discordiis ac rei publicae calamitate consumptis, cum tot 
bella aut a nobis necessario suscipiantur aut subito atque inprovisa nascantur? Nonne et hominem ipsum ad dubia rei 
publicae tempora reservandum et ceteros studio laudis ac virtutis inflammandos putatis? 
 
Therefore, judges, if you need to be reminded by me – although you do not – it seems that on account of my 
authority I can gently offer you this advice: you should resolve to protect one from that group of men whose 
virtus, work ethic, and good fortune in military matters is known. Indeed, there was once in this Republic a 
greater body of such men, and even though this was the case, nevertheless their honor was a point of 
consideration, to say nothing of their safety. Now what should you do, when military service has been 
forgotten among the youth, when our bravest men and best generals have been spent either by age, civil war, 
or disaster, when so many wars are taken up by us either because of necessity or which arise suddenly and 
unexpectedly? Do you not think that this man should be preserved for this doubtful period for the Republic 
in addition to exciting the enthusiasm for praise and virtus among the rest? 
 
He claims that this problem is so manifest that the judges themselves need no reminding (si 
etiam monendi estis a me, iudices, quod non estis). It is here too that we see Cicero present the 
problem as ubiquitous throughout the stages of senatorial career. As young men have forgotten 
military service (see Chapter 1), so too have capable generals been “spent” without adequate 
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replenishment. In addition to the pragmatics of his appeal, it is important to note how 
skillfully Cicero has deployed contemporary Roman society’s valuation of military 
achievement. The traditional privilege enjoyed by military men entitled them to special 
considerations when faced with situations like prosecution even though in that period there 
was an abundance of such men. Cicero argues now that it is even more important to protect 
not only the honor, but also the basic safety of such men since there are fewer of them at the 
Republic’s disposal. Before 70 BCE the Republic did this out of a consideration for the 
prestige of its conquering heroes. Now it needed to do so out of necessity – or so he claims.  
From Chapter 1 of this work we can imagine that Cicero’s mention of the neglect of military 
service among the aristocratic youth rang true. Although one might argue that Cicero was ill-
suited to make such an argument since he had done a very bare minimum of military service by 
the time of the trial (and, indeed, after it),11 on the other hand – if we take Cicero at his word 
and assume that the body he is addressing lack men with military experience – his own dearth 
of service further illustrates his point. 
 These passages produce, therefore, an interesting argumentative thread in Cicero’s 
defense of Fonteius. It is clear that Cicero was attempting to utilize a contemporary perception 
that there were fewer capable military commanders than previously, and we should not take 
this lightly. As a master of persuasion Cicero was uniquely adept at recognizing and 
manipulating societal concerns and anxieties. We should imagine that in the crafting of his 
speeches Cicero considered the perceptions and ideas held by his audience just as much, if not 
                                               
11 See Chapter 1 III.7. 
 
  121   
 
more, than he did style and structure. We should also note that the pro Fonteio would not be 
the last time Cicero deployed this argument in defense of a “military man.” In 63 BCE Cicero, 
as consul, defended M. Licinius Murena against charges of electoral malpractice and used a 
similar strategy. According to Cicero’s speech, the prosecution claimed that Murena’s extensive 
military experience was a liability to his consular campaign since it had frequently taken him 
abroad for long periods of time and was relatively less valuable politically when compared to 
his opponent-cum-prosecuter’s background in jurisprudence. Not only does Cicero disagree 
with this premise (recall from the Introduction that this is one of the passages Harris cites as an 
“admission” by Cicero that military activity really was the primary source of political power), 
but he also argues that given the current crisis surrounding the Catilinarian Conspiracy 
Murena’s experience should be valued at a premium.12  
What is unclear, unsurprisingly, is how much we should trust his claims to reflect 
reality. Ciceronian rhetoric is difficult source material for the ancient historian. After all, this 
is the same man who managed to talk the Roman People into voting down agrarian legislation 
which would have directly benefited them. How can we judge the truthfulness of Cicero’s 
claims? If we had more certain information, the most basic criteria we might look at is whether 
or not Cicero’s argument worked for his client. Our sources, however, do not provide us with 
information about the verdict in this trial, although it seems likely that Fonteius was 
acquitted.13 And, even if we had some solid evidence that Fonteius escaped conviction, we 
                                               
12 See Cic. Mur. Passim but especially §15-20, 78, 83-85. 
 
13 Some have taken Cicero’s sale of a Neapolitan property to a M. Fonteius to suggest 
that Fonteius was in exile following his prosecution (Cic. Att. 1.6.1, for the sale as evidence of 
Fonteius’ conviction see Schneider 1876: 33-4; against Dyck 2012: 15), but such a sale - if 
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would nevertheless have trouble crediting this thread of Cicero’s argument alone with the 
acquittal. We need, therefore, a different way to explore how connected to reality Cicero’s 
argument was. Therefore, in my next section, I have devised a way in which we might – using 
the word cautiously – “test” Cicero’s claim.  
  
 
II. Fuit enim maior talium virorum in hac re publica copia: 
Pre-Consular Command Experience 81-49 BCE.  
 
 I put “test” in quotations because, as so often with ancient material, the amount and 
nature of the source evidence does not afford us the ability to approach this issue directly. 
There is no preserved roster of available military commanders in any given period of 
republican history. Nor can we reproduce a prosopographical record for the entirety of the 
Roman Senate sufficiently comprehensive enough to afford us strong conclusions. As with 
Chapter 1, I instead suggest testing a more manageable sample and therefore have chosen to 
examine the command experience of the consuls from after the dictatorship of Sulla until the 
Caesarian Civil War, 81-49 BCE. I will be looking primarily at how many consuls had some 
form of command experience prior to their election to the Republic’s highest annual 
magistracy. In the previous chapter, due to the dearth of evidence for aristocratic youth I was 
forced to curate my sample somewhat creatively, relying on Plutarch to ensure that some 
evidence on the subject existed. But by turning our focus to military command rather than 
                                               
indeed this is the same Fonteius - would actually confirm his acquittal. Fonteius would not 
have been able to reside in an area under direct Roman control if he was in exile. It is also 
possible that the “Fonteius” mentioned by Cicero (Att. 4.15.6) is our defendant, and this 
would put him in Rome in 54 BCE. 
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service in the rank and file comes with significant advantages. We are on – relatively speaking – 
much firmer ground in the source record when discussing military command. Finally, similar 
to our sample in Chapter 1 we can assume from the success of these men that their careers are 
better attested than others. Likewise, their success also indicates to some extent that their 
actions coincided with contemporary political values. That is to say, their careers can be 
considered somewhat exemplary.  
  Before presenting my findings, I should offer a few explanations about how I 
approached the data. I am considering “command” as the holding of imperium (as a praetor, 
propraetor, proconsul, or legate). I have not counted as command the holding of legateships as 
envoys or ambassadors.14 As with Chapter 1, I have tried to provide a conservative 
interpretation of the evidence, and therefore I have counted command positions in peaceful 
provinces. This is both because even peaceful provinces often required overseeing troops and 
because it is possible that some provincial officials participated in smaller-scale military activity 
about which we have no existing evidence. Here are my findings: 
                                               
14 I follow Broughton’s on the categorization of legates (lieutenant, envoy, ambassador), 
see also Salomonsson 2001: 79. 
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Figure 2.1 Pre-Consular Command Experience 81-49 BCE. 
Figure 2.1 shows the ratio of consuls who had held imperium prior to election against those for 
whom we have no record of command before being sworn in. Between 81 and 49 BCE 61 
different individuals held the consulship, of these 32 (possibly 31)15 held imperium as a legate, 
praetor, propraetor, or proconsul. To put it in terms of percentage, 52.5% of consuls between 
81 and 49 BCE had held imperium prior to their election. A full catalogue of pre-consular 
Command experience in this period is available in Appendix I.  
 This evidence suggests some intital conclusions. To begin with, these results hardly 
support Cicero’s hyperbole in the pro Fonteio. If this evidence is indicative of the senatorial 
                                               
15 Either C. Aurelius Cotta (cos. 75 BCE) or M. Aurelius Cotta (cos. 74 BCE) may have 
been the propraetor in Spain defeated by Sertorius at sea in 80 BCE (Plut. Sert. 12.3), but it is 
unclear. Konrad 1978 suggests that neither of these men was the propraetor in question but 
that is was their younger brother L. Aurelius Cotta (cos. 65). See MRR 3.31. The legateship of 
Q. Caecilius Metellus Creticus (cos. 69 BCE) is also somewhat uncertain. Cic Leg. Man. 58 
mentions a Q. Metellus who was tribune of plebs one year and then legate the next, but this 
could also have been Q. Caecilius Metellus Celer (cos. 60 BCE). See MRR 3.38.  
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population in this period, then Cicero’s exhortation to his listeners to look around the 
audience for capable military men would not have been very effective – just over half of this 
sample had experience and just under half had actual warzone experience. Therefore, if our 
sample is indicative of the broader senatorial population then there was a good chance that 
there would be someone in the audience with some experience. We should not, however, put 
too much weight on the hyperbolic articulation in the pro Fonteio. This kind of exaggeration 
was genre-approriate for forensic speeches. On the other hand, we should also note that these 
findings also undermine the similarly hyperbolic characterization that the Roman Senate was 
an order focused primarily upon military activity. In the Republic’s last generation, it would 
seem, one was almost equally as likely not to have held any imperium prior to their consulship 
as to have done so. 
 It is more productive to engage with the implication of Cicero’s rhetoric rather than 
the hyperbole. More than a complete absence of military men, what Cicero argued for in the 
pro Fonteio is a noticeable decline in the amount of such men. He clearly suggests that the 
Republic c.70 BCE had at its disposal a smaller amount of militarily capable men than it had 
previously. Now, of course the figures for 81-49 BCE are insufficient in themselves to indicate 
such a trend; we need another data set to compare them with. Therefore, to engage with 
Cicero’s suggestion of decline I have compiled a similar set of data for the consuls from the 
period 200-170 BCE. Two variables make this period well-suited for such study. First, I wanted 
to work with a period of similar chronological length, but the challenge was to find an earlier 
30-year period which enjoys a relatively ample amount of evidence. Obviously no earlier period 
of Roman history – and, frankly, much of later Roman history – can approach the amount and 
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variety of source material we have for the Republic’s last generation, but the period between 
200-170 BCE is covered by complete books of Livy’s helpfully annalistic Ab Urbe Condita 
(books 31-43). This gives us some assurance that the major events of these years are attested. 
Here then are my findings: 
 
Figure 2.2 Pre-Consular Command Experience 200-170 BCE. 
Between 200-170 BCE 61 different individuals held the consulship (there were three 
consuls in 176 BCE), a number conveniently equal to the number of consuls from 81-49. As 
Cicero suggested in the pro Fonteio, and as we might have expected given the evidence and 
implications from Chapter 1, the number of consuls with pre-consular command in the period 
between 200-170 BCE is much higher; of these 61 consuls, 44 held some form of pre-consular 
imperium. For the remaining 17 we have no record of any command prior to their election to 
the highest annual magistracy. In terms of percentages, 72.13% of consuls in this period held 
command prior to election. As I mentioned above, I did not count as command service legates 
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who served as envoys or ambassadors, as opposed to officers, and I have not counted L. 
Cornelius Merula (cos. 193 BCE) and M’. Acilius Glabrio (cos. 191 BCE) as having held 
imperium prior to their consulships even though both suppressed slave revolts during their 
terms as praetor.16 If we were to count Merula and Glabrio then the percentage would go up to 
75.41%. Even if we accept the more conservative number, 72.13%, this is just over 18% higher 
than the consuls between 81-49 BCE, a significant increase. One could, of course, argue still 
that this amount of pre-consular command-holders – just over 70% of consuls between 200-
170 BCE – indicates that the senatorial class was still not a warrior-elite, but it is certainly 
closer to indicating an aristocratic preoccupation with military activity than the figures for the 
Republic’s last generation. Most importantly for our purposes, the decline from 200-170 BCE 
to 81-49 BCE is undeniable.  
 These are just the cursory conclusions we can draw from comparison of the numbers 
involved; closer examination of the evidence the data represents reveals more substantive 
implications. Perhaps somewhat contrary to intuition, the figures in our samples who did not 
hold pre-consular command actually tell us more than a comparison of those who did. Out of 
17 consuls without record of previous military command between 200-170 BCE 11 went on to 
hold command positions during and/or after their term in office. L. Cornelius Merula and 
Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus held consular commands against the Boii in Cisalpine Gaul. 
Merula won a significant victory at Mutina, and Ahenobarbus went on to be a legate against 
                                               
16 Merula suppressed a budding revolt of slaves and Carthaginian captives. See Livy 
32.26.4-18, although Livy mistakenly gives him the cognomen “Lentulus” (a mistake echoed by 
Zon. 9.16). Glabrio war praetor inter perigrinos in 196 BCE and suppressed a slave revolt in 
Etruria (see Livy 33.36.2-3). 
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Antiochus III at Magnesia.17 M’. Acilius Glabrio defeated Antiochus at Thermopylae and 
triumphed in 190 BCE. M. Iunius Brutus, Q. Petillius Spurinus, P. Mucius Scaevola, and M. 
Popillius Laenas all held command against the Ligurians. Spurinus died in battle, but Scaevola 
triumphed in 175 BCE. Laenas did not achieve anything notable on the battlefield, although 
he did famously draw a circle in the sand around Antiochus IV in order to force his 
cooperation with the Senate’s wishes.18 P. Licinius Crassus (cos. 171) initially turned down a 
command on religious grounds, but later held the supreme command against Perseus in 
Macedonia – although he had little success.19  C. Hostilius Mancinus (cos. 170) also held 
command against Perseus.20 Finally, C. Cassius Longinus (cos. 171) was so disappointed to not 
be assigned an active military role as consul that he attempted to march his army through 
Illyria to Macedonia to join in the fight against Perseus.21 
                                               
17 For Merula see: Livy 34.6.5-9, 35.4-8, 55.6, 56.12-23. For Domitius see: Livy 35.20.2-
7, 22.3-4, and 40.2-4. Appian (Syr. 30-6) tells us that Domitius filled in during Scipio’s period 
of illness. See also Livy 37.39.5; MRR 1.359.  
 
18 For Brutus’ campaigning in 178 BCE see Livy 41.5, 9-12. Both consuls of 176 BCE 
died in office. Cn. Cornelius Scipio Hispallus died after being injured during the celebration 
of the Latin Festival (Livy 41.16.3-4) and Spurinus was killed in battle in Liguria (Livy 41.14.8-
10, 15.5, 17.6-18.16; Val. Max. 1.5.9, 2.7.15). Scaevola earned a triumph for his efforts as 
consul in 175 BCE, see Livy 41.19.1-2. Laenas had an uneventful tenure as proconsul in 
Liguria in 172 BCE (see Livy 42.21.2-22.8, but for Laenas’ famous meeting with Antiochus IV 
see Polyb. 29.2.1-4, 27; Livy 44.19.13, 29.1-5; 45.10-12.8, and 13.1; Cic. Phil. 8.23; Vell. 1.10.1-
2; Val. Max. 6.4.3. 
 
19 Polyb. 27.8.1-15; Livy 42.31.1, 32.1-5, 36.7 48.4; 57-62, 43.4.5; Plut. Aem. 9.2; App. 
Mac. 11.9. See also MRR 1.416.  
 
20 Polyb. 27.16.1-6, 28.3.1 Plut. Aem. 93; Livy 43.9.1-4, 11.9, 17.9, 44.1.5-8, 2.6, 36.10; 
Diod. 30.5.  
 
21 Livy 42.31.1, 32.1-5, 43.1.2-12. See also MRR 1.416.  
 
  129   
 
 Therefore, if we extend our view past their respective consular elections only six of the 
consuls between 200-170 BCE have no known record of military command throughout their 
entire career.22 How does this compare with their counterparts from 81-49 BCE? Of the 28 
consuls for whom we have no record of pre-consular imperium, 14 (only 50%) went on to hold 
some kind of command. For 200-170 BCE the number was higher, nearly 65%. Now, we 
should keep in mind an obvious caveat. While we usually imagine the Late Republic to be 
better-attested than any earlier period of Roman history, it is important to acknowledge that in 
the instance – one concerned with pre-consular commands – Livy may actually provide more 
source material for the earlier period. The great strength of the late-republican evidence come 
from Cicero, and this evidence only begins in earnest in the early 50’s. Meanwhile, Livy’s habit 
of listing annual magistrates gives us an excellent idea of praetorships (and thus pre-consular 
military command) in the earlier period. Two tests of the amount of evidence we possess for 
these periods relative to each other using Broughton’s Magistrates of the Roman Republic 
suggested conflicting conclusions: The period between 81-49 BCE has more total pages (177 
pages vs. 100), but the earlier period has more attested praetorships (162 between 200-170 vs. 
145 in the later period). It is unclear, therefore, which period is better attested, but I would 
suggest that even if one period has a slight edge over the other that these two periods are 
nevertheless comparable.  
                                               
22 Sex. Aelius Paetus Catus (cos. 198 BCE), M. Valerius Messalla (cos. 188 BCE), Sp. 
Postumius Albinus (cos. 186 BCE), Cn. Cornelius Scipio Hispallus (cos. 176 BCE), C. 
Popillius Laenas (cos. 172 BCE), and P. Aelius Ligus (cos. 172 BCE). 
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Returning to the results, it is interesting to note that the difference in percentage for 
this subset of the data is consistent with the difference between the pre-consular imperium 
holders in both periods (a difference of 18% vs. 15%). Finally, more revealing than the raw 
percentages are the details. Among our 11 consuls in the earlier sample who held command 
positions only during or after their term of office but not before, all held command under 
their own auspices either as a consul or proconsul at least once. Further, all of them saw 
combat while in command. One died in battle and two – nearly three – of these men went on 
to triumph.23 Among the corresponding 14 consuls from 81-49 BCE who gained some 
experience after their consulship, only nine held command as a consul or proconsul. Of these 
nine, only six saw battle in their term as commander. 
Q. Lutatius Catulus was forced to quash his colleague’s uprising as consul, Q. Marcius 
Rex was awarded a triumph for his time as proconsul in Cilicia (although he died before 
celebrating it), and C. Calpurnius Piso led the effort against the Allobroges during his term as 
consul in 67 BCE and his subsequent proconsulship.24 But others did not have such successful 
or challenging terms in command: Illness hampered the proconsulship of Cn. Octavius, C. 
Cassius Longinus was bested by Spartacus, thanks to the lex Manilia M. Acilius Glabrio was 
                                               
23 Again, Q. Petillis Purinus (cos. 176 BCE) died in battle in Liguria. M’. Acilius 
Glabrio (cos. 191 BCE) triumphed in 190 BCE, C. Claudius Pulcher (cos. 177 BCE) 
triumphed in 177, and P. Mucius Scaevola (cos. 175 BCE) was denied a triumph for his victory 
at Mutina.  
 
24 For Catulus see: Cic Cat. 3.24; Sall. Hist. 1.54-73M; Livy Per. 90; Suet. Iul. 3; Plut. 
Sull. 34.4-5; Pomp. 15.1-16.2; App. BC 1.105-107; Gan. Ic. 43-45B; Flor. 2.11.1-6; Dio 44.28.2, 
47.4; Eutrop. 6.5.1; Oros. 5.22.16. For Marcius see: Sall. Cat. 30.3, 33.1-34.1; Cic. Sull. 34; Fin. 
2.62; Att. 1.16.10 as well as John Malalas (p. 225, II.4-11[ed. Bonn 1831]). For Piso see: Cic. 
Att. 1.1.2; Flacc. 98; Sall. Cat. 49.2; Dio 36.37.2-3. 
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only briefly proconsul in Bithynia, Cicero’s term in Cilicia saw limited resistance and he 
suggests that Bibulus’ simultaneous proconsulship also featured only minor engagements. Ser. 
Sulpicius Rufus saw no action as proconsul in Achaea.25 The difference in practice between the 
two periods is clear. Between 200-170 BCE, even if a consul ostensibly lacked command 
experience prior to his term in office he was nevertheless subsequently entrusted with major 
commands in the most active theaters. This, generally speaking, does not seem to have been 
true for the period between 81-49 BCE, when the Republic’s most pressing commands were 
more often allotted to experienced generals.    
One could argue that the decline seen in the later period was at least partly a result of a 
decline in opportunity for command, but in fact the period offered many theaters of conflict 
for the ambitious, military-minded aristocrat. On the earlier end of this period, Robert 
Morstein-Marx has argued convincingly that the 70’s BCE saw an “unprecedented 
commitment of military resources to the East in a succession of campaigns,” in an effort to 
reestablish the Roman imperium in the East after conflict with Mithridates.26 In Macedonia, 
Greece, and Asia Minor Rome not only attempted to reassert itself and check the still 
troublesome Mithridates, but it also combated the familiar problem of piracy in places like 
                                               
25 For Octavius see: Sall. Hist. 2.25M; Frontin. Str. 4.1.43. For Cassius see: Livy Per. 96; 
Plut. Crass. 9.7; Flor. 2.8.10; Oros. 5.24.4; App. BC 1.117. For Acilius see: Cic. Man. 5,26; 
Plut. Pomp. 30.1; App. Mith. 90; Dio 36.42-3. For Cicero see (focusing on his military activity 
and supplicatio): Cic. Fam. 8.7.2, 9.25.1, 2.15.1, 3.9.4, 3.15.5-6, 3.10.2, 3.13.2; Att. 6.8.5, 7.1.5 
and 7, 7.2.6, 7.3.2, 7.4.1, 7.7.3-4; Plut. Cic. 37 For Bibulus see: Cic. Fam. 2.10.2, 15.1.1, 
15.3.2; Att. 5.16.2, 5.18.1, 5.20.4, 5.21.2; Phil. 11.34-5; Livy Per. 108; App. Syr. 51; BC 5.10; 
Dio 40.30.1. For Sulpicius see: Cic. Fam. 4.3 and 4, 6.6.10, 1.6, and 4.5, 13.1.17ff. See also 
MRR 2.299.  
 
26 Kallet-Marx 1995: 291-311. 
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Cilicia and Crete. This surge of military activity is reflected as well in the surge of triumphal 
celebrations in the late 80’s and 70’s BCE.27 The amount of military activity in the East in this 
period was truly exceptional, but the West also offered some opportunities for obtaining 
military gloria. The late 70’s saw four Spanish triumphs stemming from the conflict with 
Sertorius; a fifth would have been added in the 60’s if Cato had not obstructed Caesar’s 
pursuit of a praetorian triumph.28 Gaul was also becoming more active leading up to Caesar’s 
actions in the 50’s. C. Aurelius Cotta (cos. 75 BCE) died in 73 before he could celebrate his 
triumph from Cisalpine Gaul, and two uprisings of the Allobroges were put down in this 
period.29 Thus, opportunities were available to aristocrats who wished to make a name for 
themselves by commanding Rome’s legions.  
Additionally, two institutional shifts are relevant to this trend. The first and most 
noticeable is a change in the expectations for a sitting consul from the pre-Sullan period to the 
post-Sullan period. Traditionally, the main responsibility of the consul was to lead the legions 
in the most pressing theaters of war. One or both of the consuls, thus, were usually expected to 
be absent from Rome during their term.30 After the dictatorship of Sulla, however, this 
                                               
27 This trend will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3.  
 
28 Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius, Pompey, L. Afranius, and M. Pupius Piso Frugi 
Calpurnianus all triumphed ex Hispania ulteriore between 71 and 69 BCE. See Rich 2014: 251. 
Caesar’s Spanish propraetorship in 61 BCE failed to yield a triumph because of Cato’s 
obstruction. I also discuss all of these triumphs in detail in Chapter 3.  
 
29 For Cotta see Cic. Brut. 318; Pis. 62; Ascon. 14C; Sall. Hist. 2.98M. C. Calpurnius 
Piso (cos. 67 BCE) defeated the Allobroges in 154 BCE (Cic. Att. 1.13.2, 1.1.2; Dio 36.37.2). 
C. Pomptinus did the same in 176 BCE (Cic. prov. Cons. 32; Dio 37.47-48; 39.65.1-2; Liv. Per. 
103). 
 
30 See Beck et al. 2011: esp. 7ff. 
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changed, and both consuls regularly stayed in the city in order to oversee domestic affairs. 
Mommsen saw in this development the formal bisection of the imperium that had hitherto 
characterized the consulship; the civic, domestic power of the consul was retained by the 
magistrates in Rome while their military imperium was bestowed on proconsuls who were not 
always ex-consuls. Yet, as is somewhat usual with the work of Mommsen, his theory is plagued 
by an anachronistic sense of legalism. His suggestion of a lex Cornelia de provinciis ordinandis (a 
purely theoretical law, the existence of which was suggested by Mommsen to support his own 
theory) has been dismissed and the idea that there was any formal bisection of the consular 
imperium cast aside.31 Nevertheless, the new trend of consuls remaining in the city during their 
term limited the opportunity for these men to hold commands after their election.  
 Another administrational shift in this period is the emergence of the position of 
legate.32 Of our consuls between 200-170 who held command prior to their consulship only 
two did so exclusively as a legatus: L. Quinctius Flamininus (cos. 192 BCE), Ap. Claudius 
Pulcher (cos. 185 BCE).33 Some others had been legates but had additionally held command 
either as a praetor, propraetor, or proconsul prior to their consulship. Compare this to the 
                                               
 
31 See most notably Giovannini 1983; also Balsdon 1939; Valgiglio 1957: 132-40; 
Girardet 2001: 155-61; Beck et al. 2011: 1-16. 
 
32 See Lange 2016: 71ff. 
 
33 Flamininus was a legate in Macedonia in charge of the fleet in Greece from 198 until 
194 BCE (Livy 32.16.2; 28.9, 33.17.2 and 15). Claudius served under Flamininus from 195-
194 (Livy 34.40.10) and then returned to Greece as a legate in 191 (Livy 36.10.10-14, 13.1, 
22.8, and 30.2; App. Syr. 16). There is some debate about the nature of his role under 
Flamininus – see MRR 1.331-2. 
 
  134   
 
nine consuls between 81-49 BCE who had only held command as legate before their election: 
Mam. Aemilius Lepidus Livianus (cos. 77 BCE), C. Scribonius Curio (cos. 76 BCE), M. 
Terentius Varro Lucullus (cos. 73 BCE), Cn. Cornelius Lentulus Clodianus (cos. 72 BCE), Q. 
Caecilius Metellus Creticus (69 BCE), L. Manlius Torquatus (cos. 65 BCE), C. Antonius 
Hybrida (cos. 63 BCE), A. Gabinius (cos. 58 BCE), and Cn. Domitius Calvinus (cos. 53 
BCE).34 This increase in service as a legate is also noticeable among those who held command 
only after their term as consul. Only one of the 11 figures from 200-170 BCE who held 
command only after their consular term did so as a legate: Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus (cos. 
192 BCE) served as a legate at Magnesia. In the period between 81-49 BCE 4 out of the 14 
figures were legates after their term.35 
 Therefore, the evidence suggests that those who did have some military experience 
prior to their consulship (and, indeed, after it) increasingly earned this experience as legates 
rather than as proconsuls. This trend in our evidence fits well with the findings of Mia-Maria 
Salomonsson in her excellent study on legates throughout the Republic’s entire history.36 I 
reproduce her graph here because it shows nicely how dramatic this change was: 
                                               
34 See Appendix I. 
 
35 L. Iulius Caesar (cos. 64 BCE), Cn. Domitius Calvinus (cos. 53 BCE), M. Valerius 
Messalla Rufus (cos. 53 BCE), and L. Aemilius Paullus (cos. 50 BCE). 
 
36 Salomonsson 2001.  
  135   
 
 
Figure 2.3 Salomonsson’s table showing the increase of legates throughout Roman history. 
Date along the X axis are in BCE. 
 
Closest to the period with which we are concerned, Salomonsson finds a gradual increase in 
lieutenant legates beginning in 109 and continuing until 80 BCE. What impact might this 
trend have on the issues considered in the present study? Most obviously service as a legate, 
although frequently requiring similar responsibility to an imperium-holding commander, was 
nevertheless a subordinate position. We have some evidence from Cicero which suggests that 
the community say commands held as legates as significantly inferior to supreme commands.37 
Legates also, for example, were not able to lay claim to triumphal processions since their 
command was technically under the auspices of their superior imperator.38 This development, 
which naturally would have yielded more men with experience as legates and fewer who 
                                               
37 Cic. Prov. Cons. 5. Cicero characterizes Macedonia as easily held by Rome following 
its conquest and cites the fact that it was overseen mostly by legates who were sine imperio. 
Likewise, in Att. 5.21.3, Cicero lamented Bibulus’ absence from his province in Syria because 
the Parthians were threatening and important provinces ought not be left to legates.  
 
38 Val. Max 2.8 See also Lundgreen 2014. 
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commanded forces under their own auspices, may well have partially informed the perception 
that Cicero was utilizing in the pro Fonteio. If Romans were accustomed to look first for 
experienced military men among commanders who had held positions under their own 
auspices, then this number would have been declining in the face of the increased frequency of 
legateships. 
This theory is especially interesting if we refer back to §43 of the pro Fonteio. At this 
point in the speech Cicero compares the dearth of contemporary commanders with the depth 
of senatorial command talent in the Social War just under 20 years prior. He specifically asks 
his listeners to think about the legates in that conflict and lists some: M. Caecilius Cornutus 
(pr. by 90 BCE), L. Cinna (pr. 90 BCE), L. Sulla (pr. 93 BCE), C. Marius (cos. 107, 104-100), T. 
Didius (cos. 98 BCE), Q. Catulus (cos. 102 BCE), and P. Crassus (cos. 97 BCE). Starting with 
the men who had reached the praetorship by the outbreak of the war, little is known about the 
career of Cinna or Cornutus before their service in this conflict. Sulla had, of course, 
advertised himself as crucial in the ending of the Jugurthine War due to his role in the capture 
of the Numidian king.39 He had also served with distinction during the invasion of the Cimbri 
and Teutones. The rest of the Social War legates mentioned were all of consular rank at the 
time of their commission. This was a rarity initself.40  
                                               
39 See Plutarch (Sull. 6.1) says that King Bocchus of Maurentania, who aided the 
Romans by betraying Jugurtha to them, dedicated trophies and images on the Capitoline 
highlighting Sulla’s involvement. See also a coin minted by Faustus Sulla in 56 BCE (RRC 
#426) which depicted the capture of Jugurtha. 
 
40 See MRR 2.27-28, 34-35. 
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What is even more striking about the consular legates alluded to by Cicero is that all of 
them were also triumphatores by the outbreak of the Social War. Marius had already celebrated 
two triumphs, one for his victory over Jugurtha and the other for turning back the Cimbri and 
Teutones. T Didius may not be as recognizable a name as Marius or Sulla but he had also 
triumphed twice before his commission as a legate in 91. Q. Catulus shared a triumph in 101 
BCE with Marius, even though the two were not particularly friendly. Finally, P. Crassus held a 
triumph over the Lusitanians in 93 BCE.41 Thus, just among the consular legates there were 6 
triumphs. If we do as Cicero asks and compare our findings about his contemporaries with the 
men of the previous generation, we do in fact see a stark difference. The earlier legates often 
had military laurels of their own while the legates of 81-49 BCE more frequently recorded 
service under another commander. It is easy to see how this may have aided at least the 
perception that there were fewer accomplished military men available to the Republic in 70 
BCE. This is perhaps further supported by the lack of political success enjoyed by legates in 
Late Republic. Excepting notably the brief surge of the Pompeian legates in the consulship 
during the late 60’s and early 50’s, Salomonsson notes correctly that “from 110 to 31 B.C. 
hardly any of the former legates reached any higher offices. During this time, it is obvious that 
the office of legate was no longer a regular part of a political career.”42  
                                               
41 For Marius’ triumphs see: CIL I2.1; Sall. Iug. 114.3; Livy Per. 67; Val. Max. 2.2.3; 
6.9.14; 8.15.7; Vell. 2.12.1; Luc. 3.903; Plin. NH 33.12; Suet. Iul. 11; Plut. Mar. 12.2-5; Sull. 
3.3; Flor. 1.36.17; Dio Cass. 48.4.5; Eutrop. 4.27.6; Oros. 5.15.19. Didius’ first triumph from 
his proconsul in Macedonia was either in 100 or 99, see MRR 1.571, 573 and 3.81. His second 
triumph, earned in Spain against the Celtiberians, was in 93, see Cic. Planc. 61; Inscr. Ital. 
13.1.85; MRR 2.15. For Catulus’ triumph with Marius see: Plut. Mar. 25-7; Vell. 2.12.5; Plin. 
NH 17.2, 22.11. For P. Crassus’ see: Cic. Pis. 58; Ascon. 14C; MRR 2.15. 
 
42 Salomonsson 2001: 88. 
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To sum up this section, if we strip away the hyperbolic (but given the setting 
appropriate) rhetoric of Cicero’s claim then the evidence presented here in principle supports 
his assertion. Judging from the consuls of the period, officials seemed to have had less 
command experience upon entering office than earlier generations and were less likely to go on 
to obtain military command after their term in office. Further, the changing nature of Roman 
practice in allocating command during the Republic’s last generation may have also 
contributed to the strength of the perception that the senatorial class was less militarily capable 
than previous generations. In the next section I will present some other evidence from outside 
the pro Fonteio which supports this finding.  
 
III. Age vero, nunc inserite oculos in curiam: The Shortage of Commanders. 
 
Nam saepe ego audivi Q. Maxumum, P. Scipionem, <alios> praeterea civitatis nostrae praeclaros viros solitos ita dicere, 
quom maiorum imagines intuerentur, vehementissume sibi animum ad virtutem adcendi. Scilicet non ceram illam neque 
figuram tantam vim in sese habere, sed memoria rerum gestarum eam flammam egregiis viris in pectore crescere neque prius 
sedari quam virtus eorum famam atque gloriam adaequaverit. At contra quis est omnium, his moribus, quin divitiis et 
sumptibus, non probitate neque industria cum maioribus suis contendat? Etiam homines novi, qui antea per virtutem soliti 
erant nobilitatem antevenire, furtim et per latrocinia potius quam bonis artibus ad imperia et honores nituntur; proinde 
quasi praetura et consulatus atque alia omnia huiusce modi per se ipsa clara et magnifica sint, ac non perinde habeantur ut 
eorum qui ea sustinent virtus est. Verum ego liberius altiusque processi, dum me civitatis morum piget taedetque. (Sall. Iug. 
4.5-9) 
 
For often I heard that Q. Maximus, P. Scipio, and other famous men of our state used to say that whenever 
they looked upon the imagines of their ancestors their spirits were set ablaze for virtus. Certainly neither the wax 
nor the figure had in itself such power, but the memory of their achievements fed the flame in the chest of 
these excellent men which could not be quenched before their virtus equaled theirs in fame and glory. 
Conversely, under the current values is there anyone who does not compete with his ancestors in wealth and 
luxury rather than righteousness and work ethic? Even the new men strive for commands and honors 
clandestinely through crime rather than through good practices – those who previously were accustomed to 
exceed the nobility through virtus. As if the praetorship, consulship, and all other things of the sort were 
prestigious and renowned on their own rather than judged according to the virtus of those who hold them. 
Truly I have gone on too long and too freely in loathing and lamenting the character of my state. 
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I start this section not with a portion of the pro Fonteio, but with the end of the 
prologue of Sallust’s Jugurtha. Before launching into his narrative of the war in Numidia Sallust 
took some time (apparently an overly indulgent amount by his own estimation) to comment 
upon the mores civitatis of his time. I also referenced this passage in the Introduction along with 
the passage from the Catiline in which the author complains that aristocrats of his time no 
longer competed amongst each other in virtus, but in luxury and greed.43  Given Sallust’s 
choice of examples and activities, it is clear that foremost on the author’s mind is the 
aristocratic aversion to military service. The praeclari viri, for example, referenced in the Jugurtha 
are probably the two most famous bearers of those names: Q. Fabius Maximus Cunctator and 
P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus – the heroes of the Second Punic War.44 In this passage I have 
left virtus untranslated, partly because it is a difficult word to render in English and partly 
because I wanted to highlight the repetition of the word which, in Sallust, is mostly connected 
to military prowess. The ability of the imagines to motivate young Romans to military glory 
should also be familiar since it was also mentioned earlier by Polybius in his famous 
                                               
43 Sall. Cat. 9-10. 
 
44 Kostermann 1971: 39 identifies them instead as the sons of L. Aemilius Paullus (cos. 
168) but does not offer reasoning for this choice. Paul (1984: 16) prefers, as I do, Q. Fabius 
Maximus Cunctator but is inconclusive about Scipio. He suggests that this could be either 
Scipio Africanus or Scipio Aemilianus. Africanus would make sense given that Fabius was his 
contemporary, but Aemilianus appears in the Jugurtha shortly after the prologue as Jugurtha’s 
mentor at Numantia. The advice given by Aemilianus, even though it went unheeded, presents 
him as a worthy object of emulation. The difference is less important for my argument; both 
men were primarily remembered as great generals.  
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description of the aristocratic funeral.45  Meanwhile in the Catiline, Sallust again stressed that 
earlier generations of Romans were concerned primarily with virtus.46 Thus, although he cites 
different reasons, in his prologues Sallust seems to agree with the pro Fonteio: aristocrats in his 
time were not as martial as they used to be. 
I prefaced this section with these prologues to signal that this portion of the work will 
look outside of the pro Fonteio for other indications that the Late Republic had fewer men of 
military experience at its disposal than it had once had. Cicero’s message in the speech was 
clear, and now that we have seen that the data presented in the previous section seems to 
support his claim it is time to ask what other sources might be brought to bear on this topic.  I 
will here discuss several other pieces of evidence which, when taken together with the findings 
of section 2, strongly suggest that we should take Cicero’s claim in the pro Fonteio seriously. 
Before exploring new material, however, it will be instructive to briefly review some evidence I 
presented in the Introduction.  
Traditionally command positions seem to have been almost universally coveted by 
aristocrats. This ubiquitous desire in turn had produced a practice in the distribution of 
command which favored amateurism. By denying repeated commands to successful 
commanders the state both provided more command opportunities to a wider group of 
senators and prevented any one commander from accruing too much prestige from his 
                                               
45 Polyb. 6.53, esp. 53.10 οὗ κάλλιον οὐκ εὐµαρὲς ἰδεῖν	θέαµα νέῳ φιλοδόξῳ καὶ 
φιλαγάθῳ· τὸ γὰρ τὰς τῶν ἐπ᾿ ἀρετῇ δεδοξασµένων ἀνδρῶν εἰκόνας ἰδεῖν ὁµοῦ πάσας οἷον εἰ 
ζώσας καὶ πεπνυµένας τίν᾿ οὐκ ἂν παραστήσαι; τί δ᾿ ἂν κάλλιον θέαµα τούτου φανείη; 
 
46 Sall. Cat. 7-9. 
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campaigns.47 This understanding of Roman practice reinforces the idea that commands at 
Rome were nearly universally desired and the subject of intense aristocratic competition. In the 
first century, however, we can clearly detect a surprising phenomenon: aristocrats rejecting 
commands. In the Introduction I mentioned the recent study by Wolfgang Blösel which shows 
convincingly that a significant number of magistrates were declining to take up commands 
following their year in office. Blösel’s study found that between 80 and 50 BCE only 52% of 
praetors definitely took over a province following their term in office. Further, we know for 
certain that at least 15% rejected the opportunity, and it is likely that some portion of the 
remaining 33% also did so.48 Moving up the cursus honorum, an earlier study by J.P.V.D. 
Balsdon found that between 79-53 BCE – a period which comprised 48 consuls who could 
take up a province following their year in office– we know that at least 14 declined to do so. 
Concerning a further 10 we are uncertain.49 
As to why aristocrats were rejecting commands at unprecedented rates in the first 
century, our sources provide insight into several possible factors. Blösel’s argument focuses on 
                                               
47 Gruen 1991: 253-4; Rosenstein 1990: esp. 114ff; 1993; 1995: 45ff; 2006; 2007: esp. 
138ff. 
48 Blösel 2016. On the praetorship see also Brennan 2000: 400-2. 
 
49 Balsdon 1939: 63. Two consuls died in 68 BCE: L. Caecilius Metellus (Dio Cass. 
36.4.1) and a suffect consul – possibly a Servilius Vatia – about whom little is known (again, 
Dio Cass. 36.4.1). See also MRR 2.137. In 78 BCE Q. Catulus stayed in Italy to combat the 
insurrection of his colleague M. Lepidus (see Cic. Cat. 3.24; Sall. Hist. 1.54-73M; Livy Per. 90; 
Suet. Iul. 3; Plut. Sull. 34.4-5; Pomp. 15.1-16.2; App. B. Civ. 1.105-107; Dio Cass. 44.28.2; MRR 
2.85-6), and in 72 BCE both consuls held unsuccessful commands against Spartacus in Italy 
(see Sall. Hist. 3.106M; Livy Per. 96; Plut. Crass. 9.7-10.1; Cat. Min. 8.1-2; App. B. Civ. 1.117; 
MRR 2.116). Cicero’s colleague C. Antonius Hybrida stayed in Italy to combat Manlius and 
Catiline (see Cic. Fam. 5.2.1; Sall. Cat. 1.19, 1.26, 30.5, 42.3, 57.2; Plut. Cic. 16.1; Dio Cass. 
37.32.2; MRR 2.165-6). 
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the financial motivations behind such a decision; military command does not seem to have 
been as profitable as we have previously imagined.50 There were, however, other considerations 
that must have influenced such a decision. An obvious, but perhaps overlooked factor for the 
would-be imperator is the risk posed to one’s life by military service. By the first century it was 
relatively rare for a commander to die on the battlefield, but that does not mean that such 
positions were entirely without risk. As we shall see below, in the previous generation 
magistrates had died in office much more frequently, and we should remember that in 
dismissing this concern for the Republic’s last generation we benefit from hindsight. At the 
outset of his proconsulship in Cilicia Cicero was quite concerned for his safety when rumors of 
a Parthian invasion reached him.51 And Crassus’ death at Carrhae in 53 BCE would have 
certainly served as a momento mori to his senatorial colleagues.  
Even if the threat to one’s life was a relatively minor concern for those considering a 
provincial posting in the first century BCE, such positions were taxing. Cicero went out to 
Cilicia only when compelled by the Lex Pompeia de provincia, and earlier his brother also seems 
to have taken little pleasure in having his position extended in 60 BCE, nor does he seem to 
                                               
50 In addition, see Rosenstein 2016 in the same volume. Interestingly these figures 
match proportion of consuls with command experience offered above. 
 
51 Cic. Fam. 15.1 & 3. See also Caelius’ letters to Cicero. The rumors of a Parthian 
incursion into Syria were taken very seriously at first (Fam. 8.10). Caelius said he took comfort 
in the idea that Cicero’s military resources in Cilicia were so meagre that he would not commit 
to battle with them and reveals that the Senate was considering sending Pompey or Caesar to 
confront the incursion. In (Fam. 8.7) he expresses some concern about the breakout of a full-
scale Parthian war dum istic eris, de belli Parthici periculo cruciabor, ne hunc risum meum metus aliqui 
perturbet.  
 
  143   
 
have profited much financially.52 In addition to being onerous, there is also a sense in the 
sources that foreign postings involved a level of political opportunity cost; we have a good 
amount of strong evidence that in this period time away from Rome was seen as politically 
risky, even if the destination was a provincial governorship. The Commentariolum Petitionis 
stresses the value of staying in the city: 
iam adsiduitatis nullum est praeceptum, verbum ipsum docet quae res sit; prodest quidem vehementer nusquam discedere, 
sed tamen hic fructus est adsiduitatis, non solum esse Romae atque in foro sed adsidue petere, saepe eosdem appellare, 
non committere ut quisquam possit dicere, quod eius consequi possis, se abs te non [sit] rogatum et valde ac 
diligenter rogatum. (Comm. Pet. 43) 
 
Presence requires no explanation; the word explains itself. Certainly it is quite useful to never leave town, 
but the value of presence is not only being in Rome and in the Forum but also constantly canvassing, and 
often calling on the same people, so that nobody – so far as you are able to follow up – will be able to say 
that they were not engaged by you, and engaged meaningfully and diligently.  
 
This sentiment is echoed by Cicero elsewhere.  We might, for instance, be reminded of his 
humorous account of his own return from his quaestorship in Sicily, when he found that his 
time abroad had garnered little interest from those in Rome. Admittedly he was not abroad in 
a military capacity, but the anecdote shows the dangers of leaving the city for the young man 
aiming to raise his profile among the People. This is clearly what Cicero took from the 
experience; he resolved thereafter to “live within in eye-sight.”53 In 50 BCE Cicero, frustrated 
with his position in Cilicia, pleaded with his young correspondent Caelius: 
                                               
52 Cic. Q Fr. 1.1ff Etsi non dubitabam quin hanc epistulam multi nuntii, fama denique esset ipsa 
sua celeritate superatura tuque ante ab aliis auditurus esses annum tertium accessisse desiderio nostro et 
labori tuo, tamen existimavi a me quoque tibi huius molestiae nuntium perferri oportere. 
 
53 Cic. Planc. 65-66 esp. Sed ea res, iudices, haud scio an plus mihi profuerit, quam si mihi tum 
essent omnes congratulati. Nam posteaquam sensi populo Romano aures hebetiores, oculos autem esse acres 
atque acutos, destiti quid de me audituri essent homines cogitare; feci, ut postea quotidie me praesentem 
viderent; habitavi in oculis; pressi forum; neminem a congressu meo, neque ianitor meus, neque somnus 
absterruit.  
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Urbem, urbem, mi Rufe, cole et in ista luce vive! omnis peregrinatio, quod ego ab adulescentia iudicavi, obscura et sordida 
est iis quorum industria Romae potest illustris esse. quod cum probe scirem, utinam in sententia permansissem! (Cic. Fam. 
2.12.2) 
 
Rome! Stay in Rome, dear Rufus, and live in the bright light. All travel is wretched obscurity for those who are 
able to be famous through their efforts in Rome; I learned this in my youth. I wish I had followed my own 
advice since I knew this well.  
 
In the pro Murena the importance of presence in Rome is directly compared with that of 
military service with, apparently, at least one party claiming that military service outside Rome 
greatly hindered one’s effectiveness at the polls.54  
Finally, as I will discuss in detail in Chapter 3, even if one made the decision to go out 
to the camp and managed to accomplish something noteworthy in the defense or expansion of 
Rome’s imperium, the process of getting one’s achievements recognized was difficult in the first 
century. The 60’s and 50’s BCE saw frequent and innovative instances of triumphal 
obstruction. Even commanders like Caesar who achieved historically remarkable feats at the 
head of the legions were not safe from having their subsequent honores threatened by the 
political machinations of their enemies. If the prospect of foreign service was already 
unappealing, the withering hope of achieving a triumph may have further disincentivized 
command positions. John Rich has argued that the low rate of triumphal processions in this 
period is partly a result of the intensity of obstruction returning commanders faced in trying to 
obtain honors and that we should assume that many commanders opted not to pursue a 
triumph at all in light of the prospect of such resistance.55 This logic is easily extended to 
                                               
 
54 Cic. Mur. 21. Note, however, that Brennan 2000: 400-2 finds no discernible electoral 
advantage in consular elections for those praetors who turned down provincial positions.  
 
55 Rich 2014: 237. 
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aristocrats considering whether or not to accept a command at all. If the chances of obtaining 
honors after command were low, perhaps some chose to forego command altogether. Finally, 
not only did provincial command expose an aristocrat to the dangers of the battlefield, but it 
also made him vulnerable to prosecution upon his return. We can see a surge in prosecutions – 
some seemingly dubious – against provincial governors in this period.56 
We see, therefore, several different indications that the aristocracy of the first century 
had reasons to be less interested in pursuing provincial positions and military commands than 
we have traditionally imagined. But what impact does this have on Cicero’s claim in the pro 
Fonteio? This phenomenon would naturally lead to an aristocracy with relatively less military 
experience than previous iterations, and we have already seen in section 2 that this was likely 
the case. And we can detect evidence of a decline in military experience among the elite outside 
of the pro Fonteio as well. One example has received little attention in the secondary literature 
but is nevertheless noticeable: there is a recurrent topos in our sources of the use of literature 
and handbooks by newly-appointed commanders. In Chapter 1 we already saw a relevant 
passage from the speech of Marius in Sallust’s Jugurtha:  
Atque ego scio, Quirites, qui postquam consules facti sunt et acta maiorum et Graecorum militaria praecepta legere 
coeperint: praeposteri homines, nam gerere quam fieri tempore posterius, re atque usu prius est. “Comparate nunc, Quirites, 
                                               
56 Steel 2013: 220-1, 242-3. See also Comment. Pet. 8-9. in petitione autem consulatus 
caupones omnis compilare per turpissimam legationem maluit quam adesse et populo Romano supplicare. 
Gruen 1974 is still the best analysis of lawsuits in this period, one which saw an immense amount 
of legal activity. No thorough catalogue of the de repetundis trials of the Republic’s last generation 
is possible or necessary here, but I can offer a few examples of the weaponizing of extortion 
prosecutions in service of politics. Catiline’s candidacy for the consulship of 65 had been 
disqualified by a hasty prosecution de repetundis, and in 54 the prosecutors of M. Scaurus were 
clearly trying to stall his campaign. Ap. Claudius Pulcher (cos. 54) was proconsul in Cilicia from 
53 to 51 BCE. When he returned he was prosecuted for extortion, see: Cic. Fam. 3.9.2, 8.6.1-3; 
Att. 6.2.10. 
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cum illorum superbia me hominem novom. Quae illi audire aut legere solent, eorum partem vidi, alia egomet gessi; quae illi 
litteris, ea ego militando didici. Nunc vos existumate facta an dicta pluris sint.  (Sall. Iug. 85.12-14) 
 
I know, citizens, of those who after they have been made consul begin to read about their ancestors 
achievements and the military handbooks of the Greeks; these are absurd men, for although action comes later 
than election, experience is earlier. Compare now, citizens, their arrogance with me, a new man. The things 
they are accustomed to hear about or to read about I have I have either seen personally or done myself. The 
things they have learned from literature I have learned from soldering. Now judge for yourself which is better: 
words or actions. 
 
Marius’ emphasis on experience supports several Sallustian rhetorical projects. His speech 
explicitly criticizes the superbia of the aristocracy, something the author highlighted as a focus of 
his monograph at the opening of the work, and his pride in his merit-based novitas also foils him 
against one of the monograph’s other major characters, Sulla, who displays a formidable natural 
ability despite little military experience. Also, in having Marius pit words against deeds Sallust 
was picking up a theme from his Greek model Thucydides. As I mentioned in Chapter 1, 
however, Marius’ speech in the Jugurtha is plagued by uncertainty for the historian. But if we put 
aside the questions of dramatic date this passage can be connected with other first century 
compositions that mention the aristocracy’s reliance on literature to make up for inexperience in 
command. We have now seen this concern echoed by Cicero in the pro Fonteio. In comparing 
Fonteius with the military men of the past (C. Marius, T. Didius, Q. Catulus, and P. Crassus) 
Cicero said that these men were non litteris homines ad rei militaris scientiam, sed rebus gestis ac 
victoriis eruditos.57  
 Whether or not Marius actually said anything similar to the speech attributed to him by 
Sallust, his rhetoric reflects a well-attested aversion among the Romans to “book-learning” as 
opposed to hands-on experience. Even Cicero, one devoted to the praecepta of the Greeks, voiced 
                                               
57 Cic. Font. 43.  
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anxiety about the value of developing skills via theoretical study. Cicero consistently gave priority 
to actual experience.58 His ambivalence on the subject is perhaps best expressed by Scipio in the 
de Republica: 
sed neque his contentus sum, quae de ista consultatione scripta nobis summi ex Graecia sapientissimique homines 
reliquerunt, neque ea, quae mihi videntur, anteferre illis audeo. quam ob rem peto a vobis, ut me sic audiatis, neque ut 
omnino expertem Graecarum rerum neque ut eas nostris in hoc praesertim genere anteponentem, sed ut unum e togatis 
patris diligentia non inliberaliter institutum studio-que discendi a pueritia incensum, usu tamen et domesticis praeceptis 
multo magis eruditum quam litteris. (Cic. Rep. 1.36) 
 
I am not, however, content with the writings on this matter left to us by Greece’s best and wisest. Yet, I do not 
dare to prefer my thoughts on the matter to theirs. Therefore, I ask that as you listen to me as though I am 
somewhat familiar with the Greek material but as one who does not necessarily prefer it – especially in this 
instance. Think of me as a Roman – educated broadly by the attention of my father and enthusiastic about 
learning from my childhood, but nevertheless trained by the lessons learned at home more than by literature.  
 
Scipio walked a fine line; his interlocuter Philus was blunter when he said that he hoped Scipio’s 
insights “will be more useful than anything in the treatises of the Greeks.59 This emphasis on 
experience over study is related to a larger ideological difference between Greeks and Romans. 
Matthew Roller’s recent (2018) study on the importance of exemplarity (Models from the Past in 
Roman Culture) discusses convincingly the unique emphasis placed on events in Roman 
thinking. Indeed, unlike their Greek counterparts, Roller points out that Romans – even in 
literature – rarely examined abstract virtues on their own but rather preferred to ground 
discussions of virtues in exemplary events and figures, thus moving from concrete example to 
treatment of the abstract.60 
                                               
58 E.g. In the study of rhetoric, see Or. 1.85ff; 2.121ff. 
 
59 Cic. Rep. 1.37 spero enim multo uberiora fore, quae a te dicentur, quam illa, quae a Graecis 
hominibus scripta sunt, omnia. Although, Cicero tells us in a letter to Quintus (1.1) that Scipio 
apparently kept a copy of Xenophon’s Cyropaedia because of its instructive value.  
 
60 Roller 2018: 13ff. He makes sure to distinguish his point from the tired and false 
dichotomy of “abstract Greeks” and “concrete Romans.” See also Haltenhoff 2005: 86-91 and 
2000: 22-7; Van der Blom 2010: 68. 77; Hölscher 2001: 199-201.  
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 In a more famous passage on rhetorical training, Cicero turned to the study of military 
experience to argue for the superiority of experience over literary study. In the de Oratore (2.75) 
Cicero tells the story of when the Peripatetic philosopher Phormio visited the court of 
Antiochus III in Ephesus. Cicero says that Phormio, whom he called copiosus (“prolific”), 
lectured for hours on generalship and that the audience was delighted except for a notable 
guest. Rome’s arch-nemesis Hannibal was at that time in the court of Antiochus and when 
asked his opinion of Phormio’s lecture he said that he had never seen someone so crazy as 
Phormio. Cicero approved of the Carthaginian’s estimation: 
Neque mehercule iniuria; quid enim aut arrogantius, aut loquacius fieri potuit, quam Hannibali, qui tot annis de imperio 
cum populo Romano, omnium gentium victore, certasset, Graecum hominem, qui nunquam hostem, nunquam castra 
vidisset, nunquam denique minimam partem ullius publici muneris attigisset, praecepta de re militari dare? (Cic. Or. 2.76) 
 
By god he was not wrong. Indeed, what is more arrogant or more empty talk than a Greek who had never seen 
an enemy or camp – or participated in the most meager public public service – to give lessons in military affairs 
to Hannibal, who fought for so many years against the power of the Roman People, the conquerors of all 
peoples? 
 
Marius’ criticism of his contemporary aristocrats for turning to reading in place of practice was, 
therefore, a recognizably traditional position within Roman ideology.  
 Despite the ridicule he had for Phormio, Cicero did not feel so strongly about this 
principle when faced with the prospect of leading an army himself. In a letter to Papirius 
Paetus in 50 BCE, Cicero thanks his addressee for having sent him some instructive reading 
material: 
Summum me ducem litterae tuae reddiderunt. plane nesciebam te tam peritum esse rei militaris; Pyrrhi te libros et Cineae 
video lectitasse. itaque obtemperare cogito praeceptis tuis; hoc amplius, navicularum habere aliquid in ora maritima. contra 
equitem Parthum negant ullam armaturam meliorem inveniri posse. sed quid ludimus? nescis quo cum imperatore tibi 
negotium sit. Παιδείαν Kύρoυ, quam contrieram legendo, totam in hoc imperio explicavi. (Cic. Fam. 114.1) 
 
Your letters have made me into a general. I was entirely unaware that you are so experienced in military affairs; 
I see you have read the books of Pyrrhus and Cineas. Therefore, I am minded to follow you instructions and to 
have a small naval presence on the coast. They say that one cannot find a better defense against Parthian 
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cavalry. But why am I joking? You are unaware of the type of generalissimo you are talking to. In my 
administration I have set out the entire Cyropaedia, which I have shredded by reading. 
 
Paetus’ instructions have turned Cicero, so he claims, into a generalissimo. Now, certainly we 
should assume some sarcasm here, but the exchange is nevertheless telling. Cicero reveals 
familiarity with two military handbooks, a treatise on tactics by Pyrrhus of Epirus and Cineas’ 
epitome of Aelian on the same subject – both now lost.61 Cicero added to these Xenophon’s 
Cyropaedia, a purely literary work.  
This is not the first time Cicero has mentioned the instructive value of Xenophon’s 
work, he recommended it to his brother when Quintus’ governorship in Asia was renewed in 59 
BCE without a hint of sarcasm: 
qua re permagni hominis est et cum ipsa natura moderati tum vero etiam doctrina atque optimarum artium studiis 
eruditi sic se adhibere in tanta potestate ut nulla alia potestas ab iis quibus is praesit desideretur, <ut est> Cyrus ille a 
Xenophonte non ad historiae fidem scriptus sed ad effigiem iusti imperi, cuius summa gravitas ab illo philosopho cum 
singulari comitate coniungitur. quos quidem libros non sine causa noster ille Africanus de manibus ponere non solebat. 
(Cic. Qfr. 1.1.23). 
 
The truly great man, one checked by capture and schooled by the lessons and enthusiasm for the best 
pursuits can control himself while holding such power that those whom he rules over desire no other rule. 
Cyrus was like this – a model for just rule – but in Xenophon, not according to the histories. He was 
composed with the height of seriousness and exceptional kindness by that philosopher. Thus our 
Africanus, not without reason, used to keep his books at hand.  
 
Scipio’s literary interests were exceptional for his time period, but we should not use this passage 
to suggest that the practice of using literature to prepare for such activity extends back to the 
second century BCE.62 Yet, in this letter and in the later letter to Paetus we have two instances of 
aristocrats recommending literature to those about to set out upon provincial service. Of course, 
Cicero’s recommendation of the Cyropaedia in his letter to Quintus is not specifically related to 
                                               
61 See Shackleton Bailey 1977: 453. 
 
62 Cicero mentions Scipio’s affinity for the work again at Tusc. 2.62  
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military study, especially since service in Asia at the time was unlikely to involve significant 
campaigning.  But Paetus’ recommendations to him in 50 certainly were, and Cicero seems to 
have counted the Cyropaedia useful in military training as well.63 Thus, despite reaffirming the 
traditional Roman prioritization of experience over theoretical learning we can see anxiety 
among Cicero and Sallust over the role of literature in training, and in Cicero’s case we can see 
on two occasions actual participation in it. Even if we are dismissive on the historical accuracy of 
the speech of Marius as an artifact from his first consulship, we should neverthless recognize that 
Sallust, writing as he was from the first century, may have been influenced by contemporary 
practice.  
There is one other piece of evidence which is especially relevant to this issue. Catherine 
Steel once wrote in passing that “The last (a shortage of commanders) seems to be a genuine 
feature of the post-Sullan period.”64 She wrote this while discussing the lex Pompeia de provinciis 
of 52 BCE, and the connection between the law and the questions at hand are intriguing. Our 
only explicit source for the nature of this law is Cassius Dio, not an ideal witness for the 
regulation given his chronological distance from the event. He first tells us that the consuls of 
the previous year passed a senatorial decree (δόγµα) which stipulated that henceforth all office 
holders were obliged to wait five years before holding imperium.⁠ He later records that Pompey 
as consul in 52 BCE went the further step of making this regulation law.⁠ Dio does not give 
insight into why Pompey proposed this measure, but instead he focuses on the hypocrisy of 
                                               
63 On the military preoccupation of the Cyropaedia see Shackleton Bailey (1977: 453) 
who says that the work is largely concerned with “Ruler as General.” 
 
64 Steel 2013: 220. 
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Pompey for enacting a law which he immediately broke by taking a command in Spain after his 
consulship.65 For the problem which Dio believed this measure was addressing we have to go 
back to the senatorial decree of 53 BCE: 
δόγµα τε	ἐποιήσαντο µηδένα µήτε στρατηγήσαντα µήθ᾿ ὑπατεύσαντα τὰς ἔξω ἡγεµονίας, πρὶν ἂν πέντε ἔτη 
διέλθῃ, λαµβάνειν, εἴ πως ὑπὸ τοῦ µὴ παραυτίκα ἐν δυνάµει τινὶ αὐτοὺς γίγνεσθαι παύσαιντο 
σπουδαρχοῦντες. οὔτε γὰρ ἐµετρίαζον	οὔθ᾿ ὑγιὲς οὐδὲν ἐποίουν, ἀλλ᾿ ἐπ᾿ ἀλληλους παρώρµηντο πολλὰ µὲν 
δαπανώµενοι πολλῷ δ᾿ ἔτι πλείω µαχόµενοι, ὥστε καὶ τὸν ὕπατόν ποτε τὸν Καλουῖνον τρωθῆναι. οὔκουν 
οὔθ᾿ ὕπατος οὔτε στρατηγὸς οὔτε πολίαρχός τίς σφας διεδέξατο, ἀλλὰ ἄναρκτοι κατὰ τοῦτο παντελῶς οἱ 
Ῥωµαῖοι τὰ πρῶτα τοῦ ἔτους ἐγένοντο. (Dio Cass. 40.46.2-3) 
 
They passed a decree lest anyone having previously been praetor or consul obtain a command until five years 
had passed. They hoped that by prohibiting these men from holding any power immediately after their term in 
office they might temper the desire for office. For they had abandoned shame and decency and competed with 
each other in bribing with great amounts and further by fighting. Once even Calvinus, the consul, was 
wounded. The consuls, praetors, and prefects had no successors, and the Romans were entirely without 
magistrates at the beginning of the year.  
 
Naturally Dio cites the political chaos of the mid-to-late 50’s as the reason for the senatorial 
decree. The period from 55 to 52 BCE was characterized by a crescendo of political chaos as 
factions in the Senate pushed back against the recently reaffirmed union of the “big three;” 
each year required an interregnum. This would seem the most pressing issue of the time and 
therefore the most tempting candidate for the impetus of the law, but we should consider 
possible connections with the shortage of commanders. 
 Steel has twice suggested that the lex Pompeia de provinciis may have been in response to 
the dearth of magistrates willing to leave Rome for the provinces.66 The traditional scholarly 
view has followed Dio and assumed that the measure was meant to calm the chaotic political 
                                               
65 Dio Cass. 40.56.1-2 
 
66 Steel 2012 & 2013: 220-1 (in passing). For other interpretations to which Steel was 
responding see Marshall 1972; Gruen 1974: 457-60; Giovannini 1983; Ferrary 2001: 101-54; 
Hurlet 2006: 467-85.  
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climate by somewhat disincentivizing obtaining office, but Steel’s argument may be at least 
equally plausible. Of course, Dio’s mention gives significant credence to the traditional 
interpretation of the law, but it is certainly possible that the historian interpolated the most 
pressing motive in the narrative onto a law which was focused on addressing a separate 
problem. More substantively, if we think back to the pattern of rejection of command outlined 
at the beginning of this section then Steel’s theory is in some ways more tempting than the 
traditional view, despite lacking explicit textual evidence. Further, with magistrates rejecting 
commands with noticeably high frequency, it is hard to imagine that removing the prospect of 
command immediately after office greatly disincentivized the aristocracy. Certainly some 
aspiring praetors and consuls would have been looking forward to a command after their year 
in office, but it seems clear that many did not relish the prospect. Likewise, returning to the 
recent works by Blösel and Rosenstein mentioned above, provincial positions were likely not as 
profitable as we have previously imagined, in which case it might have been unlikely that 
magistrates coveted such positions to offset the bribery they undertook in order to secure 
election.67 On the other hand, if a growing number of magistrates were unwilling to go out to 
provincial commands this could have put a strain on the Republic’s ability to fill positions 
necessary for administering the provinces, and in this case a law like the lex Pompeia may well 
have been aimed at expanding the pool of commanders.  
 When coupled with the data presented in the previous section this evidence is 
compelling. Cicero appealed to a perception that there were relatively few experienced 
                                               
67 Again Blösel 2016 but see also Rosenstein 2016 in the same volume. Additionally 
Churchill 1999.  
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commanders in 70 BCE, and the evidence has suggested that his claim was rooted in reality. In 
addition to the findings on pre-consular command experience we have now also seen evidence 
from outside the speech that aristocrats were increasingly disinterested in taking up provincial 
commands and, when they did take such positions, many were ill-prepared to lead and 
inexperienced in the requirements of camp life. With this next section I will explore the 
natural question: why?  
 
IV. fortissimis autem hominibus ac summis ducibus…consumptis: Exploring the Causes of 
the Shortage. 
 
In transitioning away from evidence of the shortage of commanders towards 
explanations of it, we need not look far for a starting point; Cicero himself offers some causes 
in passing (§42): 
Quid nunc vobis faciendum est studiis militaribus apud iuventutem obsoletis, fortissimis autem hominibus ac summis 
ducibus partim aetate, partim civitatis discordiis ac rei publicae calamitate consumptis, cum tot bella aut a nobis 
necessario suscipiantur aut subito atque inprovisa nascantur? Nonne et hominem ipsum ad dubia rei publicae tempora 
reservandum et ceteros studio laudis ac virtutis inflammandos putatis? 
 
Now what should you do, when military service has been forgotten among the youth, when our bravest men 
and best generals have been spent either by age, civil war, or disaster, when so many wars are taken up by us 
either because of necessity or which arise suddenly and unexpectedly? Do you not think that this man 
should be preserved for this doubtful period for the Republic in addition to exciting the enthusiasm for 
praise and virtus among the rest? 
 
In addition to the aversion to military service among aristocratic youth (dealt with in Chapter 
1) Cicero cites attrition as the cause of this phenomenon; many of Rome’s best and bravest 
commanders have been “spent.” The orator’s suggestions for what happened to the state’s 
supply of commanders are fairly straightforward, but – as always – we have to ask ourselves 
whether or not Cicero was right. Unlike our previous testing of Cicero’s claims, we can 
approach this statement more or less directly.  
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Cicero’s first cause, age, was not unique to the Late Republic, but this does not mean 
that it was not a formidable challenge. Keith Hopkins estimates that if the average life 
expectancy for an aristocrat in the Late Republic was 25 years, one third of a given age group 
would die before reaching the age of 40, and just under 60% would die before reaching the age 
of 60. He put it bluntly: “what is important in this respect it that death rates were high and, 
and average expectations of life were low.”68 This high mortality rate made it difficult for the 
Senate to replace itself and was therefore frequently augmented by the admittance of outsiders 
into the senatorial ranks. Ostensibly this means that Cicero was correct: age was a legitimate 
force to contend with in keeping the Republic stocked with capable leaders, but not one 
unique to his generation.  
 In connection, however, with the natural attrition experienced by the Senate and the 
supply of capable military men we should also consider the findings of this chapter and of 
Chapter 1. If aristocratic interest in military service was in decline in the Late Republic then 
each successive generation would struggle even more to replenish the military men lost. This is 
to say, there would be fewer young men interested in pursuing a military career to replace the 
older generation. This would result in exactly the problem Cicero described in the pro Fonteio, 
and this problem would be a relatively new challenge for the Roman aristocracy. It is possible 
that we see evidence of this dynamic in the distribution of legates between patricians and 
plebeians. Figure 2.3 (above), Salomonsson’s analysis of legates in the Republic, shows that 
unlike earlier periods in the Republic legates in in the Late Republic were overwhelming 
plebeian. This does not necessarily mean that legates were not aristocrats; many long-
                                               
68 Hopkins & Burton 1983: 2.70-74 with special attention to Table 2.8.  
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established aristocratic families were plebeian. But it may indicate, to some degree, that the 
there were less members of the elite’s inner circle to to fill the military positions required by 
the needs of the empire. It follows then that openings in the aristocracy could be filled by 
ambitious and capable novi homines, just the type of men we would expect to be interested in 
military positions. Yet, even this process (replenishing the ranks of the aristocracy with new 
men) may have been challenging in the Republic’s last generation from a military stand point. 
If we look back to the prologue of Sallust’s Jugurtha I mentioned above, he suggests that even 
new men – the ones who would be augmenting the ranks of the aristocracy when the body 
failed to replenish itself – were no longer as interested in virtus as they had once been. Just 
judging the most famous novi homines from these two generations (not, admittedly, a perfect 
metric), Marius and Cicero, we can nevertheless see such a shift in career activity. Therefore, 
the problem Cicero calls “age” might have actually been a combination of the natural attrition 
the pool of commanders experienced in a community in which mortality rates were high 
combined with the shift in aristocratic values away from the traditional militarism which had 
helped alleviate this problem.  
 The next factor mentioned by Cicero is civil war. I am assuming that Cicero was 
thinking both of the Social War (91-88 BCE) and the Civil War between Sulla and Marius (88-
80 BCE), which adds up to over a decade of civil conflict. Mortality in war was a persistent 
point of concern in republican history. Rosenstein has postulated (cautiously) that between 
200-168 BCE the overall casualty rate in foreign wars may have been as high as 34-40%.69 
                                               
69 Rosenstein 2004: 107-37.  
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William Harris has suggested that the casualty rate among military tribunes – young senatorial 
aristocrats – may have been as high as 20-25%, although Rosenstein finds this estimate too 
high.70 Regardless of the disagreement on the precise rate of casualty among the elite in the 
legions, there would have been at least some attrition from war. This would, however, have 
been a heavier burden in the conflicts mentioned by Cicero, civil war. In civil conflicts the 
outlook for the community as a whole was twice as bad since the losses on both sides hurt the 
overall strength of the same community.  
It was also problematic in the generation prior to the Republic’s last that the attrition 
from these civil conflicts stretched beyond the battlefield. In addition to the battles of the 
Social War and the Civil War, this generation also experienced the proscriptions which 
accompanied civil conflict, the rebellion of Sertorius in Spain, and the uprising of Spartacus in 
Italy. Just how much attrition did the Roman aristocracy face in this period? In order to get 
some sense of this figure I collected data on how many magistrates died during their term in 
office in this period. If you examine Appendix II the numbers are actually quite staggering. 
Between 91 BCE (the start of the Social War) and 71 BCE (the conclusion of Spartacus’ 
uprising) – a period of just 20 years – 54 magistrates died while in office due to battle or civil 
strife. If we include those who died of illness, the number rises to 59. Seven sitting consuls 
died in this period and in 87 and 86 two consuls died each year. In just the year 87 BCE nine 
sitting magistrates died: both consuls, a tribune of the plebs, a military tribune, two legates, a 
prefect, a priest, and a proconsul who was stuck by lightning. In 82 BCE another nine 
magistrates died in office.  
                                               
70 Harris 1979: 40; Rosenstein 2004: 86. See also Eckstein 2006: 219. 
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 Of course, the natural question is whether or not such attrition was normal. After all, 
for a commander to die in office (from combat or from other causes), especially before the Late 
Republic, was not a rare occurence.71 We could not blame the calamitous events of the 80’s 
and 70’s for a dearth of military men at the time of the pro Fonteio if this rate of attrition was 
normal. So, as with section 2 of this chapter, I sought out a time period with which to compare 
the Republic’s second-to-last generation. I chose the Second Punic War (218-201 BCE) for two 
reasons. Again, source material was a major factor in this decision; we have more evidence 
about this particularly dramatic period in Roman history than most others. Second, I wanted 
to choose a period in which we would expect a higher than usual rate of magisterial mortality. 
The massive defeats at the hand of Hannibal and intense combat in Spain should account for 
a higher than average amount of magisterial attrition. Yet, in the 17 years between 218 and 
201 BCE only 21 magistrates are recorded to have died in office.72 As we might expect, the 
peak came in 216 BCE when five magistrates died at the disastrous battle of Cannae: the 
consul L. Aemilius Paullus, one praetor, one quaestor, and two promagistrates.73 This number 
                                               
71 Eckstein 2006: 219 citing Harris 1979: 40 and Rosenstein 2004: 86. 
 
72 By year: 217 BCE: Cos. C. Flaminius and Promag. C. Centenius. 216 BCE: Cos. L. 
Aemilius Paullus, Pr. L. Postumius Albinus, Q. L. Furius Bibaculus, Promag. M. Atilius 
Regulus, Promag. Cn. Servilius Geminus, 212 BCE: Promag. Ti. Sempronius Gracchus. 211 
BCE: PC Ap. Claudius Pulcher, PC P. Cornelius Scipio, PC Cn. Cornelius Scipio Calvus. 210 
BCE: PC Cn. Fulvius. 208 BCE: Cos. M. Claudius Marcellus, Cos. T. Quinctius Crispinus, 
MT A. Manlius, Pref. L. Arrenius, Pref. M’. Aulius. 205 BCE: MT P. Matienus, MT M. 
Sergius. 203 BCE: MT M. Maevius. 201 BCE: Pref. C. Ampius. 
 
73 Consul L. Aemilius Paullus (see MRR 1.247); praetor L. Postumius Albinus (Livy 
23.24.6-13; Front. Str. 1.6.4; MRR 1.249); quaestor L. Furius Bibaculus (Livy 22.49.16); M. 
Atilius Regulus, whose imperium had been prorogued from the previous year (Polyb. 3.106.2, 
114.6, 116.11; Livy 22.34.1); Cn. Servilius Geminus, whose imperium had also also prorogued 
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was equaled again in 208 BCE when both consuls died in Venusia in addition to a military 
tribune and two prefects.74 Clearly the amount of magisterial attrition in the period between 
91-71 far exceeded that of the Second Punic War. Further, between 91-71 BCE sitting 
magistrates died at a rate of almost three per year (2.7 – 2.95 per year if we include magistrates 
who died of illness), a number over twice as high as in the years of the Second Punic War 
(1.24). Note as well that all four consular legates cited by Cicero in §43 of the pro Fonteio were 
wither killed or committed suicide during the Social and Civi wars. Perhaps in mentioning 
them the orator was drawing attention to the costly events of the previous generation. 
 Cicero also cites calamitas as a reason source of attrition, and it is difficult to 
understand whether or not he was referencing something I have not already discussed. I have 
not yet, for example, mentioned the uprising of Spartacus, which claimed the life of at least 
one, possibly two, praetors in 73 BCE.75 Keep in mind too that I have only collected data on 
those aristocrats who died while holding a magistracy. This does not give us the full picture of 
aristocratic attrition during the period. I have not taken into account young aristocrats who 
                                               
(Polyb. 3.106-107, 109.1, 114.6, 116.11; Livy 22.40.6, 43.8, 45.8, 49.16; Nep. Hann. 4.4; Cic. 
Tusc. 1.89; Sil. It. 8.665, 9.271-3, 10.222-5; Enn. Ann. 234V). 
 
74 Consuls M. Claudius Marcellus and T. Quinctius Crispinus (Polyb. 10.32; Cic. Tusc. 
1.89; Flam. 1; Livy 27.26-7; Val. Max. 1.6.9; Plut. Marc. 29; App. Hann. 50; Sil. It. 15.334-380; 
Eutrop. 3.16; Oros. 4.18.6-8; Zon. 9.9); Military tribune A. Manlius (Livy 27.26.12, 27.7); 
Prefect L. Arrenius (Livy 27.29.1-4); Prefect M’. Aulius (Livy 27.26.12, 27.8). 
 
75 Sall. Hist. 3.90-93M; Livy Per. 95; Plut. Crass. 8-11; Appian B. Civ. 1.114-8; Front. 
1.5.21; Flor. 28.4; Oros. 5.24. It is possible that C. Claudius Glaber died during his 
praetorship in 63 BCE. No source mentions his death, but he is never mentioned again in our 
sources. His nomenclature is uncertain given differences in our sources. Plutarch and Frontius 
call him “Clodius.” Florus calls him “Clodius Glaber.” Livy refers to him as “Claudius 
Pulcher,” and Appian calls him “Claudius Glaber,” although he confuses his rank.  
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died in battle while in the cavalry or rank and file; surely there were many. It is also worth 
noting the obvious fact that these casualties would impact those aristocrats most dedicated to 
military service disproportionately. Given these factors, in this instance one could actually 
argue that Cicero was understating the seriousness of the challenge that faced the Roman 
aristocracy in Republic’s last generation. But limited as this evidence is, it is it still presents a 
massive amount of attrition among the elite – especially those involved in leading the army. 
When we put together the natural challenge of replacing senators with the long list of 
magisterial casualties stemming from civil conflict and the growing aristocratic disinterest in 
military activity we see, I believe, a materializing crisis of what we might call “elite manpower.”  
 
V. Conclusion. 
 
It is helpful to begin the conclusion of this chapter with a brief summary. Cicero’s 
rhetoric in the pro Fonteio provided us with a way into an intriguing question: Was there a 
shortage of capable military commanders in the Republic’s last generation? A test of a 
manageable sample, the consuls of 81-49 BCE, showed that there might have been some truth 
to Cicero’s claim. Consuls seem to have had noticeably less command experience upon 
entering office in the period between 81-49 BCE than their counterparts from 200-170 BCE 
did. We also saw that consuls from the post-Sullan period who lacked command experience 
prior to office were less likely to obtain some after their year as consul than those from the 
earlier period examined here. In addition to this statistical support, there are other sources of 
evidence for the idea that Romans of the first century lacked military experience and ambition 
relative to their ancestors, not the least of which is that they seem to have sometimes turned to 
literature in order to familiarize themselves with the qualities and responsibilities of a 
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commander. Finally, we examined the reasons Cicero himself provided for the contemporary 
dearth of commanders and found that he and his contemporaries actually were likely hard-
pressed to replace the military commanders of the previous generation.  Looking at all of this 
evidence together we should accept that the Republic of the first century BCE actually was 
facing a shortage of commanders and that the anxiety Cicero utilized in the pro Fonteio may 
have been a recognized contemporary concern. These findings have significant implications for 
our understanding of the Late Republic. One example of how these findings can affect our 
understanding of events in the Late Republic is my discussion of the lex Pompeia de provinciis 
above. We must keep this concern in mind when trying to unravel the motivations and 
concerns of the first century BCE.  
Here in the conclusion, however, I wish to highlight the larger, less episodic 
implications of the evidence. The first is a question of narrative. Polybius tells us that his goal 
in writing the Histories was to answer a question: how did the Romans come to conquer so 
much territory in such a brief period of time?76 Polybius’ answer (broadly speaking) was that 
Rome had access to a vast pool of manpower. Even after sustaining devastating losses the 
Republic was able to field more armies and prolong conflicts until their enemy suffered a 
defeat which they were conversely ill-equipped to absorb.77 Now, this narrative has traditionally 
                                               
76 Polyb. 1.1-6 τίς γὰρ οὕτως ὑπάρχει φαῦλος ἢ ῥᾴθυµος ἀνθρώπων ὃς οὐκ ἂν βούλοιτο 
γνῶναι πῶς καὶ τίνι γένει πολιτείας ἐπικρατηθέντα σχεδὸν ἅπαντα τὰ κατὰ τὴν οἰκουµένην ἐν 
οὐχ ὅλοις πεντήκοντα καὶ τρισὶν ἔτεσιν ὑπὸ µίαν ἀρχὴν ἔπεσε τὴν Ῥωµαίων, ὃ πρότερον 
οὐχ	εὑρίσκεται γεγονός, τίς δὲ πάλιν οὕτως ἐκπαθὴς πρός τι τῶν ἄλλων θεαµάτων ἢ 
µαθηµάτων ὃς προυργιαίτερον ἄν τι ποιήσαιτο τῆσδε τῆς ἐµπειρίας; 
 
77 This narrative appears in secondary scholarship frequently but see e.g. Brunt 
[1971]2001: 418-25; De Ligt 2007. 
 
  161   
 
focused upon the Republic’s ability to mobilize armies, but the importance of the aristocracy’s 
ability to consistently provide capable leadership for these armies is also often commented 
upon.78 The emphasis placed on aristocratic resiliency can be detected in some of Rome’s semi-
mythological stories. Scaevola, so the story goes, terrified the invader Lars Porsenna by 
swearing that the supply of would-be Roman assassins was large. In Plutarch’s Life of Pyrrhus the 
subject’s advisor Cineas returned from his meeting with Senate anxious that they were up 
against an assembly of kings and the Lernaean Hydra.79 Such stories should, of course, be 
treated as fictions, but they nevertheless show how on an ideological Romans valued the 
resiliency of their political class. Shifting to an example on firmer historical footing, Polybius’ 
famous description of the aristocratic funeral culminates in an appreciation of its use, namely 
that it inspired the young men present to accomplish great deeds similar to those on display.80 
An important key to Rome’s success, therefore, was its ability to replenish its manpower both 
among the rank and file and at the level of aristocratic command. The evidence from this 
chapter indicates that Sallust’s repeated assertions that the aristocrats of his day no longer felt 
such compulsion may have been accurate. 
It is interesting, then, that in a generation of chaos and in the midst of an ultimately 
terminal crisis for the republican system of government we can detect an anxiety (which, as we 
                                               
78 See e.g. Harris 1979 passim; Rosenstein 2004; Rosenstein 2007.  
 
79 For Scaevola see Livy 2.12. For Cineas see Plut. Pyrr. 19.5. 
 
80 Polyb. 6.52-3. (52.7-8 are especially relevant) διὸ κἄν ποτε πταίσωσι κατὰ τὰς ἀρχάς, 
Ῥωµαῖοι µὲν ἀναµάχονται τοῖς ὅλοις, Καρχηδόνιοι δὲ	τοὐναντίον. <ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ> ὑπὲρ πατρίδος 
ἀγωνιζόµενοι καὶ τέκνων οὐδέποτε δύνανται λῆξαι τῆς ὀργῆς, ἀλλὰ µένουσι ψυχοµαχοῦντες, 
ἕως ἂν περιγένωνται	τῶν ἐχθρῶν.  
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have seen, was ostensibly rooted in reality) over the aristocracy’s ability to replenish its roster of 
military commanders. If the evidence presented above reflects Republican realities, we should 
consider the possibility that this was a result of both pragmatics and shifting values. The 
battles, proscriptions, suicides, and – in one occasion – lightning bolts of the generation prior 
to Cicero, Pompey, and Caesar left the last generation of the Roman Republic with the 
daunting task of replacing those lost to the high rates of attrition of the previous 30 years. If 
these events had occurred 100 years prior, perhaps the elite may have been in a better position 
to replace those they lost. But with fewer aristocrats interested in military pursuits and 
command positions the task was, logic would dictate, likely much more difficult. This is all to 
say, it is hard not to notice that the Republic’s much-admired ability to replenish its ranks 
seems to have broken down at the elite level at the same time that the political community 
entered its final crisis. This is a speculative observation, but one which could yield interesting 
fruit in future study.   
Finally, this evidence also suggests that by the time Cicero rose to speak on behalf of 
Fonteius in 70 (or 69) BCE, the Roman idea that nearly any member of the senatorial class 
should be able to lead the legions effectively was long gone. In the pro Fonteio Cicero’s appeal 
operates on the assumption that militarily-capable aristocrats were a shrinking subset of the 
senatorial class. He argues from a similar position in the pro Murena later in the 60’s BCE. 
Again, we should look back to the findings presented above on consular command experience. 
In the period from 200-170 BCE even those who (so far as we can tell) had no command 
experience prior to their consulship went out to the Republic’s major theaters of war during or 
after their term in office – or both. In the period from 81-49 BCE we see more consuls who 
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continued avoiding the camp even during and after their term. To refer back to a study I 
mentioned in Introduction, the aristocracy seems to have been specializing along the lines 
presented by Keith Hopkins,81 but this specializing came at the expense of the traditional 
military ethos of the aristocracy. In just a little over 100 years, the Republic had gone from 
having a wealth of potential military commanders to a noticeable shortage.  
                                               
81 Again, see Hopkins 1978: 74-98. 
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4. Procession Recession: Triumphs, Letters, and Ideology in the Late Roman Republic. 
 
I. Introduction1 
 
The Roman triumph has been fecund source material for a number of excellent and 
celebrated works of art. Carle Vernet took two years to paint his massive Triomphe de Paul Emile 
(1789) which depicts Aemilius Paullus’ famous triumph following the Battle of Pydna in 168 BCE. 
60 years earlier (1729) the Italian painter Giovanni Tiepolo debuted his depiction of the triumph 
of Marius over Jugurtha in 104 BCE – which now graces the cover of Mary Beard’s influential 
monograph, The Roman Triumph (2007). Less famous, but also noteworthy, is Tiepolo’s 1730 
painting of the triumph of Manius Curius Dentatus over Pyrrhus (275 BCE).2 Rubens’s A Roman 
Triumph (c. 1630) is another famous work on the subject. Although the artist did not link the 
image with a specific celebration from Roman history, Rubens’ work itself was based on the 
famous series of paintings (c. 1485-1506) depicting the triumphs of Julius Caesar over Gaul and 
Pontus at the end of the Civil War painted by Andrea Mantegna. Rubens either saw these 
paintings himself or based his own work on woodcuts of the series made by Andrea Andreani. 
Clearly the triumph has inspired artists, but for the historian this catalogue poses a question: 
Where is the period between Marius and the end of the Republic?3  
                                               
1 A condensed version of this work was presented at the 2017 Annual Meeting of the 
Society for Classical Studies in Toronto under the title “Cato’s Triumph: Cato’s Attempt to 
Redefine the Roman Triumph.” I am grateful to the panel’s chair, Michele Salzman as well as to 
the audience and my fellow panelists for their thoughtful feedback. 
 
2 Before either of these Tiepolo had also painted a satirical Triumph of Pulcinella (1754). 
 
3 There is a charcoal/watercolor drawing (1765) of Pompey’s triumph in 61 BCE by 
Gabriel de Saint-Aubin but given the amount of attention this particular triumph receives in our 
ancient sources it is surprising that it has inspired relatively little artwork.  
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 As it turns out, this gap between Marius and the end of the Republic in this artistic 
catalogue is perhaps more than a result of chance artistic inspiration; the last generation of the 
Roman Republic was also a difficult period in which to obtain a triumphal celebration. A recent 
study by John Rich found that the frequency of the procession dropped dramatically during this 
time. Where the period between 81 - 69 BCE had averaged one triumphal celebration per year, the 
period between 68 - 50 BCE averaged about one every three years - a frequency comparable to the 
disastrous years of the Second Punic War. Rich and others have previously attributed this decline 
to pragmatic concerns: major commands were becoming increasingly monopolized by a small 
group of commanders, or perhaps the intense obstruction one could expect to face when lodging a 
triumphal claim discouraged seeking the honor at all.4 Neither of these explanations, we shall see, 
is entirely satisfactory. Triumphal frequency had been much higher in the past, even though the 
process for obtaining the celebration was often rigorous and important commands were repeatedly 
granted to exceptional military leaders. In this chapter I will argue that the underlying impetus for 
the decline in triumphs in this period was not a specific pragmatic issue, but rather was the 
byproduct of ideological conflict.  
That ideological reasons for triumphal decline in this period have been largely overlooked 
is partly a result of the relative scarcity of source material we have on the topic. Yet, we are not 
completely without evidence: Cicero’s letters from this period offer us a useful window into this 
topic. In particular, Cicero’s epistolary exchange with M. Porcius Cato has featured prominently in 
                                               
 
4 Rich 2014: 237. See also Lange 2016: 71ff who agrees with Rich that the monopolization 
of commands played a role, but also accounts for the increasing profile of legati in this period. For 
obstruction see also Brennan 2000: 532-35, 865-6. 
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discussion of triumphal politics. This comes as no surprise given the nature of the letter (a request 
for support in pursuit of a supplicatio and eventual triumph) and the historical record of the 
addressee; no other figure from the Late Republic looms as large over triumphal policy. Cato’s 
reluctance to support triumphal claims has in the past been explained in light of factional politics. 
This makes some sense given that the more famous instances of Cato’s obstruction are associated 
with his hostility towards first Pompey and then later his nemesis Caesar. Yet Cato, as we shall see, 
did not reserve obstruction only for his staunch political enemies. As I will argue below, we cannot 
dismiss the intensity of triumphal debate amongst the Republic’s last generation as merely 
pragmatic. 
The second part of my chapter will look closely at the entire epistolary exchange between 
the two men (Fam. 15.4-6) in order to see what kind of evidence it gives us for the arguments upon 
which Cato based his position. Previous scholarly discussion has overlooked this aspect of the 
exchange, and (as we shall see) the letters do in fact give us a clear picture of Catonian values 
regarding about Rome’s highest military honor.  
 
II. Triumphal Decline in the Republic’s Last Generation 
 
 Fluctuation in triumphal frequency was not unique to the Late Republic; throughout 
Roman history the amount of triumphs held responded to both internal and external concerns. 
During the Second Punic War, for example, the frequency of triumph dropped significantly. From 
218 BCE until 201 BCE on average there was only one triumph every three years; this was the 
lowest rate of triumphs since the late 4th century. Most obviously, the dearth of triumphs during 
the Second Punic War reflected poor performance in the field against Hannibal and the 
subsequent avoidance of major conflict. Rich also demonstrates that the Senate became more 
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sparing of the honor during this period, likely as a result of strategic and financial concerns.5 After 
the Second Punic War such a low frequency would not be matched until the period in question 
here (68-50 BCE, which had six triumphs for an average of .32 per year). Before considering why 
this period yielded a noticeable dearth of triumphs, it will be useful to assemble the evidence for 
triumphal debates in this period. After providing a more detailed account of this statistical trend, I 
will then consider the strength of current scholarly theories on the impetus for this decline.  
 Given that civil war prevented all triumphal celebrations between 87 and 82 BCE, it is 
surprising that the 80’s BCE actually saw a spike in triumphal frequency. Before the civil war 
between Sulla and Marius, P. Servilius Vatia (cos. 79 BCE, not yet styled “Isauricus”) celebrated an 
increasingly rare propraetorian triumph in 88 following his governorship. The first two Mithridatic 
Wars (88-84, 83-81 BCE) yielded two triumphs, although both were in celebration of controversial 
commands. Sulla, now firmly in control of Rome, took the opportunity in 81 BCE to celebrate his 
victory over Mithridates’ forces from four years earlier in 85 BCE even though the rise of Cinna in 
Rome had forced Sulla to conclude the hasty and generous Peace of Dardanus. After Sulla’s 
departure for Rome, his former legate L. Licinius Murena took over command of the two legions 
left in the east after the suicide of C. Flavius Fimbria. It is unclear in what role and with what 
authority Murena was left in Asia, but he took the opportunity to renew the conflict with 
Mithridates. This culminated in Murena’s defeat at the hands of Mithridates in Cappadocia and 
his subsequent recall to Rome. Nevertheless, Murena also triumphed de rege Mithridate in 81.6 Also 
                                               
5 Rich 2014: 220-4. 
 
6 Cic. Man. 8; Mur. 11, 15, 88. FT 84ff; MRR 2.77. 
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in 81 BCE, C. Valerius Flaccus (cos. 93) celebrated a triumph ex Celtiberia et Gallia.7 The date of 
Pompey’s first triumph is uncertain, and the differing sources and scholarly arguments have been 
previously discussed in my first chapter. Based on the evidence, either 81 or 80 BCE seem to be 
our best options for Pompey’s triumph ex Africa.8 Thus the last two year of the 80’s BCE featured 
four triumphs (potentially all in 81 BCE). 
 The triumphal boom of the late 80’s continued into the 70’s BCE, this decade featured as 
many as seven triumphs. The entirety of the 70’s is in part of a lacuna within the Fasti Triumphales, 
which is missing around 29 lines between Murena’s triumph in 81 and Q. Caecilius Metellus 
Creticus’ controversial triumph over Crete in 62 BCE. Nevertheless, the literary record for this 
decade is rather strong, especially thanks to Cicero’s in Pisonem (the importance of which I will 
discuss thoroughly below). Cn. Cornelius Dolabella (cos. 81) had been proconsul in Macedonia 
since 80 BCE when he returned to triumph, probably in 77 BCE.9 P. Servilius Vatia returned from 
his proconsulship in Cilicia in 74 BCE and celebrated a triumph over the Isauri (from whom he 
would hereafter take an honorific cognomen) in which he famously displayed pirates.10 Two years 
                                               
7 Cic. Quinct. 28; Gran. Lic. 39B. MRR 2.77-8; FT 563. 
 
8 See Ch. 1 III.8; MRR 3.161. The problem is a disagreement in the sources over how old 
Pompey was at the time of his first triumph: Eutrop 5.9.1 (23); Liv. Per. 89 (24); Gran. Licin. 31 
(25); vir. ill. 77.2 (26), the years 82-79 BCE. 82 BCE is unlikely given that the Civil War was 
ongoing, and Pompey would have had very little time to complete his campaign and return for his 
triumph. Likewise, Badian 1955 has argued convincingly against 79 BCE. Broughton recommends 
80 BCE, but see also Keaveney 1981. 
 
9 Cic. Pis. 44 confirms his triumph. Dolabella was also prosecuted by Julius Caesar in 77 
BCE after his triumph (Suet. DJ 4.1).  
 
10 Cic. Pis. 58; Verr. 2.1.56-57, 5.66; Val. Max. 8.5.6; Eutrop. 6.3,5; CIL I2.2.742. 
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later another proconsul in Macedonia, C. Scribonius Curio (cos. 76), celebrated a triumph over 
the Dardani.11 Finally, a decade after the exceptionally triumphal year of 81 BCE, 71 saw three 
triumphs and an ovatio. M. Terentius Varro Lucullus (cos. 73) celebrated a Macedonia triumph, 
this time over the Bessi.12 Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius (cos. 80) received a triumph for his 
proconsulship in Spain, even though Pompey had to be sent to support him against Sertorius.13 
Finally, Pompey celebrated his second triumph for his help Spain.14 Additionally, although not 
counted here, M. Crassus celebrated an ovatio in 71 BCE for his victory over Spartacus.15 Finally, it 
is unclear exactly when L. Afranius celebrated his triumph ex Hispania citeriore, but Rich places it in 
70 BCE.16 
 Between 81 and 70 BCE there were 11 triumphs (and one ovatio), an average of one 
triumph per year. The next 20 years, however, would only see seven triumphs: four in the 60’s and 
three in the 50’s – or just under one triumph every three years. This is a dramatic shift in 
triumphal frequency and has led to much speculation. As I mentioned in passing above, Rich and 
                                               
11 Cic. Pis. 44, 58; Eutrop. 6.2.2, 6.5.2. 
 
12 Cic. Pis. 44; Plut. Crass. 11.2; Eutrop. 6.10; Strabo 7.6.1; Plin. NH 4.92, 43.36,39; App. 
Illyr. 30. App. BC 1.120 confuses Varro Lucullus with his brother.  
 
13 Sall. Hist. 4.49M; Vell. 2.30.2; App. BC 1.121; Eutrop. 6.5.2; CIL I2.2.733; MRR 2.123. 
 
14 Cic. Leg. Man. 62; Pis. 58; Sest. 129; Div. 2.22; Vell. 2.30.2 (which gives us the date: Dec. 
29th); Val. Max. 8.15.8; Luc. 7.14, 8.809ff; Plin. NH 7.95-6; Plut. Pomp. 22.1, 23.2, 45.5; Crass. 
11.8, 12.4; App. BC 1.121. MRR 2.124. 
 
15 Cic. Pis. 58; Plin. NH 5.125; Plut. Crass. 11.8; Gell. 5.6.23. MRR 2.123. 
 
16 The 70’s would have featured two additional triumphs were in not for the premature 
deaths of C. Aurelius Cotta (cos. 75) and Ap. Claudius Pulcher (cos. 79). See (Cotta) Cic. Pis. 62; 
Ascon. 14C. (Pulcher) Liv. Per. 91; Flor. 1.39.6; Eutrop. 6.2.1; Ammian. Marc. 27.4.10. 
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others have cited two causes for the dearth of triumphs in this period: the monopolization of 
commands by Pompey and Caesar, and the political anarchy of the period. Neither, I believe, is 
satisfying. Rich’s first reason is already perhaps a misnomer, if Caesar’s monopolization of 
command in the Late Republic prevented others from triumphing, then he himself did no better. 
Caesar would not hold his first triumph until 46 BCE. Likewise, Pompey’s commands against the 
pirates and subsequently against Mithridates were huge undertakings, but it would be hard to 
argue that these actions prevented a significant amount of triumphs. First, pressing commands had 
been given to Pompey since the late 80’s BCE, but as we have seen this practice did not result in a 
dearth of triumphs in the 70’s. In fact, one could argue that Pompey’s second triumph helped the 
overall frequency in the 70’s, since Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius’ triumph in 71 BCE was only made 
possible with Pompey’s assistance. Finally, even with Pompey in the East in the 60’s and Caesar in 
Gaul in the 50’s, there was no lack of commands for other promagistrates; Roman armies were 
active in Spain, Gaul, Macedonia, Cilicia, Syria – just to name a few prominent examples. We 
cannot, therefore, blame the lack of triumphs in the 60’s and 50’s on Pompey and Caesar. 
 Rich’s second reason for the decrease in triumphal celebrations in this period is the 
political anarchy that characterized this period. The lead up to the Civil War was certainly a 
tumultuous time in Roman politics, and this no doubt had an effect on all of the city’s political 
institutions. This does, however, merit more discussion than Rich afforded it.17 One way to think 
about the effect of political chaos on triumphal frequency is to compare the 60’s and 50’s BCE 
with another chaotic period from republican history. The obvious choice would be the tribunates 
of the Gracchi. The period between Tiberius Gracchus’ tribunate in 133 and his brother’s death in 
                                               
17 Understandably so, since he was surveying the entirety of triumphal history.  
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121 saw eight triumphs (and one ovatio) in 12 years, or one triumph every 1.5 years. This means 
that triumphal frequency during the period of the Gracchi was twice as high as the last two 
decades of the Republic.  
It is also worth considering just how “political chaos” would affect such a precipitous 
decline in triumphal frequency. In this respect we should not confuse a chaotic political climate 
with the malfunction of institutions. It is true that the ferocity of political quarrels in this period 
brought on irregularity, especially in the late 50’s when elections were frequently delayed due to 
violence or intransigence, but holding elections was different from granting triumphs. Elections, 
since they were both hotly contested and held on a specific day, were especially susceptible to the 
kinds of disruption we see in the 50’s, but triumphal debates were the purview of the Senate and 
the assemblies. Thus, in order to satisfyingly blame political chaos for the drop in triumphal 
frequency in the Late Republic we would need to see a continuous malfunctioning in the 
Republic’s more quotidian political processes and institutions, and we do not. It is understandably 
tempting to cite the extraordinarily hostile political climate of the period for aberrations in 
practice, but in the case of the triumph the societal structures responsible for granting them were 
functioning in the Late Republic. We should not blame political chaos out of hand.  
More precisely, Rich and T. Corey Brennan have also pointed out that obstruction played 
a role in the dearth of triumphs in the 60’s and 50’s BCE, and this is a much more intriguing 
explanation. It is true that obtaining a triumph almost always seems to have involved debate and, 
in some cases, included obstruction. The frequency of triumphal debates in Livy shows that the 
honor was traditionally closely guarded by the Senate.18 Still, it has been shown that the refusal of 
                                               
18 For an excellent discussion of the triumphal debates in Livy see Pittenger 2008. 
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a triumphal request from the Hannibalic War to the 160’s was somewhat rare.19 Further, within 
our period of study, from 81 until the mid 60’s BCE we do not have an example of an acclaimed 
imperator who did not obtain at least an ovatio.20 Beginning in the 60’s, however, the frequency of 
triumphal obstruction within our sources skyrockets. Of course, finding instances of triumphal 
obstruction is not straightforward, but there is one phenomenon in the Late Republic that 
indicates such an increase in opposition to aspiring triumphatores: extended waiting periods outside 
the city. Commanders wishing to hold a triumph faced a constitutional dilemma upon their return 
to the city. In order to retain the command over his soldiers a general was required to maintain his 
imperium, but no citizen with imperium was permitted to enter the city’s sacred boundary while also 
retiaining his imperium, the pomerium, unless they were given a special dispensation to do so. Such 
an exception was usually obtained via a popular bill, but only gave the triumphator the right to enter 
the city during his triumph. Thus, those waiting for a triumph were forced to remain ad urbem.21 
From 150 BCE until Lucullus’ triumph in 63 BCE we get no example of imperatores undergoing a 
lengthy waiting period between their return from the front and the celebration of their triumph. 
This does not necessarily mean that it did not happen, but if it did our sources do not mention it. 
Conversely, in the 60’s it was more likely than not that a would-be triumphator would have to spend 
                                               
 
19 Brennan 1996: 315-37; 2000: 534. 
 
20 Brennan 2000: 534. 
 
21 Senatorial meetings to discuss triumphal grants were therefore held outside of the 
pomerium (e.g. Livy 28.9.5, 31.47.7, 33.22.1, 34.39.5). Liou-Gille 1993; Beard 2007: 202ff; Drogula 
2007; Pittenger 2008: 3, 250, 282ff; Lange 2016: 77-82. The exception would be sitting 
magistrates, since consular imperium was not limited by the pomerium, see Develin 1978. 
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years awaiting the honor. Lucullus (cos. 74) waited three years for his triumph in 63 BCE, as did Q. 
Caecilius Metellus Creticus (cos. 69) for his in 62. Q. Marcius Rex (cos. 68) also waited for three 
years outside the city but died before he was able to celebrate his triumph in 61. Lentulus Spinther 
(cos. 57) spent two years waiting outside the pomerium after his command in Cilicia. C. Pomptinus 
waited four years before his triumph in 54 BCE.22 Further, we know of a number of commanders 
who were proclaimed “imperator” by their armies, but failed to triumph.23 In fact, in the 18 years 
before Caesar’s Gallic request in 50 BCE only Pompey’s triumph in 61 BCE was granted in the 
same year as the return of the commander. 
Clearly something had changed in how the triumph was awarded. In order to understand 
what this trend means, we must examine these events in more detail. The first three examples, 
those from the late 60’s, all have one similarity: the commander in question had come into 
conflict with Pompey during his command. Lucullus received the command against Mithridates 
after his consulship and had brilliant successes with victories against Mithridates at Cabira, and 
against Mithridates’ son-in-law Tigranes (the king of Armenia) at Tigranocerta and Artaxata. 
                                               
22 Lucullus: Cic. Mur. 37, 69; Arch. 21; Acad. 2.3; Strabo 12.5.2; Vell. 2.34.2, Plin. NH 
14.96; Plut. Luc. 37.2-4; Pomp. 30.2; Cat. Min. 29.3-4; App. Mith. 77. Creticus: Cic. Pis. 58; Vell. 
2.34.2; App. Sic. 6; Sall. Cat. 30.3-4; Livy Per. 99. Rex: Sall. Cat. 30.3, 33.1-34.1; Cic. Sull. 34; Fin. 
2.62; Att. 1.16.10. Spinther: Cic. Fam. 1.9; Att. 5.21.4. Pomptinus: Cic. Att. 4.18.4; QF 3.4.6; Pis. 
58; Dio 39.65. 
 
23 L. Manlius Torquatus, C. Antonius Hybrida, C. Octavius (Macedonia), C. Memmius 
(Bithynia), A. Gabinius (Syria), Ap. Claudius Pulcher (Cilicia), M. Tullius Cicero (Cilicia). See 
Rich 2014: 237 n.205. It is also interesting to ponder whether or not Crassus’ ovatio in 70 BCE 
came after obstruction to a triumph request. Plutarch (Cras. 11) denies that Crassus sought a 
triumph and the assumption has been that the status of Crassus’ foe prevented him from being 
considered for the honor, but Cic. Pis. 58 seems to suggest that he at least attempted to gain a 
triumph for defeating Spartacus: Crasse, pudet me tui: quid est quod confecto per te formidolosissimo bello 
coronam illam lauream tibi tanto opere decerni volueris a senatu? 
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Trouble, however, came with a difficult winter in 68 BCE. Lucullus was unable to capture either 
rogue monarch, and his troops were becoming increasingly mutinous – apparently partly under the 
influence of Lucullus’ brother-in-law P. Clodius Pulcher. In 66 BCE, with his soldiers refusing 
commands, the People (via the lex Manilia) relieved Lucullus of his command and sent Pompey to 
take over the campaign. Lucullus returned to Rome hopeful for a triumph, but aside from the 
obvious obstacle (that he had left his command in disgrace before the end of the war) he also faced 
significant political opposition. Although apparently cordial at first, Lucullus and Pompey had a 
(predictable) falling out, and the locus of their mutual vitriol was the triumph. Lucullus accused 
Pompey of playing the vulture and claiming credit (i.e. honors) for wars which were in reality 
already won by previous commanders. Likewise, Pompey accused Lucullus of having avoided the 
real conflict with Mithridates in favor of fighting with lesser kings.24 C. Memmius, a tribune in 66 
BCE friendly to Pompey, first attempted to prosecute Lucullus’ brother for his quaestorship under 
                                               
24 Plut. Pomp. 31. Lucullus argued that Pompey’s victories over Sertorius, Lepidus, and 
Spartacus were actually won by Metellus, Catulus, and Crassus. In 77 BCE Pompey had received 
imperium, probably as a propraetor, in order to fight against the insurrection of M. Aemilius 
Lepidus (cos. 78 BCE). Lepidus was defeated in a battle on the Campus Martius by Q. Catulus, 
Lepidus’ co-consul in 78 BCE. Pompey besieged Lepidus’ supporters under the command of M. 
Iunius Brutus (trib. 83 BCE) at Mutina. Brutus surrendered, and then Pompey (controversially) 
had Brutus killed. See Liv. Per. 90; Plut. Pomp. 16.2-5; Brut. 4.1-2; Cic. Att. 9.14.2; Leg. Agr. 2.89, 
92; Sall. Hist. 1.79M; Val. Max. 6.2.8; App. BC 2.111. After the uprising of Lepidus, Pompey 
received proconsular imperium in order to fight Q. Sertorius in Spain (see Liv. Per. 91; Plut. Pomp. 
17.1-4; Sert. 18.1-2; App. BC 1.108; Cic. Leg. Man. 30, 62). Lucullus’ critique concerning this 
conflict is less convincing, since he would ascribe credit to Pompey’s predecessor Q. Caecilius 
Metellus Pius (cos. 80 BCE) who was nearly forced out of his own province by Sertorius. See Plut. 
Sert. 12.4-13.6. MRR 2.83. Gruen 1974: 18-19. Finally, Pompey does seem to have attempted to 
take some of the credit for the suppression of Spartacus and his followers in the Third Servile 
War. Crassus had defeated Spartacus in a pitched battle, but those who fled from the battle were 
met, and slaughtered, by Pompey returning from Spain. Pompey, according to Plutarch, wrote a 
letter to the senate claiming that Crassus had defeated the army, but he had ended the war. See 
Plut. Crass. 11; Pomp. 21.1-2; Cic. Leg. Man. 30; App. BC 1.120. 
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Sulla, and when that was unsuccessful, obstructed the lex curiata Lucullus required in order to 
triumph.25  
 Q. Caecilius Metellus Creticus also came into conflict with Pompey while on campaign. 
After his consulship in 69 BCE, Metellus was made proconsul in Crete and Achaea in order to 
deal with the pirate problem in the region. In 68 BCE he had some success, winning a naval 
engagement and besieging some Cretan towns. In 67 BCE, however, the situation in the region 
became more complicated. The lex Gabinia gave Pompey command of the Mediterranean and all 
regions 50 miles inland.26 In light of this development, some Cretan communities preferred to 
surrender to Pompey rather than Metellus, apparently believing that Pompey would be more 
lenient.27 Pompey agreed to accept the surrender of these communities, and thereby angered 
Metellus who refused to recognize the validity of this arrangement and continued prosecuting the 
war on Crete until he had the island organized as a province in 66.28 The disagreement led to  
                                               
25 Plut. Luc. 37.1-2; Cat. Min. 29.3; Cic. Acad. 2.3. Memmius is an interesting figure for this 
study. He is rumored to have obstructed Lucullus on Pompey’s behalf. Additionally, Memmius 
allegedly had affairs with both the Luculli’s wives (Cicero compared Memmius to Paris, and the 
brothers to the Atreidae in Att. 1.18.3) Memmius (perhaps in accordance with poetic justice) is 
also among our generals who seem to have been acclaimed imperator, but not to have triumphed. 
See MRR 2.203. 
 
26 Cic. leg. Man. 44, 52-8; leg Agr. 2.46; P. Red. in Sen. 11; Phil. 11.18; Sall. Hist. 5.21-24M; 
Livy Per. 99; Vell. 2.31-2; Val. Max. 8.15.9, Tac. Ann. 15.25; Plut. Pomp. 25-6; Luc. 37.4; App. Mith. 
94; Dio 36.23-7. MRR 2.144-5. 
 
27 Plut. Pomp. 29; Dio 36.18ff; Cic. Flacc. 30, 63, 100; ad Brut. 1.8; Livy Per. 98; Vell. 2.34.1, 
Val. Max. 7.6, App. Sic. 6.2. 
 
28 Cic. Flacc. 30, 100; ad Brut. 1.8; Livy Per. 100; App. Sic. 6; Strabo 17.3.25. The historian 
Sisenna was a legate under Pompey and was tasked with convincing Metellus to yield, 
unfortunately Sisenna fell sick and died on Crete (Dio 36.19.1). 
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hostility between the two men. Pompey worked to prevent Metellus’ triumph until 62, and 
Metellus fought Pompey’s ratification in the East until it finally passed in 59 BCE.29 
 Q. Marcius Rex was consul in 68 BCE and then given the province of Cilicia for a term as 
proconsul in 67.30 While in Cilicia he notably caused trouble for Lucullus, who was still in 
command against Mithridates. Marcius’ brother-in-law P. Codius Pulcher had fanned the flames of 
discontent among Lucullus’ soldiers, and then in 67 BCE was received by Marcius.31 Much of the 
detail of Marcius’ time in Cilicia is unclear; a once-mentioned trip to Antioch has been the source 
of much speculation.32 We do know, however, that at some point during his proconsulship 
Marcius was acclaimed imperator by his troops.33 In the following year, 66 BCE, Marcius was 
relieved of his command in favor of Pompey. Nevertheless, he returned to Rome and waited ad 
Urbem for a triumph. Marcius, however, died before he was able to celebrate his triumph.34 In a 
                                               
29 Plut. Pomp. 29. For a more detailed discussion of the clash between Metellus and Pompey 
see Seager [1979]2002: 46-9.  
 
30 Sall. Hist. 5.13-4M; Dio 36.15.1, 17.2; CIL I2. 2.747. MRR 2.146.  
 
31 For Clodius service under Lucullus: Cic. Har. Resp. 42; Plut. Luc. 34.1-2; Dio 36.14.3-4, 
17.2. For his transfer to Marcius see additionally Dio 38.30.5; App. B. Civ 2.23. 
 
32 6th century CE chronicler John Malalas (p. 225, II.4-11[ed. Bonn 1831]) mentioned a 
Κόϊντος Μαρκιανὸς ῥηξ who came to Antioch τυπῶσαι φόρους διδόναι αὐτὸν ῾Ρωµαίοις. This 
has been accepted to be Q. Marcius Rex, although it is entirely uncertain when during his 
proconsulship Marcius visited Antioch, and unclear what the goal of his mission was. For a useful 
discussion see Downey 1937. 
 
33 Sall. Cat. 30.3-4, 33.1. 
 
34 Sall. Cat. 32.3-34.1; Cic. Att. 1.16.10.  
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fortunate coincidence, both Marcius and Metellus (along with their troops) were near to the city 
and able to be deployed against the Catilinarian conspirators in 63 BCE.35  
 It is clear that the obstruction these commanders faced was part of a larger political conflict 
in the 60’s. Sallust laconically blamed the obstruction of Metellus and Marcius on those senators 
quibus omnia honesta atque inhonesta vendere mos erat, but we have no evidence that bribery or lack 
thereof played a direct result in these obstructions.36 All three commanders were closely aligned 
with senatorial policy in the important eastern conflicts against the pirates and Mithridates, and all 
three were replaced by popular laws in favor of Pompey. This strongly suggests that the triumphal 
obstructions of the 60’s were a result of factional politics. Lucullus was a vehement opponent of 
Pompey’s rise in the 60’s and was heavily involved in the blocking of Pompey’s eastern resolutions 
in the Senate.37 Further, there is also a noticeable methodological consistency in these triumphal 
obstructions. In the cases of Lucullus and Metellus, both faced some level of obstruction from 
tribunes. C. Memmius attacked first Lucullus’ brother and then excited the People against the 
general. Cassius Dio records that Pompey used a tribune to prevent two prominent pirate kings 
from appearing in Metellus’ triumph, although he does not give the name of the tribune.38 We 
lack almost entirely the details of the obstruction of Marcius’ triumph, but given that Pompey had 
                                               
35 Sall. Cat. 30.3-5. 
 
36 Sall. Cat. 30.3. 
 
37 See Keaveny 1992: 131ff. 
 
38 Dio 36.19.3. Although we do get the names of the pirate kings: Panares and Lasthenes. 
Pompey’s argument was that these pirates had surrendered to him and not to Metellus.   
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had success using tribunes to frustrated imperatores it is certainly possible that Marcius faced similar 
problems.39  
 This level of triumphal obstruction, hitherto unheard of, seems to have emerged in the 
60’s as a political tool for frustrating one’s opponents. Lucullus and Metellus eventually obtained 
their chariot ride and Pompey was able to push through his eastern acta with the help of new 
friends, but the practice of using triumphal debate as a political weapon endured. In all three of 
these examples Pompey and his adherents appear to have blocked the aspirations of those 
associated with his political opposition, but after 62 BCE the conservative faction within the 
Senate turned Pompey’s triumphal obstruction against him, and one man in particular is singled 
out by our sources in this effort: M. Porcius Cato. Cato’s political career began in the 60’s while 
this new trend of triumphal obstruction was taking place. Already in 66 BCE Cato, who was 29, 
fought hard against the tribune Memmius’ opposition to Lucullus’ triumph, apparently at 
significant political risk.40 In 62 BCE, the year in which Metellus finally held his Cretan triumph, 
M. Porcius Cato was tribune of plebs. It is possible that Cato co-sponsored a law on the triumph 
during his tribunate, the lex Porcia Maria de triumphis, but the law is poorly attested.41  
                                               
39 Plut. Pomp. 46.4 says that in the face of opposition from Lucullus and Cato Pompey 
ἠναγκάζετο δηµαρχοῦσι προσφεύγειν καὶ προσαρτᾶσθαι µειρακίοις· 
 
40 Plut. Cato 29.3. ὁ δὲ Κάτων...ἀντέστη τῷ Μεµµίῳ, καὶ πολλὰς ὑπέµεινε διαβολὰς καὶ 
κατηγορίας, τέλος δὲ, τῆς ἁρχῆς ἑκβαλλόµενος ὡς τυραννίδος, τοσοῦτον ἐκράτησεν ὣστε τὸν 
Μέµµιον αὐτὸν ἀναγκάσαι τῶν δικῶν ἀποστῆναι καὶ φυγεῖν τὸν ἀγῶνα. Lucullus was Cato’s 
brother-in-law. 
 
41 Val. Max. 2.8.1. This law is sometimes confused (e.g. Wistrand 1979: 25) with an 
apparently earlier law that required 5,000 enemy casualties for triumphal consideration, but the 
existence of the earlier law is questionable. Valerius says that the law introduced by Cato (and his 
otherwise unattested colleague in the tribunate L. Marius), poenam enim imperatoribus minatur qui 
aut hostium occisorum in proelio aut amissorum civium falsum numerum litteris senatui ausi essent referre, 
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In the next year, 61 BCE, Pompey himself felt the sting of triumphal obstruction when 
Cato opposed his efforts. Pompey was returning victorious from the East, and this meant the 
Senate had to consider the honors that it would grant the imperator. Pompey’s achievements during 
his campaign were unparalleled; he had cleared the Mediterranean of pirates, defeated Rome’s old 
foe Mithridates, and organized much of Rome’s eastern holdings.42 Pompey, however, wished to 
use his popularity to help M. Pupius Piso Frugi Calpurnianus canvass for the consulship of 61 
BCE. Piso had been one of Pompey’s legates in Asia, and Pompey was no doubt eager to ensure 
that a friendly consul was in office during the debate over his settlements. Pompey was, however, 
unable to cross over the pomerium while awaiting his triumph and unable to aid Piso without 
entering the city. Accordingly, Pompey wrote to the senate and requested that the consular 
elections be postponed until after his triumph. Given the spectacular nature of Pompey’s res gestae, 
it is reasonable to assume that the new Alexander felt he was entitled to some constitutional 
leniency, Plutarch says as much explicitly. Cato, however, was troubled by Pompey’s attitude and 
successfully lobbied his fellow senators to reject the pleas of the returning imperator. Thus, Cato 
forced Pompey to choose between holding his triumph and assisting his lieutenant at the elections. 
The choice was likely a simple one – Piso was elected even without Pompey’s physical presence in 
the city, and Pompey’s triumph in 61 BCE was arguably the most splendid in Roman history up to 
that point. Still, Cato had used triumphal obstruction to expose some weakness in Pompey, even 
                                               
iubetque eos, cum primum urbem intrassent, apud quaestores urbanos iurare de utroque numero vere ab iis 
senatui esse scriptum. 
 
42 Pompey’s campaigns, and more precisely his triumph, have often been cited as the 
beginning of Rome’s (self-imagined) identity as the dominant world power see Kallet-Marx 1995: 
331-4. His procession included a trophy of the oikumene. See Nicolet 1991: 31-33; Ostenberg 2009: 
284-287; Osgood 2014: 154.  
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during his victorious return. Pompey seemed to recognize Cato’s potential to cause trouble in the 
future and offered him a marriage alliance, which Cato refused.43  
In the following year, Cato again forced a returning general to choose between a triumph 
and involvement in the elections; this time the commander in question was Julius Caesar. Caesar 
had left Rome in 61 BCE to become proconsul in Hispania Ulterior, and on his arrival he added 
ten cohorts to his two legions and defeated the Callaici and Lusitani.44 Caesar left Spain with his 
typical celerity (before his successor arrived, possibly with an eye to the coming elections) and upon 
his arrival ad urbem asked for permission to stand for the consulship technically in absentia, since he 
could not enter the pomerium.45 Cato, seeing that Caesar’s request was gaining support in the 
                                               
43 Plut. Cato Minor 31; Pomp. 44. However, Dio 37.44 states that Pompey did get his delay. 
The problems with sources pertaining to this event will be discussed in detail below. Plut. Cat. 
Min. 30.3-6; Pomp. 44.2-4. 
 
44 Cic. Att. 2.1.6-10, 3.3; Plut. Caes. 12-14; Pomp. 47; Crass. 14.1-3; Cat. Min. 31; Luc. 42.5-
6; App. Livy Per. 103; Dio. 37.54-58.  
 
45 For an excellent discussion on the subject see Morstein-Marx 2007: 168-169; also Pelling 
2011: 187-188, as well as Linderski 1965. We have evidence for the election in absentia of some 
priests, and an aedile. Scipio Nasica Serapio was possibly elected Pontifex Maximus in 141 BCE 
while fighting the Scordisci; Marius was elected augur in 98 BCE while he was in Cappadocia. See 
Cic. ad Brut. 1.5.3. L. Lucullus, Cato’s brother-in-law, was elected aedile for 79 BCE (Plut. Lucull. 
1.6; Cic. Acad. 2.1. See also, Balsdon 1962: 140). In respect to those running for the consulship, 
C. Marius had been elected in absentia three times, Pompey and Crassus had been elected in 
absentia for the consulships of 70 BCE, and Pompey again was elected while absent in 52 BCE via 
a proposal that was made by Bibulus and seconded by Cato himself (Plut. Mar. 12.1, 14.9; Livy Per. 
67,68). Pompey’s second two consulships are less relevant, but still serve to show the flexibility in 
procedure. Linderski (1966) argues that considering Pompey’s election in 71 BCE as in absentia is 
anachronistic, as candidates were not legally required to give a professio (the official declaration of 
one’s candidacy) in person until later – see Levick 1981 and Lintott 1999: 45. This is correct in a 
legalistic sense, but I follow Morstein-Marx 2007: 168 n. 44 who argues that Pompey’s absence still 
breaks significantly with tradition, and thus provides a good precedent for Caesar’s hopes. See 
Kunkel & Whittman 1995: 70-78 concerning the importance of the professio as a presentation of 
the candidate to the People.  
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senate, was unable (as he had been with Pompey) to convince his colleagues to vote against the 
measure. Instead of yielding the vote, Cato turned to what Caesar would later call his “old-time 
custom” and filibustered until sundown, when the law required that the senate adjourn.46 Caesar 
decided to relinquish his bid for a triumph and instead ran for the consulship of 59 BCE, which 
he won. Cato’s victory would, however, be short-lived – in the face of predictable Catonian 
opposition, Caesar went on to broker a political alliance with Pompey and Crassus. This would 
not be the last time that Cato’s stubborn opposition to honors for Caesar would have far-reaching 
consequences for the entire community. 
It seems that during this period Cato had discovered a new kind of political tool to wield 
against returning generals. Cato had utilized the constitutional quandary faced by imperators to 
sour their returns and threaten their ability to capitalize on their military success at the polls. The 
maneuver was no doubt frustrating for the commanders, but not time consuming; Cato was able 
to force the dilemma precisely because the elections were a fast-approaching sine qua non for each 
general. This was not the case for C. Pomptinus. Pomptinus was a career military man.47 He had 
been a legate to Crassus during the Third Servile war in 71 BCE and as praetor had provided the 
damning evidence against the Catilinarian conspirators after intercepting the Allobrogian 
ambassadors on the Pons Milvius. After 63 Pomptinus served pro consule in Gallia Narbonensis (62-
                                               
46 Plut. Cat. Min. 31.3-4. Caes. BC 1.32.3 calls the filibuster Cato’s “pristina consuetudine.” 
 
47 Sall. Cat. 45.2 refers to Pomptinus as a homo militaris. For general discussions of viri 
militares see Campbell 1975, De Blois 2000. Rosenstein 2007.  
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59 BCE), where he put down the rebellion of the Allobroges under Catugnatus.48 Pomptinus was 
replaced in 59 BCE and returned to Rome, where he requested a triumph for his efforts.49 Unlike 
Pompey and Caesar, Pomptinus does not seem to have had electoral plans, but Cato still opposed 
his request; this time the commander opted to wait for the opportunity to triumph. Pomptinus 
waited outside the pomerium until 54 BCE when, only by some procedural trickery done behind 
Cato’s back, he was finally able to celebrate his return.50 
It is not explicitly confirmed in our sources, but it is fairly certain that Cato also obstructed 
the triumphal request of L. Cornelius Lentulus Spinther (cos. 57) in 53 BCE. As consul in 57 
BCE Lentulus had striven hard for and brought about the recall of Cicero from exile.51 After his 
consulship Lentulus received Cilicia for his proconsulship, and he was acclaimed imperator by his 
                                               
48 Sall. Cat. 45.2. For service under Crassus in 71 see Frontin. Str. 2.4.7. For his aid against 
the Catiline see Cic. Cat. 3.5ff, 14; Flacc. 102; Sall. Cat. 45.1-4. For his proconsulship see Cic. Prov. 
Cons. 32; Dio. 37.47-48, 39.65.1-2; Livy Per. 103. 
 
49 Pomptinus was likely Caesar’s immediate predecessor in Gaul. Metellus Celer (cos. 60 
BCE) was appointed to succeed Pomptinus, but (possibly) had his office taken away by the tribune 
Flavius. Whether or not Metellus was actually removed from office, he died suddenly before 
leaving the city. See Cic. Cael. 59; Sest. 130-131; Vat. 19; Att. 2.5.2; Dio 37.50.4; MRR 2.183. 
 
50 Cic. Pis. 58; Dio 39.65.1-2. It is unclear on what grounds Pomptinus’ request was 
objected to, but both Cato and Caesar seem to have opposed it. Beard (2007: 370) alleges an 
improper vote of imperium, but while possible considering the uncertainty surrounding his 
successor, this seems speculative. Cato was joined in his opposition in 54 BCE by his fellow 
praetor P. Servilius Isauricus (cos. 48, 41 BCE) and the tribune Q. Mucius Scaevola, whom Cicero 
(Q. Frat. 3.4.6) rather poetically claimed was Ἄρη πνέων on the issue (quoting Aesch. Aga. 375). 
 
51 MRR 2.200. Cic. Att. 3.22.2; QF 1.4.5; Fam. 1.1.1-17, 3.7.5; P. Red. in Sen. 5, 8-9, 26-7; P. 
Red. ad Quir. 11, 15, 17ff; Dom. 7, 30, 70-1, 75; Har. Resp. 12; Sest. 70, 72, 107, 117, 144, 147; Pis. 
34, 80; Mil. 39; Dio 39.6-8. On the law: Cic. P. Red. in Sen. 27; P. Red. ad Quir. 17; Dom. 75, 87, 90; 
Sest. 109, 128; Pis. 35-6; Dio 39.8.2. 
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troops.52 Lentulus was replaced in 53 BCE and he returned to Rome to seek a triumph for his 
service. He finally celebrated his triumph in 51 BCE.53 The only source material we have relating 
to the details of this triumphal obstruction comes from a letter Cicero wrote to Cato (Fam. 15.4, 
which will be discussed in length below). In it Cicero wrote that Cato opposed the supplicatio of a 
certain vir optimius clarissimus.54 Given the context this man is almost certainly Lentulus.  
The last Catonian triumphal obstruction (save his opposition to Cicero in 50 BCE which 
will be discussed in detail below) for which we have evidence is the most famous: Cato’s 
opposition to Caesar in 50 BCE. There is no need to recount Caesar’s achievements in Gaul. 
Although there were several close calls, Caesar had ultimately been wildly successful against 
Rome’s oldest, traditional enemy.55 Almost equally famous are Cato’s efforts to end Caesar’s 
command, including his rather ridiculous demand that Caesar be surrendered to the Germans.56 
Caesar received a total of fifty-five days of supplicationes from the Senate while in command in Gaul 
                                               
52 Lentulus was initially commissioned to restore the Egyptian king Ptolemy XII Aluetes to 
his throne but was prevented from taking up the task by a prohibition from the Sybilline Books 
and the efforts of Pompey and Crassus. See MRR 2.210. Cic. Fam. 1.1-7; QF 2.2.3, 2.3.2; Pis. 50; 
Rab. Post. 21; Cael. 23-6; Plut. Pomp. 49; Dio 39.12-16. For his acclamation as imperator see Cic. 
Fam. 1.8.7, 1.9.2. 
 
53 Cic. Att. 5.21.4. 
 
54 Cic. Fam. 15.4.11 te denique memini, cum cuidam clarissimo atque optimo viro supplicationem 
non decerneres, dicere te decreturum si referretur ob eas res quas is consul in urbe gessisset. tu idem mihi 
supplicationem decrevisti togato, non, ut multis, re publica bene gesta sed, ut nemini, re publica conservata. 
 
55 e.g. Cic. Marc. 4-10; Prov. Cons. 34-35. 
 
56 Plut. Caes. 22.3, Cat. Min. 49.1; Suet. Iul. 24.3; App. Celt. 18. The demand was clearly 
absurd, and likely an attempt to prevent the granting of a supplicatio to Caesar. See Morstein-Marx 
2007: 161. 
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(more than any commander had ever enjoyed), a clear sign that he would easily obtain a triumph 
for his efforts.57 This time, unlike in 60 BCE, Caesar had prepared in advance to shield his 
ambitions from Cato’s obstinacy. In 52 BCE all ten tribunes had joined to carry a law that granted 
Caesar the ability to stand for the consulship in absentia. Caesar clearly desired this law to protect 
himself from the kind of dilemma Cato presented him with in 60. In the face of tribunician 
unanimity, Cato’s attempt to filibuster the legislation was ultimately unsuccessful,58 and the 
dispute over the conditions of Caesar’s return from Gaul ended in civil war.  
 There are noticeable differences between the triumphal obstructions of the late 60’s 
(Lucullus, Metellus Creticus, and Q. Marcius Rex) and these Catonian efforts. First, Pompey seems 
to have turned to friendly tribunes for assistance in obstructing the triumphs of his political rivals, 
but Cato acted as his own agent in the cases discussed above. Beginning with Pompey Cato had 
devised a new tactic in checking the ambitions of returning generals by forcing them to choose 
between the triumph and electoral concerns. In Pompey’s case in 61, Cato was able to persuade 
the Senate to agree with him and even though Pompey got all that he wanted Cato did manage to 
land a blow to Pompey’s prestige. In the following year he was forced to rely upon the filibuster to 
obstruct Caesar and this time was successful in depriving Caesar of his procession, which clearly 
grieved Caesar since he made careful provisions against suffering from such a predicament in the 
50’s. Cato spent his early career in the 60’s when a new breed of intransigent triumphal 
                                               
57 Morstein-Marx 2007: 169 n.46. See also Cic. Prov. Cons 32-35, 26, 29. Marius had gotten 
five days after the battle of Aquae Sextae in 102 BCE; Pompey had gotten ten days after defeating 
Mithridates. 
 
58 Caes. BC 1.32.3, 1.9.2; Cic. Att. 7.1.4, 7.3.4, 7.6.2; Fam. 6.6.5, 8.3.3, 16.12.3; Phil. 2.24; 
Livy Per. 107; Suet. Iul. 26, 28; Plut. Pomp. 56; App. BC 2.25. 
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obstruction debuted in Roman politics; in the late 60’s and 50’s Cato provided further innovation 
to this phenomenon. 
 In respect to Pompey and Caesar it would be easy to understand Cato’s behavior as 
principally similar to the other triumphal obstructions of the 60’s: factional politics. Cato had 
been at the forefront of opposition to Pompey since the latter’s return from his campaigns in the 
East, and Cato had already locked oratorical horns with Caesar in 63 during the debate over the 
punishment of the Catilinarian conspirators. Yet, other Catonian triumphal obstructions 
undermine such an understanding. Cato’s opposition to Pomptinus lacks a clear explanation and 
is further complicated by the fact that Caesar, who was rarely aligned with Cato, also worked to 
obstruct Pomptinus’ claim. Neither can Cato’s opposition to Spinther’s request be explained away 
by political rivalry. Finally, as we shall see in the next section of this chapter, Cato also opposed the 
request of his friend and frequent collaborator Cicero in 50 BCE. It would be hard to argue that 
Cato and Caesar were on the same side of a political faction that put them at odds with 
Pomptinus, and Cicero’s appeal to Cato heavily emphasized their shared political views.   
  
III. Cato and Cicero’s Epistolary Exchange. 
Cicero did not want to serve a provincial governorship; he had even bartered away his 
opportunity to govern normally-coveted Macedonia after his consulship in 63 BCE. Unfortunately 
for the metropolitan Cicero, the lex Pompeia de provinciis of 52 BCE changed the way in which 
provincial governors were selected and he was obligated to take up a posting in Cilicia for 51 
  186   
 
BCE.59 Cicero arrived in his province to a rather distressing situation, especially for such an 
unmilitary man: two years after Crassus’ disastrous defeat and subsequent death at the Battle of 
Carrhae Roman allies in the region informed Cicero that the crown prince of Parthia, Pacorus, 
had crossed the Euphrates into Roman Syria with a sizeable force.60 Syria’s governor M. Bibulus 
had not yet arrived in that province and Antioch (under the command of proquaestor C. Cassius 
Longinus) was the only Roman position of any strength between Pacorus and Cilicia. Preparing for 
the worst, Cicero led his army into Cappadocia and prepared to face the Parthians should Pacorus 
head in that direction.61 While Cicero moved his army into the Amanus mountain range on the 
border with Syria, Cassius held Antioch and repelled the Parthians. The crisis had passed, but 
Cicero took the opportunity to renew conflict with the inhabitants of that region, who were 
perpetually hostile to Rome and welcoming to its enemies across the Euphrates. Cicero wrote that 
he killed many of the enemy, took some prisoner, and burned their strongholds. In recognition of 
his success his soldiers acclaimed him as imperator at Issus. That Alexander the Great had defeated 
Darius there just over 280 years earlier was not lost on the orator-cum-imperator. 62After this success 
                                               
59 Cic. Fam. 3.2.1, 15.12.2; Att. 5.15.1 denique haec (provincial govenorship) non desidero: 
lucem, forum, urbem, domum, vos desidero. sed feram ut potero, sit modo annuum; si prorogatur actum est. 
Once resigned to his provincial duty, Cicero went to great efforts to ensure that his tenure would 
be as short as possible, see Cic. Att. 5.1.1, 5.2.3, 5.9.2, 5.11.1 and 5, 5.13.3, 5.17.5, 5.18.1, 5.20.7; 
Fam. 2.7.4, 2.8.3, 2.10.4, 3.8.9, 15.9.2, 15.12.2, 15.13.3, 15.14.5. See also Dio Cass. 40.46.2. 
Rawson 1983: 164-82; Mitchell 1991: 204-5; Tempest 2011: 151ff. Steel 2012 for an excellent 
discussion of the details of the law. 
 
60 For narratives of Cicero’s campaign see Fam. 15.1, 15.2, 15.3, 15.4.2-10; also see below. 
 
61 Cic. Fam. 15.2.2; 15.4.4. 
 
62 Cic. Fam. 2.10.3 ita victoria iusta imperator appellatus apud Issum, quo in loco, saepe ut ex te 
audivi, Clitarchus tibi narravit Dareum ab Alexandro esse superatum... 
 
  187   
 
Cicero went further into the Amanus, where he besieged Pindenissem, a town of free Cilicians. 
After 57 days the city surrendered on the Saturnalia in 51 BCE.63 
So went Cicero’s one season as general. Once the soldiering was done, Cicero set out on 
another massive campaign, the campaign to obtain a triumph for his efforts. He allegedly wrote to 
almost every member of the Senate, which at the point boasted roughly 600 members.64 Scholars 
concerned with the triumph have noted that what we still have available of Cicero’s epistolary 
campaign shows that obtaining a triumph was not, as some have imagined, a question of box-
checking the proper criteria, but rather was a political exercise.65 Cicero often took the time to 
tailor the letter to suit the specific interests of the addressee.66  The most recent study that attempts 
                                               
63 Cic. Fam. 15.4.10. Cicero claims that the pro-Parthian elements in the Amanus 
mountain range were threatening to strengthen anti-Roman elements in the region. For the end of 
the siege on the Saturnalia see Cic. Att. 5.20.1. 
 
64 Cic. Att. 7.1.8 litteras...ad omnis mitterem. There were two senators that Cicero did not 
write to: C. Lucilius Hirrus who had been defeated for the curule aedileship by Cicero’s friend 
Caelius, and his former son-in-law Furius Crassipes. Att. 7.1. Hirrus was also on the receiving end 
of some Ciceronian wit concerning an apparent speech impediment, see Fam. 2.9-10. Also, 
Shackelton Bailey 1971: 123ff.  
 
65 There is no strong consensus, but recent scholarship has tended to favor a less legalistic 
understanding. Gruen 1990: 131-133 was an early, if brief, critic of the idea of a legalistic 
triumphal standard. He has since been followed by more thorough attacks on the ius triumphandi. 
Beard 2007 is perhaps the most high-profile denunciation of strict regulations. See also, 
Itgenshorst 2005; Pittenger 2008. Lundgreen 2014 is the most recent comprehensive study; he 
follows Beard in denying the existence of set rules but does reserve space for some “principles.” 
The older, legalistic view can be traced back to Gibbon [1796]2014 or Mommsen StR (or, indeed, 
to Valerius Maximus), but more recent arguments have been lodged by Petrucci 1996, Brennan 
1996, and Auliard 2001. 
 
66 For some examples, see Fam. 15.10 to C. Claudius Marcellus Minor (cos. 50), in which 
Cicero appealed to his good relationship with other Marcelli. To the other consul of 50 BC, L. 
Aemilius Lepidus Paullus, Cicero brought attention to past favors. See Beard 2007: 191ff. 
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to understand the basic nature of the triumph defines the procession simply as “an honour 
conferred by peers.”67 The triumph was still a military honor and an imperator was still expected to 
have some significant achievement under arms, but obtaining a triumph also required some adept 
politicking after one’s campaign concluded. For our purposes this means that it is important to 
remember that Cicero crafted his letter to meet what he perceived to be Cato’s specific concerns. 
Yet, Cicero’s effort would be unsuccessful – but why? I will argue that Cato’s refusal to support 
Cicero’s triumphal claim shows us that Cato’s triumphal obstruction came from an ideological 
conflict, rather than from personal or pragmatic concerns (as has often been imagined). Therefore, 
what follows is a close reading of the letters (Fam. 15.4-6) that seeks to uncover the grounds on 
which Cato opposed military honors. Such a reading has thus far been missing from the analysis of 
these letters.  
  
III.1 Cicero’s Initial Letter (Fam. 15.4 = SB 110). 
 Cicero’s letter to Cato was special. One could protest that since Cicero possibly wrote to 
almost all of the Senate’s 600 members one letter to Cato hardly constituted a extraordinary 
honor, but the content is what clues us in to this letter’s special status. Other letters from this 
epistolary campaign are all much shorter, and none gives the amount of narrative detail that this 
letter does.68 Cato would have had access to all the details of Cicero’s campaign from the 
                                               
67 Lundgreen 2014: 28. 
 
68 Cic. Fam. 15.1 & 15.2 (to the magistrates and the Senate), 15.3 (to Cato), 15.10 (to C. 
Claudius Marcellus), 15.13 (to L. Aemilius Paullus), and 15.4 (to Cato). Cicero’s account of his 
campaign in Fam. 15.4 is much more sophisticated than other examples in his extant corpus (see 
Att. 5.20 and Fam. 2.10). See also Fehrle 1983: 226ff; Hutchinson 1998: 89ff; Beard 2007: 191-2. 
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imperator’s dispatches to the Senate and especially the letter (now lost) that Cicero sent to the body 
formally requesting the honor, but Cicero did his addressee the honor of sending him a 
personalized version.69 Of course receiving his own letter would have appealed to Cato’s sense of 
prestige, but Cicero had another reason for crafting an appeal specifically for Cato. As we have 
already seen, Cato was a familiar fixture in triumphal debates (often to the detriment of the would-
be triumphator). It was important for Cicero to secure Cato’s support, and thus also important to 
appeal not only to Cato’s sense of self-importance, but also to his principles in the letter of request.  
 The first thing I believe we need to note about Fam. 15.4 is the sophistication of its 
structure. It is tempting (in light of the author) to see the letter as a long-winded exercise in self-
praise, but it is actually an excellent example of Rome’s master of persuasion plying his trade. In 
fact, the structure of Fam. 15.4 bears a similarity to another branch of the Ciceronian corpus: it 
can be analyzed like a forensic speech, complete with an exordium, narratio, propositio, argumentatio, 
and peroratio.70 This is not to say that Cicero sent a speech to Cato; a persuasive letter is not the 
same as a persuasive speech. Yet, the structure of the letter does show that Cicero put great care 
into his appeal. Further, there are some advantages to reading Fam. 15.4 as we might read a speech 
– often when lacking the speech for the prosecution we are able to look closely at Cicero’s 
argument to reconstruct what kind of arguments he anticipated having to engage with. Similarly, 
                                               
69 Those who wished to obtain a triumph sent a “laurelled letter” to the Senate to formally 
request the honor; e.g. Cic. Phil 14.23-4, Luc. 1.12, Dio Cass. 42.18.1. See also Oakley 1998: 714; 
Beard 2007: 201-3; Rich 2014: 211. Cicero had previously sent Cato his own version of a dispatch 
to the Senate (Fam. 15.3). 
 
70 Wistrand 1979: 16; Hutchinson 1998: 87. 
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in Fam. 15.4 we can look at Cicero’s argument and reconstruct the concerns he expected his 
addressee to have.  
 An ideological reading of Fam. 15.4 is lacking from current scholarship. Modern scholarly 
discussion of this letter has traditionally focused upon the military narrative (§2-10), and the 
awkwardness of Cato’s refusal.71 In his commentary Shackleton Bailey characterized Fam. 15.4 
simply as “a lengthy account of military operations.”72 Magnus Wistrand’s study of Cicero’s pursuit 
of a triumph provides a close reading of this letter but one focused mainly on the weakness of 
Cicero’s request on qualitative grounds.73 His reading usefully highlights some inconsistencies 
between this account other narratives in different letters, but only mentions in passing non-
                                               
71 Shackleton Bailey’s commentary (1977: 1.109-113) is valuable, but I believe he 
misunderstands the tone of the exchange, particularly Cato’s response (Fam. 15.5) which he calls 
“humbug.” Magie 1950: 396-9 focuses entirely on the military narrative; Syme 1995: 118-24 & 
127-43 deals with the geographic details we are able to glean from Cicero’s letter as well as the 
narrative of his involvement with the Roman vassal Deiotarus (Mitchell 1993: 1.33-6 & 55-7 also 
focuses on what we can learn about Roman Anatolia); Gelzer 1969: 225-42 is a narrative of 
Cicero’s time in Cilicia, with only a brief mention of the epistolary exchange with Cato (Sherwin-
White 1984: 290-7 also uses the letters to help reconstruct Cicero’s time in the province); Mitchell 
1991: 235 (esp. n14) only mentions Cato’s refusal in passing, and in the notes speculates that Cato 
may have done so “on an objection in principle to honors for minor successes.” Fehrle 1983: 224-
34 is a good starting point, because he acknowledges the special status of these letters, but he only 
nods to Cato’s aversion to military honors. Griffin 1989: 35-6 briefly uses these letters as a case 
study for how philosophy impacted elite interaction in this period. Wistrand 1979 provides a 
useful reading but largely ignores the ideological conflict. I will refer to it throughout. Hutchinson 
1998: 86-100 is an excellent overview of the rhetorical strategies Cicero deployed in his campaign 
narrative (§2-10) in Fam. 15.4 - including an intriguing discussion of the similarities between 
Cicero’s narrative and Caesar’s Bellum Gallicum - but leaves much of the rest of the letter 
undiscussed. Hall 2009 is a useful resource for thinking about rhetorical and persuasive strategies 
throughout the Ciceronian epistolary corpus, but he only mentions these letters passim (mostly in 
isolating repeated phrases). 
 
72 Shackleton Bailey 1977: 109 
 
73 Wistrand 1979: 10-18.  
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military concerns within the letter. He concludes: “To sum up: if we penetrate the rhetoric of 
Cicero’s letter fam. 15, 4, it will be found that Cicero is asking Cato to support a triumph on the 
grounds of the unjust treatment he had suffered in the past, of his moral excellence and their 
common interest in philosophy.” This is partly true, but I believe that Wistrand did not penetrate 
the rhetoric of the letter deeply enough. In addition to these rhetorical strategies Cicero crafted his 
plea to fit the criteria and values which he knew Cato promoted in such questions. I offer here a 
new reading that includes this important aspect of Fam. 15.4. 
Shackleton Bailey dated Cicero’s this letter to January of 50 BCE, when Cicero had 
returned to Tarsus after the campaign season. Here is how Cicero began his request: 
Summa tua auctoritas fecit meumque perpetuum de tua singulari virtute iudicium ut magni mea interesse putarem et res eas 
quas gessissem tibi notas esse et non ignorari a te qua aequitate et continentia tuerer socios provinciamque administrarem. iis 
enim a te cognitis arbitrabar facilius me tibi quae vellem probaturum. (Cic. Fam. 15.4.1) 
 
Your great auctoritas and my eternal admiration for your outstanding virtus have led me think that it is very much in 
my interest that the things I have achieved be known to you, and that you not be ignorant of my just and fair 
protection of our allies and administration of this province. Once these are known to you, I believe you will easily 
approve of what I want. 
 
Cicero begins by referencing Cato’s auctoritas and virtus so as to highlight his recipient’s prestige; 
this type of language is crucial in aristocratic epistolary culture, especially when the topic is a 
favor.74 Cicero took great care throughout the letter to make sure that Cato felt respected. In 
addition to setting a deferential tone, he also introduced the subject matter he thought most 
important. First, he communicated his wish that his res gestae not be unknown to Cato. Cicero’s 
use of the phrase res gestae surely refers to his military action; but it is noticeably efficient, especially 
when we recognize that Cicero was requesting military honor. The imperator gave much more 
linguistic space to his civil administration (non ignorari a te qua aequitate et continentia tuerer socios 
                                               
74 Hall 2009: 8ff terms this register the “politeness of respect” or “verecundia.” 
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provinciamque administrarem). If Cicero aimed for balance in this important sentence, one might 
imagine that he could have expressed his pride in his civil administration with equal concision.75  
 §2-10 cover Cicero’s account of his campaign season, which I pass over. I do not suggest 
that this part of the letter is superfluous, only that it has been well-discussed and does not 
highlight the strategies in the letter that I seek to prioritize here. After the conclusion of his 
military narrative, Cicero articulated what his actual request was: 
Nunc velim sic tibi persuadeas, si de iis rebus ad senatum relatum sit, me existimaturum summam mihi laudem tributam si tu 
honorem meum sententia tua comprobaris, idque, etsi talibus de rebus gravissimos homines et rogare solere et rogari scio, tamen 
admonendum potius te a me quam rogandum puto. tu es enim is qui me tuis sententiis saepissime ornasti, qui oratione, qui 
praedicatione, qui summis laudibus in senatu, in contionibus ad caelum extulisti; cuius ego semper tanta esse verborum pondera 
putavi ut uno verbo tuo cum mea laude coniuncto omnia adsequi me arbitrarer. (Fam. 15.4.11) 
 
Now, I hope that you can be convinced that, if there is a discussion of this in the Senate, I would judge it as the 
highest praise for myself if you would approve of my honor with your vocal opinion. Further, although I know that 
the most important men are accustomed to ask and to be asked about such things, I think that you are to be 
encouraged by me rather than asked. After all, you have honored me most frequently with your voice in debate and 
have exalted me to the sky with your speech, with your public announcements, with the highest praise in the 
Senate, and in public meetings. I have always thought your words to be of such weight that I judge that I have 
gained all with one word of praise from you. 
 
The phrase velim sic tibi persuadeas is a common one in the Ciceronian epistolary corpus.76 This 
type of language again offers deference to Cato in terms of respect, but it also signaled to the 
reader that what followed was an articulation of the request: Cicero wanted Cato to support the 
vote on his honor in the Senate with his sententia, in this case the voting of a supplicatio (with an 
eye to a subsequent triumph) in honor of Cicero’s victories in Cilicia. Cicero’s request should not 
                                               
75 Cato’s views on provincial administration are the subject of an excellent recent study by 
Kit Morrell. See Morrell 2017: 98-128. 
 
76 Hall 2009: 74 notes that the phrase tibi persuadeas...velim seems to be a “stereotyped 
formula of politeness.” It appears elsewhere in the Ciceronian epistolary corpus, including in an 
awkward letter from M. Antonius (Att. 10.8A.1). See Hall 2009 Appendix 10 for other uses of the 
phrase. See also Roesch 2004. Elsewhere in Cicero see Fam. 1.8.6, 3.2.2, 5.8.3, 6.20.3, 7.10.4, 
9.13.2, 11.5.3, 11.6A.2, 11.17.2, 11.21.4, 12.1.2, 12.30.7, 13.1.6, 15.4.11; Att. 2.22.5, 14.13B.5. 
We shall see below that Cato uses this phrase as well in his response. 
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be surprising to the reader, but the language he used is worth a closer look. Cato’s support, 
claimed Cicero, would be the summa laus in this situation. This, of course, further glorifies Cato, 
but it also presents an honorific hierarchy important to Cicero’s rhetorical project in Fam. 15.4: 
the devaluing of recognition for military achievement. As we shall see, Cicero expected that Cato’s 
praise would be reserved for his non-military achievements, so in this way Cicero is following the 
lead of his addressee: Cato’s praise is more important than the triumph itself. This also hearkens 
back to the beginning of the letter (§1), where Cicero stressed the importance of his achievements 
as a provincial administrator rather than a military commander.  
 Later in §12, we get even more insight into Cato’s triumphal policy (as Cicero understands 
it): 
te denique memini, cum cuidam clarissimo atque optimo viro supplicationem non decerneres, dicere te decreturum si referretur ob 
eas res quas is consul in urbe gessisset. tu idem mihi supplicationem decrevisti togato, non, ut multis, re publica bene gesta sed, ut 
nemini, re publica conservata. (Fam. 15.4.11) 
 
I recall that you, when you rejected a supplicatio in honor of a certain great and most notable man, said that you 
would have approved the honor if it had been requested in connection with the things he had done in the city as 
consul. Indeed, you approved of a supplicatio for me when I was in the toga, not (as for many) for good done on 
behalf of the Republic but (unprecedentedly) for having saved the Republic.   
 
As I mentioned above, the vir optimus clarissimus referred to here is certainly P. Cornelius Lentulus 
Spinther (cos. 57 BCE). As mentioned above, the details of Spinther’s campaign are unclear, but he 
was acclaimed imperator by his troops sometime in 55 BCE.77 If Cicero’s testimony here is to be 
trusted in this instance, apparently Cato had said that he would have honored Spinther for his 
domestic actions as consul in 57 BCE. During his consulship, Spinther had worked for Cicero’s 
                                               
77 Shackleton Bailey 1977: 1.110. Cic. Fam. 1.8.7 & 1.9.2. Shackleton Bailey’s Loeb note 
assumes that he campaigned against the free Cilicians, as Cicero would during his governorship of 
the province.  
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recall from exile and eventually obtained a law to that effect from the centuriate assembly.78 This 
implicit calculation (that Cato valued domestic achievements above military ones) is bolstered by the 
next sentence, wherein Cicero recalled that Cato had voted him a supplicatio for his suppression of 
the Catilinarian Conspiracy in 63 BCE – an achievement that Cicero always championed as a 
domestic achievement.79 Cicero’s suggestion is clear: Cato preferred to recognize non-military 
achievements with such honores; and since Cicero is saying this to Cato directly, we should suppose 
that this must have been close to the truth (although for the moment I reserve confirmation for 
discussion of Fam. 15.5).  
    Thus, in both his opening and in his request, Cicero declined to stress the military nature of 
the honor he was ultimately pursuing. As we have seen, he instead focused on earning Cato’s 
approval for his domestic achievements. This does, however, create an awkward rhetorical position: 
the triumph (Cicero’s clear aim) was a military honor. If he is presenting himself as sympathetic to 
Cato’s rather unusual challenge, why should Cicero care for the honor at all? Cicero next (§13) 
addresses this natural question: 
Quaeres fortasse quid sit quod ego hoc nescio quid gratulationis et honoris a senatu tanti aestimem. agam iam tecum familiariter, 
ut est et studiis et officiis nostris mutuis et summa amicitia dignum et necessitudine etiam paterna. si quisquam fuit umquam 
remotus et natura et magis etiam, ut mihi quidem sentire videor, ratione atque doctrina ab inani laude et sermonibus vulgi, ego 
profecto is sum. testis est consulatus meus, in quo, sicut in reliqua vita, fateor ea me studiose secutum ex quibus vera gloria nasci 
posset, ipsam quidem gloriam per se numquam putavi expetendam. (Fam. 15.4.13) 
 
Perhaps you wonder why I place so much value on this token of congratulation and honor from the Senate. I 
will be frank with you, as is worthy of our mutual interests, obligations, close friendship, and paternal family 
                                               
78 MRR 2.199-200; for Spinther’s efforts see Cic. Att. 3.22.2; QF 1.4.5; Fam. 1.1.1, 1.1.9, 
16-17, 3.7.5; P. Red. in Sen. 5, 8-9, 26-7; P. Red. ad Quir. 11, 15, 17ff; Dom. 7, 30, 70-1, 75; Har. 
Resp. 12; Sest. 70, 72, 107, 117, 144, 147; Pis. 34, 80; Mil. 39; Dio 39.6-8. For the law obtained by 
Spinther see Cic. P. Red. in Sen. 27; P. Red. ad Quir. 17; Dom. 75,87,90; Sest. 109, 128; Pis. 35-6, Dio 
39.8.2. Spinther also aided Cicero in the recovery of his home (Cic. Har. Resp. 13). 
 
79 This spawned Cicero’s (in)famous boast Cedant arma togae, concedat laurea laudi (Off. 
1.77). 
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ties.80 If anyone was by nature and especially (as I think of myself) by reason and education more removed from 
the banal praise and eulogy of the mob, I declare I am so disposed. My consulship is proof of that, in which (as 
in the rest of my life) I confess I pursued zealously those things that give birth to true glory, but I have never 
thought to seek after glory for its own sake.  
 
This begins something of a Ciceronian apology for triumphal ambition. Cicero has already 
reinforced the notion that Cato cared little for military honor, but he went further and asserted 
that he too shared Cato’s aversion to such honors. To convince Cato that he shared his opinion, 
Cicero alluded to his consulship in 63; his description of this period is short but significant: fateor 
ea me studiose secutum ex quibus vera gloria nasci posset, ipsam quidem gloriam per se numquam putavi 
expetendam (“I confess I pursued zealously those things that give birth to true glory”). The concessive 
valence of the verb fateor shows that Cicero knew his addressee disapproves of pursuing glory at all. 
Cicero confessed that he has sought after glory, but never for its own sake. In addition to his 
domestic role in the suppression of the Catilinarian Conspiracy, Cicero also mentioned that he 
declined the opportunity to govern the triumph-rich province of Macedonia and instead stayed in 
the city. What then changed Cicero’s mind about the triumph? he explained: 
idem post iniuriam acceptam, quam tu rei publicae calamitatem semper appellas, meam non modo non calamitatem sed etiam 
gloriam, studui quam ornatissima senatus populique Romani de me iudicia intercedere. itaque et augur postea fieri volui, quod 
antea neglexeram, et eum honorem qui a senatu tribui rebus bellicis solet, neglectum a me olim, nunc mihi expetendum puto. 
(Fam. 15.4.13) 
 
After the wrong I suffered (which you always call a disaster of the Republic – but not for me a crisis, in fact, an 
honor) I have desired that the Senate and People of Rome issue the most decorous judgements possible concerning 
myself. Therefore, after this I wished to be made augur (which previously I had neglected) and I also wished for this 
honor, which is customarily bestowed by the Senate in recognition of military events. Although this honor was once 
neglected by me, now I believe it I should pursue it.  
 
                                               
80 This is the only reference in our sources to a friendship between Cicero’s father and 
Cato’s. Cicero tells us that his father’s poor health kept him from spending much time in Rome 
(Leg. 2.3), but nevertheless we do know of a few important connections that the orator’s father 
had; aside from this acquaintance with M. Porcius Cato (tr. 99 BCE), we also know that he knew 
L. Licinius Crassus and C. Iulius Caesar Strabo (see de Or. 2.1ff, 2.265). 
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Here Cicero gave his justification for desiring an honor he previously ignored. Cicero’s return from 
exile is often painted as one of the high points of his career, but Cicero is also clear here and 
elsewhere that his physical return to Rome did not restore his financial situation or his position 
within the political community.81 Of course, this adds considerable weight to the theme of obligation 
– now not only is the triumph something Cicero desires, but to refuse him would be to ignore a plea 
for help. At the same time Cicero was also aligning himself ideologically with Cato by providing an 
apology for wanting something that most Romans would have seen as inherently desirable.82 This 
may be how Cicero authentically felt about the triumph, though it is difficult to know given the 
obvious incentives Cicero had for agreeing with Cato in this context. Whether or not Cicero truly 
believed this, however, his goal was to give Cato the ability to approve of this request without 
condoning behavior Cicero knew he disapproved of.   
Thus far, Cicero was able to justify his interest in obtaining a triumph in such a way that 
(at least in Cicero’s expectation) Cato might understand. Yet, Cicero has had little to say about 
why he actually deserved the award. Thus far in the letter Cicero has presented a mostly political 
and pragmatic case. Admittedly I have passed over the military narrative (§2-10), but outside of this 
portion he spends little time referencing his military achievements. Rather, in light of the passages 
I have analyzed, it seems clear that Cicero did not expect that his military campaign would win 
Cato’s approval. We have also been able to understand some aspects of Catonian philosophy vis à 
vis the triumph by examining how Cicero broached the topic. Cicero has pointed out Cato’s 
                                               
81 Rawson 1983: 122-45; Mitchell 1991: 158-68; Tempest 2011: 125ff. 
 
82 Cicero’s other existing letters asking for support for his supplicatio do not include any 
such ideological evaluation.  
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reluctance to approve honors for military achievements and voiced his approval of such a policy. 
Now, Cicero’s task is to present himself as worthy of an honor normally granted for military 
achievements. 
Cicero began §14 by fortifying the legitimacy of his claim: 
paulo ante me negaram rogaturum, vehementer te rogo, sed ita si non ieiunum hoc nescio quid quod ego gessi et contemnendum 
videbitur sed tale atque tantum ut multi nequaquam paribus rebus honores summos a senatu consecuti sint. (Fam. 15.4.14) 
 
Earlier I said I would not ask you, but now I ask whole-heartedly. Yet, what I have accomplished is seems to me 
neither meager nor to be looked down on, but rather it is of such a quality and scale that many others with 
achievements not equal to my own have obtained the highest honors from the Senate. 
 
He has made it clear by now that he will not be appealing to Cato in the usual way. Whereas 
among other colleagues the main question about supplicationes and triumphs was military 
achievement, Cicero has left no doubt that he knows with Cato the criteria are different. Still, lest 
Cato or anyone else who might read the letter misunderstand, Cicero states firmly here that his 
military achievements were more than sufficient to warrant the recognition he sought. The more 
fascinating claim, however, comes after this: 
equidem etiam illud mihi animum advertisse videor (scis enim quam attente te audire soleam), te non tam res gestas quam mores 
<et> instituta atque vitam imperatorum spectare solere in habendis aut non habendis honoribus. (Fam. 15.4.14) 
 
Further, it seems to me that in the awarding or withholding of honors you (indeed you know how attentively I 
listen to you) are accustomed to consider the habits, and lifestyle of commanders rather than their campaigns. 
 
Cicero has put it plainly: Cato’s record on the triumph shows that he was more concerned with 
honoring the mores instituta atque vita of commanders than their res gestae. That Cicero would 
characterize Cato’s views so clearly in a letter to the man himself strongly suggests that Cato was 
fairly clear on this issue in his public life. That is to say, although Cicero was a gifted twister of 
words, for him to misrepresent Cato’s own beliefs to him and expect it to aid in his request is 
highly unlikely. Now that Cicero established this positive criterion, he began to argue his 
worthiness on these grounds: 
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quod si in mea causa considerabis, reperies me exercitu imbecillo contra metum maximi belli firmissimum praesidium habuisse 
aequitatem et continentiam. his ego subsidiis ea sum consecutus quae nullis legionibus consequi potuissem, ut <ex> alienissimis 
sociis amicissimos, ex infidelissimis firmissimos redderem animosque novarum rerum exspectatione suspensos ad veteris imperi 
benevolentiam traducerem. (Fam. 15.4.14) 
 
If you will examine my case, you will find that I made my fairness and justice the most solid guard against the 
fear of a massive war – not my weak army. Fortified with these virtues I achieved things which I would never 
have been able to with any legion: our allies were hostile and aloof, but from their disloyalty I have restored their 
spirits to a position of greatest reliability – even though previously they were desirous of revolution I have led 
them to goodwill towards their old empire. 
 
Here Cicero presented his tenure in Cilicia as a working example of Catonian values: fair and just 
civil administration had succeeded in securing a province when the army could not. This is the 
part of this letter that has been so often overlooked. Cicero is not saying that his army was weak 
and therefore he had to turn to diplomacy. Rather, Cicero is confirming for his addressee that his 
fairness as a provincial governor has left Cilicia in better shape than any military action could have. 
This must have been the logical foundation of Cato’s position. Separate from any sense of 
friendship, obligation, or shared philosophy, Cicero argues here that according to Cato’s own 
criteria he deserves the honor he seeks on the merit of his service.  
 Cicero’s closing of this part of the letter works to reinforce the idea that Cato should 
consider him worthy of his support:  
Sed nimis haec multa de me, praesertim ad te, a quo uno omnium sociorum querelae audiuntur. cognosces ex iis qui meis 
institutis se recreatos putant; cumque omnes uno prope consensu de me apud te ea quae mihi optatissima sunt praedicabunt tum 
duae maxime clientelae tuae, Cyprus insula et Cappadociae regnum, tecum de me loquentur, puto etiam regem Deiotarum, qui 
uni tibi est maxime necessarius. quae si etiam maiora sunt et in omnibus saeculis pauciores viri reperti sunt qui suas cupiditates 
quam qui hostium copias vincerent, est profecto tuum, cum ad res bellicas haec quae rariora et difficiliora sunt genera virtutis 
adiunxeris, ipsas etiam illas res gestas iustiores esse et maiores putare. (Fam. 15.4.15) 
 
But too much about me – especially to you, through whom the complaints of all our allies are helped. You will 
learn from those who think themselves renewed by my administration. All will tell you about me as if with one 
voice, and in terms which are most desirable to me – especially two of your client communities, Cyprus and 
Cappadocia, will discuss me with you, as will your close friend king Deiotarus. These qualities are more important 
when you consider that in all the ages there have been found few who conquered their own desires rather than the 
enemy. When you add to my military achievements these rarer and more challenging fruits of virtus you will judge 
these things and my military achievements to be greater and worthier.  
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For those who can see past the somewhat humorous opening (“but I have gone on too much about 
myself”) and the author’s subsequent dismissal this section reinforces the ideological program Cicero 
has been advancing, a program I am arguing is actually Catonian. Cicero alluded again to the 
personal obligation Cato is under for the good turn he has done unto two of Cato’s client 
communities, but more importantly he also once more advertised himself as Cato’s ideal provincial 
administrator. In doing so Cicero playfully mixed Stoic philosophical language with a military 
metaphor to present himself not only as Cato’s ideal provincial governor, but as Cato’s ideal 
triumphator.83 Cicero (unlike others) has conquered himself and his desires and believes himself fully 
deserving of a triumph according to Cato’s preferences.  
 What can we say in closing about Fam. 15.4? Cicero’s strategy was more complex than 
embellishing his achievements or cultivating a sense of obligation in his addressee; what we have 
seen was Cicero’s attempt to engage with well-known Catonian principles. Cicero first took efforts to 
show that he and Cato shared a triumphal ideology that deprioritized military achievement, and 
then expressed his need. In this way, Cato would not only be helping a friend, but would also be 
helping himself by aiding someone who supported his program. This required Cicero (if he shared 
Cato’s hostility to military honors) to explain why he would wish for the honor at all. Finally, Cicero 
presented himself as Cato’s ideal candidate for senatorial recognition, which once again aligned 
Cicero’s wish with the advancement of Catonian principles. Judging from what we know of Cato’s 
modus operandi (even if our image has been distorted by his post-mortem hagiographical tradition) 
                                               
83 On conquering one’s self see e.g. Seneca Ira 13.1 Pugna tecum ipse! Si vis vincere iram, non 
potest te ilia. Incipis vincere, si absconditur, si illi exitus non datur. Also, Ben. 5.20.7, Ep. 9.19. 
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personal appeals were not likely to persuade him. So, Cicero instead attempted to present his pursuit 
of a triumph as not only useful to Cato, but as an ideal example of Catonian principles in practice. 
 
III.2 Cato’s reply (Fam. 15.5 = SB 111). 
M. CATO S. D. M. CICERONI IMP. 
1     Quod et res publica me et nostra amicitia hortatur libenter facio, ut tuam virtutem, innocentiam, diligentiam, cognitam 
in maximis rebus domi togati, armati foris pari industria administrare gaudeam. itaque, quod pro meo iudicio facere potui, ut 
innocentia consilioque tuo defensam provinciam, servatum Ariobarzanis cum ipso rege regnum, sociorum revocatam ad 
studium imperi nostri voluntatem sententia mea et decreto laudarem, feci. 
2      supplicationem decretam, si tu, qua in re nihil fortuito sed summa tua ratione et continentia rei publicae provisum est, 
dis immortalibus gratulari nos quam tibi referre acceptum mavis, gaudeo. quod si triumphi praerogativam putas 
supplicationem et idcirco casu<m> potius quam te laudari mavis, neque supplicationem sequitur semper triumphus et 
triumpho multo clarius est senatum iudicare potius mansuetudine et innocentia imperatoris provinciam quam vi militum aut 
benignitate deorum retentam atque conservatam esse; quod ego mea sententia censebam. 
3      Atque haec ego idcirco ad te contra consuetudinem meam pluribus scripsi ut, quod maxime volo, existimes me laborare 
ut tibi persuadeam me et voluisse de tua maiestate quod amplissimum sim arbitratus et quod tu maluisti factum esse gaudere. 
Vale et nos dilige et instituto itinere severitatem diligentiamque sociis et rei publicae praesta. 
 
I do freely what the Republic and our friendship encourage me to do: rejoice that your virtue, integrity, and 
attentiveness, all recognized already in the most important domestic affairs, are equally deployed under arms 
abroad. Therefore, I did what I was able to do according to my judgment – namely I praised in a speech and on 
record the defense of your province through your integrity and wisdom, the salvation of Ariobarzanes’ reign and 
life, and the recovery of our allies’ hearts and minds to support of our rule.  
In respect to the supplicatio that has been decreed, if you prefer that we give thanks to the immortal gods for the 
benefit done to the Republic (which came about not at all by chance, but through your great prudence and self-
control) rather than to you, I rejoice. But, if you think that the supplicatio is a precursor of a triumph, and 
therefore prefer that chance be thanked instead of yourself, a triumph does not always follow a supplicatio. Yet, 
much more splendid than a triumph is for the senate to judge that your province was preserved and saved 
through the grace and integrity of its commander, rather than by the soldiers or the favor of the gods. I said as 
much in my speech.  
I have written to you at length, contrary to my custom, so that you might recognize (as I dearly desire you to) that 
I am taking pains to persuade you that concerning your reputation I wanted what I judged to be best, and that I 
rejoice that what you wanted has been accomplished. 
Goodbye, think well of me, and according to the path set down provide discipline and diligence to the Republic 
and our allies. 
 
In my analysis of Fam. 15.4 I provided only a few salient passages from a rather lengthy 
letter. Although in his response Cato claimed to have written “at length, contrary to my custom,” 
it was not difficult to provide the entirety of his letter to Cicero. Whether or not Cato’s remark 
about the length of his letter was tongue-in-cheek is impossible to know, but it is certainly clear 
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that if Cato considered this letter lengthy his others must have been incredibly brief. Thanks in 
part to its brevity it is important, but simultaneously difficult to determine the overall tone of Fam. 
15.5. It is clear in the letters that we do have from the Late Republic that there was a sense of 
decorum associated with aristocratic interaction. In writing letters to fellow senators, the writer had 
to make sure to preserve the addressee’s sense of self-esteem, what politeness theorists Brown and 
Levinson have termed “positive face.” If one side of the epistolary conversation neglected to pay 
attention to the other’s interests or prestige this threatened to damage his correspondent’s 
perceived and actual value in the larger community of aristocrats. Naturally, the risk of offending 
one’s interlocutor was much higher in situations (like Fam. 15.5) that required the refusal of a 
request.84 
Cato’s response (Fam. 15.5) has traditionally been regarded as a curt response to Cicero’s 
passionate plea. One reason for this interpretation is, of course, the brevity of the letter. Cicero’s 
letter was about 1,700 words long. If you read it aloud at an average rate (three words per second) 
it would take you almost ten minutes to read. Cato’s response is just 188 words long; at the same 
pace you would finish it in about one minute. It has been hard for some to take seriously such a 
brief explanation of such a delicate political situation. Shackleton-Bailey found little in the letter to 
suggest that Cato was actually attempting to explain his motives to Cicero. He twice called Cato’s 
reply, “humbug,” and disapprovingly observed that every sentence ends in a verb.85 These 
                                               
84 Hall 2009: 111-17 discusses some other examples (Att. 1.1, 8.10; Brut. 1.12). The 
Commentariolum Petitionis recommended not refusing anything at all (Comm. Pet. 44-45).  
 
85 Shackleton-Bailey 1971: 124 & 1977: 449. See also the note in Tyrrell & Purser 1904: 
33 which says the syntax of Cato’s letter was prose was characterized by, “ponderous pedantry,” 
and that the prose was “stiff,” and, “architectural.”  
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assumptions about tone, not unlike the content of the letter, seem to have been gleaned from 
Cato’s reputation rather than close reading.86 I believe, however, that the letter is not so overtly 
impolite as some have claimed. Indeed, Cicero himself initially called Cato’s letter, “most 
agreeable” in a letter to Atticus. It is only after Cicero is told that Cato was supporting Bibulus’ 
lesser claim that he became openly frustrated with Cato’s objection.87 The tone of ad Familiares 
15.5 is important. As we have seen, reading a dismissive or disingenuous tone into the letter 
naturally leads to discrediting its content. If, however, we agree with Cicero (as I am suggesting) 
and assume that Cato responded in amity, and in an honest attempt (as Cato claims) to persuade 
his longtime friend and ally that he believed he had acted in his best interests, then the ideology 
deployed in Cato’s argument would represent a legitimate articulation (i.e. one that Cato believed 
Cicero could actually accept) of Catonian principles in respect to military honor. 
There has been a tendency in modern scholarship to attribute Cato’s refusal to his high 
standards for approving the honor. Magnus Wistrand, to cite one example, has suggested that 
Cato did not support Cicero because Cicero’s campaign, limited in scope and lacking a formidable 
enemy, failed to live up to Cato’s standards. It is clear from the other obstructions listed above, 
however, that Cato opposed commanders who boasted vast campaigns against serious and feared 
                                               
86 Hutchinson 1998: 87; Wistrand 1979: 31-34. While I believe that Wistrand 
misunderstands the reasons for Cato’s objection, his discussion of the politeness of Cato’s tone in 
Fam. 15.5 is an excellent treatment of the topic. Hall 2009 is also a useful discussion of politeness 
in Cicero’s epistolary corpus, and although he does not specifically treat this letter Fam. 15.5 seems 
to fit with his conclusions about acceptable language in potentially awkward exchanges.  
 
87 Att. 7.1.7; 7.2.6-7; 7.3.5.  
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enemies.88 As we have seen above, however, we have no other example of Cato objecting to a 
triumph on such qualitative grounds. This is supported by the fact that in §1 (as in the rest of the 
letter) we get no indication that Cato looked down on the scale or nature of Cicero’s achievements 
in Cilicia. Instead, Cato’s language is manifestly laudatory. Cato addresses Cicero as imperator and 
immediately praises him for his deeds while armatus. He went on to describe Cicero’s province as 
having been “saved” and “defended.” Cato next praised Cicero for having preserved Ariobarzanes’ 
life and rule, an achievement that Cicero accomplished primarily through diplomacy, but also with 
the aid of his army. Finally, at the end of §1 Cato thanked Cicero for the “recovery of our allies’ 
hearts and minds to support of our rule.”  
 At first glance Cato’s opening shows great promise for Cicero’s request, but if we think (as 
we did with Cicero’s letter) about what Cato is trying to emphasize at the beginning of his reply, 
Cicero’s prospects seem much more tenuous. Above I argued that in Fam. 15.4 Cicero sought to 
gloss over the military nature of the honor he desired, and instead framed his request to emphasize 
non-military achievement. In his opening, however, Cato has not engaged explicitly with Cicero’s 
rhetorical project from the previous letter. Rather than starting his response with praise for 
Cicero’s philosophical approach to his governorship or his just provincial administration Cato 
seems to have focused on the narrative portion of the previous letter. In doing so Cato was 
ignoring the true substance of Cicero’s request. Cato did profess that Cicero’s province had been 
“saved” and “defended” which could refer to Cicero’s honorable administration of affairs in Cilicia 
(as Cicero had imagined in Fam. 15.4). Cato, however, leaves this portion ambiguous.  
                                               
88 Wistrand 1979: 24-5. Others have made similar suggestions: Afzelius 1941: 126ff; Fehrle 
1983: 222-234; Hutchinson 1998: 87. 
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In §2 Cato sets about his refusal in earnest, one rather more artful than most readings give 
it credit for. The supplicatio has been decreed (suppliactionem decretam), although (as with most of 
§1) the passive voice is noticeable – likely in this instance because it was decreed without Cato’s 
official support. Cato did not give details on the vote of the supplicatio (it passed easily) but rather 
shifted subjects in order to control Cicero’s ambitions.89 In what follows, Cato constructed an 
ethical web through which he attempts to control (retroactively) Cicero’s motivations for seeking 
the supplicatio in the first place. Cato gave Cicero two options. The first option: 
supplicationem decretam, si tu, qua in re nihil fortuito sed summa tua ratione et continentia rei publicae provisum est, dis 
immortalibus gratulari nos quam tibi referre acceptum mavis, gaudeo. (Fam. 15.5.2) 
 
In respect to the supplicatio that has been decreed, if you prefer that we give thanks to the immortal gods for the 
benefit done to the Republic (which came about not at all by chance, but through your great prudence and self-
control) rather than to give you credit, I rejoice. 
 
The first point of interest is that it appears as though Cato construes the supplicatio strictly as a 
thanksgiving to the gods, giving no credit to the general. On one level, Cato was technically correct: 
the supplicatio was a religious ritual that thanked the gods.90 It is clear from a mass of our evidence, 
however, that the supplicatio also gave honor to the general on whose behalf it was issued. Léon 
Halkin identified three different types of supplicationes. The first two were focused on 
communication with the gods either in response to some misfortune (la supplication expiatoire) or as 
a preemptive measure against a perceived threat (la supplication propitiatoire). The third kind of 
supplicatio, the one Cato seems to have forgotten, what Halkin calls la supplication gratulatoire. This 
type of supplicatio is often translated as “thanksgiving.” While it is true that this type of celebration 
                                               
89 For the passing of the supplicatio see Fam. 8.11.2. 
 
90 Supplicationes were also given in times of great distress, e.g. after the Battle of Lake 
Trasimene. See Livy 22.10.8. 
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was presumably always formally directed at the gods, Halkin rightly points out that by the first 
century BCE this type of supplicatio clearly honored the commander, and political concerns often 
determined whether or not a general received a supplicatio in his honor, and for how long.91 
Further, it is only logical to assume that Cicero would not have coveted a supplicatio if it did not 
afford him some benefit. 
This thesis is supported by the clear evidence that commanders of the first century took 
pride in the number of days of thanksgiving that they accrued and compared their number of days 
to others’. Caesar proudly announced that 15 days of thanksgiving were decreed for his actions in 
57 BCE, a number unprecedented in Roman history.92 Furthermore, we have evidence that Cato 
was being somewhat obtuse in his letter to Cicero; he himself understood the political value that 
the supplicatio afforded its celebrant. In 50 BCE Cato himself voted Bibulus a thanksgiving of 20 
days. This is a telling decision on Cato’s part, and it exposes the politicking he was engaged in 
concerning the distribution of honors. The exact details of Bibulus’ campaign are unclear; Cicero 
is our best source and he is undoubtedly invested in downplaying Bibulus’ achievements vis à vis 
his own. There is, however, no reason to suspect that Bibulus’ res gestae were significantly greater 
than Cicero’s (or remotely comparable to Caesar’s). The more likely explanation is that Cato and 
others were attempting to aid Bibulus (his son-in-law) in keeping honorific pace with his political 
enemy and former consular colleague.93 
                                               
91 Halkin 1953: 108. 
 
92 Caes. BG 2.35. He also received two twenty-day supplicationes, first in 55 BCE (Caes. BG 
4.38) and again in 52 BCE (Caes. BG 7.90). Pompey had previously been granted two ten-day 
supplicationes, first in 63 BCE and again in 62 BCE (Cic. Prov. Cons. 27). 
 
93 Cic. 7.2.6-7.  
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 From this first option then, the aristocratic general, according to Cato in this letter, is 
unable to win any credit via a supplicatio for success on the battlefield, since it is a purely religious 
ceremony in honor of the gods. The second option that Cato gives Cicero extends this idea to the 
triumph:  
quod si triumphi praerogativam putas supplicationem et idcirco casu<m> potius quam te laudari mavis, neque supplicationem 
sequitur semper Triumphus et Triumpho multo clarius est senatum iudicare potius mansuetudine et innocentia imperatoris 
provinciam quam vi militum aut benignitate deorum retentam atque conservatam esse; (Fam. 15.5.2) 
 
But if you think that the supplicatio is a precursor94 to a triumph, and therefore prefer that chance be thanked 
instead of yourself, a triumph does not always follow a supplicatio. On the other hand, much more splendid than 
a triumph is for the senate to judge that your province was preserved and saved through the grace and integrity 
of its commander, rather than by the soldiers or the favor of the gods. 
 
Immediately noticeable is that, although Cato was able to imagine a supplicatio devoid of personal 
honor, the triumph did not lend itself to this kind of reimagining. This is because the honorific 
economy presented by Cato in this sentence is strikingly divergent from the political and cultural 
significance of the triumph, as we know it from virtually all other texts. As with the supplicatio, 
                                               
 
94 The word praerogativa is difficult to render in English. In the Republic the praerogativa 
was the century that voted first in comitia centuriata. Originally, the equites (eighteen centuries) 
voted first together; but by the Late Republic the praerogativa was granted to just one of the first-
class centuries (seventy in total). Because the centuries announced their votes publicly, and only 
voted until a majority of centuries was reached, Cicero tells us that the praerogativa massively 
influenced the following centuries and often indicated the results of the vote. (Cic. Planc. 49 una 
centuria praerogativa tantum habet auctoritatis ut nemo umquam prior eam tulerit quin renuntiatus sit aut 
eis ipsis comitiis consul aut certe in illum annum.) This is, perhaps, something akin to the Iowa Caucus 
or the New Hampshire Primary in American presidential elections. Shackleton-Bailey’s Loeb text 
translates it as “an earnest,” a descendant from the Latin arrabo via the Middle English ernes – 
which is a down payment confirming a contract. The sense of “an earnest” well represents Cato’s 
meaning, but the usage of the word peaked in the middle of the 1800’s and is rare today. Taylor’s 
discussion of the praerogativa is seminal, see 1966: 91-96, also Staveley & Levick’s 2016 entry 
“praerogativa” in the OCD) calls the praerogativa “omen,” which nicely renders the sense, but 
oversteps the boundary between the religious and political that Cato crafted carefully in his letter. I 
have chosen “precursor” to capture the indicative nature of the supplicatio while upholding the 
secular meaning.  
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Cato redirected the credit and value of the Roman triumph away from the aristocratic 
commander. In the case of the supplicatio, Cato was able to redirect this positively: Cicero must 
have intended his supplicatio to be a religious affair, thanking the gods for their hand in his success. 
In the case of the triumph, however, Cato’s revisions do not suggest anything so redeeming. The 
triumph, Cato argues would thank “chance,” (casus) “the soldiers,” (vis militum) or “the favor of the 
gods” (benignitas deorum) as the forces that bring about military success.95 In light of Cato’s Stoicism 
par excellence, I here follow Shackleton-Bailey in compressing these three options to two – the favor 
of the gods and the agency of the soldiers.96 Yet, regardless of whether or not one wishes to accept 
three or two options, in both cases there is no option in which a triumphator receives any personal 
credit or benefit from celebrating a triumph. Thus, Cato recognizes that the triumph celebrates 
military achievement, but he directs the praise from the celebration away from triumphatores.  
This is not to say that Cato’s argument that honors like the supplicatio and the triumph 
were primarily in recognition of the soldiers and/or the gods had no foundation in the tradtional 
                                               
95 Cato’s suggestion that “chance” is thanked by the triumph (and not the skill or ability of 
the commander) is picked up on by the Neronian poet Lucan in his eulogy of Cato:  Si veris magna 
paratur/ Fama bonis et si successu nuda remoto/ Inspicitur virtus, quidquid laudamus in ullo/ Maiorum, 
fortuna fuit. Quis Marte secundo,/ Quis tantum meruit populorum sanguine nomen?/ Hunc ego per Syrtes 
Libyaeque extrema triumphum/ Ducere maluerim, quam ter Capitolia curru /Scandere Pompei, quam frangere 
colla Iugurthae. It is speculative, but I believe entirely possible, that this passage was directly influenced 
by Fam. 15.5. 
 
96 Shackleton-Bailey 1977: 450. The concepts of both chance and divine favor, according to 
Stoic theology, fall under the category of πρόνοια. Broadly speaking, this suggests that an 
intelligent divinity guides the operating of all things. Take, for instance, the assertion of Imperial 
Stoic author Seneca: sic nunc naturam voca, fatum, fortunam. omnia eiusdem dei nomina sunt varie 
utentis sua patestate (Ben. 4.8.3). The best modern touchstone (although of course a problematic 
one) is the Calvinist conception of Predestination, where by all events and occurrences in the 
world occur according to the already decided upon plan of god (the connection between Calvin’s 
theology and Stoicism is perhaps betrayed by Calvin’s first published work – a commentary on 
Seneca’s de Clementia).  
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aristocratic ethos, it did. But it is strain of Roman ideology more concerned with military defeat 
than with victory. In his seminal work Imperatores Victi (1990) Nathan Rosenstein discusses the 
ways in which the aristocracy of the Middle and Late Republic protected the reputations of 
defeated commanders. In his search for an explanation for why generals often suffered little 
political consequence following even major defeats, Rosenstein found that the aristocracy worked 
to protect its unsuccessful members in order to safeguard the group’s legitimacy within the 
community. Just as a triumphator’s celebration aided the entire aristocracy in their claim to effective 
administration of the Republic’s affairs, so defeat threatened their narrative. Thus, the aristocracy 
developed ways of shifting blame away from defeated aristocratic commanders, and it is interesting 
to note that the two main reasons they favored were divine displeasure and the common soldiers.  
These are, as we have just seen, the two groups cited by Cato’s as the true recipients of military 
honors. It would seem then that Cato was applying an aristocratic narrative usually associated with 
defeat to the honors bestowed on victorious commanders.  
Cato’s prioritization of the gods and the soldiers, therefore, should not be seen as an 
entirely eccentric position, but rather a testament to the flexibility of traditional Roman values. It 
would be difficult in light of the evidence presented on how much prestige generals gained from 
supplicationes and triumphal processions to argue that the gods and soldiers monopolized the credit 
for victory as they sometimes did in defeat. Rather, it seems that Cato has reappropriated the logic 
of a position designed to preserve the aristocracy’s claim to virtus in order to undermine the value 
of military achievement on principle. This dynamic is what makes this letter such an excellent 
source for the renegotiation of aristocratic values in this period.  
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Cato’s letter ends in a conciliatory tone, but one quite different from the congratulatory 
spirit of §1: 
Atque haec ego idcirco ad te contra consuetudinem meam pluribus scripsi ut, quod maxime volo, existimes me laborare ut tibi 
persuadeam me et voluisse de tua maiestate quod amplissimum sim arbitratus et quod tu maluisti factum esse gaudere. 
Vale et nos dilige et instituto itinere severitatem diligentiamque sociis et rei publicae praesta. (Fam. 15.5.3) 
 
I have written to you at length, contrary to my custom, so that you might recognize (as I dearly desire you to) that 
I am taking pains to persuade you that concerning your reputation I wanted what I judged to be best, and that I 
rejoice that what you wanted has been accomplished. Goodbye, think well of me, and according to the path set 
down provide discipline and diligence to the Republic and our allies. 
 
I have above dealt with Cato’s amusing reference to the length of the letter. Cato again rejoices, 
but this time because “what you (Cicero) wanted has been accomplished.” Here, as above, we see 
Cato attempting to control Cicero’s motivations for seeking military honor. His statement is 
ambiguous, and likely intentionally so. On the one hand, Cato is referring to the passage of the 
supplicatio. Even if his principles did not allow him to vote in favor of Cicero’s honor, nevertheless 
he could still be pleased that Cicero obtained the supplicatio despite his abstention. On the other 
hand, Cato made clear above, in §2, that he “rejoiced” (and it is important to note that in both 
instances he uses the same verb, gaudeo) only if Cicero obtained the supplicatio in service of the 
proper motivations. This kind of flexibility in meaning is a useful tool in this type of epistolary 
situation: Cicero is afforded the opportunity to read the statement the first way, one that allows 
him to disagree with Cato’s honorific economy. Likewise, however, Cato is simultaneously able 
(again) to answer on Cicero’s behalf as to his estimation of the supplicatio and the triumph. In just 
188 words Cato has woven a rhetorical web that leaves his addressee little room to openly disagree.  
 
III.3 Cicero’s response (Fam. 15.6 = SB 112). 
 As awkward as it is to refuse a request, it is perhaps more awkward to respond to a refusal. 
The first half of this brief letter (Fam. 15.6) restates some of what Cicero had explained in Fam. 
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15.4; in doing so Cicero communicated that he was likewise unconvinced by Cato in Fam. 15.5: 
Sed causam meae voluntatis (non enim dicam cupiditatis) exposui tibi superioribus litteris. quae etiam si parum iusta tibi visa 
est, hanc tamen habet rationem, non ut nimis concupiscendus honos sed tamen, si deferatur a senatu, minime aspernandus esse 
videatur. spero autem illum ordinem pro meis ob rem publicam susceptis laboribus me non indignum honore, usitato praesertim, 
existimaturum. (Fam. 15.6.2) 
 
But I have already explained the reason for my wishes (I will not even call them “desires”) to you in the previous 
letter. Maybe these reasons seem unworthy to you, but this is point: the honor is not to be sought after 
excessively, but if the Senate grants it ought not to be looked down upon. Still, I hope that body will judge me 
and the labor I have done on behalf of the Republic worthy of the honor – especially since it is in accordance 
with custom. 
 
Here Cicero abandoned the main project of Fam. 15.4, namely to convince Cato that he was 
deserving of honor according to the values Cato had espoused in triumphal debates. Cicero had 
failed to convince Cato using the criteria he imagined Cato would value, but this did not mean that 
Cicero despaired of his triumphal ambitions – quite the opposite. Instead, Cicero now appealed to 
custom. This is an important point, and a fitting one on which to end the close-reading portion of 
this chapter: having failed to convince Cato on his own ideological ground, Cicero now appealed to 
the traditional. This means that, at least from Cicero’s perspective, the two were not the same. This 
is yet another strong contrast drawn between Cato’s behavior and expected senatorial practice. 
Cicero went on to request that if Cato could not support his triumphal claim, then he should at least 
not oppose it. We do not know if Cicero would have gained this concession from Cato or not – the 
vote on Cicero’s triumph never took place. The senatorial discussion of Cicero’s triumph was 
postponed in favor of the more pressing issue: Caesar’s return from Gaul. The Civil War effectively 
ended Cicero’s pursuit of a triumph, although he would not officially give up his imperium until 47 
BCE.97   
                                               
97 Cic. Fam. 16.11. In the pro Ligario (§7) Cicero suggests that Caesar would have allowed 
him to triumph following his pardon and return to Rome following the Battle of Pharsalus: 
[Caesar], cum ipse imperator in toto imperio populi Romani unus esset, esse me alterum passus est; a quo hoc 
ipso C. Pansa mihi hunc nuntium perferente concessos fascis laureatos tenui, quoad tenendos putavi; qui mihi 
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To return to the ideological level of analysis, the first section of Fam. 15.6 is far more 
significant: 
‘Laetus sum laudari me’ inquit Hector, opinor, apud Naevium ‘abs te, pater, a laudato viro.’ ea est enim profecto iucunda laus 
quae ab iis proficiscitur qui ipsi in laude vixerunt. ego vero vel gratulatione litterarum tuarum vel testimoniis sententiae dictae 
nihil est quod me non adsecutum putem, idque mihi cum amplissimum tum gratissimum est, te libenter amicitiae dedisse quod 
liquido veritati dares. et si non modo omnes verum etiam multi Catones essent in civitate nostra, in qua unum exstitisse mirabile 
est, quem ego currum aut quam lauream cum tua laudatione conferrem? nam ad meum sensum et ad illud sincerum ac subtile 
iudicium nihil potest esse laudabilius quam ea tua oratio quae est ad me perscripta a meis necessariis.’ (Fam. 15.6.1) 
“I am happy to be praised by you, father, a praised man,” said Hector, I think, in Naevius.98 Indeed, the praise that comes 
from those who have spent their life in applause is certainly delightful. Either due to the congratulations expressed in 
your letter or the testimony you gave in the Senate, I believe there is nothing else from me to gain. That you have freely 
attributed to friendship what you acknowledge openly as truth is the most rewarding and moving thing to me. If only 
there were many Catos in our state (not even only Catos). In our state it is miraculous that one Cato exists – what chariot 
or laurel crown could I compare to you? In accordance with my judgement and with that exact and precise knowledge 
nothing is able to be more flattering than that speech of yours (a copy of which has been made for me by my friends).” 
Cicero first glossed over Cato’s refusal and instead focused on Cato’s kind words. In doing so, 
Cicero is saving face for both parties. First, he is (for the moment) ignoring the fact that Cato did not 
offer his support in pursuit of a triumph and was actually cautionary on the subject. Secondly, in 
expressing his pleasure at the praise Cato bestowed upon him, Cicero defused some of the tension 
that comes naturally with responding to a refusal. 
 This does not mean that Cicero omitted tension from the letter. Unlike in §2, where Cicero 
was rather neutral about the divide between Cato’s ideas about the triumph and what was 
traditional, here Cicero veiled this thought in flattery: “If only there were many Catos in our state!” 
There were not. The thought is phrased as if to compliment Cato, but Cicero is also communicating 
the distance between Cato and his peers. Cato’s ideals may be praiseworthy, but they are not in line 
with the political community in which he lived. This is the same idea Cicero had conveyed a decade 
                                               
tum denique se salutem putavit reddere, si eam nullis spoliatam ornamentis dedisset. See also Wistrand 1979: 
199.  
 
98 This quotation of Naevius is a favorite of Cicero, see also Fam. 5.12.7 & Tusc. 4.67.4 
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earlier in much less flattering terms in a letter to Atticus, when he famously groaned that Cato lived 
in Plato’s Republic, rather than Romulus’ cesspool.99  
 
IV. Conclusion: Triumphal Philosophies. 
 This reading of ad Familiares 15.4-6 shows that political values were at the heart of Cicero 
and Cato’s discussion of honoring military achievement. We should no longer imagine that ad hoc 
pragmatic concerns or disputes about the quality of Cicero’s campaign or rigorous application of 
“triumphal rules” were the only issues involved in Cato’s rejection of Cicero’s request. With the 
conclusion of this chapter I will move beyond the somewhat strict confines of this epistolary 
exchange and consider the motivations and scope of this type of behavior. We might put this 
simply in two questions: 1) Was Cato alone in this type of revisionism, or were other aristocrats 
also questioning the honoring of military achievement? And, 2) Why might Cato – and others – 
have formed a value position so divergent from Roman tradition?   
 Before moving onto new ground, however, it is important to acknowledge that Cato had 
political motivations in obstructing the triumphs of men like Pompey and Caesar. He was clearly 
aligned with those in the Senate who were concerned about the power military men were gaining 
from their campaigns, and triumphal obstruction offered Cato an avenue to check their rapidly 
growing influence. Plutarch hinted as much during his account of Cato’s opposition to Pompey in 
61.100 We may also see the influence of political considerations in Cato’s support for the triumphal 
                                               
99 Cic. Att. 2.1.8 
 
100 Plut. Cat. Min. 30.2 τῶν δὲ πλείστων ὑπεικόντων, οὐ τὴν ἀναβολὴν µέγιστον ὁ Κάτων 
ἡγούµενος, ἀλλὰ τὴν πεῖραν ἀποκόψαι καὶ τὴν ἐλπίδα τοῦ Ποµπηΐου βουλόµενος, ἀντεῖπε καὶ 
µετέστησε τὴν βουλήν, ὥστε ἀποψηφίσασθαι. 
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ambitions of his kinsman M. Bibulus. As I mentioned above, one possible reason that Cato 
supported Bibulus may have been to help Bibulus compete with Caesar, who was gaining immense 
political prestige from his campaigning in Gaul at the time. This is to say that while my project 
focuses on the impact of values, I do not wish to suggest that political considerations were absent 
from Cato’s motivations. Indeed, Kit Morrell has shown that Cato’s political goals did outweigh 
his philosophical principles in other areas.101 It is also important to note, however, that his 
opposition to the triumphal requests of other figures cannot be easily attributed to purely political 
reasons. Most obviously, there was no danger that one triumph would transform Cicero into a 
military despot.  
 In addressing the question of whether or not Cato was alone in opposing the traditional 
military ethos of the Roman aristocracy we can look within his own lineage. There is a tempting 
argument that Cato the Younger inherited his aversion to glorifying military achievement from his 
famous ancestor Cato the Elder (234-149 BCE). Similar to Cato the Younger’s rivalry with Pompey 
and Caesar, Cato the Elder had often been in conflict with the military hero Scipio Africanus.102 
Cato the Elder was already a larger than life figure in Roman history by the time the younger Cato 
was born, and his crowning literary achievement was his Origines, a history of Rome from its 
founding and (possibly) the first work of history in Latin. Further, it is clear that Cato the 
Younger’s parsimonious and severe manner was influenced by his ancestor.103  
                                               
101 Morrell 2017: 98-128 
 
102 Plutarch wrote that Cato and Scipio had πολλὰ διερισάµενος ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ See Cat. 4, 
9, 15, 18.  
 
103 Besides spawning a number of anecdotes which had already become exempla for 
aristocrats of the first century BCE, Cato also produced a large amount of literature which was still 
  214   
 
 The Origines exist today only in fragments, but one odd stylistic element is discernable from 
what is left of the text and the testimony of ancient readers. Cato the Elder seems to have excised 
the personal names of officers and commanders from his military narratives.104 Instead, he 
preferred to use official titles. This is an example from one of the fragments of the Origines: 
consul tribuno gratias laudesque agit. tribunus et quadringenti ad moriendum profiscuntur. hostes eorum audaciam 
demirantur; quorsum ire pergant in expectando sunt. sed apparuit ad eam verrucam occupandam iter intendere, mittit 
adversam illos imperator Carthaginiensis peditatum equitatumque, quos in exercitu viros habuit strenuissimos. (F76) 
 
 The consul thanked the tribune. The tribune and 400 men set out to certain death. The enemy admired their 
courage and waited to see where the Romans would go. But, when it was clear that they were aiming to take up 
position on that hill, the Carthaginian commander sent a force of cavalry and infantry against them – the most 
active he had in his army. 
 
This is an episode from the First Punic War, specifically 258 BCE. It is unclear exactly what the 
name of the military tribune in question was, but this is a good example of Cato’s commitment to 
omitting personal names from such scenes.105 Even the Carthaginian commander is referred to 
                                               
in circulation by the Ciceronian age. Cicero knew of over 150 speeches of Cato the Elder, and he 
wrote monographs on agriculture, military science, and a work entitled the Carmen de Moribus, the 
nature of which is uncertain. FRH 1.193ff. For the speeches see Cic. Brut. 65-7; this collection 
included a speech concerning the fate of Rhodes after the 3rd Macedonian War in 167 BCE which, 
according to Sallust (Cat. 51), Caesar used against Cato the Younger. De Agri Cultura survives, but 
de Re Militari is lost and Cato’s legal text is poorly attested. Gell. 2.2.1 quotes Carmen de Moribus, 
but its precise nature and subject matter remain unclear.  
 
104 Other Roman authors commented on this practice: Nepos Cato 3.4 atque horum bellorum 
duces (Cato) non nominavit, sed sine nominibus res notavit; Apparently, however, elephants who 
distinguished themselves in battle could expect to be named: Pliny NH 8.11 certe Cato, cum 
imperatorum nomina annalibus detraxerit, eum, qui fortissime proeliatus esset in Punica acie, Surum tradidit 
vocatum, altero dente mutilatio. 
 
105 FRH 3.121-126. The date and location (Camarina) of this event are gleaned from other 
accounts (Livy Per. 17; Oros. 4.8.1-3; Zonar. 8.12.1-3). Gellius, who does not omit personal names, 
called the tribune in question Q. Caedicius while also mentioning that Claudius Quadrigarius 
called him Laberius; Frontius (Strat. 1.5.15; 4.5.10) used the name Calpurnius Flamma. It has also 
been noticed that this scene is similar to accounts of the devotio of P. Decius Mus as military 
tribune in 343 BCE during the First Samnite War (Livy 7.34-7; Cic. Div. 1.51; Front. Strat. 1.5.14, 
4.5.9; Vir. Ill. 26.1-2). Both the tribune mentioned here, and Mus were said to have received the 
corona graminea. It is likely that Cato gave the name Caedicius earlier in his narrative, given that it 
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simply as imperator Carthaginiensis.106 It is possible, perhaps even likely, that Cato the Elder 
provided names of figures relevant to military events at their entrance into the narrative and 
thereafter referred to them by ranks, but even with such a concession it is undeniable that Cato’s 
writing actively sought to obscure the identity of individual commanders. One could argue then 
that the younger Cato was taking his cue from his ancestor in seeking to undermine personal 
claims to military success.  
Cato the Elder’s point in removing these names was likely an ideological one. The 
beginning of the Origines claimed that the work was about the deeds of the populi Romani, and we 
should see his style of narrative in this light. The “hero” of the work was not any individual but 
rather the Roman People, and in removing the personal names from achievement Cato 
emphasized that commanders were representatives of the People.107 We should not, however, 
conflate this ideological position with the one presented by Cato the Younger in ad Fam. 15.5. 
Cato the Elder was making a point about the burden of duty that Roman magistrates and 
commanders carried; when it came to the militaristic ethos of the Roman aristocracy he seems to 
have been an enthusiastic participant and supporter. This is obviously evidenced by the fact that 
                                               
is the name Gellius uses and he does not mention obtaining the name elsewhere – see Astin 
[1978]2000: 232; Albrecht 1989: 28. 
 
106 The commander in passage above is uncertain, but Cato referred even to Hannibal 
simply as dictator Carthaginiensis (F78 = Gell. 10.24.7). 
 
107 FRH 1.215ff. Cato Orig. F1B (=Pomp. GL 5.208) si ques homines sunt quos delectat populi 
Romani gesta discribere... 
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Cato the Elder celebrated a triumph in 194 BCE following his victory at Emporiae as proconsul in 
Spain.108  
Even if we were to dismiss his triumphal celebration as not necessarily indicative of his 
ideological beliefs, there is some additional testimony in our literature that suggests Cato the 
Elder’s dedication to traditional Roman militarism. Cato the Elder was memorably present for a 
famous event in Roman cultural history: the so-called “embassy of the philosophers” in 155 BCE. 
Three prominent philosophers – one Stoic, one Academic, and one Peripatetic – came to Rome to 
dispute a fine levied on Athens by the Achaen League. While the philosophers waited for the 
Senate to hear and debate their position they took to the streets to argue amongst each other and 
made a point of arguing each side of any given argument. The youth of Rome were enchanted with 
the rhetorical prowess of the ambassadors, but Cato the Elder was anxious about the affect their 
speeches would have on young Romans. Plutarch recorded the source of Cato’s unease: 
ὁ δὲ Κάτων ἐξ ἀρχῆς τε τοῦ ζήλου τῶν λόγων παραρρέοντος εἰς τὴν πόλιν ἤχθετο φοβούµενος, µὴ τὸ φιλότιµον 
ἐνταῦθα τρέψαντες οἱ νέοι τὴν ἐπὶ τῷ λέγειν δόξαν ἀγαπήσωσι µᾶλλον τῆς ἀπὸ τῶν ἔργων καὶ τῶν στρατειῶν. 
(Plut. Cat. 22.4) 
 
But from the instant that enthusiasm for this kind of speaking began to flow throughout the city Cato was troubled. 
He was afraid that young men would turn their ambition towards this, and prefer to pursue an reputation based 
on speaking rather than deeds or military service. 
 
If this truly was Cato’s anxiety in 155 BCE, and we have no reason to imagine that Plutarch was 
wrong, then we cannot reconcile Cato the Younger’s anti-military disposition with the beliefs of 
his famous ancestor. Cato the Censor may have had some influence on his successor’s opposition 
to contemporary generalissimos like Pompey and Caesar – the elder Cato himself was in frequent 
                                               
108 Livy 34.46.  
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conflict with the military hero of his generation, Scipio Africanus – but Cato Uticensis’ hostility to 
honoring military achievement in principle was not an inherited anxiety.  
There is one anxiety of Cato the Elder that does have some possible bearing on the 
Younger’s aversion to military achievement: Hellenistic philosophy. It is impossible to date 
precisely when the Roman aristocracy embraced the study of Greek philosophy. There may be 
some truth to the influence of Pythagoreanism among the Romans of the 4th century BCE thanks 
to the philosopher’s residence in Croton, but it is impossible to know for sure.109 Our sources, 
however, begin to address the arrival of Greek philosophical ideas in Rome in the middle of the 
second century BCE following the Macedonian Wars (214-148 BCE) and the destruction of 
Corinth (146 BCE).110  Before we have any direct evidence for philosophical engagement we can 
detect anxiety about the topic via the expulsion of the philosophers and rhetoricians in 161 
BCE.111 The embassy of the philosophers, which so troubled Cato the Elder, came six years later in 
155 BCE. Personal associations between prominent Roman politicians and Greek philosophers 
                                               
109 See Gruen 1984: 1.251. Cicero (de Or. 2.154) says Nam et referta quondam Italia 
Pythagoreorum fuit tum, cum erat in hac gente magna illa Graecia, although the connection between 
Numa and Pythagoras to which he refers was certainly ahistorical. He also mentions (Tusc. 4.4) a 
Pythagorean poem written by Ap. Claudius Caecus (cen. 312 BCE). There is also some evidence to 
suggest that a statue of Pythagoras was erected in Rome during the Samnite Wars, see Plin. NH 
34.26; Plut. Numa 8.10.  
 
110 Gruen 1984: 1.255ff; Griffin 1989: 3. Gruen cites Cic. Rep. 2.34: influxit enim non tenuis 
quidam e Graecia rivulus in hanc urbem, sed abundantissimus amnis illarum disciplinarum et artium... as 
referring to this period.  
 
111 Suet. Rhet. 1; Gell. NA 15.11. The Urban Praetor, M. Pomponius, was instructed to do 
so by decree of the Senate. There is a less well-attested event in 173 BCE in which the Senate 
expelled two Epicurean philosophers from the city, see Athenaeus 12.547a; Aelian VH 9.12. 
Griffin 1989 does not acknowledge a well-attested expulsion of philosophers before 161.  
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became increasingly more common. Scipio Aemilianus may have been in the audience for the 
embassy of the ambassadors in 155 BCE, but even if he was not, he clearly embraced the 
enthusiasm for philosophy that gripped his peers. This was, so Plutarch suggests, in part thanks to 
his biological father Aemilius Paullus (cos. 182, 168 BCE), who emphasized Greek culture in his 
sons’ education, employing the Greek painter and philosopher Metrodorus as a tutor.112 As an 
adult Scipio surrounded himself with many Greek intellectuals, most notably Polybius, but the 
Stoic philosopher Panaetius lived with him and accompanied him abroad.113 Scipio’s nephew 
Tiberius Gracchus was also frequently accompanied by a philosopher, Blossius of Cumae, whose 
loyalty to Gracchus was so strong that the philosopher admitted to the consuls that if Gracchus 
had asked him to burn the Capitol he would have.114   
 The close association between Roman aristocrats and Greek philosophers increased as time 
went on. Cicero mentioned that the take-over of Athens by the Mithridatic faction in 89 BCE 
forced many prominent Greek intellectuals to flee to Rome, notably Philo of Larissa who was then 
head of the Academy.115  Scipio’s keeping a philosopher in his home may have been a novelty, but 
by the period we are discussing it was common for a prominent senator’s entourage to feature 
                                               
112 Plut. Aem. 6.8. See also Cic. Brut. 77; Diod. 31.26.5. For modern discussion: Gruen 
1984: 1.256-6; Astin 1967: 15ff.  
 
113 Cic. Mur. 66; Amic. 104; Tusc. 1.5; Brut. 84; Verr. 2.4.98; Rep. 1.17, 1.29, 1.34, 3.5; Vell. 
1.12.3, 1.13.3; Plut. Mor. 777a. Panaetius also had relationships with other prominent Romans, 
usually with some connection to Scipio. See also Astin 1967: 15, Appendix 6.2. 
 
114 Cic. Amic. 37; Plut. Ti. Gracc. 20.4; Val. Max. 4.7.1. 
 
115 Cic. Brut. 306. Cicero cited this event as one that fueled his desire to learn philosophy. 
For more on the influx of Greek intellectuals into Rome during this time see Rawson 1985: 7-9. 
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philosophers. The Stoic philosopher Diodotus lived with Cicero, and Athenodorus Cordylion 
(also Stoic) lived with Cato the Younger. Both Diodotus and Athenodorus died in their Roman 
patron’s home. Brutus lived with the philosopher Aristius, and Aristius’ brother, the Academic 
Antiochus of Ascalon, accompanied L. Licinius Lucullus on his campaigns during the 3rd 
Mithridatic War, and Lucullus brought the Peripatetic Tyrannion of Amisus to Rome following 
his return from the east.116 Pompey’s campaigns also brought Greek philosophers into his circle; 
Pompey met the Stoic philosopher Posidonius at Rhodes and the two became friends, so much so 
that Posidonius wrote a monograph on his conquests. The Epicurean Philodemus may not have 
lived in the same house with Caesar’s father-in-law L. Calpurnius Piso, but the two were clearly 
close. Cicero chose his own former instructor M. Pupius Piso Frugi (cos. 61 BCE) to voice the 
Peripatetic position in his de Finibus Bonorum et Malorum, perhaps in light of Pupius’ connection to 
the Peripatetic Staseas of Naples. Plutarch tells us that the only one of M. Crassus’ intimates to 
always accompany him was the Peripetetic philosopher Alexander Cornelius who, despite the 
immense wealth of his Roman companion, always returned his travelling cloak at the end of their 
journey.117  
                                               
116 Cicero employed Tyrannion as a tutor for his son Marcus and nephew Quintus: ad Q.f. 
2.4.2. 
 
117 Cicero/Diodotus: Cic. Brut. 309. Cato/Athenodorus: Plut. Cat. Min. 10, 16; Strabo 
14.5.14. Brutus/Aristius: Plut. Brut. 2.1-4. Lucullus/Antiochus: Cic. Aca. 2.11. Lucullus & 
Cicero/Tyrannion: Strabo 12.18, 13.54; Cic. ad Att. 12.6.2, 4.4A; ad Q.f. 2.4.2, Plut. Sull. 26.2. 
Pompey/Posidonius: Strabo 11.1.6. Piso/Philodemus: Cic. Pis. 68-72; also Nesbit 1961: 183-6, 
Grimal 1966: 47-8. Pupius/Staseas: Cic. Fin. 5.8, see also Syme 1960. Crassus/Alexander: Plut. 
Crass. 3.6-8. In addition see Balsdon 1979: 54-8; Griffin 1989: 5-6.  
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 It also became increasingly common for young aristocrats to go abroad for philosophical 
training. It was somewhat common in the late second century BCE for politicians to attend some 
philosophical lectures in the east while on their way to or back from an eastern posting but 
beginning in the early first century young men often went east in a private capacity for 
philosophical and rhetorical training. Cicero and Caesar went to Rhodes as young adults to study 
rhetoric with Apollonius Molon, and Cicero went also to Athens. By the following generation 
“study abroad” was quite common. Cicero refers to travel for study in passing, suggesting its 
normalcy.118 Brutus studied with Aristius in Athens, and Cassius was said to have lived more in 
Rhodes than in Rome.119 Cicero’s son Marcus went to Athens in March of 49 BCE and later 
commanded a cavalry unit against Caesar at Pharsalus. Marcus returned to Athens in 45 BCE to 
study with Cratippus and was again recruited for military duty, this time with the so-called 
“Liberators.” Horace too was enlisted to the Liberator’s cause while studying in Athens.  
This has been the briefest of surveys, but it does show that interest in Hellenistic 
philosophy among Roman elites had been trending upward since at least the middle of the second 
century BCE and that by the Republic’s last generation a large portion of the Roman aristocracy 
was engaged in philosophical study – of course to varying degrees. It is not hard to detect this 
trajectory, what is more difficult is to understand the effect it had on aristocratic leadership. 
Miriam Griffin has argued previously that attempts to connect philosophical teachings with 
                                               
118 Rawson 1985: 10. Cic. Tusc. 2.26 in which Cicero assumes his interlocutor spent time 
in Athens for study, Rep. 1.3.6 in which he says that Epicureans go abroad.  
 
119 Brutus: Cic. Brut. 332; Plut. Brut. 24. Cassius: App. B.Civ. 4.67; Plut. Brut. 40.2.  
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Roman policy decisions is futile.120 Hellenistic philosophical schools often eschewed politics, and – 
as the ambassadors in 155 BCE had shown – their teachings were so flexible as to be theoretically 
capable of justifying many different positions. She was correct to preach caution, and her 
conclusion that philosophical learning provided Roman elites with a method of debate, rather 
than a set of rigid principles, is certainly valid.  
There are, however, reasons I believe we should consider Hellenistic philosophy’s possible 
role in the questioning of the aristocratic military ethos. First, recent scholarship has, I believe, 
convincingly argued against Griffin’s skepticism concerning the influence of philosophical 
engagement on decision making among Rome’s political class. Kit Morrell’s study (2017) on the 
influence of philosophy on first century Roman foreign policy positions is compelling. Morrell 
finds that rather than simply providing the semantics through which aristocrats could express 
themselves to each other (as Griffin argues), “Romans consciously applied philosophical principles 
in the practice of imperialism.”121 Her study focuses not only on Cato, who could perhaps be 
considered an outlier in his enthusiasm for philosophical engagement, but also on Pompey, whom 
we would be hard pressed to characterize similarly. Morrell’s project focuses on reform in 
provincial government but there is no reason, given the nature and strength of her argument, that 
we should limit our acknowledgment of the influence of philosophy to interactions outside of the 
city; philosophical influence permeated politics foreign and domestic.  
                                               
120 Griffin 1989.  
 
121 Morrell 2017: esp. 8-10; 98-128. 
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Further, Griffin’s argument deals primarily with situations in which Greek philosophical 
dogma was able to be manipulated in order to align with traditional Roman values, but in the case 
of Cato and the questioning of military achievement’s role in society we see precisely the opposite. 
That is to say, the rejection of the aristocratic military ethos as expressed by Cato is so untraditional 
that I believe it is fair to bring philosophical concerns into the discussion about its impetus. Thus, 
I believe it is relevant that Cato the Younger was a Stoic par excellence.122 Stoicism struggled with 
the idea that personal honor and prestige was a reward. Stoics argued that the only true good thing 
was virtue, the only true evil was vice, and that virtue alone was necessary for happiness. Living 
virtuously meant living in accordance with nature, but this focused primarily on decision making, 
and not benefits. Living virtuously was itself the only true good, and thus could be the only true 
goal. Because virtue is the only good and vice is the only evil, Stoics argue, they are the only two 
things about which we should have concern.  
This anxiety about glory is not restricted to Fam. 15.5 but appears in many texts where 
political concerns collide with philosophical tenets. Cicero himself seems to have shared much of 
Cato’s concern on this issue. It is unfortunately now lost, but Cicero mentions a treatise he wrote 
on this subject, the de Gloria.123 Despite the loss of the treatise, some of Cicero’s foundational 
beliefs about military glory are preserved in his de Officiis. There should of course be renown for 
those who have provided service to the Republic, but the community’s estimation of those who 
                                               
122 Cicero called him perfectus Stoicus, (Cic. Stoic Paradoxes Prooemium 2); Seneca frequently 
held him up as the model of Stoic virtue (e.g. Ep. 104.21, 29, de Const. 7.1). I am aware of a 
forthcoming work by Fred Drogula, Cato the Younger: Life and Death at the End of the Roman 
Republic, which is rather skeptical of the image of Cato as a “perfect Stoic,” but its publication 
(April, 2019) is sadly too late to be included in the present iteration of this project.  
 
123 Cic. Off. 2.31. 
  223   
 
found success on the battlefield should hinge upon the intent of the commander, and not the 
result: 
...maximeque ipse populus Romanus animi magnitudine excellit. Declaratur autem studium bellicae gloriae, quod statuas quoque 
videmus ornatu fere militari. Sed ea animi elatio, quae cernitur in periculis et laboribus, si iustitia vacat pugnatque non pro 
salute communi, sed pro suis commodis, in vitio est; non modo enim id virtutis non est, sed est potius immanitatis omnem 
humanitatem repellentis. Itaque probe definitur a Stoicis fortitudo, cum eam virtutem esse dicunt propugnantem pro aequitate. 
Quocirca nemo, qui fortitudinis gloriam consecutus est insidiis et malitia, laudem est adeptus; nihil enim honestum esse potest, 
quod iustitia vacat. (Cic. Off. 1.61-2) 
...above all, the Roman People as a nation are celebrated for greatness of spirit. Their passion for military glory, 
moreover, is shown in the fact that we see their statues usually in soldier’s garb. But if the exaltation of spirit seen in 
times of danger and toil is devoid of justice and fights for selfish ends instead of for the common good, it is a vice; 
for not only has it no element of virtue, but its nature is barbarous and revolting to all our finer feelings. The Stoics, 
therefore, correctly define courage as “that virtue which champions the cause of right.” Accordingly, no one has 
attained to true glory who has gained a reputation for courage by treachery and cunning; for nothing that lacks 
justice can be morally right. 
 
He also makes a similar argument in the Republic:  
 
Agros vero et aedificia et pecudes et inmensum argenti pondus atque auri qui bona nec putare nec appelare soleat, quod 
earum rerum videatur ei levis fructus, exiguous usus, incertus dominates, saepe etiam deterrimorum hominum immensa 
possessio, quam est hic fortunatus putandus, cui soli vere liceat omnia non Quiritium, sed sapientium iure pro suis vindicare 
nec civili nexo, sed communi lege naturae, quae vetat ullam rem esse cuiusquam nisi eius, qui tractare et uti sciat; qui inperia 
consulatusque nostros in necessariis, non in expetendis rebus, muneris fugendi gratia subeundos, non praemiorum aut gloriae 
causa adpetendos putet. (Cic. Rep. 1.27) 
 
How fortunate must he be considered who is not accustomed to call or consider that fields, buildings, cattle, and 
heaps of gold and silver are “goods” because the benefit of these things seems to him negligible, their use brief, 
their mastery uncertain, and who acknowledges that even the worst men possess these things in abundance. It is 
appropriate for this man to claim all things as his own based on the assent not of the citizens but of the wise, not 
by societal obligation but by the laws of nature – which forbids that anything be of anyone except for him who 
knows its use. This man thinks our consulships and commands necessary things not to be sought after but to be 
undertaken for the sake of duty and service, not reward or glory. 
 
Not only is it clear that these conceptions of military honor are heavily influence influenced by 
Stoicism, it is important to note how similar this argument sounds to Cato’s response in Fam. 
15.5. The ethical web that Cato deployed in his refusal of Cicero’s request sought primarily to 
constrict Cicero’s intent in seeking honor. Using Cicero’s own application of Stoic ethics in 
respect to military honor, we can possibly read further into Cato’s response: perhaps Cato felt that 
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Cicero was not seeking the honor for the right reasons. Cicero himself says elsewhere in the 
Republic that virtus does not desire “lead statues, nor triumphs, nor laurels.”124 
There is also some evidence that philosophical considerations influenced triumphal 
policies of at least one other senator. Five years before the epistolary exchange between Cato and 
Cicero concerning the supplicatio, Cicero delivered his in Pisonem, a blistering invective against L. 
Calpurnius Piso (cos. 58 BCE). Piso, allegedly in thanks for his complicity in the exiling of Cicero, 
received Macedonia as his province following his consulship, where he was proclaimed imperator by 
his troops in 57 BCE. Meanwhile, back in Rome, Cicero attacked Piso on the grounds that he had 
criminally mismanaged his province and argued that Piso be replaced. This happened in 55 BCE, 
and when Piso returned to Rome he neglected to pursue a triumph for his efforts in Macedonia. 
To be certain, evidence from invective is problematic. Cicero targeted Piso’s Epicurean interests in 
his assassination of Piso’s character, but this does not mean that the orator was accurately 
representing Piso’s motivations for spurning the triumph. Yet, we should also consider that 
Cicero’s argument was intended to persuade his audience; if he made ridiculous or unbelievable 
claims about Piso he would have risked undermining the efficacy of his invective. That is to say, if 
Cicero targeted the influence of Epicureanism on Piso’s political decisions then it stands to reason 
that Cicero’s elite audience would have found this at least possible.  
Cicero makes the connection between Piso’s philosophical interests and his neglect of the 
triumph explicitly:  
At audistis, patres conscripti, philosophi vocem: negavit se triumphi cupidum umquam fuisse. (Cic. Pis. 56) 
 
But you have heard, conscript fathers, the voice of a philosopher: he denied that he had any desire of a triumph.  
                                               
124 Cic. Rep. 6.8.8. tamen illa divina virtus non statuas plumbo inhaerentes nec triumphos 
arescentibus laureis, sed stabiliora quaedam et viridiora praemiorum genera desiderat. 
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Not only does this passage clearly show Cicero’s rhetorical investment in connecting Piso’s 
Epicureanism and his behavior, it also indicates that Piso himself articulated an explanation along 
those lines. Shortly after comes the highlight of Cicero’s criticism of Piso regarding the triumph, 
his humorous rebuke of famous triumphatores past and present. This begins with a sarcastic 
expression of sympathy for Pompey, who was consul at the time: 
Non est integrum Cn. Pompeio consilio iam uti tuo. Erravit enim; non gustarat istam tuam philosophiam: ter iam homo stultus 
triumphavit. (Cic. Pis. 58) 
 
Pompey is unable to follow your advice. Indeed, he has made a mistake; he has not partaken in that philosophy of 
yours: the idiot has already triumphed 3 times.  
 
Here again Cicero clearly suggests that philosophia influenced Piso’s decision to shun military honor 
and, conversely, that Pompey’s lack of philosophical interest allowed him to triumph multiple times. 
Finally, Cicero refers to Piso himself as “Epicurus” when mockingly asking him why he has not been 
able to persuade his son-in-law, Julius Caesar, to shun military honors. This is only one other source, 
but it does show both that Cato was not alone in devaluing military honors and that philosophical 
engagement was at least thought to have played a role in one other senator’s position.  
The decline in triumphal frequency in the 60’s and 50’s BCE may have begun through 
factionally-motivated obstruction, but I believe that by the beginning of the Civil War this trend 
was indicative of an aristocratic debate concerning values. The triumph and its frequency may 
seem a relatively minor concern when compared to other signs of political instability in the 50’s, 
but I argue that this kind of institutional change is a result of a wider renegotiation of aristocratic 
identity. Discussions of the Caesarian Civil War often focus on personal rivalries and battlefields – 
but these are the results of a much longer process. In order to understand the crisis of the Late 
Republic it is important to understand the ideological conflict around Rome’s political values. In 
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attempting to explain the sudden decrease in triumphal frequency in the 50’s BCE, John Rich 
blamed the “anarchic political conditions of the time” – and, as I have said above, he is surely 
correct in part.125 We should, however, consider whether we might be able to flip this cause and 
effect. Perhaps the decrease in triumphal frequency was itself a symptom of the political anarchy 
and instability of the 50’s. 
 
                                               
125 Rich 2014: 237. 
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5. The Aristocratic Ethos and Historical Narratives. 
 
After Caesar’s legions repelled Pompey’s cavalry and crushed the wing of his army at 
Pharsalus, the victorious Caesarians overran the Pompeian camp. The men (allegedly) found some 
strange fixtures among the tents of the Pompeians: gazebos, silverware, turf mattresses, ivy trellises, 
and other things which Caesar attributed to “excessive luxury and confidence in victory.”1 These 
were not the things Caesar’s men had been accustomed to seeing during their long service in Gaul or 
the months of maneuvering that led up to the Battle of Pharsalus. The material in the camps 
reflected somewhat the character of much of Pompey’s entourage. In this project we have seen that 
the decline of the aristocratic military ethos was even more precipitous and complex than we had 
previously imagined. The final fate of the Republic may have been decided by two military leaders, 
but it would be a mistake to understand the Civil War of the 40’s as the result of rampant militarism 
among the elite as a whole. After Pompey’s flight and death, the resistance rallied around Q. 
Metellus Scipio and Cato, neither of whom claimed much military experience. Cato’s suicide did 
more damage to Caesar than any military effort he put forth. Caesar’s former officer Labienus 
lingered in Spain until 45 BCE, but the reality was that after the death of Pompey the resistance’s 
                                               
1 Caes. B. Civ. 3.96 In castris Pompei videre licuit trichilas structas, magnum argenti pondus 
expositum, recentibus caespitibus tabernacula constrata, Luci etiam Lentuli et nonnullorum tabernacula 
protecta edera, multaque praeterea quae nimiam luxuriem et victoriae fiduciam designarent. For a useful 
discussion of this passage see Grillo 2012: 121ff. We should not, of course, take Caesar entirely at 
his word about what he found in the Pompeian camp. Cassius Dio (46.61-3), Velleius (2.52), and 
Appian (B. Civ. 2.81) do not mention such luxuries. Plutarch does mention decorated tents and 
wine. This scene also plays into a larger effort by Caesar to “orientalize” Pompey (see Rossi 2000: 
254; Tronson 2001 and again Grillo 2012). Nevertheless, there is little evidence to suggest that 
Caesar fabricated the decorations of the Pompeian camp entirely.  
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bench of commanders was rather shallow. Put too simply, but nevertheless in accordance with our 
reception of the Civil War, a group which previously seems to have required (in a de facto sense) 
military activity for both entrance into ranks and continued success as a member now lacked 
warriors.  
 The decline in strength of the aristocratic military ethos has not escaped the notice of the 
scholars I mentioned in the Introduction to this work, but what I have provided here is a more 
nuanced understanding of the nature of this phenomenon. The emphasis placed on military activity 
in discussions of elite behavior and motivations by Harris and others does to some extent seem to 
accurately represent the political culture of the Middle Republic, but it is a poor foundation upon 
which to build a conception of late-republican aristocratic values. In the Introduction I cited Harris’s 
desire to see the primacy of military achievement as political reality which endured into the 
Republic’s last generation even in the face of obfuscation by figures such as Cicero, but it is clear 
now that the evidence does not support so reductive a view. The Late Republic was a political 
landscape in which the traditional aristocratic preoccupation with military achievement still existed 
but was also being questioned and challenged by members of the elite. Therefore, Cicero’s 
ambivalence on the topic in texts like the de Officiis and the de Republica is better understood as a 
product of the ideological division of the community he inhabited rather than an inconsistent 
program of misrepresentation. A monolithic conception of aristocratic values simply cannot account 
for the variety of opinions we find among the elite on this issue in the Republic’s last generation. 
 It should also be clear that the active role some aristocrats took in challenging the status of 
military achievement in the hierarchy of sources of political prestige was an important catalyst for 
change. As we have seen throughout, phenomena such as the decline of youthful military service, the 
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increasing number of magistrates who rejected command opportunities, and the decline in the 
frequency of triumphal processions have most often been explained by ad hoc pragmatic concerns in 
modern scholarship, and I again want to stress that such explanations are entirely plausible and, in 
many cases, likely. But we also must acknowledge (following the lead of Geertz) that the negotiation 
of community values is both a passive and an active process. The emphasis placed on military service 
among young aristocrats would not have disappeared only because the state hired provincial infantry 
units, aristocrats considered more than financial gain when mulling taking up provincial commands, 
and while some in the Late Republic may have avoided the triumph due to the difficulty of the 
process we also have strong evidence that others rejected military honors on principle.  
As we saw in Chapter 1, the aristocratic shift away from military activity began early for 
young elite men of the first century. Whether or not aristocrats of the Middle Republic had been 
required to serve ten campaigns before running for office, the amount of youthful service 
undertaken by the figures examined from the first century fell well short of the traditional 
expectation. More significantly, just within our sample, the evidence of decline was starkly noticeable. 
Men like Cato and Brutus may have lamented contemporary mores and turned to conservative 
rhetoric to bolster their positions in the political disputes of their day, but at least in this respect – 
military service – their actions did not align with their reverence for the mos maiorum. Further, in 
terms of acculturation, this shift away from youthful military service – once a foundational shared 
experience for the senatorial class as a whole – would have had a significant impact on the body. It is 
entirely possible that some of the intransigence we see in the debates over aristocratic behavior in the 
Late Republic were exacerbated by this trend.  
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In Chapter 2 the evidence showed that the growing aristocratic aversion to military service 
continued when the men of Cicero’s generation entered the Senate and began holding magistracies. 
When Cicero spoke of a dearth of capable commanders relative to earlier generations at the trial of 
Fonteius he was not, so far as we can tell, being dishonest. Calamity after calamity had thinned the 
ranks of aristocratic military men at a startling rate in the generation prior to the Republic’s last. 
When we consider the material from Chapters 1 and 3, the challenge of replenishing the 
aristocracy’s military roster must have been more difficult in the first century when increasingly less 
men were showing interest in serving the army or even in holding previously much-coveted 
command positions. Rather, the Senate of the Republic’s last generation had largely been content to 
entrust the most pressing military engagements to experienced military leaders, especially Pompey, 
with lengthy terms of command. This may make perfect sense by modern American standards, but it 
was a radical departure from traditional republican practice and no doubt contributed to the 
shrinking number of aristocrats with meaningful command experience. It is possible then that the 
republican aristocracy experienced an unusually grave depopulation in the chaos of the early first 
century BCE and the generation that followed, thanks in part to its growing distaste for military 
activity, was ill-prepared to absorb the blow. 
Finally, Chapter 3 provided a glimpse into the ideological nature of this shift away from the 
traditional military ethos. The first two chapters primarily looked at evidence of decreased 
engagement and considered the practical causes of these trends, but in the third we saw Cato make 
an argument based upon values. Cato’s family name and posthumous reputation as a defender of 
old-school Romanitas has muddied the water in the interpretation of his letters to Cicero “Imperator.” 
Cato’s arguments in ad Familiares 15.5 reveal how innovative and – in light of our understanding of 
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the values inherited by his generation – we might even say iconoclastic his views on military 
achievement’s role in Roman society were. He objected to Cicero’s pursuit of a triumph not on 
qualitative grounds but rather in protest of honoring military achievement on principle. Nor was his 
objection to triumphatores based solely on the political enmity he held against prominent generals of 
his day; it is clear that Cato’s devotion to philosophy informed his position. If we are to believe 
Cicero, Cato was not alone in allowing his philosophical devotions to influence his estimation of the 
traditional militaristic ethos. Scholarly orthodoxy has held that despite the clear enthusiasm for 
philosophical learning among the Roman elite of the first century we should refrain from connecting 
their study with their policy positions, but Cato’s letter to Cicero shows, I believe, that it is time to 
reconsider this argument.2 As I mentioned in the chapter itself, a new study has compelling shown 
the influence of philosophy on the provincial administrations of Cato an Pompey; this chapter 
further supports Kit Morrell’s findings.3 In the middle of the second century BCE Cato the Censor 
had worried about the impact the Greek philosophical schools would have on the Roman youth; the 
behavior of the aristocracy just a century later, and specifically in this instance of a man who shared 
his name, shows his concerns were legitimate. 
Late-republican political culture, therefore was a landscape which included traditional ideas 
about the primacy of military achievement and one in which that primacy was being actively and 
aggressively challenged. As I mentioned briefly in the Introduction, one popular way to understand 
this ideological dissonance has been to view it through the lens of specialization. Just over 40 years 
                                               
2 Griffin 1989. 
 
3 Morrell 2017. 
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ago Keith Hopkins made a compelling argument for viewing the changes in aristocratic behavior in 
the Late Republic through what he called “structural differentiation.”4 As Roman society became 
more complex, Hopkins’s claims, institutions within society began to “separate out and become 
more functionally specific.” Some have gone further to suggest that this differentiation followed two 
principle paths: military and domestic, an opinion first voiced by Cicero, albeit in a forensic setting.5 
Structural differentiation along the lines presented by Hopkins helpfully accounts for the 
fragmenting and increasingly specialized aristocratic activity (e.g. lawyer, orator, military man), but if 
we approach this phenomenon focusing on traditional republican aristocratic values then the process 
is slightly more complicated. The differentiating institutions within Roman society were in 
competition with each other for power and access to the Republic’s resources – the fruits of election 
to high office.6 But with the entirety of this study now in view, we have to ask ourselves what it 
meant to “specialize” in military affairs, and what kind of success those who focused their attention 
on the army actually achieved.  
Thinking back to Chapter 1, it is somewhat paradoxical that, in an era of specialization we 
saw a nearly total shift away from traditional expectations for youthful military service. Logic would 
dictate that if previous, less-differentiated iterations of the aristocratic community had expected 
significant amounts of military service prior to seeking office then later, more-specialized aristocratic 
communities would show, naturally, more young elite Romans shirking duty in the camps but in 
addition to a group of men who spent more time in the army in an effort to specialize. Instead, as the 
                                               
4 Hopkin 1978: 74-98.  
 
5 Again, see Afzelius 1946; Rawson 1985: 3-18; de Blois 2000; Rosenstein 2007: 144; and 
Balmaceda 2017: passim. 
6 Hopkins 1978: 74-5. 
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evidence in Chapter 1 showed, the movement away from the camp was more comprehensive, with 
even future generalissimos serving less than we would expect.  
Certainly if we look past youthful service and examine military activity during political 
careers we are presented with the gargantuan figures of Pompey and Caesar, both of whom fit the 
description of military specialists. These two men focused their efforts (mostly) on obtaining long, 
extra ordinem commands and subsequently capitalizing on the prestige afforded them by their success. 
They did not, however, have much company. That is to say, the success these two men had in 
competing with specialists of other republican institutions such as the law or oratory is certainly 
worth mention but few others were able to follow their example – or even seem to have tried. 
Further, outside of Pompey and Caesar, many of those who did focus their attention on gaining 
prestige through military activity failed to translate such activity into political success. Some of 
Pompey’s legates were able to ride their commander’s wave of popularity to consulships in the late 
60’s, but none were particularly effective as politicians.  
More interesting is the group some have called viri militares. The term is somewhat plagued by 
association with a later, Imperial group of men who – if perhaps professionally descended from our 
late-republican examples – tell us little about their predecessors.7 But nevertheless these are the men 
we would expect in a specializing aristocracy. In the Catiline Sallust twice uses homo militaris to 
describe men of exceptional military experience. The first describes L. Valerius Flaccus and C. 
Pomptinus, the praetors of 63 BCE: 
Cicero per legatos cuncta edoctus L. Valerio Flacco et C. Pomptino praetoribus imperat ut in ponte Mulvio per insidias 
Allobrogum comitatus deprehendant. Rem omnem aperit quoius gratia mittebantur; cetera, uti facto opus sit, ita agant 
permittit. Illi, homines militares, sine tumultu praesidiis conlocatis, sicuti praeceptum erat, occulte pontem obsidunt. (Sall. Cat. 
45.1-2). 
 
                                               
7 See Campbell 1975; De Blois 2000. 
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Cicero having been informed of everything through legates ordered the praetors L. Valerius Flaccus and C. 
Pomptinus to arrest the band of Allobroges in an ambush on the Milvian Bridge. He made entirely clear the reason 
they were being sent but left the rest to them according to what the deed required. These men, being military men, 
occupied the bridge secretly after posting a guard without any noise as instructed.  
 
Later, we get an even more revealing passage, this time about M. Petreius:  
At ex altera parte C. Antonius, pedibus aeger, quod proelio adesse nequibat M. Petreio legato exercitum permittit. Ille cohortis 
veteranas, quas tumulti causa conscripserat, in fronte, post eas ceterum exercitum in subsidiis locat. Ipse equo circumiens unum 
quemque nominans appellat, hortatur, rogat ut meminerint se contra latrones inermis pro patria, pro liberis, pro aris atque focis 
suis certare. Homo militaris, quod amplius annos triginta tribunus aut praefectus aut legatus aut praetor cum magna gloria in 
exercitu fuerat, plerosque ipsos factaque eorum fortia noverat; ea conmemorando militum animos adcendebat. (Sall. Cat. 59.4-6) 
 
But on the other side Gaius Antonius turned over the army to his legate M. Petreius, because his feet were diseased 
and he was not able to join the battle. Petreius placed the veteran cohorts (the ones he had enlisted because of the 
uprising) at the front and behind these the rest of the army as reinforcements. He himself was riding around 
horseback calling upon each man by name, encouraging them and asking that they remember that they were up 
against unarmed criminals for the sake of their fatherland, liberty, altars, and homes. He was a military man, because 
he had served with great distinction as military tribune, or prefect, or legate, or praetor in the army for 30 years. He 
was familiar with many of the men and their brave deeds personally, by mentioning their deeds he was enflaming 
the spirits of the soldiers.  
 
What can we make of this evidence? First, in the cases of Petreius and Pomptinus we should 
recognize the time-honored ability of outstanding military service to raise the profile of novi homines. 
This means, however, that we should not take the careers of these new men as evidence of elite 
specialization. They were behaving as ambitious men from non-elite families had often behaved in 
the past.  
More interesting is the patrician example L. Valerius Flaccus. Perhaps his extended military 
service is evidence of such a trend. Gruen discusses his career in his treatment of the 
professionalization of the army and rightly cautions against “exaggerated conclusions” about 
military specialization.8 What Gruen was arguing against was the idea that men were abandoning 
civic political careers in favor of military ones, and he is surely right. Of the few figures we can find 
in this period who seem to be homines militares, most show some active interest in climbing the 
                                               
8 Gruen 1974: 380ff.  
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cursus honorum. Where I would split from Gruen, however, is in assessing their success. Let’s 
examine Sallust’s three military men. L. Valerius Flaccus was son of the suffect consul of 86 BCE, 
whom he accompanied on campaign in Asia from 86-83 BCE. He then served in 82 or 81 as a 
military tribune under his uncle, C. Valerius Flaccus, in Transalpine Gaul, and again from 78-76 
BCE in Cilicia under P. Servilius Vatia. He held the quaestorship in Spain in 70 BCE 
(coincidentally, this gave him at least seven years of service before his quaestorship) and was next a 
legate, first under Metellus Creticus from 68-66 BCE then under Pompey from 66-65.9 The other 
two men, C. Pomptinus and M. Petreius, were both novi homines, and thus we know little about their 
life before adulthood. Petreius was the son of a first spear centurion and Pomptinus is the only 
significant figure from Roman history bearing his name.10 Both men gained some prominence as a 
result of their efforts. Petreius was praetor in 64 BCE and Pomptinus held the office in the 
following year. Pomptinus triumphed in 54 BCE de Allobrogibus and later accompanied Cicero to 
Cilicia. Petreius went on to be a Pompeian commander in Spain and later committed suicide after 
Thapsus.11 
 This amount of evidence alone would not suffice to claim that a significant portion the 
aristocracy was specializing militarily, but even if we were to accept these three as part of new group 
of military personnel it is important to note that their choice of specialization does not seem to have 
                                               
9 DNP Valerius [I.24]; MRR 2.71, 78. For his action under Creticus see Cic. Flac. 6, 62ff; 
Planc. 27. Under Pompey: Cass. Dio. 35.54. See also Ramsey 2007: 177.  
 
10 For Petreius see Plin. HN 22.11; for Pomptinus see Fündling, “I.Pomptinus,” in DNP.  
 
11 MRR 2.161,167. Cic. Pis. 58; Dio 39.65.1-2. Petreius was bested by Caesar at Ilerda in 49 
BCE – see Caes. BCiv. 1.38-85; App. B.Civ. 2.43.168-71). Caesar allowed Petreius to flee and he 
rejoined Caesar’s enemies; he committed suicide after the Battle of Thapsus (Livv. Per. 110; Vell. 
Pat. 2.50.3; Caes. Bell. Afr. 18.1-19.6; App. BCiv. 2.95.299ff; Cass. Dio 41.62.2ff, 43.2.1-3). 
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resulted in much political success. Neither Petreius, who had 30 years of military experience when 
he was a praetor (!), nor Pomptinus advanced to the consulship. After his praetorship Valerius 
survived a trial for extortion thanks to Cicero in 59 BCE but seems to have died shortly after a 
posting as legate in Macedonia from 58-56. In the cases of these three men, military service did 
not, it seems, yield enough political capital to obtain the consulship. This is more striking when we 
consider a man like Cicero reached the consulship with only two campaigns of military service as a 
tiro. In fairness, Gruen also includes Q. Marcius Crispus (pr. c. 54 BCE), M. Anneius (a 
Ciceronian legate in Cilicia), Q. Sertorius (pr. c. 85/4 BCE), L. Murena (cos. 62 BCE), L. Afranius 
(cos. 60 BCE), and T. Labienus (pr. 59 BCE) as examples of military men staying politically active. 
Indeed, this list features some consuls, but is somewhat underwhelming if we consider it to be the 
best examples of politico-military careers outside of Pompey and Caesar.  Little is known about 
Marcius before his service under L. Calpurnius Piso in Macedonia in 57-55 BCE. Nothing is 
known about Anneius other than that he was a legate under Cicero in Cilicia. I have discussed 
Sertorius above, but – like Pomptinus and Petreius – he did not advance past the praetorship, 
although he might have in different circumstances. Perhaps Labienus would have reached the 
office as well if he had chosen the winning side, but we should also note that he does not seem to 
have had much of a military career prior to his praetorship and subsequent service under Caesar. 
Afranius was a new man, and thus hardly an example of elite military specialization. Of all these 
examples Murena is the most likely to fit the billing as an elite military-specialist who obtained the 
consulship, and it is fair to characterize him thusly. 
The main point here is that if the late-republican aristocracy was specializing along the lines 
laid out by Hopkins and others, then in most cases their efforts to specialize seem to have included 
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less military experience than the previous, less-differentiated society had expected, and the military 
specialists were – on the whole – not very successful in the competition for the Republic’s power 
and resources. The importance of this point is that the temptation to rely on specialization in 
order to understand the behavior of the Roman aristocracy in the first century misleads. The 
senatorial class certainly did not divide along two career paths, one military and one domestic. 
Instead, what the evidence presented in this work suggests is a nearly comprehensive shift away 
from the traditional militaristic ethos during this period.   
This could fundamentally change the way we view the rise of Pompey and Caesar. The 
breakdown of the republican form of government is often presented as a result, at least partially, of 
the political community’s inability to accommodate the immense prestige of politico-military 
“dynasts” who were increasingly monopolizing command and dangerously outpacing their peers in 
the accumulation of political capital.12 Such accounts normally make the conclusion – in fairness, 
a logical one given our understanding of traditional aristocratic values – that men like Pompey and 
Caesar had found innovative ways to gain repeated commands at the expense of their peers. In this 
way, the ambition of a few powerful men helped destabilize the Republic’s fragile political 
equilibrium to the point of collapse, and indeed past it. How differently we might conceive of the 
extra ordinem commands of the first century in light of this evidence for the shortage of 
commanders!  
                                               
12 See e.g. Syme 1939 passim; Hopkins 1978: 92ff; Rich 1993, Rose 1995: 388; Steel 2013: 
242; 2014: 235ff; Vervaet 2014: 214-52; Stevenson 2015; Hammer 2015: 510ff; Lange 2016: 71ff. 
Contra Gruen 1974: 102ff.  
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 What is now clear is that the temptation to view these men as military dynasts glosses over 
the fact that Pompey and Caesar were pursuing military positions at a time when others were 
increasingly avoiding such opportunities. In the Introduction I began by citing a tension between 
the decline in strength of the traditional militaristic ethos and the “dynast narrative,” in which 
Pompey and Caesar dominated the political landscape on the foundation of their military prestige. 
Recall a passage I spent some time on in Chapter 2:  
Quid nunc vobis faciendum est studiis militaribus apud iuventutem obsoletis, fortissimis autem hominibus ac summis ducibus 
partim aetate, partim civitatis discordiis ac rei publicae calamitate consumptis, cum tot bella aut a nobis necessario 
suscipiantur aut subito atque inprovisa nascantur? Nonne et hominem ipsum ad dubia rei publicae tempora reservandum et 
ceteros studio laudis ac virtutis inflammandos putatis? (Cic. Font. 42) 
 
Now what should you do, when military service has been forgotten among the youth, when our bravest men and 
best generals have been spent either by age, civil war, or disaster, when so many wars are taken up by us either 
because of necessity or which arise suddenly and unexpectedly? Do you not think that this man should be 
preserved for this doubtful period for the Republic in addition to exciting the enthusiasm for praise and virtus 
among the rest? 
 
I focused on examining Cicero’s reasons for the dearth of military men, but now we should note 
the argument this point was supporting. Cicero’s logic here is quasi-economic: the demand for 
capable commanders – conflict – had stayed consistent, but the supply of such men had dropped 
drastically. In light of the shortage of commanders in this period, which Chapter 2 found evidence 
to support, we may instead think of these two careers in terms of supply and demand. 
Thinking about military achievement and political power in terms of supply and demand 
can help us reconcile our two competing narratives. In the past, when there was a large amount of 
demand for military commanders and a large supply of them, the political value of military service 
was high primarily because military affairs were important to the survival of the community. The 
community had agreed, so to speak, that military activity was important and confirmed this with 
their votes. Up to this point in the project we have seen the ways in which aristocrats had found 
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other routes to political prominence, and the corresponding decline in aristocratic military service 
– both in youth and as magistrates. This decline in activity represents a decline in the supply of 
capable commanders, and since there is no corresponding decline in demand for commanders we 
should naturally expect those who can fulfil that role to reap greater rewards. Looking at the first 
century in this way makes it possible to reconcile elite disinterest in military service with the rise of 
politico-military giants like Caesar and Pompey: in terms of supply and demand these trends would 
naturally go hand in hand. Further, perhaps these men were not as much military “dynasts” as 
opportunists who saw a chance to capitalize on military achievement even while the importance of 
such activity seemed to be declining in political value.  
 The implications of this evidence and their influence on orthodox historical narratives 
stretches even past the end of the Republic. Since Ronald Syme’s The Roman Revolution (1939) one 
interpretation of the Augustan settlement has been that the princeps brought pax partly by 
monopolizing the prestige associated with military achievement and thus disincentivizing military 
activity. The Late Republic, so the argument goes, had suffered from the unchecked ambition of its 
elite and Augustus stopped the chaos abruptly by centralizing the benefits of military action within 
the imperial house.13 This interpretation makes sense if we understand the Late Republic as an 
succession of military warlords; Tacitus did, as did Syme.14 But if we think of the trends in 
aristocratic behavior outlined here we see something more complex. It is certainly true that 
Augustus emerged from two generations of almost constant civil bloodshed, much of it stemming 
                                               
13 E.g. Syme 1939: esp. 2ff; 15ff, 513-4; Richardson 2012: 76-77. 
 
14 Tac. Hist. 2.38; Syme 1939: 9. 
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from the community’s inability to grapple with its military leaders. Yet, we could also see the 
monopolization of military achievement by the imperial house as the end of a shift in aristocratic 
values which had developed alongside the historical narrative of Marius, Sulla, Pompey, and 
Caesar. This is to say that Augustus’ “monopolization” of military pusuits looks rather different 
when we consider this evidence. These arguments are speculative, but they are also areas where 
further research may build upon the findings of this project.
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Appendix I: Evidence for Pre-Consular Command Among the Consuls of 81-49 BCE. 
 
Key: PM = promagistrate (exact position uncertain); Leg. = legate; P = praetor; PP = propraetor; 
PC = proconsul. 
 
Name (RE number) (consular year) 
§ Year. Position. (Citation in MRR).1 
 
1. Q. Caecilius (98) Metellus Pius (cos. 80 BCE). 
§ 88-87 BCE. PC in the Social War. (MRR 2.42, 48) 
§ 86-83 BCE. Command of Sullan forces in Africa. (MRR 2.54, 58, 61) 
§ 83 BCE. PC in Campania. (MRR 2.63) 
§ 82 BCE. PC in Northern Italy. (MRR 2.68) 
 
2. L. Cornelius (392) Sulla Felix (cos. 80 BCE)2 
 
3. P. Servilius (93) Vatia Isauricus (cos. 79 BCE). 
§ 90-89 BCE. P or PP in Sardinia(?). (MRR 2.26, 35) 
§ 87 BCE. Leg. under Sulla at Ariminum. (MRR  2.51) 
§ 82 BCE. Leg. under Sulla at Clusium. (MRR 2.72) 
 
4. Ap. Claudius (296) Pulcher (cos. 79 BCE) 
§ 87 BCE. Probably a PP under Sulla at Nola. (MRR 2.48) 
 
5. M. Aemilius (72) Lepidus (cos. 78 BCE) 
§ 77 BCE. PP in Sicily. (MRR 2.89) 
 
6. Mam. Aemilius (80) Lepidus Livianus (cos. 77 BCE) 
§ 82 or 81 BCE. PM (Leg.?) at Norba. (MRR 2.71) 
 
7. C. Scribonius (10) Curio (cos. 76 BCE) 
§ 86 BCE. Leg. under Sulla in Athens. (MRR 2.56) 
§ 85 BCE. Leg. in Bithynia. (MRR 2.59) 
 
                                               
1 For brevity’s sake I am providing the citation in MRR rather than an exhaustive 
review of the sources. I also have consulted the new and excellent Digital Prosopography of the 
Roman Republic (romanrepublic.ac.uk) and recommend that interested readers do the same. 
 
2 Sulla’s record of command experience up to 80 BCE was quite extensive and well 
known, nor was this his first consulship. For details see RE (“Cornelius” no.392) and for a 
scholarly review of his career see Keaveney’s biography, now in its second edition ([1982]2005). 
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8. C. Aurelius (96) Cotta (cos. 75 BCE) OR M. Aurelius (107) Cotta (cos. 74 BCE)3 
§ 80 BCE. Possibly a PP in Spain. (MRR 2.80) 
 
9. L. Licinius (104) Lucullus (cos. 74 BCE) 
§ 77-76 BCE. PP in Africa. (MRR 2.90, 94) 
 
10. M. Terentius Varro Lucullus (Licinius 109) (cos. 73 BCE) 
§ 82 BCE. PP in Gaul. (MRR 2.70) 
 
11. L. Gellius (17) Popicola (cos. 72 BCE) 
§ 93 BCE. PC in Asia. (MRR 2.15) 
§ 89 BCE. Leg. under Pompeius Strabo. (MRR 2.36) 
 
12. Cn. Cornelius (216) Lentulus Clodianus (cos. 72 BCE) 
§ Before 75 BCE. Leg.4  
 
13. Cn. Aufidius (32) Orestes (cos. 71 BCE) 
§ 76 BCE. PM (PP?) in Spain. (MRR 2.94) 
 
14. Cn. Pompeius (31) Magnus (cos. 70, 55, 52 BCE)5 
 
15. M. Licinius (68) Crassus (cos. 70, 55 BCE) 
§ 82 BCE. Possibly Leg. under Sulla. (MRR 2.71) 
§ 72-71 BCE. PC against Spartacus (MRR 2.118, 123) 
 
16. Q. Caecilius (87) Metellus Creticus (cos. 69 BCE) 
                                               
3 Again, either C. Aurelius Cotta (cos. 75 BCE) or M. Aurelius Cotta (cos. 74 BCE) 
may have been the propraetor in Spain defeated by Sertorius at sea in 80 BCE (Plut. Sert. 12.3), 
but it is unclear. Konrad 1978 suggests that neither of these men was the propraetor in 
question but that is was their younger brother L. Aurelius Cotta (cos. 65). See MRR 3.31. The 
legateship of Q. Caecilius Metellus Creticus (cos. 69 BCE) is also somewhat uncertain. Cic Leg. 
Man. 58 mentions a Q. Metellus who was tribune of plebs one year and then legate the next, 
but this could also have been Q. Caecilius Metellus Celer (cos. 60 BCE). See MRR 3.38. 
 
4 Cicero (leg. Man. 58) gives examples of men who held the tribunate on year and a 
legateship the next, this may the Cn. Lentulus mentioned although it could also be Cn. 
Cornelius (228) Lentulus Marcellinus (cos. 56 BCE).  
 
5 Like Sulla, Pompey’s command résumé is well known and well attested. See RE 
(“Pompeius” no. 31) and for a scholarly review of his career see Seager’s biography, now in its 
second edition ([1979]2002). 
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§ 81 BCE(?). Leg.6  
 
17. L. Caecilius (74) Metellus (cos. 68 BCE) 
§ 70 BCE. PP in Sicily. (MRR 2.128-9) 
 
18. L. Manlius (79) Torquatus (cos. 65 BCE) 
§ 67 BCE. Leg. under Pompey against the pirates. (MRR 2.149) 
 
19. C. Antonius (19) Hybrida (cos. 63 BCE) 
§ 65 BCE. Leg. (MRR 2.160) 
 
20. L. Licinius (123) Murena (cos. 62 BCE) 
§ 73-71 BCE. Leg. under Lucullus. (MRR 2.109n.5, 113, 119) 
 
21. M. Pupius (10) Piso Frugi Calpurnianus (cos. 61 BCE) 
§ 71-69 BCE. PC in Spain (MRR 2.124, 129, 133) 
§ 67-65 BCE. Leg. under Pompey. (MRR 2.149) 
 
22. Q. Caecilius (86) Metellus Celer (cos. 60 BCE) 
§ 67 BCE. Leg. under Pompey in Armenia. (MRR 2.145) 
§ 63 BCE. P against Catiline. (MRR 2.168-9) 
§ 62 BCE. PC in Gaul. (MRR 2.176) 
 
23. L. Afranius (60) (cos. 60 BCE) 
§ 75-72/3 BCE. Leg under Pompey. (2.99, 119) 
§ 70-69 BCE. PC in Spain. (2.128, 133) 
§ 66-64 BCE. Leg. under Pompey (2.156, 160, 164) 
 
24. C. Iulius (131) Caesar (cos. 59 BCE) 
§ 61 BCE. PC in Spain. (MRR 2.180) 
 
25. M. Calpurnius (28) Bibulus (cos. 59 BCE) 
§ 51-48 BCE. PC in Syria and Macedonia. (MRR 2.242, 250, 261, 275) 
 
26. L. Calpurnius (90) Piso Caesonius (cos. 58 BCE) 
§ 60 BCE. Possibly PC in Spain.7 
 
27. A. Gabinius (11) (cos. 58 BCE) 
§ 66-63 BCE. Leg. under Pompey. (MRR 2.156, 164, 170) 
 
                                               
6 Possibly another man mentioned by Cicero in leg. Man. 58, but unclear. See MRR 3.38.  
 
7 Unclear. See Syme 1956: 129-134; MRR 3.47. 
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28. P. Cornelius (238) Lentulus Spinther. (cos. 57 BCE) 
§ 59 BCE. PM (PC?) in Spain. (MRR 2.191) 
 
29. Q. Caecilius (96) Metellus Nepos (cos. 57 BCE) 
§ 67-63 BCE. Leg. under Pompey. (2.148, 160, 164, 170) 
§ 59 BCE. PM (PC?) in Spain. (MRR 2.180) 
 
30. Cn. Cornelius (228) Lentulus Marcellinus (cos. 56 BCE) 
§ 67-65 BCE. Leg. under Pompey. (2.148) 
§ 59-58 BCE. PC in Syria (MRR 2.190, 197) 
 
31. Ap. Claudius (297) Pulcher (cos. 54 BCE) 
§ 56 BCE. Leg. under Lucullus. (MRR 2.210) 
§ 56 BCE. PM in Sardinia (MRR. 2.210) 
 
32. Cn. Domitius (43) Calvinus (cos. 53 BCE) 
§ 62 BCE. Leg. under Valerius Flaccus in Asia. (MRR 2.177) 
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Consuls with no record of having held imperium prior to their consulship: 
 
1. Q. Lutatius (8) Catulus (cos. 78 BCE) 
 
2. D. Iunius (46) Brutus (cos. 77 BCE) 
 
3. Cn. Octavius (22) (cos. 76 BCE) 
 
4. Cn. Octavius (26) (cos. 75 BCE) 
 
5. C. Aurelius (96) Cotta (cos. 75 BCE) OR 
M. Aurelius (107) Cotta (cos. 74 BCE) 
 
6. C. Cassius (58) Longinus (cos. 73 BCE) 
 
7. P. Cornelius (240) Lentulus Sura (cos. 
71 BCE) 
 
8. Q. Hortensius (13) Hortalus (cos. 69 
BCE) 
 
9. Q. Marcius (92) Rex (cos. 68 BCE) 
 
10. C. Calpurnius (63) Piso (cos. 67 BCE) 
 
11. M. Acilius (38) Glabrio (cos. 67 BCE) 
 
12. M’. Aemilius (62) Lepidus (cos. 66 
BCE) 
 
13. L. Volcatius (8) Tullus (cos. 66 BCE) 
 
14. L. Aurelius (102) Cotta (cos. 65 BCE) 
 
15. L. Iulius (143) Caesar (cos. 64 BCE) 
 
16. C. Marcius (63) Figulus (cos. 64 BCE) 
 
17. M. Tullius (29) Cicero (cos. 63 BCE) 
 
18. D. Iunius (163) Silanus (cos. 62 BCE) 
 
19. M. Valerius (266) Messalla Niger (cos. 
61 BCE) 
 
20. L. Marcius (76) Philippus (cos. 56 BCE) 
 
21. L. Domitius (27) Ahenobarbus (cos. 54 
BCE) 
 
22. M. Valerius (268) Messalla Rufus (cos. 
53 BCE) 
 
23. P. Cornelius (352) Scipio Nasica (cos. 
52 BCE) 
 
24. Ser. Sulpicius (95) Rufus (cos. 51 BCE) 
 
25. M. Claudius (229) Marcellus (cos. 51 
BCE) 
 
26. L. Aemilius (81) Paullus (50 BCE) 
 
27. C. Claudius (216) Marcellus (cos. 50 
BCE) 
 
28. L. Cornelius (218) Lentulus Crus (cos. 
49 BCE) 
 
29. C. Claudius (217) Marcellus (cos. 49 
BCE)  
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Appendix II: Casualties Among Magistrates 91-71 BCE. 
 
 
Rank   Name     Cause of Death 
91 BCE 
  
1. Pr.   Q. Servilius (29)   Mob violence.1 
2. Leg.  Fonteius (2)    Mob violence.  
3. PC   M. Porcius (14) Cato   Unclear.2 
 
90 BCE 
1. Cos.  P. Rutilius (26) Rufus   Killed in action.3 
2. Pr.   L. Postumius    Killed in action.4 
3. PC.   Sex. Iulius (151) Caesar   Illness.5 
4. PC.  Q. Servilius (50) Caepio  Killed in action.6 
5. Leg.  C. Baebius (11)   Executed.7 
 
89 BCE 
                                               
1 Servilius is recorded as a praetor in Vell., Diod., and Oros. but Livy and App. call him 
a proconsul. Mommsen thought he was a praetor with imperium pro consule (StR 2.235). The 
murder of him and his legate Fonteius began the Social War. See Diod. 37.13.2; Livy Per. 72; 
Vell. 2.15.1; Flor. 2.6.9; App. BC 1.38; Oros. 5.18.8. 
 
2 The only source for his death is Gell. 13.20.9. He had performed well in the Battle of 
Pydna (see Cic. Off. 1.37; Plut. Aem. 21.1-3; Cat. Mai. 20.6-8; Val. Max. 3.2.16. 
 
3 Rutilius ignored Marius’ cautioning about the preparedness of his troops and was 
killed in Tolenus Valley. Livy Per. 73; Vell. 2.16.2; App. BC 1.40, 43; Flor. 2.6.12. See also Dio 
29, Oros. 5.18.11-12, and Ovid Fast. 6.563-566.  
 
4 Killed by the Samnites at Nola. Livy Per. 73; App. BC 1.42. 
 
5 He died of illness while besieging Asculum. Livy Per. 73; App. BC 1.48.  
 
6 He received part of Rutilius’ command after the consul’s death but was killed in an 
ambush. Livy Per. 73; App. BC 1.44; Eutrop. 5.3.2; Oros. 5.18.14; Flor. 2.6.11. 
 
7 Served under Sex. Iulius Caesar, but was arrested in the proscriptions and executed at 
Asculum. App. BC 1.48.  
 
  247   
 
1. Cos.   L. Procius (16) Cato   Killed in action.8 
2. Pr.    A. Sempronius (17) Asellio  Mob violence.9 
3. Leg.   T. Didius (5)    Killed in action.10 
4. Leg.   A. Gabinius (9)   Killed in action.11 
5. Leg.   A. Postumius (36) Albinus  Mutiny.12 
 
88 BCE 
1. Cos.   Q. Pompeius (4) Strabo  Mutiny.13 
2. Pr.    Q. Ancharius (2)   Executed.14 
3. Trib. Pleb.  P. Sulpicius (92) Rufus  Executed.15 
4. Leg.  M’. Aquilius (11)   Killed in action.16  
5. Leg.   M. Gratidius (1)   Mutiny.17 
 
87 BCE 
                                               
8 Killed during a defeat at the hands of the Marsi. Sisenna fr.52; Dio 30-5; Livy Per. 75; 
Vell. 2.16.4; App. BC 1.50; Eutrop. 5.3.2; Oros. 5.18.24. 
 
9 Killed in Rome by a mob. Livy Per. 74; val. Max. 9.7.4; App. BC 1.54. 
 
10 Killed on June 11th after he captured Herculaneum. Ovid Fast. 6.567ff.  
 
11 Killed during a siege in Lucania. Livy Per. 76; Flor. 2.6.13; Oros. 5.18.25. 
 
12 Killed by his own men. Livy Per. 75; Val. Max. 9.8.3; Plut. Sull. 6.9; Oros. 5.18.22. 
 
13 Livy Per. 77; Vell. 2.20.1; Val. Max. 9.7; App. BC 1.63. 
 
14 Killed at the command of Marius. Plut. Mar. 43.3; App. BC 1.73; Flor. 2.9.16. 
 
15 He had been one of the main movers against Sulla during his tribunate. Upon Sulla’s 
return to Rome he was betrayed. Herenn. 1.25, 4.31; Cic. Or. 3.11; Vat. 23; Cat. 3.24; Leg. 3.20; 
Phil. 8.7; Har. Resp. 41; Brut. 227, 307; Lael. 2; Sall. Hist. 1.77.7M; Nepos Att. 2.1; Livy Per. 77; 
Vell. 2.19.1; Val. Max. 6.5.7; Ascon. 64C, 80C; Plut. Sull. 10.1; App. BC 1.55-60; Flor. 2.9.8; 
Oros. 5.19.6. 
 
16 Captured by Mithridates and executed. Livy Per. 77-78; App. Mith. 17, 19, 21, 112; 
Val. Max. 9.13.1; Vell. 2.18.3; Plin. NH 33.48; Cic. Leg. Man. 11; Scaur. 3.2; Tusc. 5.14. 
 
17 Sent by Marius to take over Sulla’s army but was killed by the soldiers. Val. Max. 9.7; 
Oros. 5.19.4; Plut. Mar. 35.4; Sull. 8.4. 
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1. Cos.   Cn. Octavius (20)   Executed.18 
2. Cos. Suff.  L. Cornelius (106) Merula  Suicide.19  
3. PC   Cn. Pompeius (14) Strabo  Illness.20 
4. Trib. Pleb.  Sex. Lucilius (15)   Executed.21  
5. Leg.  P. Licinius (61) Crassus  Suicide.22  
6. Leg.   C. Milonius (2)   Executed.23 
7. M. Trib.   C. Flavius (88) Fimbria  Killed in action.24 
8. Pref.   P. Caelius (13)    Suicide.25  
9. Pont.  C. Iulius Caesar Strabo  Executed.26 
 
86 BCE 
1. Cos.   C. Marius (14)    Illness.27 
                                               
18 Killed by the partisans of Cinna after taking the Janiculum in protest. Cic. Cat. 3.24; 
Har. Resp. 54; Phil 8.7, 3.1-2; Tusc. 5.55; Livy Per. 80; Vell. 2.22.2; Ascon. 23C; Plut. Mar. 42.4-
5; Sull. 12.8; App. BC 1.71; Flor. 2.9.14. 
 
19 Diod. 38.3; Val. Max. 9.12.5; Vell. 2.20.3, 22.3; Tac. Ann. 3.58; Plut. Mar. 41.1, 
45.2; App. BC 1.65-66, 70, 74; Flor. 2.9.16; Dio 30-35. 
 
20 Struck by lightning. Sisenna fr. 129; Livy Per. 79; Vell. 2.21.1-4; Val. Max. 5.5.4; Plut. 
Pomp. 1, 3; App. BC 1.66-68, 80; Gran. Lic. 25-29B; Oros. 5.19.10-13, 18.  
 
21 Thrown from the Tarpeian Rock. Vell. 2.24.2; Liv. Per. 80; Plut. Mar. 45.1; Dio 30-
35.  
 
22 He killed himself after his son was killed. Cic. Sest. 48; Or. 3.10; Scaur. 1-3; Tusc. 
5.55; Diod. 37.29.5; Livy Per. 80; Ascon. 23, 25C; Lucan 2.124; Plut. Crass. 4.1, 6.3; App. BC 
1.72; Flor. 2.9.14.  
 
23 Killed on the Janiculum with Octavius. Gran. Lic. 23, 25B. 
 
24 He killed Crassus’ son, but was apparently killed himself. Livy Per. 80; Flor. 2.914; 
Augustine CD 3.27.  
 
25 Committed suicide before he could be captured by the partisans of Cinna. Val. Max. 
4.7.5. 
 
26 Killed by Marians. Cic. Brut. 307; Or. 3.10; Tusc. 5.55; Livy Per. 80; Val. Max. 5.3.3, 
9.2.2; Ascon. 25C; Suet. Cal. 60; App. BC 1.72; Flor. 2.9.14; Augustine CD 3.27. 
 
27 Died early in the year, January 13th. Cic. ND 3.81; Rosc. Amer. 33; Livy Per. 80; Vell. 
2.23.1; Plut. Mar. 45.2-46.5; App. BC 1.75; Flor. 2.9.17; Oros. 5.19.23.  
  249   
 
2. Cos. Suff.   L. Valerius (57) Flaccus  Mutiny.28 
 
85 BCE 
1. Leg.   C. Flavius (88) Fimbria  Suicide.29 
 
84 BCE 
1. Cos.   L. Cornelius (106) Cinna  Mutiny.30  
 
82 BCE 
1. Cos.   Cn. Papirius (38) Carbo  Executed.31 
2. PC   C. Norbanus (5)   Suicide.32 
3. Pr.    Q. Antonius (41) Balbus  Killed in action.33 
4. Pr.    C. Carrinas (1)   Executed.34 
5. Pr.    L. Iunius (58) Brutus Damasippus Executed.35 
6. Trib. Pleb.  Q. Valerius (50) Soranus  Executed.36 
                                               
28 Killed in a mutiny led by his own legate. Cic. Flacc. 61; Sall. Hist. 3.33, 5.13M; Diod. 
38.8.1; Stabo 133.1.27; Livy Per. 82, 98; Vell. 2.24.1; Plut. Sull. 20.1; Luc. 7.2; App. BC 1.75; 
Mith. 51-53; Dio 30-35; Oros. 6.2.9.  
 
29 After some success against Mithridates he committed suicide when his army defected 
to Sulla. Diod. 38.8; Livy Per. 83; Vell. 2.24.1; Stabo 13.1.27; Plut. Sull. 25.1; App. Mith. 59-60; 
Oros. 62.9-11.  
 
30 Killed by his own troops at Ancona. Livy Per. 83; Vell. 2.24.5; Plut. Sert. 6.1; Pomp. 
5.1-2; App. BC 1.77-78; Oros. 5.19.24.  
 
31 Forced from Gaul he fled to Africa where he was captured and executed by Pompey. 
Cic. Fam. 9.21.3; Att. 9.14.2; Sall. ad Caes. 1.4; Hist. 1.52M; Livy Per. 89; Val. Max. 5.3.5, 6.2.8, 
9.13.2; Lucan 2.548; Plut. Pomp. 10.1-4; App. BC 1.96; Flor. 2.9.26; Oros. 5.21.11, 24.16.  
 
32 Defeated at at Faventia and fled to Rhodes where he killed himself. App. BC 1.91, 
94; Oros. 5.20.7, 21.8; Livy Per. 89; Vell. 2.28.1. 
 
33 By Sulla’s legate Marcius Philippus. Livy Per. 86.  
 
34 After the Battle at the Colline Gate. App. BC 1.87-93; Oros. 5.20.5-9, 21.10.  
 
35 After the Battle at the Colline Gate. Sall. Cat. 51; App. BC 1.92, 95; Dio 30-35.  
 
36 Revealed the secret name of Rome and was executed. Plin. NH 3.9.3, 5; Cic. Or. 
3.43; Plut. Pomp. 10.4.  
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7. Pro. Pr.   C. Fabius (82) Hadrianus  Killed in action.37 
8. Leg.   C. Marcius (43) Censorinus  Killed in action.38 
9. Pont.   Q. Mucius (22) Scaevola  Executed.39 
 
81 BCE 
1. Promag.  Cn. Domitius (22) Ahenobarbus Executed.40  
2. Leg.   Paccianus (12)    Killed in action.41  
3. Leg.   L. Iulius (453) Salinator  Killed in action.42 
 
80 BCE 
1. Q.    C. Mallelous (14)   Killed in action.43 
2. Leg.   C. Papirius (34) Carbo  Mutiny.44 
 
79 BCE 
1. PC.  M. Domitius (44) Calvinus  Killed in action.45  
2. Leg.   L. Thorius (4) Balbus   Killed in action.46  
 
77 BCE 
                                               
37 Burned alive in his tent during an uprising. Cic. Verr. 2.1.70, 5.94; Diod. 38.4; Livy 
Per. 86; Val. Max. 9.10.2; Oros. 5.20.3; Ps. Ascon. 241. 
 
38 At the Battle at the Colline Gate. App. BC 1.88, 90, 92-3.  
 
39 By the praetor Damasippus. Cic. Rosc. Amer. 33; Or. 3.10; Brut. 311; ND 3.80; Att. 
9.15.2; Diod. 37.29.5, 38.17; Livy Per. 86; Vell. 2.26.2; Lucan 2.126-129; App. BC 1.88; Oros. 
5.20.4; Augustine CD 3.28.  
 
40 By Pompey. Cic. Leg. Man. 30-31, 61; Sall. ad Caes. 1.4.1; Livy Per. 89; Val. Max. 
6.2.8; Plut. Pomp. 11.1-13.5; App. BC 1.80; Oros. 5.21.13-14, 24.16. 
 
41 Killed fighting against Sertorius. Plut. Sert. 9.2-3; Crass. 4.2. 
 
42 Served under Sertorius, was killed in the Pyrenees. Sall. Hist. 1.96M; Plut. Sert. 7.  
 
43 Killed in Cilicia. Cic. Verr. 2.1.41-102 passim; Ps. Ascon. 234, 244.  
 
44 While besieging Volaterrae. Gran. Lic. 39B; Val. Max. 9.7.3. 
 
45 Defeated by Sertorius’ quaestor on the Anas. Sall. Hist. 1.11M; Livy Per. 90; Plut. Sert. 
12.3-4; Flor. 2.10.7; Oros. 5.23.3. 
 
46 Defeated by Sertorius at Consabura. Plut. Sert. 12.3; Flor. 2.7.6; Cic. Fin. 2.63. 
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1. PC.   Ap. Claudius (296) Pulcher  Illness.47 
2. Leg.   Cornelius (318) Scipio  Executed.48   
3. Leg.   M. Iunius (52) Brutus   Executed.49 
 
76 BCE 
1. Leg.  D. Laelius (5)    Killed in action.50 
   
75 BCE 
1. Promag.  C. Memmius    Killed in action.51 
2. Leg.?  L. Hirtuleius (3)   Killed in action.52 
3. Leg.   C. Herennius    Killed in action.53 
  
74 BCE 
1. PC   L. Octavius    Unclear.54 
 
73 BCE 
1. Pr.    L. Cossinius (2)   Killed in action.55 
  
72 BCE 
                                               
47 Livy Per. 91; Flor. 1.39.6; Eutrop. 6.2.1; Ammian. Marc. 27.4.10; Oros. 5.23.17-19. 
 
48 Son of the rebel consul of 77 M. Aemilius Lepidus. Oros. 5.22.17, 24.16. 
 
49 By Pompey. Plut. Pomp. 16.2-5; Brut. 4.1-2; Sall. Hist. 1.79M; Livy Per. 90; Val. Max. 
6.2.8; Oros. 5.22.17. 
 
50 Against Sertorius at Lauro. Sall. Hist. 2.31M. 
 
51 Under Pompey against Sertorius at Turia. Plut. Sert. 21.1; Oros. 5.23.12; Cic. Balb. 5. 
 
52 Under Sertorius against Metellus Pius. Sall. Hist. 2.59M; Livy Per. 91; Oros. 5.23.12. 
 
53 Under Sertorius against Pompey at Valencia. Plut. Sert. 19; Oros. 5.23.14. 
 
54 Died while proconsul in Cilicia. Sall. Hist. 2.98M; Plut. Luc. 6. 
 
55 Plut. Crass. 9.4-5; Sall. Hist. 3.94M. It is possible that his colleague C. Claudius 
Glaber also died in office. He was defeated by Spartacus and never heard from afterwards. Plut. 
Crass. 9.2; Flor. 2.8.4; Oros. 5.24.1; Sall. Hist. 3.90-93M; Livy Per. 95; Plut. Crass. 8-9; App. BC 
1.116. 
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1. ?   Q. Sertorius (3)   Murdered.56 
2. ?    M. Perperna (6) Vento   Executed.57 
 
71 BCE 
1. PC   M. Antonius (29) Creticus  Illness.58 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
56 By his own men at Osca. Sall. Hist. 3.84087M; Diod. 37.22A; Livy Per. 96; Vell. 
2.30.1; Plut. Sert. 25-28; Comp. Sert. et Eum. 2.3-4; Pomp. 20.2; App. BC 1.113-114; Ib. 101; Flor. 
2.10.8-9; Eutrop. 6.1.3; Oros. 5.23.13. 
 
57 By Pompey. Sall. Hist. 3.81-85; Diod. 37.22A; Livy Per. 96; Val. Max. 6.2.8; Vell. 
2.30.1; Plut. Sert. 25-27; Pomp. 20.2-4; App. BC 1.114-115; Ib. 101; Flor. 2.10.8-9; Ammian. 
Marc. 26.9.19; Oros. 5.23.13. 
 
58 Cic. Verr. 2.3.213; Livy Per. 97; Plut. Ant. 2.1; Ps. Ascon. 202, 239; Sall. Hist. 3.16M. 
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